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EDITOR'S NOTE
Ten years ago when students at the University of Denver College of
Law created the Water Law Review, they premised it on the statement
that the journal would focus on water law, but that nothing exists in
isolation, neither in law nor in nature. A review of the last 20 issues of
the journal reveals, in addition to a vast wealth of water law and policy
knowledge, that the last decade has added significant depth and meaning to this statement. Changes both in the natural environment and in
societal values can be seen in the discussions that have taken place in
legislatures, courts, and agencies as reflected in the last 20 issues of the
Water Law Review. Through litigation, as well as legislative and administrative action, new uses of water emerge and are refined, and increasing demands are met through conservation and negotiation. We are
pleased to present this issue of the journal in a continuing effort to
provide a unique, high quality forum for sharing ideas, information,
legal analyses and policy analyses concerning water law issues.
This issue opens with an article written by Glenn E. Porzak, Steven J.
Bushong, P. Fritz Holleman, and Lawrence J. MacDonnell, attorneys
with the firm of Porzak Browning & Bushong LLP, covering the development of recreational in-channel diversions ("RICDs") as an integral
feature of Colorado's prior appropriation law. The relatively new concept RICDs is a prime example of adaptation of water law to new uses.
The authors of this article were heavily involved in both the litigation
and legislative actions regarding RICDs, and as a result are able to provide the "inside story" in a detailed and informative manner.
The next article featured in this issue of the journal is an article authored byJohnJ. Cyran, Edward (Ted) R. Kowalski, and LindaJ. Bassi
detailing the arguments in favor of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Colorado Water Conservation Board v. City of Central, 125 P.3d
424 (Colo. 2005). Colorado's instream program was created in 1973,
yet the refinement of those instream rights continues on the judicial,
legislative, and administrative levels. The authors of this article had
close connections to the City of Central litigation, and provide a thorough discussion of the importance of the Colorado Supreme Court's
decision to the state's instream flow program, both in terms of the legal arguments supporting the decision and the policy that it furthers.
The third article featured in this issue of the journal, authored by
James H. Davenport, is titled "Softening the Divides: The Seven Colorado River Basin States' Recommendation to the Secretary of the Interior Regarding Lower Basin Shortage Guidelines and the Operation of
Lakes Mead and Powell in Low Reservoir Conditions." The article details the recommendations made by the Colorado River Basin States to
the United States Secretary of the Interior concerning allocation of
water to those states and to Mexico in water shortage conditions, and
the negotiations leading to those recommendations.
As climate

change exacerbates the scarcity of water in the western United States,
large scale negotiation efforts between states and involving the federal
government, such as the negotiations discussed by Mr. Davenport,
must become an increasingly critical part of water supply policy.
An issue that looms over the entire water community is that of climate change and increasing drought. This issue was the topic of the
2007 American Bar Association Section of Environment, Energy, and
Resources' 25h Annual Water Law Conference, titled "Changing Values, Changing Conflicts." This issue of the Water Law Review includes
two articles authored by presenters at the ABA conference. The first of
those articles is authored by Craig Bell, titled "Promoting Conservation
by Law: Water Conservation and Western State Initiatives." This survey
type article gives a brief overview of the agricultural and municipal
conservation measures in western states, and discusses other aspects of
water conservation including conservation incentives and third party
impacts. The second of those articles is authored by Bonnie C. Colby,
titled "Assessing the Value of Adjudications in a World of Uncertainty:
An Economic Perspective." This article provides a discussion of the
economic viability of general water adjudications, and gives an economic perspective on how the efficiency and effective monitoring of
adjudication efforts could be improved.
To provide an international perspective, the journal is pleased to include an article authored by Arlene J. Kwasniak, titled "Waste Not
Want Not: A Comparative Analysis and Critique of Legal Rights to Use
and Re-use Produced Water - Lessons for Alberta." This article discusses the challenges that Alberta faces with increasing water production from wet coalbed methane gas deposits. The article compares
Alberta's water administration framework with that of Wyoming and
Colorado in a produced water context, concluding with suggestions on
how produced water may be integrated into existing water law.
Finally, Justice Gregory Hobbs Jr., of the Colorado Supreme Court,
has contributed a fifth update to his article, "Colorado Water Law: An
Historical Overview." This update provides a survey of the cases that
the Colorado Supreme Court has heard recently. The refinement of
Colorado's water law as chronicled injustice Hobbs' article and update
is a valued asset to the journal.
As we move into the next ten years, the Water Law Review will continue its efforts to provide coverage that is illustrative of the varied and
changing landscape of water. The development of water law occurs on
many fronts. A wide variety of concentrations including economics,
politics, sociology, and meteorology, are germane to the development
of water resource management, and are critical to effective coverage of
that development. This issue continues the tradition of covering the
emergence of new uses and the refinement of existing uses in hopes of
carrying that tradition on into the next decade of the Water Law Review.
Mark Terzaghi Howe

JUSTICE GEORGE E. LOHR
DEDICATION BY JUSTICE GREGORY HOBBS, JR.f
I have the great privilege of writing this dedication to Justice George
E.Lohr.
Justice Lohr served as a member of the Colorado Supreme from December 14, 1979 to January 14, 1997. He came to the court after serving as a district judge from 1972-1979 and, part of that time, as chief
judge for the Ninth Judicial District, which comprises Pitkin, Garfield
and Rio Blanco counties.
He was the water judge for Water Division No. 5 from 1976 to 1979.
Before his judicial career, Justice Lohr practiced law with Davis, Graham & Stubbs for ten years and for the Snowmass American Corporation for three years as in-house general counsel. After retiring from
the supreme court, he served from 1997 to 2006 as a senior judge, accepting trial court assignments throughout Colorado.
*In a periodic series for the Water Law Review, Justice Hobbs has provided illustrative
excerpts of all water opinions issued by the Colorado Supreme Court since May of
1996. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An HistoricalOverview, 1 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 1, Appendix, 61-74 (1997); 2 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 223 (1999); 4 U.
DENV. WATER L. REv. 111 (2000); 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 116 (2002), 8 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 213 (2004); 10 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 391 (2007). See also A Decade of
ColoradoSupreme Court Water Decisions 1996-2006, Headwaters, Colorado Foundation for

Water Education (Fall 2006).

Smart, humble, and kind, Justice Lohr set very high standards for
himself. Though our service as justices overlapped for only eight
months, I saw how hard and meticulously he worked. He was a rigorous scholar and grammarian. He insisted on a work atmosphere that
permitted him to concentrate intensely on his own work and the proposed opinions of his colleagues.
In one of the rarest of occurrences, saying something to the press, he
remarked on his reasons for retiring from the supreme court: "I've
enjoyed it very much. It's an interesting and challenging job, and the
only reason one would leave is because it requires more energy than
one has."
I would say it this way. He preferred being in outdoor Colorado, but
the attention he devoted to the court's work mostly kept him indoors.
Chief Justice Mary Mullarkey says, "He loves hiking, and anyone who
has ever walked with him knows it. He is a fast walker, and can walk
almost anyone into the ground. Every spring he would take a backpacking trip, often in the Utah canyon lands area, and often with his
daughter Karen. His daily exercise was to walk from the court to
Cheesman Park and back over the lunch hour. Only the worst weather
would deter him."
On the trial bench he had a reputation for thoroughly scrutinizing
every proposed order or decree. Former chief judge and water judge
Tom Ossola remembers from his own practice days that, "No matter
how routine, long, or complex the document, Judge Lohr would read
every word and pass judgment on every comma. To get an order or
decree signed on the first try was a great achievement. Few succeeded."
I learned from Justice Lohr there is no substitute for a scholarly and
experienced appellate judge who studies hard, thinks expansively, and
writes precisely.
Early in my effort to write opinions, I sought him out on a draft opinion I had proposed to the court. He proceeded right into the discussion, as he had read every case I had cited, plus several more he
thought I could have (and should have) addressed.
He specialized in de-grouping the complex sentence that gropes its
way to obscurity. He liked a good quip about the use of language. In
one of our weekly Thursday morning decisional conferences he suggested to the opinion's author that a semi-colon might be used to separate independent but coordinate thoughts. "You mean hook up the
boxcars," I interjected. 'Just like that," he smiled.
At the informal retirement goodbye the other six of us gave him (he
wanted no formal send off), we declared him a lover of alternative ties
(he liked to wear bow ties) and presented him a magnificent southwestern bolo tie (he might have preferred no gift, I imagine).
Water lawyers, judges, and supreme court justices continue to rely on
Justice Lohr's water opinions written over the span of seventeen years.

They deal with difficult state and federal law issues Colorado faces in
the post-1950s' era of rapid growth, over-appropriated streams, and
depleting tributary and non-tributary aquifers. Of course, the decisions of the court are always the decisions of the multiple justices, but
the author bears a particular burden of expression on behalf of the
court.
His colleague on the court, Justice Jean Dubofsky, credits Justice
Lohr for the broader context he brought to water decisions. "His water law decisions in the early 1980's were my education about water
law. Most of the decisions prior to his arrival on the court began and
ended with the dispute in question. His decisions placed the dispute
in the broader context of water law and policy; reading several of those
decisions made the nuances of an important area of law available to
those of us who were not water law practitioners."
In my view, Justice Lohr's enduring contributions are the opinions
he authored identifying the following features of Colorado water law:
(1) by constitution and statute, all water in Colorado is a public resource; (2) use rights to water of the natural stream, including tributary groundwater, are allocated and administered according to the
prior appropriation provisions of the Colorado constitution and statutes; (3) designated groundwater and non-tributary groundwater are
subject to allocation and administration in the exercise of the General
Assembly's plenary power, not by the constitutional doctrine of prior
appropriation; (4) changes of prior appropriation water rights, including for tributary groundwater, are subject to quantification based on
actual historical beneficial use and the imposition of decree conditions
necessary to alleviate injury to other water rights; (5) decreed augmentation plans are the means under the 1969 Act for preventing injury to
other water rights caused by out-of-priority surface or tributary
groundwater diversions; and (6) a person cannot claim a water right
free of the call of prior appropriation water rights, by such devices as
removing peat bogs, cutting vegetation, or "unintentionally" intercepting tributary groundwater through sand and gravel mining, for example.
This is a substantial body of work that the Colorado Supreme Court
has relied upon in many subsequent decisions. In each case, Justice
Lohr clearly detailed the facts and based the court's decision on constitutional and statutory provisions, as well as the prior case law, clarifying
and distinguishing it when necessary. I summarize briefly.
In his first full year on the court Justice Lohr authored Weibert v.
Rothe Brothers, 200 Colo. 310, 618 P.2d 1367 (1980). This case involved a change in point of diversion from an existing irrigation well to
a new irrigation well, together with an augmentation plan. The new
well would pump groundwater tributary to the South Platte River thirty
miles downstream. The water court had not considered the actual historic beneficial use of the groundwater made by means of the existing

well. Nor, in ruling on the augmentation plan application, had the
water court taken evidence concerning the adequacy of the proposed
replacement water source to alleviate injury to other water rights by the
change. Nor had the water court included a provision in the decree
retaining jurisdiction to examine injury to other water rights.
Relying on cases dating to the late 19th Century, Justice Lohr wrote
in Weibert that "Historical use" as a limitation on the right to change a
point of diversion has been considered to be an application of the
principle that junior appropriators have vested rights in the continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the time of their respective
appropriations." Id., 200 Colo. at 317, 618 P. 2d at 1372. Citing 1969
Act statutory provisions, this decision required the water judge to allow
evidence concerning the adequacy of replacement water rights to alleviate injury to water rights diverting from the South Platte River, "including the amount and timing, to be made available" under the augmentation plan. And the opinion required inclusion of a retained jurisdiction provision in the decree, as provided by statute.
In Danielson v. Vickroy, 627 P.2d 752 (1981), the proposed change
in point of diversion filed in water court under the 1969 Water Right
Determination and Administration Act was from a ditch diverting surface water to a well that would intercept groundwater of a designated
groundwater basin. Justice Lohr wrote that the water court had no
jurisdiction over designated groundwater. Under the 1965 Groundwater Management Act, such jurisdiction belonged to the Colorado
Groundwater Commission and the established management district for
the designated basin.
Groundwater "hydraulically connected" to the natural stream "which
can influence the rate or direction of movement of the water" in an
"alluvial aquifer or a natural stream" is subject to the jurisdiction of the
water court under the 1969 Act, not designated groundwater. "Designated ground water ... includes water not tributary to any stream, and
other water not available for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights."
Id. at 756. The burden of proving that designated groundwater did
not qualify for designation belongs to the person who makes such a
contention. Id. at 758-59.
Having written that designated groundwater is not subject to the
constitutional doctrine of prior appropriation, as implemented by the
1969 Act, Justice Lohr authored the supreme court's opinion in State v.
Southwestern Colorado Water Conservation District, 671 P.2d 1294
(1983). This incredibly important decision holds that "(F)ederal statutes, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, recognize
Colorado's authority to adopt its own system for the use of all waters
within the state in accordance with the needs of its citizens, subject to
the prohibitions against interference with federal reserved rights, with
interstate commerce, and with the navigability of any navigable waters."
Id. at 1307.

Thus, the state's authority extends to all water, whether surface water, tributary groundwater, nontributary groundwater. Because Colorado's prior appropriation constitutional and implementing statutory
provisions of the 1969 Act apply only to the integration of "water in or
tributary to streams," the General Assembly may determine in its sole
discretion how to allocate and administer nontributary groundwater.
Id. at 1308-09.
Supreme Court decisions in the 1890s had held that "underground
waters supplying a natural stream and underground currents that flow
in well-defined channels are governed by the same rules of appropriation as surface streams. These (named early decisions) indicate an
early awareness of tributary underground waters but show an imperfect
understanding of the interrelation of surface streams and underground waters." Id. at 1309. By adjudicating and administering surface stream and tributary groundwater under the 1969 Act, "(The)
vested rights of senior appropriators can be fully protected by seasonal
regulation of diversion by junior appropriators." Id. at 1313
In contrast, nontributary water is subject to depletion, causing "a
mining condition," Id. at 1313. Because such water belongs to the
public and not the landowner as an inherent part of his or her land
property rights, the General Assembly may establish the principles for
its allocation. "(We) believe that, given the state's plenary control over
development of water law, the traditional property concept of fee ownership is of limited usefulness as applied to nontributary ground water
and serves to mislead rather than to advance understanding in considering public and private rights to utilization of this unique resource."
Id. at 1316.
Accordingly, Justice Lohr's opinion on behalf of the court definitively put to rest three very contentious issues about the nature of water
rights in Colorado, by answering them as follows: first, Colorado did
not obtain title to all water arising in the state by reason of its admission to the Union, instead it received from Congress authority to create
property use rights in the public's unappropriated water resource; second, surface water and tributary groundwater rights are subject to curtailment in reverse order of adjudicated priority, junior to senior, when
there is not enough supply naturally available to satisfy all rights; and
third, nontributary groundwater is a public resource, the allocation
and administration of which resides in the plenary authority of the
General Assembly because it is not an inherent attribute of land ownership.
On a different subject, Justice Lohr in a trio of cases authored opinions prohibiting the recognition of "developed" water rights free of the
call of prior appropriation water rights on the stream, by such devices
as draining a marsh, thereby reducing evaporation, R.J.A., Inc. v. Water
Users Association of District No. 6, 690 P.2d 823 (1984); or by intercepting tributary groundwater "unintentionally" in the course of sand

and gravel mining, Three Bells Ranch Associates v. Cache La Poudre

Water Users Association, 758 P.2d 164 (Colo. 1988) and Zigan Sand
and Gravel, Inc. v. Cache La Poudre Water Users Association, 758 P.2d
175 (Colo. 1988).
He wrote that "Nowhere in the entire scheme of the 1969 Act is
there a suggestion that rights to tributary water independent of the
priority system can be obtained." R.J.A., 690 P.2d at 825. "The water
rights sought here are based upon alterations of long existing physical
characteristics of the land. Alteration of natural conditions and vegetation in order to save water carries with it the potential for adverse effects on soil and bank stabilization, soil productivity, wildlife habitat,
fisheries production, water quality, watershed protection and the hydrologic cycle." Id. at 828. The court left to the General Assembly
such questions of reducing historical consumptive uses by modifying
conditions found in nature.
Justice Lohr reasoned that construction of sand and gravel pits results in a "diversion" of tributary groundwater, as to which the State
Engineer or Division Engineer must issue an "order of discontinuance
• . .if the water is required by water users having senior priorities,"
unless depletions to the South Platte River causing injury to other water rights are replaced. Zigan, 758 P.2d at 181, 183-84. "As knowledge
of the science of hydrology has advanced, it has become clear that
natural streams are simply the surface manifestations of extensive
tributary systems including underground water in stream basins ....
The 1969 Act provides for the adjudication and administration of
tributary water under a system of priorities, implementing the constitutionally based right of prior appropriation." Three Bells, 758 P.2d at
170.1
Justice Lohr's final water opinion for the supreme court addresses
the law governing municipal conditional water right appropriations
and changes of water rights agricultural to municipal use. City of
Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1 (1996) establishes among
other principles that: (1) "a municipality may be decreed conditional
water rights based solely on its projected future needs, and without
firm contractual commitments or agency relationships, but a municipality's entitlement to such a decree is subject to the water court's determination that the amount conditionally appropriated is consistent
with the municipality's reasonably anticipated requirements based on
substantiated projection of future growth," Id. at 39; (2) importers of
water that is not native to the watershed may use and reuse the water to
Subsequent to Three Bells and Zigan, the General Assembly enacted a specific statutory

provision, section 37-80-120(5), applicable to sand and gravel mining operations that
expose ground water to evaporation. This section does not require replacement of

depletions caused by the preexisting vegetative cover when such operations convert the
area to permanent open surface water.

extinction, but an appropriator of native waters may make only one use
because return flows and seepage waters belong to the stream to fill
other appropriations, absent a decreed appropriation securing a right
of reuse, Id. at 65, 70-72; (3) in a change of water right proceeding,
surface and tributary groundwater appropriators whose water rights
depend on return flow and seepage patters existing as of the date of
their decreed appropriations are entitled to protection against injury,
Id. at 80; (4) a water conservancy district may prevent the exportation
of its water supply to areas outside the district, Id. at 59; and (5) the
water court may not require an instream flow for the purpose of diluting pollutant discharges, Id. at 93.
Justice Lohr more than deserves this issue's dedication to him. His
contributions to Colorado water law will continue to guide the use and
administration of the public's water resource.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary water uses in Colorado have evolved from mining to
agriculture to large-scale municipal and industrial uses. There is, however, another emerging water use moving onto the stage, and that is
recreation. The phenomenal surge in the demand for water for recreation reflects both the changing nature of Colorado's economy, and
the flexibility found in existing water law and policy. This paper focuses on the significant evolution of Colorado water law between 1997
and 2006 that has created greater security for recreational water rights.
A recreational water right is based on the traditional concepts of
water appropriation in Colorado. First, there is a diversion of water by
structures that concentrate and control specified flows. Second, there
is beneficial use as these diversion structures create water features that
are used by kayakers, canoeists, rafters, inner tubers, and other boaters.
Third, there is a need to protect a community's investment in its "boating park" and the recreation based economies that have that have
grown around these parks. This is accomplished by obtaining a priority for a water right sufficient to protect the recreational use against
future upstream diversions and exchanges. In short, just like a traditional water right appropriation for any other purpose, recreational
water rights involve a direct human use of water to generate an economic benefit that is protected under the priority system.
But that is where the tradition ends. The recreational water rights
that are the subject of this paper are diverted and used within the historic stream channel. In the eyes of many of Colorado's most powerful
water users-sometimes referred to as the "water buffaloes"-when it
comes to water appropriation, "traditional" has meant only out-ofchannel diversion and water consumption. The only exceptions tolerated were hydropower uses and the State-owned minimum instream
flows to protect the natural environment to a reasonable degree.
While the latter water rights are instream, non-consumptive uses like
recreational water rights, they have been tolerated because they are
limited to very low flows and may not be appropriated or owned by
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local governments or private parties. Instream flows may only be held
by the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB"), a state board
generally controlled by traditional water users. In a dry year like 2002,
when those minimum streamflows needed to be enforced the most,
Colorado water politics prevented the CWCB from calling for any of its
instream flows during the entire irrigation and domestic storage season.
The recreation water rights discussed in this paper are different
from the state-held minimum stream flows. First, they involve control
and possession of water using man-made structures. Second, they are
for beneficial uses of certain flows of water at and between the structures. Third, they are not appropriated directly for environmental
purposes, but for recreation use, and the appropriator is putting water
to use for economic benefit. Most significantly, unlike CWCB-held
instream flows, the new recreation water rights have been secured for
very large flows. To the traditionalist water buffaloes, these large, nonconsumptive, in-channel, recreation rights in the hands of non-state
entities were, and remain to a lesser degree, western water law heresy.
Recreational water rights are controlled by local governmental entities whose area economies are dependent upon boaters, and the
spectators that flock to these communities to watch special competitive
events. These communities are less vulnerable to state water politics,
and will call for their water in a dry year when enforcement of their
water right is truly needed.
The greatest threat to the water buffaloes was the sheer size of most
recreational in-channel diversions-claims that ranged up to 1800 cubic feet per second ("cfs").1 To them, it was irrelevant that none of the
water used for recreational purposes was consumed. To them, it was
irrelevant that agricultural diversions hold senior rights to nearly
ninety percent of the State's water,' while generating less than one percent of Colorado's gross product To them, it was immaterial that the
municipal diverters held senior rights to significant amounts of water,
and that it was primarily citizens of the large Front Range municipalities who traveled to and utilized the new boating parks. To them, it
was irrelevant that the Western Slope boating parks could function off
of flows that Colorado is already obligated to deliver at the State line to
meet its Colorado River Compact obligations. To them, it was irrele1. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Court, In re Application for Water Rights of Chaffee County, No. 04CW129 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 2
Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Decree, In re Chaffee County].
2. See COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., STATEWIDE WATER SUPPLY INITIATIVE WATER
DEMANDS FACT SHEET 2, available at http://www.cwcb.state.co.us/IWMD/pdfdocs/Demand FactSheet 7-19-04.pdf [hereinafter CWCB FACT SHEET].
3. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NEWS RELEASE: GROSS
DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) BY STATE, 2005 (Oct. 26, 2006), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/gdp state/gsp newsrelease.htm.
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vant that the tourist and recreation based industries are among the
State's largest and most important industries, and the largest industry
on the Western Slope. Rather, the traditionalists' primary concern
could be summed up in one word-control. The water buffaloes put
up a vigorous, yet ultimately unsuccessful, fight to stop what they believed to be a non-traditional use that they did not control.
To counter an unprecedented level of opposition, the proponents
engaged in a decade long effort between 1997 and 2006 to protect recreational water rights as a legitimate use of Colorado's water and ensure that such rights were not consigned to second-class status under
Colorado water law. As a result of a unique coalition of local governments, recreationalists and environmentalists, recognition of recreational water rights expanded from grudging acceptance of the ability
to appropriate just enough water for boat passage (55 cfs in the Ft.
Collins case),' to high flow decreed water rights of 1400 cfs in Steamboat and 1800 cfs in Chaffee County,5 and finally to statutory recognition in 2006 of the ability to appropriate as much as fifty percent of the
historic average volume in a river channel at a boating structure.6
This article begins with the application for recreation water rights
filed by the City of Golden in 1998. It turns next to the 2001 legislative
enactment of Senate Bill 216 during a break in the Golden trial. The
article then discusses the applications for boating parks by the towns of
Vail and Breckenridge, and the ultimate deadlock by the Colorado
Supreme Court in reviewing the CWCB's appeal of the Golden, Vail,
and Breckenridge decrees, thereby upholding the first large flows for
in-channel recreation uses. It then considers the Colorado Supreme
Court's decision in Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District v.
Colorado Water Conservation Board and the CWCB's rulemaking response. The article then discusses the State's all-out litigation stance
that occurred between 2003 and 2005 over the claim by the City of
Steamboat Springs, as well as the stipulated decree entered in the
claim by Chaffee County on behalf of the City of Salida and the Town
of Buena Vista. The article also considers the legislative response to
these various water court claims and decrees, including the attempt to
kill recreation rights with Senate Bill 62 in 2005, and the emergence of

4.

City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 919 (Colo. 1992) (en

banc).
5. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Court at 4, In
re Application of the City of Steamboat Springs, No. 03CW86 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water
Div. 6 Mar. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Decree, In re Steamboat Springs]; Decree, In reChaffee County, supra note 1, at 4.
6. S.B. 06-037, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (codified at COLO.

§ 37-92-305(13) (f)).
Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy

REV. STAT.

7.

Dist., 109 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2005).
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a compromise bill, Senate Bill 37, in 2006. Finally, it offers some observations and conclusions.
II. CREATING A FULL RECREATION WATER RIGHT: THE CITY
OF GOLDEN WHITE WATER COURSE (WATER DISION 1 CASE
NO. 98CW244)
A. BACKGROUND - THE 1;'T. COLLINS DECISION

In 1992, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized for the first time
an appropriative water right for in-channel use to support boating.! A
central issue in the case was whether the City of Fort Collins could
claim a water right for a boat chute built into an old diversion dam
(the "Power Dam") on the Cache La Poudre River.' In its final decision, the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory definition of a diversion and held the boat chute constituted a diversion of water, and the
use of the diverted water for recreation by boaters and tubers constituted a beneficial use."° The court thus found the requirements of an
appropriation of water under Colorado law had been met, and granted
the City a water right decree to protect these uses."
The CWCB opposed the Fort Collins application. The court rejected the CWCB's argument that the claimed right was a statutory instream flow water right delegated to the CWCB's exclusive control."
Distinguishing the CWCB's instream flow rights, the court noted the
recreation right claimed by Fort Collins required a man-made diversion structure for the control of water to allow the intended beneficial

8. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d at 920, 933.
9. Id. at 920.
10. Id. at 932.
11. Id. at 933. Under Colorado water law, any person may gain a legally-protected
right to the use of water through the act of appropriation. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
Historically, appropriation was the act of diverting water from its channel that typically
manifested individual control of water. Fort Morgan Land & Canal Co. v. South Platte
Ditch Co., 30 P. 1032, 1034 (Colo. 1892). Yet, Colorado courts long have recognized
that the method of controlling water to make possible its beneficial use is unimportant,
so long as it is reasonably efficient and accomplishes the beneficial purpose without
waste. Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 349 P.2d 370, 378 (Colo. 1960); Thomas v. Guiraud,
6 Colo. 530, 533 (Colo. 1883). The essential test of an appropriation is a demonstration that the water is, or will be, placed to a beneficial use. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 574 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
12. See City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d at 931. The Colorado General Assembly enacted
Senate Bill 97 in 1973.
This law authorized the CWCB to appropriate "minimum"
stream flows between designated points on a stream to "preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree." COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2006). It also removed statutory references to diversion in the definitions of "appropriation" and
"beneficial use." In 1987, the General Assembly made it clear only the CWCB is authorized to appropriate instream flows. S.B. 87-212, 56th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Colo.
1987) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)).
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use.'" Instream flow rights, on the other hand, do not require control
of the water by a man-made structure and instead represent minimum
flows for a stream reach, the purpose of which was not recreation but
to help preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree."
The court noted that an instream flow right usually signifies the complete absence of a man-made diversion or control structures and that
even in-channel diversion structures were inconsistent with the statutory instream flows.'"
B. THE GOLDEN BOATING PARK

The idea for a boating park on Clear Creek in Golden emerged
from citizen initiative, primarily from kayakers who wanted a place to
practice their skills in the Front Range metropolitan area, and who
were convinced that Clear Creek, as it exits the mountains and passes
through downtown Golden could be transformed into an exceptional
whitewater venue. Pushed by the kayakers, the City hosted a series of
public meetings at which the idea was thoroughly discussed. Initially
reluctant City officials were eventually convinced that not only was construction of the proposed park feasible, but that such a park would
attract large numbers of people to the downtown area and help spark a
much-needed revitalization.
The Golden City Council approved the construction of the boating
park with the intention of building a facility that would draw boaters
from around the Front Range of Colorado and would be capable of
hosting elite and Olympic-caliber events that would attract people from
around the country, and even around the world. Based on the input
received from kayakers, rafters and park supporters, and after considering historic flow data, Council directed the construction of a worldclass boating park.
The City hired Gary Lacy, a world-renowned course designer, expert engineer, and avid boater, to design the course. Mr. Lacy designed the course to operate optimally at a flow rate of 1000 cfs.'6 The
original course consisted of seven structures, using 4000 tons of rock
and 800 tons of grout or cement." The diversion dams were designed
and built to be natural in appearance, but at the same time were highly
engineered structures built eight feet down into the streambed and
fifteen feet into each stream bank.'8 The dams were built with low-flow
13. City ofFort Collins, 830 P.2d at 931.
14. COLO. REV.STAT. § 37-92-102(3).
15. City ofFort Collins, 830 P.2d at 931.
16. Testimony of Gary Lacy, Transcript of Record, In re Application for Water
Rights of the City of Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Mar. 14.
2001) [hereinafter Transcript of Record, In re City of Golden].
17.

Id

18.

Id
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and high-flow boating channels or chutes to concentrate the water under different hydrologic conditions. The structures completely modified what had been a uniform stream channel. Spectator seating was
constructed adjacent to the course.
The enormous popularity of the initial boating park prompted City
Council to authorize construction of an "extension" that would
lengthen the course and add more features. Then, on December 30,
1998, the City filed for water rights to ensure there would be sufficient
flows in Clear Creek to protect the investment it had made in the boating park. 9 Just as important, the City sought to protect the significant
secondary economy that had grown around the boating park, and
which had already helped to revitalize the downtown, river-corridor
economy.
C. THE GOLDEN APPLICATION

Golden's application sought conditional and absolute water rights
for the diversion structures in the boating park. Golden asked for confirmation of absolute rights for a portion of the claimed flow rates for
the seven structures already built and in use on Clear Creek, ranging
from a high of 992 cfs to a low of 75 cfs, based on measured instantaneous peak flows at the closest gage during each month in 1998.0 The
City requested conditional rights for flow rates at the same structures
that varied by month, up to 1000 cfs in May, June and July. This was
based on the design capacity of the park and the hydrology of Clear
Creek. Golden also sought conditional water rights for the additional
structures it contemplated building in the boating park extension.
The application was specifically based on the statutory definition of
diversion at Colorado Revised Statutes ("C.R.S.") section 37-92-103(7),
as expressly interpreted in the Ft. Collins decision.'
D. THE WATER COURT PROCESS
Eight parties, including the CWCB, filed statements of opposition to
Golden's claim.' The State Engineer intervened in 2000.2' Golden
settled with all actual water users, but was unable to reach agreement
with the CWCB and the State and Division Engineers ("State"). With
19. Application for Water Rights of the City of Golden, In re Application for Water
Rights of the City of Golden, Case No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 June 13,

2001)
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Decree, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of Golden, Case No.
98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. IJune 13, 2001) [hereinafter Decree, In reCityof
at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/watercourts/watGolden],
available
divl /ordergolden.htm.

23.

Id.
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no actual water rights that could be injured by the application, these
State entities pressed the case to trial to further their firm position that
in-channel water rights for recreation purposes could not be decreed
to the City under Colorado law. As one State witness explained, the
only acceptable term and condition ever offered by the State in settlement was that Golden withdraw the application. 4
In ruling on pretrial evidentiary motions, District CourtJudgeJonathan Hays noted the unique factual questions presented by Golden's
claim for an in-channel water right for its boating park. 5 His ruling
articulated the water court's view concerning the applicant's burden:
"Golden's burden is to establish that the flow rates it seeks do not exceed the reasonable rates needed to fulfill its stated purpose." 6 With
this road map from the court, Golden was able to prepare to meet its
burden at trial.
The State offered numerous grounds for opposing Golden's claim.
Among other theories, the State argued Golden's claims were in fact
instream flow water rights, and that only the CWCB was authorized to
appropriate water for instream flow purposes. Despite the clear holding in the Ft. Collins case, the State further argued Golden's whitewater
course structures did not constitute a "diversion" of water within the
statutory definition at C.R.S. section 37-92-103(7). Citing the definition of "beneficial use" at C.R.S. section 37-92-103(4), the State argued
that Golden could not demonstrate that the amount of water it
claimed was "that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate
under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the
purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made."'
While the State's grounds for opposition continually changed and
expanded, ultimately the State's main argument became that the court
should develop a "duty of water" for boating parks, limiting the size of
any water rights that could be claimed to only that which would allow
some minimally reasonable boating experience (i.e. just enough water
to float a boat). The State advanced this argument notwithstanding
Golden's undisputed intent to develop a "world-class" boating park.'
At the heart of the State's opposition, and underlying all of its arguments, was the State's assertion that recreation was a lesser or second24. Testimony of Edward Kowalski, Transcript of Record, In re City of Golden, supra
note 16.

25.

Orders Re: Applicant's Motions in Limine, In re Application for Water Rights of

the City of Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Mar. 7,2001).

26.
27.

Id.
Colorado Water Conservation Board Statement of Opposition, In re Application

for Water Rights of the City of Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Feb.

25, 1999).
28. Objectors' Trial Brief at 2-3, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of
Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Mar. 7, 2001).

29.

Id. at 3.
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class use of water that either should be denied or severely limited to
preserve the water for future, traditional consumptive uses.
In responding to the State's "duty of water" argument, Golden argued that no matter how the State dressed up the argument, its attempt to cap the size of Golden's recreation right to an amount less
than Golden's actual or intended beneficial use was contrary to the
right to appropriate the unappropriated waters of the State guaranteed
by Article XVI, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution.' Moreover, in
attempting to limit Golden's right to preserve water for some future,
undefined consumptive use, the State's argument amounted to a public trust-type argument in reverse.
The public trust doctrine has been used in some states to limit or
preclude proposed or existing water rights in order to ensure water is
left in the stream to protect certain future public uses of water without
water rights, such as recreation, boat passage and the environment.'
The irony in the Golden case was that the State was making this argument so that future water appropriators could further deplete (not
protect) the stream. Golden pointed out that Colorado courts had
repeatedly rejected the public trust doctrine when it came to setting
aside water for environmental benefits, and argued that the doctrine
could not now be invoked to preclude a water right for a demonstrated, current beneficial use in favor of hypothetical future appropriations.

Golden cited Board of County Commissioners v. United States,

for the proposition that "a public interest theory is in conflict with the
doctrine of prior appropriation because a water court cannot, in the
absence of statutory authority, deny a legitimate appropriation based
on public policy."" It was almost worth the fight just to see the water
buffaloes have to defend a public trust doctrine they have fought so
vigorously against in the past.
In its trial brief, Golden cited the diversion statute, C.R.S. section
37-92-103(7), the Ft. Collins decision, and other Colorado Supreme
Court cases for the proposition that a diversion in the conventional
sense, meaning removing water and carrying it away from the stream,

30. City of Golden Reply Brief, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of
Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 March 7, 2001).
31. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712, 719 (Cal. 1983);
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1094-95
(Idaho 1984); Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170-71
(Mont. 1984).
32. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo. 1995) (en
banc); see also Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901
P.2d 1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) ("This court has never recognized the public
trust doctrine with respect to water.") (Mullarkey, J., dissenting); People v. Emmert,
597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (en banc) (rejecting the public trust doctrine as a
basis for recognizing public recreational use of water over privately owned stream beds
of non-navigable waterways).
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was never a strict requirement of prior appropriation law in Colorado."
On the "beneficial use" question, Golden pointed out that the term was
not defined in the Colorado Constitution. Case law was very clear that
what constitutes beneficial use is a question of fact and depends upon
the circumstances in each case. ' Golden spent considerable time at
trial proving the economic value of recreational uses of water, a value
that vastly exceeded the economic value of most agricultural water
uses. Agriculture accounts for about ninety percent of all water consumption in Colorado.' Golden's recreation use, by contrast, creates
enormous economic value without consuming a drop of water. All of
the water used in the course would be immediately available for use
and re-use downstream of the kayak park.
With its opening argument at the water court trial, Golden suggested that if it had built a hydropower project on the banks of Clear
Creek and sought a 1000 cfs flow rate, the State would not have filed its
opposition.' Golden noted there were only two differences between its
boating park water right and a more "traditional" hydropower right.
First, the recreation rights would not dewater the stream. Second, the
kayak course generated more revenue for the City than a hydropower
plant. Testifying on behalf of Golden, Dr. Robert Raucher conserva-

33. City of Golden Trial Brief, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of
Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 March 7, 2001); see also Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 573-574
(Colo. 1979) (en banc) (recognizing that Colorado permits "valid appropriation without a headgate or ditch"); Genoa v. Westfall, 349 P.2d 370, 378 (Colo. 1960) ("It is not
necessary in every case for an appropriator of water to construct ditches or artificial
ways through which the water might be taken from the stream in order that a valid
appropriation be made."); Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. Luthe, 9 P. 794, 796 (Colo.
1886) ("We think there may be a constitutional appropriation of water without its being at the instant taken from the bed of the stream."); Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 531,
533 (Colo. 1883) ("The true test of an appropriation is the successful application
thereof to the beneficial use designed; and the method of diverting or carrying the
same, or making such application, is immaterial."). Other Western states have similarly
recognized that the diversion element in prior appropriation law is better understood
as requiring a degree of control over the water claimed sufficient to affect the desired
beneficial use, rather than actual removal of the water from the stream. See State Dep't
of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 928 (Idaho 1974) ("[O]ur
Constitution does not require actual physical diversion."); Stevenson v. Steele, 453 P.2d
819, 826 (Idaho 1969) (finding appropriation for instream livestock use); Steptoe Live
Stock Co. v. Gulley, 295 P. 772, 774-75 (Nev. 1931) (mechanical means of diversion
from the stream not necessary for a livestock diversion).
34. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Sw. Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294, 1322
(Colo. 1982) (en banc) (quoting City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 842
(Colo. 1939)).
35. CWCB FACr SHEET, supranote 2.
36. Transcript of Record, In re City of Golden, supra note 16, at 16 (3-12-01).
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tively estimated the present and future value of Golden's whitewater
course to be $23 million. 7
On the issue of intent, Golden's Director of Public Utilities, Dan
Hartman, testified that the City wanted to develop a "world-class" facility to draw people into the area, revitalize the downtown, and maximize the economic benefits to the City.' Gary Lacy, the designer of
the course and an expert engineer and kayaker, explained the structures in the boating park, their function and hydraulics, and their optimum design capacity of 1000 cfs. 9 Various business owners testified
about the importance of the boating park to the local economy. Dr.
Jeris Danielson, the former State Engineer, further explained how the
structures controlled the amount of water claimed, and offered his
expert opinion that Golden's water rights were administrable by the
State Engineer's Office and that Golden's claim met the requirements
of a traditional Colorado water right appropriation.'
The State based a great deal of its opposition to the Golden claim
on the testimony of its outside "boating expert," Dr. Bo Shelby, a sociologist from Oregon with experience in quantifying the needs of boaters in the context of decisions about dam and hydropower operations.
Dr. Shelby supervised a survey of boaters that had used the Golden
boating park, and offered his opinion that the Golden claim was excessive."'
While seriously questioning the value of the opinion testimony the
State's outside expert offered, Golden did not object to the raw data he
had collected in the surveys on course use. In fact, the survey information was ultimately helpful to the court in determining the extent of
beneficial use. The survey demonstrated that the boating park was
beneficially used at flows of 1000 cfs and greater, and was extensively
used throughout the year. Among other findings, the State's collected
data showed the mean user in the sample had used the course 100
times, and traveled 47 miles from home to get there." The survey also
demonstrated that many kayakers had used, or would like to use the
boating park at night. One survey respondent commented that the
Golden boating park was "among the best courses anywhere."43 An37.

Id at 181 (3-13-01). The analysis upon which Dr. Raucher based his testimony is

found in

RAusCHER ET AL., PRELIMINARY EvALUATION OF THE BENEFICIAL VALUE OF
WATERS DIVERTED IN THE CLEAR CREEK WHITEWATER PARK IN THE CITY OF GOLDEN (Dec.

7,2000).
38. Transcript of Record, In re City of Golden, supranote 16, at 61 (3-12-01).
39. Id. at 146.
40. Id. at 12-37 (3-14-06).
41. Id. at 93 (3-15-06). A subsequent Colorado Open Records Act request, on file
with author, revealed that the CWCB paid Dr. Shelby $80,000 for his work in opposing
the Golden claim at a rate of $385 per hour.
42. Transcript of Record, In reCity of Golden, supranote 16.
43. Id. at 129.
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other" said, "If there were lights, there would be folks there all night
long. 44

E. BREAK IN THE GOLDEN TRIAL AND ATTEMPTED EMERGENCY
LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE

The first phase of the trial ended on March 15, 2001. At that time,
it was scheduled to continue for one additional day on May 10, 2001. 45
During this break in the trial, the CWCB drafted a bill that became
Senate Bill 216, regarding what have come to be called "recreational
in-channel diversions" ("RICDs"). Ordinarily, bills cannot be introduced into the Colorado General Assembly at such a late point in the
legislative session. Nevertheless, SB 216 gained late-bill status from
legislators sympathetic to the CWCB's traditional view of water rights.
As originally proposed by the CWCB, the bill would have given the
CWCB almost complete authority to decide RICD applications, subject
to water court review only under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.' The bill would have applied retroactively to Golden's application even though it was filed in 1998 and the trial on the application
was almost complete. In short, it was originally an effort to severely
limit or outright kill RICDs. At best, it was an effort to make RICDs a
second-class water right. As discussed in Section III below, the bill that
finally emerged was much modified, and, after a thorough legislative
battle, essentially ratified RICDs as a beneficial use of Colorado water.
F. THE WATER COURT DECISION
Upon completion of the trial, the water court decreed the full
amount of the water rights claimed by Golden."7 In doing so, the court
pointed out the boating park was used both day and night, and found
44. Id. at 130-31.
45. Id. at 221.
46. S.B. 01-216, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess., at 7 11.22-25 (Colo. 2001) (preamended
draft 2, Apr. 24, 2001) (noting that the water judge shall utilize the arbitrary and capricious standard set forth in COLo REv. STAT. § 24-4-106(6), (7)). The arbitrary and
capricious standard gives great deference to the agency decision under review. The
CWCB argued in Colorado Water ConservationBoard v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District that its findings and recommendations should be reviewed using this
higher standard. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this argument:
By urging a higher standard such as clear and convincing evidence or arbitrary and capricious review, the CWCB is fashioning for itself the role of an
administrative adjudicatory agency or a quasi-judicial body-a role which...
was specifically rejected by the General Assembly. SB 216 does not grant the
CWCB the authority to review RICD applications as an administrative adjudicatory agency or quasi-judicial body, and thus, its findings are not entitled to a
corresponding deferential standard.
109 P.3d 585, 597 (Colo. 2005).
47. Decree, In re City of Golden, supra note 22.
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Golden was entitled to absolute rights for the flow rates as measured at
the Clear Creek Gauge for the time periods when the course had been
used by boaters as of the time of trial, and granted conditional rights
for the full claimed remaining amounts, including the 1000 cfs highflow claim."
The court held that the seven structures that had been built at the
time of trial controlled water within the statutory meaning of the term
"diversion" in C.R.S. section 37-92-103(7), and as the diversion requirement had been further explained in the Ft. Collins decision.49 The
court found the structures were designed for optimal effect at 1000 cfs,
and that, at this flow, the structures created waves and jets of water,
self-scouring pools, hydraulic holes, large changes in current direction,
and other whitewater features important to boaters!"
The court offered a detailed finding explaining that the full
claimed amounts had or could be put to beneficial use. Most importantly, the court found that the boating park received greater use, and
Golden received greater economic benefit, as the flows increased, so
that the greatest use and greatest economic benefit were at the high
flow rate of 1000 cfs:
The Court further finds that this beneficial use at the conditional
amount claimed is reasonable and there is no waste as the higher the
flows, the greater the Course usage, and attendant economic benefit.
The testimony was unrebutted that when flows are at the 1000 cfs
level, the Course is accessible to intermediate, advanced-intermediate,
expert, and even world-class boaters. Intermediates use easier parts of
the Course, while more experienced boaters utilize more challenging
structures in the Course.
In addition, the Court finds that the Golden Course is perceived by
many boaters as the best in the area. That reputation translates directly into economic value for the City in that it attracts boaters from
across the State, the Country, and even international competitors.
The Court finds that the reputation of the Course is in large part due
to the high flows.
The Court concludes that high flow rates are a critical component of
the Course as an attraction and amenity for Golden. For all of the
foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that flows of up to 1,000 cfs
can and will be put to beneficial use and not wasted."
The court expressly found Golden's appropriations to be reasonable for the purposes for which they were claimed, and rejected the
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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CWCB's attempt to set aside water for future consumptive uses. Citing
the statutory definition of "beneficial use" at C.R.S. section 37-92103 (4), the court explained:
The question, therefore, is not whether the amount of water claimed
is "reasonable" in the abstract, or as compared to other potential future uses of the water, but whether the amount claimed is reasonable
for the purposes for which Golden made the appropriation. When
tested against Golden's purposes .

.

. the Court concludes that the

1,000 cfs claimed by Golden in May, June and July, and the lesser
5"
amounts claimed in the other months of the year, are reasonable.
On this point, the court specifically noted: "Golden's constitutional
right to appropriate a new water right in accordance with Colorado law
may not be denied or limited based upon the public trust doctrine, or
similar policy restraints purportedly rooted in concern for the quanti53
'
ties that should be left for future water users.
In further assessing the reasonableness of Golden's claim, the court
referenced Golden's stipulations with all actual water users on Clear
Creek. 4 The court explained that Golden was adding a new use onto
water that was already mostly subject to downstream senior calls, so that
in a dry year, 100% of the claimed water was already subject to a call; in
an average year, roughly eighty-four percent of the water that would
pass through the structures was already subject to a downstream senior
call. "
In perhaps the most stunning rebuke of the State's case, the court
offered a detailed finding discounting the testimony of the State's $385
per hour boating expert:
The Court further finds that the testimony of the State's expert witness, Dr. Bo Shelby, does not assist the Court in rendering the decision on "beneficial use" and "reasonableness" that must be made in
the context of the Colorado appropriation doctrine. Water rights in
Colorado are quantified according to the amount of water that is reasonable to serve the appropriator's intended beneficial use. Dr.
Shelby did not take into account the intent of the appropriator, the
City of Golden. On this point, Dr. Shelby did not consider one of the
major elements of his own methodology; namely, the decision envi52. Id.
53. Id. ("[A] public interest theory is in conflict with the doctrine of prior appropriation because a water court cannot, in the absence of statutory authority, deny a
legitimate appropriation based on public policy." (quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo. 1995))).
54. Several of the stipulations were designed to work in tandem with the boating
park so that the timing of upstream diversions would impact flow levels in the boating
park only at night, and thus not affect day-time boating. See Decree, In re City of
Golden, supra note 22.
55. Id.
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ronment, which in this instance is the law in Colorado on the appropriation of water. Instead, his opinions were based on a survey of a
small group of Course users. The survey results purportedly offered
the flow numbers that kayakers prefer for different boating opportunities, but the Court notes that those numbers are inconsistent with
the kayakers' narrative comments about the Course, which expressed
a clear preference for higher flows.56
The court further found that Golden's boating park water right
would have no impact on Colorado's ability to fully use its compact
entitlement:
Because the rights sought in this matter are on Clear Creek in
Golden, immediately upstream of major industrial, municipal and agricultural diversions of area in-state water users, it will not negatively
impact Colorado's ability to use its compact entitlements. The unrebutted testimony of the former State Engineer, Dr. Danielson, established that the water diverted by the Course . . . will be beneficially
used and reused by downstream appropriators up to seven times before it reaches the Colorado-Nebraska state line. The State conceded
at trial that there is no adverse impact
on Colorado's compact enti7
tlement as a result of this water right.
The court entered its decree on June 13, 2001, awarding 8Golden
the full amounts of the absolute and conditional flows claimed.
G. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GOLDEN DECREE
The Golden case expanded previous notions of what a recreational
water right could be. It took the legal precedent provided in the Ft.
Collins decision and developed it into a full-fledged appropriative water
right. In place of the notch in the dam that was addressed in the Ft.
Collins case, Golden's appropriation involved a series of specially designed instream structures, engineered to generate particular whitewater features favored by boaters at high rates of flow. In effect, each of
these structures functioned like a dam, controlling and shaping water
flows in the manner desired for the intended boating uses. Rather
than a minimum appropriation for safe boat passage, Golden requested and obtained an appropriation consistent with operation of a
"world class" boating park. While nonconsumptive, the decreed flows
56. Id.
57. Id. Notwithstanding this concession in the Golden and other RICD cases, the
State continued to maintain compact impairment as one of the principal justifications
for SB 216. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., RICD STATEMENT OF BAsIS AND PURPOSE 1
[hereinafter CWCB, RICD STATEMENT OF BAsis AND PURPOSE], available at
http: / /www.cwcb.state.co.us /WaterSupply/RICD/Rules/RICDstatementofbasisandpur
pose.pdeo
58. Decree, In re City of Golden, supra note 22.
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represented most of the hydrograph available in that reach of Clear
Creek. The case established the fundamental principle that the reasonableness of the flow rates claimed for a boating park depends on
the intent of the appropriator-the kind of recreation and boating
experience the appropriator intended to establish with its boating
park. In this respect, the water court simply confirmed that recreation
water rights should be treated like other water rights under the Colorado appropriation doctrine."
The case stirred widespread opposition among traditional water interests. Used to viewing the prior appropriation doctrine as the special
purview of those whose water uses required removal of water from a
stream channel, as well as water consumption, these interests fiercely
resisted this new form of in-channel appropriation. Yet, in one of the
great ironies of the entire battle over recreational in-channel diversions, the Golden application triggered a legislative initiative that initially sought to legislate such rights out of existence, but instead, ultimately served to confirm and bolster the legal foundation for such
rights.
II. SENATE BILL 216
At the aforementioned March 2001 break in the Golden trial, and
perhaps anticipating that it would lose, the CWCB persuaded Senator
Lewis Entz and Representative Lois Spradley to introduce a late bill
"Concerning the Establishment of a Procedure for the Adjudication of
a Recreational In-Channel Diversion by a Local Government. " ' As
originally written, the bill ("SB 216") would have given the CWCB substantial authority over RICDs. The applicant was to provide the CWCB
a copy of its application prior to its filing with the water court.6 ' The
CWCB was to review the application and make an administrative finding whether or not to grant the application." Water court consideration of any RICD claim was then limited to review on the administrative
record, under an arbitrary and capricious standard." The bill would
have applied retroactively to all pending RICD applications.' In short,
the State agency opposing the Golden recreational water right applica59.

For example, the appropriator for an agricultural right decides whether to

irrigate 10 acres or 1000 acres. So long as the water can be put to beneficial use without waste, the appropriator has been allowed to make that decision. For boating parks,

like other beneficial uses of water, it was shown in the Golden case that the beneficial
use increases with increased flows at least up to the design capacity of the course.
60. S.B. 01-216, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2001) (preamended draft 1, Apr.
24, 2001), available at http://www.leg.state.co.us/2001/inetcbill.nsf/fsbillcont/
1B78415825BD448687256A24006AEB20?Open&file--216PPP O1.pdf.

61.
62.

Id. at 311. 1-16.
Id. at 3 11.9-12.

63.

Id. at 4 11.10-12, 7 11.3-6.

64.

Id. at 4 11.15-18.
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tion in court would have been given almost complete authority to decide that Golden's claim should be denied.
As substantially revised in the legislative process, the role of the
CWCB was altered so that it became simply a fact-finder for the water
court. The final bill also limited the class of entities that could hold
these rights to local governments (county, municipality, city and
county, water district, water and sanitation district, water conservation
district, or water conservancy district).' Factors to be considered in
the CWCB review process were identified as: (1) potential impairment
of Colorado's ability to consumptively use its compact entitlements; (2)
the appropriateness of the proposed stream reach; (3) whether there is
access for the proposed use; (4) whether the proposed diversion would
injure instream flow water rights; and (5) whether the proposed diversion would promote maximum utilization of the waters of the state.'
Under the final bill, the CWCB is to make a recommendation to the
water court concerning whether to grant, grant with conditions, or
deny the application based on written findings.67 The CWCB findings
were presumptively correct in water court, subject to rebuttal.' The
bill defined "recreational in-channel diversion" as "the minimum
stream flow as it is diverted, captured, controlled, and placed to beneficial use between specific points defined by physical control structures
... for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water."' Applications filed prior to January 1, 2001 were exempted from the provisions of the bill, thus "grandfathering" the Golden, Breckenridge, and
Vail claims from the new legislation, and allowing these cases to be
tried under pre-SB 216 water rights law. 0
Far from being a repudiation of the Ft. Collins case, SB 216 as
amended in the legislative process became a codification of that decision. The Legislative Statement for SB 216 explained:
SB 216 is designed to ensure that decrees for recreational in-channel
diversions, as recognized by the Colorado Supreme Court in the City
of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins case, are integrated into the state
prior appropriations system in a manner which appropriately balances the need for water based recreational opportunities with the
ability of Colorado citizens to divert and store water under our com-

65.

S.B. 01-216, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess., § 2 (Colo. 2001) (codified at COLO. REV.
§ 37-92-103(7) (2006)).
66. S.B. 01-216, § 1 (codified at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(6) (b) (I)-(VI)).
67. S.B. 01-216, § 1 (codified at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(6) (b)).

STAT.

68.

69.
70.

S.B. 01-216, § 3 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(13) (a)).
S.B. 01-216, § 2 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(10.3))
S.B. 01-216, § 1 (codified at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(6) (d)).
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pact entitlements for more traditional consumptive use purposes,
such as municipal, industrial and agricultural uses.71
The Legislative Statement further provided: "Finally, nothing in
S.B. 216 is intended to create a water right which did not previously
exist by virtue of state Supreme Court interpretation of Colorado statute. . . .7 Clearly, and despite arguments that would come in later
RICD litigation, SB 216 did not create new water rights. All of the case
law on recreational in-channel diversions developed prior to SB 216
remains relevant even after the statute.
In another irony of this water battle, legislative icon Lewis Entz
would lose his bid for reelection in 2006, in large measure due to his
opposition to recreation water rights. His district included areas of the
State in which recreation, including water-based activities, are an increasingly important part of the economy. Those areas overwhelmingly voted against his reelection.
IV. STATE APPEAL OF THE GOLDEN DECISION TO THE
COLORADO SUPREME COURT
The State Engineer and the CWCB filed their appeal of the Golden
case with the Colorado Supreme Court in 2001. The importance of
this case is demonstrated by the number of parties filing amicus briefs:
forty six in total, roughly evenly split between support for Golden and
support for the State.
A. MOTION TO DISQUALIFYJUSTICE HOBBS
In preparing for the Supreme Court, attorneys for Golden faced a
difficult question: what to do about the participation of one of the
members of the Court, Justice Gregory Hobbs. Until his appointment
to the bench in 1996, Justice Hobbs served as general counsel to the
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District ("Northern District"),
and his former law firm continued as its legal counsel. He represented
the Northern District in its opposition to the City of Fort Collins' filing
for recreation water rights.' In the Golden appeal, the Northern District filed an extensive "amicus" brief with the Supreme Court in support of the CWCB. 74 The CWCB's opening brief in the Supreme Court,
and a number of the amicus briefs filed in support of the CWCB's posi-

71. Legislative Statement, S.B. 01-216, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2001)
(emphasis added) (on file with author).
72. Id.
73. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 919 (Colo. 1992) (en

banc).
74. See Brief for Amici Curiae Colo. Springs Utils. et al., State Eng'r v. City of
Golden, 69 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2003) (No. 01SA252), 2002 WL 32357112.
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tion, contained substantially the same arguments made by Justice
Hobbs in a brief written in opposition to the Fort Collins' application.
Eric Wilkinson, general manager of the Northern District, also served
as a member of the CWCB board and had produced a briefing paper
for the board expressing considerable skepticism about recreation water rights." Despite these red flags, it was not easy for Golden to ask a
well-respected Supreme CourtJustice to disqualify himself.
There were intense discussions among Golden and all of the
amicus parties supporting its position, as well as consultation with formerjustices regarding whether a motion to disqualify should be filed.
Opinion was equally divided. Many expressed concern over the effect
it might have on future cases that they would have before the Colorado
Supreme Court. In the end, however, it came down to what was in the
best interests of the client, the City of Golden. When analyzed on that
basis, the decision was clear. Golden filed a motion to disqualify Justice Hobbs."6 Although the Supreme Court denied the motion, Justice
Hobbs voluntarily recused himself after the motion was filed.77 Justice
Hobbs' nonparticipation would turn out to be a critical moment in the
RICD story, as the quest for large in-channel recreation water rights
may have been cut short by a Supreme Court loss at such an early stage
of the movement.
B. THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS IN THE SUPREME COURT
In its Opening Brief in the Supreme Court, the State distilled its
trial court arguments and pushed three main theories. First, it argued
that Golden's water right was an impermissible instream flow, and that
recreation was only a recognized beneficial use of water in Colorado
when it occurs at an impounded dam." Second, the State argued the
structures in the Golden course did not sufficiently control the flows so
as to constitute a statutory "diversion" of the type recognized in the Ft.
Collins decision.' Third, the State asserted Golden's appropriation was
unreasonable, and could not meet the statutory definition of beneficial
use at C.R.S. section 37-92-103(4).80 Underlying all these arguments,
however, and apparent in all the briefing, was the State's sentiment
that the water Golden sought needed to be saved for other consump75. Eric W. Wilkinson, Briefing Paper to Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Recreational Instream Flows: Questions, Concerns, and Statutory Considerations (Oct. 23,
2000).
76. See Notice of Non-Participation, State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027
(Colo. 2003) (No. 01SA252).
77. Id.
78. Opening Brief for State of Colorado at 4-13, State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69
P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2003) (No. 01SA252).
79. Id. at 14-17.
80. Id. at 21-28.
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tive uses. While this viewpoint was implicit in the State's arguments on
appeal,8' it was explicit in many of the amici briefs, which claimed recreational appropriations would "deprive the citizens of the state of
Colorado of their right . . . to divert unappropriated water,"8 and
would impact "the ability of water users in Colorado to develop waters
of the state."" Since any existing water right (absolute or conditional)
would already be senior to the Golden course, the argument was that
Golden's current beneficial use should be curtailed to save water for
future, undefined uses, which these entities believed were more important.
On its instream flow argument, the State referenced legislative history related to the State's instream flow program, emphasizing its concern about appropriations of water not based on out-of-channel diversion and control of the water. In particular, it argued the enactment of
Senate Bill 212 in 1987, which established the CWCB's exclusive authority to appropriate instream flows, was a legislative repudiation of
the Ft. Collins decision, and barred Golden's in-channel diversion water right. "4 After SB 212, the State argued, in-channel recreation rights
could not be claimed by any entity other than the CWCB, and the only
recreation right that could be claimed by entities other than the CWCB
was for water that was physically diverted out-of-channel or stored in an
85
on-channel reservoir.
To support its argument that the Golden structures did not "divert"
the amount of water claimed, the State emphasized the difference between the dam and notch at issue in Ft. Collins and the different kind
of control over the water exhibited by the diversion structures in the
Golden boating park. 8 The Golden structures, the State asserted,
merely created whitewater features, whereas the notch in the dam in
Fort Collins had impounded water and then allowed safe boat passage. 7 The State argued that the Ft. Collins decision presented a limited exception to what the State asserted was a strict requirement in
Colorado law that water right could only be created for water diverted
81.

This view was clear in the State's original expert report by Dr. Shelby, who pro-

posed a "percentage approach" whereby Golden would get eighty-six percent of the
available water instead of a water right for a fixed appropriation. The basis for this
novel concept was to leave "14% of the flow in the river ... for other [future] uses." At
trial, the State prevented a detailed cross-examination of Dr. Shelby on this approach
by agreeing to delete portions of the report from the record already in evidence. See
Transcript of Record, In re City of Golden, supranote 16, at 160-63 (3-15-01).

82.

Brief for Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist. et al. as Amici Curiae Support-

ing Appellants at 21, State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2003) (No.
01SA252).
83. Brief for Amici Curiae Colo. Springs Utils. et al., supra note 74, at 2.
84. Opening Brief for State of Colorado, supra note 78, at 10-11.

85.
86.
87.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 14-16.
Id. at 14-15.
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out-of-channel, and urged the Supreme Court to narrowly limit the
holding in Ft. Collins to the facts of that case. 88 Moreover, the State argued that the Golden structures exhibited the requisite control only at
a 30 cfs low-flow level, the flow rate at which water was contained within
a low-flow conveyance notch in the structures. If Golden's right was
allowed at all, "the water court should have granted a maximum right
of 30 cfs."' In the alternative, the State argued that at the very most,
the claim must be limited to 200 cfs, the flow rate at which the structures began to create white water features.'
Finally, the State argued Golden's appropriation was not a reasonable use of water and that either the 30 cfs at which a low flow conveyance channel is created or the 200 cfs at which whitewater features are
created would better meet the statutory definition of "beneficial use."9
The State maintained that the decreed appropriation constituted "virtually the entire hydrograph and all of the water produced in the upper Clear Creek basin. 92 Thus, the court should have established a
"duty of water" for recreational boating that would limit appropriations
to a boat passage flow, not the amount necessary to meet the appropriator's intended experience.
C.

GOLDEN'S RESPONSE

Responding to the State's arguments, Golden emphasized the water court's findings respecting Golden's intent to build a world-class
whitewater course, that the course was designed to operate at the decreed flow rate of 1000 cfs, that the course structures controlled water
and created desired whitewater features at this rate of flow, and that
this amount of water is available for appropriation." Golden emphasized it was merely exercising its constitutional right to appropriate the
waters of the state for beneficial use and that it was doing so fully
within the requirements of Colorado water law."4 Golden argued its inchannel structures met all statutory and case-law requirements of a

88.
See id. at 14-20; see also Reply Brief for State of Colorado at 16-17, State Eng'r v.
City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2003) (No. 01SA252). On this point, the CWCB's
argument in the Supreme Court directly contradicted the White Paper it circulated in
support of SB 216, which argued that the Ft. Collins decision was a very broad holding
that needed to be limited by legislation. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Recreation

Water Rights Legislation (Jan. 2001).
89. Opening Brief for State of Colorado, supra note 78, at 3.
90. Id. at 3-4.

91.

Id. at 26.

92.
93.

Id.
See City of Golden Answer Brief, State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027

(Colo. 2003) (No. 01SA252).

94.

Id. at 6.
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diversion, and that the test of control established in the Ft. Collins decision had been met.95
Responding to State arguments concerning the relevance of SB
212, which gave the CWCB exclusive authority to appropriate instream
flows, Golden pointed out it was not seeking an instream flow right. It
noted Fort Collins had originally filed for an instream flow right but
had amended its application to claim an appropriation based on diversion at dams that controlled water for beneficial use.'
Regarding beneficial use and reasonableness, Golden pointed to
the clear evidence of the economic benefits of the course to the City
and the undisputed evidence linking the extent of flows to the extent
of use.97 Golden intended to build an elite course, one that would attract boaters from not only the entire Front Range of Colorado but
nationally and even internationally for special events. Viewed from this
perspective, the claimed level of flows was reasonable.
Golden also argued the claimed flows were reasonable in the context of Clear Creek, its hydrology, and the existing pattern of water
uses.' Not only were claimed flows physically available, Golden's analysis determined that virtually all this water would be flowing downstream to meet senior rights anyway. Golden highlighted the trial
court finding that in dry years, 100% of the water would be subject to
downstream senior calls.' Golden also noted the stipulations it had
entered with all actual water users."
Golden argued the fallacy of the State's diversion and control argument was demonstrated by the fact that it would have been overcome if Golden had simply constructed a parallel kayak course channel
next to the stream, and then diverted up to 1000 cfs of the river into
that channel.'"' Although that approach would be wasteful in terms of
land use and finances, and would unnecessarily degrade the environment, it would have completely addressed the State's control argument. Rather than go to such unnecessary extremes, Golden followed
the express language of C.R.S. section 37-92-103(7), and the Ft. Collins
decision, and built the structures in the channel. In turn, those dams
controlled the water in a manner that created one of the best kayak
courses in the country, all without de-watering the stream or harming
the environment.

95.

Id. at 14.

96.

Id. at 16; see also City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 920-21

(Colo. 1992) (en banc).
97.

City of Golden Answer Brief, supranote 93, at 25.

98.

Id.

99.

Id. at 27.

100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 20.
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Finally, Golden noted the passage of SB 216 rendered moot the
State's various policy-based arguments. 2 Golden argued that the
Court should not consider the far-flung scenarios regarding future
kayak courses at unknown locations and with unknown circumstances
that were raised by the State and its supporting amici" The General
Assembly had already considered the same scenarios and policy arguments when it passed SB 216. With that bill, the General Assembly
acknowledged the validity of RICD water rights while imposing some
additional factors for the water court to consider, as well as creating an
advisory role for the CWCB. So, while Golden and the other three applications pending at the time of SB 216 were exempted from the legislation, the legislature had already taken up the issue, considered the
policy questions, and provided guidance for all future claims. There
was no need for the Supreme Court to second-guess what the legislature had just done with SB 216.
D. ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

The case was argued on October 2, 2002. The Supreme Court was
standing-room-only, and even the standing room was fully occupied
along both walls of the spectator section. More than 200 people
somehow managed to find seats. Arrayed in the front row were the
State's top water officials, including the executive director of the Colorado Department of Natural Resources, the State Engineer, and the
director of the CWCB. For Golden, most of the City Council was present, as were representatives of the Northwest Council of Governments,
many other Colorado cities and towns, Trout Unlimited, and representatives of the recreation and environmental communities.
Golden's presentation began with the observation that the underlying premise of the State's appeal was that recreation is a lesser form of
water use and that limits should be placed on recreation water uses
that are not placed on other types of water uses. Golden noted that
the water court had rejected that premise, and urged the Supreme
Court to do the same. Golden's basic argument was that recreation is
an acknowledged beneficial use of water under Colorado water law,
and that there was no basis for treating this beneficial use any differently than any other type of water right appropriation. It urged the
court to explicitly acknowledge that recreation is a use of water coequal with any other beneficial use.
Golden argued its water right met the same requirements as any
other water right: diversion pursuant to statute, beneficial use at
102. Id. at 41.
103. Id. One such scenario was that Las Vegas would throw a few rocks in the Colorado River at Fruita and claim large flows of water to preclude its upstream consumptive use.
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amounts claimed, and amounts claimed are reasonable. It repeated
again the weight of supporting evidence for each of these elements at
trial and affirmed by the water court in its decision. It urged the court
to reject the State's attempt to assert authority not found in law to reduce appropriations for the benefit of undetermined future appropriations.
Golden pointed to the demonstrated economic benefits generated
by the use, by the wide range of users who enjoy the whitewater course,
by the use of the course for elite competitions, by the widespread recognition of the course as one of the best in the country, and by the
water court's finding that there was no waste associated with the use.
Golden emphasized the importance of considering the appropriator's
intent when evaluating reasonableness, and pointed to the City's welldocumented desire to have a world-class facility.
Golden then turned to the matter of diversion and control and
pointed out previous Supreme Court decisions rejecting the State's
theory that water must be diverted out of the channel. Golden noted
the abundant evidence at trial establishing the highly engineered nature of the structures, their design to work best at 1000 cfs, and their
effectiveness at creating features that produced the desired recreation
experience. The best evidence of all, Golden argued, was the thousands of documented users who had been coming to the course with
their boats and the many others who had been watching and enjoying
these uses. Crowds of people don't come to a river to watch it flow in
its normal channel.
To counter the State's claim that Golden should be limited to the
minimum amount to float a boat, Golden pointed out that people do
not come to Colorado to ski our minimum slopes, to climb our minimum-sized mountains, or to experience the State's minimum beauty.
Cities are not limited to irrigating minimum-size parks or lawns, and
farmers are not restricted to growing the least-consuming crops. Likewise, Golden did not build a minimum whitewater course, nor was it
required to. Colorado water law encourages users to be efficient, but
efficiency is framed by the context of the desired beneficial use. Colorado leaves the matter of that use to the appropriator to determine,
not state agencies.
On March 14, 2003, the Clerk of the Supreme Court notified the
parties that the Justices had determined not to reach a decision until
after they heard oral arguments in the State's appeal of water right
decrees issued by the District Court for Water Division No. 5 for the
boating parks in Vail and Breckenridge.
V. EXTENDING THE RECREATION WATER RIGHT: VAIL AND
BRECKENRIDGE
As the Golden case progressed, other Colorado towns and cities
explored the possibility of claiming water rights for their river im-
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provements. They saw the opportunity to help diversify and strengthen
their economies while providing an increasingly popular amenity for
their citizens. After Golden, the next communities to commit to securing water rights for their whitewater parks were the mountain towns of
Vail and Breckenridge.' °'
A. THE VAIL WHITEWATER PARK AND WATER COURT APPLICATION
(WATER DIVISION 5, CASE No. 00CW259)
Vail is a world-famous ski destination that has increasingly sought
ways to attract visitors year round. Among its many natural amenities is
Gore Creek as it moves through the heart of the town. Vail's local
boating community and its tourism board made a presentation to
Vail's Town Council about the importance of kayaking to the state's
economy and asked the Town to consider building a whitewater park.
After further study, the Council voted to construct a whitewater park
within the channel in the heart of Vail's Gore Creek Promenade pedestrian area. In its first summer of operation, the park hosted the
Teva Whitewater Festival, which was broadcast nationwide on Fox
Sports Net and brought thousands of visitors to Vail during the spring
season.
On December 26, 2000, the municipal water provider for Vail, the
Eagle River Water & Sanitation District ("District"), filed an application
for conditional water rights for the Town of Vail Whitewater Park. ' By
Memorandum of Understanding dated November 16, 2000, the Town
of Vail and the District had agreed to the manner in which the proposed whitewater park would be operated in relation to area municipal
and snowmaking water rights, and the District agreed to adjudicate
and own the water rights for the boating park.'" As beneficial uses, the
District identified boating (including kayaking, rafting and canoeing),
piscatorial, and general recreational uses.0 7 Objections were filed by
the CWCB, the State and Division Engineers, the Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District, and the Cities of Colorado Springs and
Aurora through the Homestake Project.'0 Trout Unlimited filed a
104. Aspen also filed a claim in 2000 for water rights for its new boating course. The
decree established an absolute right for 270 cfs in June, 350 cfs in July, and 33 cfs in
August in the channel of the Roaring Fork in which the course was constructed. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree, In re Application for Water
Rights of the Town of Aspen, No. 00CW284 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5 Aug. 11,

2005).
105. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Water Court at 1, 4,
In re Application for Water Rights of the Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist., No.
O0CW259 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5 June 5, 2002) [hereinafter Decree, In re Eagle

River].
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2.
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supporting statement so that it would have standing to participate in
the case."
B. TOWN OF BRECKENRIDGE WHITEWATER PARK AND WATER COURT
APPLICATION (WATER DIVISION 5, CASE No. 00CW281)
Breckenridge existed originally as a mining town, but its modem
economy is heavily based on skiing in the winter and tourism in the
summer. Situated along the Blue River above Dillon Reservoir,
Breckenridge has invested heavily in restoring and improving the river
to clean up old mining wastes and restore a more natural channel with
improved habitat for fish. In the process, it constructed trails along the
river for hiking and biking. It saw the addition of a boating park as
another way it could increase the value of the river to the community
and attract additional visitors during the non-ski season. The idea for
the boating park originated with the Town's Open Space Committee.
The Breckenridge Town Council subsequently authorized construction
of a park with fifteen structures that extend approximately 1800 feet
down the river."' The structures were designed for optimal performance at flows of 500 cfs.Y'
On December 28, 2000, the Town of Breckenridge filed an application seeking conditional water rights to protect the flows for which the
structures had been designed and built."' The application provided
for the diversion of water of the Blue River at fifteen dam and water
deflector structures for use by kayaks, canoes, rafts, and other forms of
recreational boating and floating.'
Claimed beneficial uses for the
whitewater park included all forms of boating and floating, piscatorial,
and general recreational uses."4 Objections were filed by the CWCB,
the State and Division Engineers, and the Homestake Project."5 Again,
Trout Unlimited filed a supporting statement so that it would have
standing to participate in the case."6
C. WATER COURT PROCEEDINGS

With both the Vail and Breckenridge cases filed in Water Division 5
and involving many of the same parties, Judge Thomas W. Ossola
agreed to a case management order in June, 2001, under which the
109. Id.
110. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Water Court at 2, In
re Application for Water Rights of the Town of Breckenridge, No. 00CW281 (Colo.
Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5June 5, 2002) [hereinafter Decree, In reTown of Breckenridge].
111.
Id. at 4-5.
112. Id. at 1-2.
113. Id. at2.
114. Id. at 1-2, 5-6.
115. Id. at 2.
116. Id.
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trials in the two cases would be held consecutively, beginning with the
Vail case."1 7 Trials were scheduled for May, 2002."8
The State filed a motion for summary judgment in both cases, asserting the same arguments it was pressing in the Golden appeal that a
recreation right could only be decreed as a beneficial use for water that
was impounded at a dam. "9 The State also filed a motion in limine
asking the Court to exclude any reference to the stipulated decree that
the CWCB had consented to for the in-channel diversion water right
2
sought by Littleton for boating structures on the South Platte River.
The Northern District filed a motion for summary judgment in the
Vail case arguing that the District, as a water and sanitation district organized under the Colorado Special District Act, did not have statutory
authority to hold a water right for recreation purposes. 12 ' The Northern District further argued that Ft. Collins allowed only a "boat passage"
recreation right, and that the Vail claim, if allowed at all, could not be
decreed for more than the 30 cfs required to pass a kayak through the
boating park."n Judge Ossola denied all of the foregoing motions, and
both the Vail and Breckenridge cases proceeded to trial. 22
The parties submitted trial briefs generally tracking the arguments
that had been made in the Golden case. Town officials from Vail and
Breckenridge explained the importance of their respective boating
parks to the communities. Kayakers and local business owners offered
supporting testimony. Dr. Danielson, the former State Engineer, once
again offered important expert testimony supporting the claimed recreation water rights and generally rebutting the State assertions.
117. See Decree, In re Town of Breckenridge, supra note 110, at 1; Decree, In re Eagle
River, supranote 105, at 1.
118. See Decree, In re Town of Breckenridge, supra note 110, at 1; Decree, In re Eagle
River, supra note 105, at 1.
119. See State 56(h) Motion for Determination of Question of Law, In re Application
for Water Rights of the Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist. & In re Application for
Water Rights of the Town of Breckenridge, Nos. 00CW259 & 00CW281 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Water Div. 5 Mar. 8, 2002).
120. See State's Motion in Limine Regarding the Littleton Boating Course at 1, In re
Application for Water Rights of the Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist. & In re Application for Water Rights of the Town of Breckenridge, Nos. OOCW 259 & OOCW 281
(Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5 Apr. 22, 2002). In 2000, the City of Littleton and the
South Suburban Park and Recreation District obtained a decree for three boat chutes
located in the South Platte River below Chatfield Dam. The chutes are decreed for
100 cfs. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Ruling of the Referee and Decree of the
Water Court, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of Littleton and the So.
Suburban Park & Recreation Dist., No. 94CW273 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Sept. 5,
2000).
121.
See Order Denying Opponents' Motions for Summary Judgment and Determination of Questions of Law at 1, In re Application for Water Rights of the Eagle River
Water & Sanitation Dist. & In re Application for Water Rights of the Town of Breckenridge, Nos. 00CW259 & 00CW281 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 5 Apr. 17, 2002).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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For its part, the State continued to assert that the claims were impermissible instream flows, that the boating park structures could not
constitute diversion structures sufficient to sustain an appropriative
water right, and, in the alternative, if such rights were allowed at all,
that the water court must impose a "duty of water" to limit the size of
the rights.
D. THE WATER COURT DECISIONS
The District Court Judge for Water Division 5 awarded decrees for
the claimed flow rates for both boating parks, up to 400 cfs for Vail'24
and 500 cfs for Breckenridge between the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 8:00
p.m.' 25 Moreover, the court specifically found that the District had the
authority needed to apply for-and hold-recreational water rights for
customers within its service area."n The court only denied piscatorial
uses as an independent basis for the claimed water rights."n In granting the recreational water rights, Judge Ossola entered decrees which
contained many of the same factual findings and determinations
reached by Judge Hays in the Golden case. The State immediately
filed appeals to the Colorado Supreme Court in both cases.
E. THE VAIL AND BRECKENRIDGE APPEALS

The briefing generally tracked the same arguments made in the
Golden case. Among other issues, the State argued that prior to enactment of SB 216 there was no authority to allow any party other than
the CWCB to appropriate RICDs. Vail concluded its argument with
the statement: "People do not travel to Vail to kayak the Park for its
minimum water."
F. ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT
The Colorado Supreme Court set oral argument for both cases for
May 3, 2003. While the Golden case had already been argued, it was
clear the court was considering all three cases together.
Counsel for Vail and Breckenridge began by noting the court was
considering two more decisions by a different water judge that fully
upheld claims for recreational in-channel water rights as a matter of
basic Colorado water law, just as the judge had in the Golden case.
Counsel recounted why these decisions had been made, and why they
should be upheld. Beginning with the issue of diversion, he pointed
out that under both the Colorado statutory definition of diversion and
124.
125.
126.
127.

Decree,
Decree,
Decree,
Decree,

In re Eagle River, supra note
In re Town of Breckenridge,
In re Eagle River, supra note
In re Town of Breckenridge,

105, at 4, 8.
supranote 110, at 4, 8.
105, at 3.
supranote 110, at 6.

Issue 2

RECREATION WATER RIGHTS

the interpretation of this provision in the Ft. Collins decision, inchannel diversions exist where (1) a structure (2) functions as designed (3) to control water for beneficial use. With respect to the reasonableness of the claims, counsel noted that, after lengthy trials, two
different water court judges in three cases held the amounts claimed to
be reasonable within the factual context of each case. Reasonableness
must be evaluated in the context of the appropriators' intent to develop the best possible boating park, and the amount of water appropriated was in fact the minimum necessary for the intended purpose.
Moreover, the evidence of the direct correlation between flow and use
was unrebutted. Next, counsel argued the passage of SB 216 had undercut the entire basis for the State's appeals. The bill clearly confirmed the legitimacy of recreational in-channel diversions.
Vail and Breckenridge returned to what they termed the "essence"
of the State's opposition: that recreation is a lesser form of water right
that should be entitled to a lesser amount of water. The State sought
to limit recreation to some minimum experience, without regard for
the intentions of the appropriator. In fact, towns like Vail and
Breckenridge provide a world-class recreational experience for skiing,
a quality experience essential to their economies. Recreation represents the economic future for resort communities in Colorado, and
increasingly the entire State. Whitewater parks bring people to Colorado in times when tourism is otherwise low. People come looking for
the best possible boating experience. Higher flows enhance the experience and bring more users. As summarized by counsel for Vail and
Breckenridge, "the greater the flow, the greater the dough, for the
State as a whole."
The towns went on to argue that the non-consumptive, in-channel
appropriations represented the ultimate in achieving maximum utilization of the State's waters. For the most part, such appropriations simply add another use to water that is already moving to senior uses
downstream. It adds a new nonconsumptive use that is already claimed
downstream or must be delivered under Colorado's compact delivery
obligations. New appropriations always have the effect of limiting what
others may do in the future. Such is the nature of the prior appropriation doctrine. But the test of value has always been the willingness of
the user to invest the time and money necessary to put water to beneficial use. Here, three public entities had made considerable investments to appropriate and use water in furtherance of their citizens'
economic and social well being.
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VI. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN GOLDEN,
BRECKENRIDGE, AND VAIL
With Justice Hobbs not participating, the Colorado Supreme Court
deadlocked 3-3 on whether to affirm the decisions of the two water
courts in the three different cases."l ' The effect of an equally divided
court is to affirm the lower court decisions by operation of law, pursuant to Colorado Appellate Rule 35(e)." Thus, the decision of the Water Court for Water Division No. 1 became final, as did the decisions in
Water Division No. 5. The Golden, Vail, and Breckenridge boating
parks were protected with decreed water rights, and the Denver and
local newspapers heralded this as a victory for recreation water with
front page banner headlines." ° The next round of legal battles would
be fought under the terms established in SB 216.
VII. THE CWCB'S RICD RULES UNDER SB 216
Allegedly in conformity with the mandate of SB 216, the CWCB
adopted Recreational In-Channel Diversion Rules on November 8,
2001."' The rules require the applicant to submit a copy of its water
court application to the Board within thirty days after filing.'3 2 The
rules listed a total of twenty-five findings the Board may make in its
consideration of the five statutory factors.'
By way of introduction to
this list of findings, the rules stated:
If the Board determines that the amount of water sought for a RICD
does not represent the stream flow necessary to provide a reasonable
recreation experience in and on the water and/or that the RICD does
not divert, capture, and control water in its natural course or location
with physical control structures, then the Board shall note that determination in its written recommendation to the water court and
specifically
preserve the Board's authority to argue these issues in wa34
ter court.

128. See State Eng'r v. Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist., 69 P.3d 1028, 1029
(Colo. 2003) (en banc); State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027, 1028 (Colo. 2003)

(en banc).
129.
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In addition, the rules identified twelve types of information the applicant should provide to assist the Board in its evaluation. '
In 2003, the Board adopted the "Recreational In-Channel Diversion ('RICD') Policy Regarding Technical Criteria."'" It referred to
the criteria as a set of "minimum guidelines to evaluate whether an
RICD should be granted and under what conditions the CWCB should
recommend approval of an RICD. '3 7 The CWCB suggested applicants
should follow the criteria for determining a "reasonable flow rate for a
recreational course design that utilizes stream flow in the most efficient
manner possible."'" The guidance "recommends" a flow rate in the
range of 50 to 350 cfs without regard for the size of a river or stream. "'
It suggests a flow rate that exceeds the fortieth percentile flow during
the intended time period (that is, a flow at the structure that would be
equaled or exceeded sixty percent of the time) would be per se "unreasonable."'"
In short, the rules were an effort to accomplish administratively
what the CWCB was unable to do through the legislative process or in
court-undermine RICDs and at the same time, make the administrative process so cumbersome and expensive that local communities
would be deterred from even trying to appropriate such rights.
VIII. SORTING OUT THE PROCESS: THE SUPREME COURT
DECISION IN THE GUNNISON CASE
In 2002, the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District
("Upper Gunnison") filed an application for water rights for the Gunnison River Whitewater Course, consisting of six separate structures to
concentrate and control the flows of the Upper Gunnison River for
beneficial use. 41 The application sought conditional rights to use flows
42
between May 1 and September 30 ranging from 270 cfs to 1500 cfs.1

Identified beneficial uses were boating (including but not limited to
kayaking, rafting, and canoeing) and general recreational uses. The
Upper Gunnison claim was the first significant RICD application filed

135.

Id. 8.

136.

COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., RECREATIONAL IN-CHANNEL DIVERSION
POLICY REGARDING TECHNICAL CRITERIA (Nov. 21, 2003), available at
http://cwcb.state.co.us/WaterSupply/RICD/CWCB RICD 12 1 2003.pdf.
137. Id. at 1.
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138.
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140. Id. at5.
141. See Application for Surface Water Rights for Recreational In-Channel Uses, In re
Application for Water Rights of Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., No.
02CW38 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 4 Mar. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Application, In re
Gunnison].
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under SB 216 and submitted to the CWCB under it SB 216 agency
rules.
The CWCB review process focused heavily on the flow rates that, in
its view, would constitute the minimum necessary to provide a reasonable recreation experience. In contrast to the flows sought by the applicant, the CWCB staff recommended flows of 250 cfs for May, August,
and September and 500 cfs forJune and July.'43 It based these recommendations on statements in the Upper Gunnison's expert's report
that whitewater kayaking could occur at 250 cfs, as well as balance
needs for future development with the applicant's interest in providing
a reasonable recreation experience.'" Staff recommended that any call
under the water right in June and July be regarded as "futile" if it
would not produce the full 500 cfs.'45 In its written findings and recommendations to the water court, the Board stated its view that the
minimum stream flow necessary to provide a reasonable recreation
experience was 250 cfs from May through September and zero cfs the
rest of the year.'46
. Rejecting the CWCB position, the Division 4 Water Court granted
the Upper Gunnison the conditional water rights requested. 7 In its
conclusions, the court acknowledged the presumption entitled to the
adverse CWCB findings, but found that the Upper Gunnison had
brought forth sufficient contrary evidence to overcome the presumptions.'" It noted the CWCB had not addressed the flow rates claimed
by the applicant, and in that regard had not presented the findings of
fact called for under SB 216. The court went on to state that it would
not "second guess" the Upper Gunnison's requested amounts of water. "' 9 The court granted the decree for conditional water rights for the
course in substantially the amounts claimed.'"

143.

Memorandum from Rod Kuharich et al. to Colo. Water Conservation Bd. re:

The Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist.'s Recreational In-Channel Diversion Application 2 (Sep. 3, 2002), available at http://cwcb.state.co.us/

WaterSup-

ply/RICD/UpperGunnsonStaffRecommendation.pdf.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2-3.
146.

Findings and Recommendations of the Colo. Water Conservation Bd. to the

Water Court at 2, In re Application for Water Rights of Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy Dist., No. 02CW38 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 4 Oct. 1, 2002), available at
http: //cwcb.state.co.us/WaterSupply/RICD/gunnisonfinalfindingsandrecommendati
on.pdf.
147. Decree at 4, In re Application for Water Rights of Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy Dist., No. 02CW38 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 4 Dec. 26, 2003).

148.

Id. at 8.

149. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 13-20, In re Application for
Water Rights of Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., No. 02CW38 (Colo.
Dist. Ct., Water Div. 4 Dec 26, 2003).
150. Decree, In re Application for Water Rights of Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy District, supra note 147.

Issue 2

RECREATION WATER RIGHTS

The CWCB appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court. Among
other matters, the State argued that under SB 216 the water court must
uphold all presumptively valid CWCB findings unless rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence.' The State also asserted SB 216 directed the
CWCB, not an applicant, to determine whether the amount claimed is
the minimum stream flow necessary to serve an applicant's intended
reasonable recreation experience.'
In addition to the six parties participating in the appeal, the case
drew numerous amicus parties, twenty-four in total, again roughly
evenly split between proponents and opponents of recreational water
rights.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that both the CWCB and the
water court failed in certain respects to follow the requirements of SB
216."' The court rejected the CWCB assertion of "objective" authority
to determine the appropriate minimum stream flow.' 4 The court directed the CWCB must review the application in the form submitted by
the applicant: "As such, we hold that the General Assembly intended
for the CWCB to function as a narrowly constrained fact-finding and
advisory body when it reviews RICD applications, rather than in an unrestricted adjudicatory role."'55 Because of the manner in which the
CWCB conducted its review, the water court "received no guidance
from the CWCB about how Applicant's plans might affect the five
statutory factors under consideration."'56 Finding confusion in the record respecting the actual findings and recommendations of the
CWCB, the court concluded:
No matter which way one views the record, the CWCB's limitation of
Applicant's claimed RICD to 250 cfs was in clear violation of the plain
language of SB 216, which requires the Board to review the application strictly as submitted by the applicant, make the requisite statutory
findings
of fact, and formulate a recommendation to the water
57
court.

The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the Division 4 Water Court's
handling of the presumptive effect of CWCB findings under SB 216.2"
The court specifically rejected the State's assertion that its findings
could only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. In the words
of the court: "By urging a higher standard such as clear and convincing
151.
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evidence or arbitrary and capricious review, the CWCB is fashioning
for itself the role of an administrative adjudicatory agency or a quasijudicial body-a role which... was specifically rejected by the General
Assembly."5 9
The court did note, however, that SB 216 puts in place a "minimum stream flow" standard for RICDs, and determined that the water
court failed to independently determine that this requirement had
been met:
In short, we hold that the starting point for the water court's analysis
of a RICD application is the definition of a RICD provided by the
General Assembly. Unless the application is limited to the minimum
stream flow for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water, it does not satisfy the beneficial use requirement, and the application cannot be granted.'60
The court then went on to consider the meaning of the phrases
"minimum stream flow" and "reasonable recreation experience." It
defined minimum stream flow as "the least necessary stream flow to
accomplish a given reasonable recreation experience ...

.,'

The court

noted the reasonableness of a recreation experience varies according
to the perspective of the appropriator.161 In its search for other guidance respecting a reasonable recreation experience, the court noted
that what is reasonable depends on the particular circumstances at
hand, particularly the availability of unappropriated water in the proposed reach of stream, as well as the needs of future upstream consumptive users. In the right circumstances, the court noted, a "worldclass" course claiming almost the entire flow of a stream could be "reasonable." 63
In conclusion, the court directed water courts to first make an objective determination concerning whether the application is for a reasonable recreation experience and then to determine the minimum
amount of stream flow necessary to accomplish that purpose.'" The
water court must then "carefully evaluate" the five statutory factors as
they bear on the acceptability of the application before making its final
determination."
The Gunnison court ultimately held that RICDs are to be evaluated
by water courts on a case-by-case basis. The court sifted this evaluation
down to three fundamental elements that an applicant must prove
159.
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when seeking flows for a RICD. First, what was the recreation experience intended by the applicant? Second, is that recreation experience
reasonable given the available flows and stream characteristics? Third,
are the claimed flows the minimum amounts to achieve that recreation
experience? Again, the Colorado Supreme Court in Gunnison specifically contemplated decrees providing sufficient flows to support a
world-class course and a world-class recreation experience.
While the Supreme Court decision was a procedural setback for
Upper Gunnison as it involved a remand, the decision was a clear substantive victory for recreation water rights. The State, on the other
hand, was now 0-4 at both the trial court and Supreme Court level.
After spending hundreds of thousands of dollars of taxpayer money on
both sides, the State had yet to reduce a claimed RICD by a single cfs.
IX. CITY OF STEAMBOAT SPRINGS BOATING PARK- THE
FIRST TRIAL AFTER GUNNISON
The first RICD case tried after the Supreme Court's discussion and
analysis of SB 216 in the Gunnison decision was the claim by the City of
Steamboat Springs for its boating park on the Yampa River. The
CWCB's vehement opposition to the Steamboat claim was unprecedented.
The Yampa River flows through the heart of the City of Steamboat
Springs, and is one of the last rivers in the State that has not been
overappropriated. It is an extraordinary recreational and aesthetic
amenity of tremendous importance to the City. The idea for a boating
park on the Yampa emerged out of the combined interests of citizens,
City staff, commercial outfitters, and downtown businesses, and was
formalized within a broader Yampa River Management plan that the
City had been pursuing to preserve and protect the river corridor.
The City built two boating diversion structures, known as Charlie's
Hole and D-Hole, in a reach of the river near the downtown area. In
keeping with the image of its ski mountain, and the athletic heritage of
a small town that counts more than eighty Olympians as its current or
past residents, the City sought to build a facility that would draw boaters from around the state, the nation, and even internationally. It saw
the boating park as an important attraction during the spring and
summer months when there was no ski-related business. The concept
was to build a facility that would attract the widest possible range of
users with varying skill levels and boating interests. By the time of the
RICD application, the two structures had already acquired a national
reputation.
Given the high flows of the Yampa River, Mr. Lacy designed the two
Steamboat structures to operate at their optimal level at flows of over
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1700 cfs.'" The City claimed a RICD right that began with modest flow
claims in April, climbed to a maximum claim of 1700 cfs during a twoweek period during the spring runoff, and then extended through the
16 7
end of the summer with lesser amounts to preserve a tubing flow.

After a high flow season, tubing on the Yampa is an extremely popular
activity on the stretch of the river through the City.
While the CWCB had clearly been a consistent and zealous opponent of all the previous RICD water rights, it pulled out all the stops in
its opposition to the Steamboat claim. The CWCB's strategy was
clear-not only kill the Steamboat RICD, but at the same time make
the litigation process as expensive as possible. The CWCB strategy was
coordinated by the CWCB's "RICD Program Coordinator," who was a
former Colorado Assistant Attorney General, and implemented by
CWCB staff members and a team of three attorneys at the Attorney
General's office that worked virtually full-time on the case for an extended period.
Work on the case began with preparations for the CWCB hearing
on the five criteria required by SB 216. That hearing was held for two
days in May 2004 before a packed house in a large conference room at
the Steamboat Grand Hotel. After presentations by the city, the
CWCB, and many of the parties that filed statements of opposition to
the claim, as well as extensive periods of public comment, the CWCB
recommended that the claim be denied. It issued its written recommendation in June of 2004.'" While satisfied with the compact, access,
and instream flow protection factors required to be considered under
SB 216, the CWCB recommended against the claim because, in the
CWCB's opinion, the boating park was not in an appropriate stream
reach (this despite the fact the reach was selected by a river management plan seven years in the making), and did not serve the concept of
maximum utilization of Colorado's water resources."
Following the CWCB hearing, but well in advance of trial, the City
entered into extensive settlement negotiations with the objecting water
users in the Yampa River basin. The City pursued those settlement
negotiations to promote comity with its neighboring water users in the
basin, but also to address the direction from the Gunnison decision that
the reasonableness of any RICD claim would be judged, in part, by
166. Application for Surface Water Rights, In re Application of the City of Steamboat
Springs, No. 03CW86 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6 Dec. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Appli-

cation, In re City of Steamboat Springs].
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168. Findings and Recommendations of the Colo. Water Conservation Bd. to the
Water Ct., In reApplication for Water Rights of the City of Steamboat Springs, Case No.
03CW86 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6 June 11, 2004), available at http://cwcb.state.
co.us/WaterSuply/RICD/Mayl 4SteamboatdraftRecommendationand%20Finding.
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whether it left room for upstream consumptive uses. 70 Eventually, the
city reached agreements with all of the other water users in the basin.
The settlements reduced the city's high flow claim of 1700 cfs down to
1400 cfs, and contained other terms and conditions to protect the existing and future water needs of upstream water users. Despite the objection of the CWCB to these settlements, they were approved by the
Water Court.' 7' Thereafter, only the State Engineer and the CWCB
continued to oppose Steamboat Springs, and they forced the case to
trial.
In response to the CWCB's continued strident opposition, the city
put together a "dream team" of expert and lay witnesses, which included city officials; members of the City's recreation water advisory
board; expert whitewater park designer Gary Lacy; many expert kayakers including three-time Olympian Scott Shipley, himself also a boating
park designer; former Colorado State Engineer Jeris Danielson; wellknown water resources engineer Gary Thompson; fisheries biologists;
and economists. The CWCB took the deposition of all of these witnesses, and many other people. In all, the parties took more than
twenty depositions.
The CWCB also perpetuated its opposition with a series of pre-trial
motions. Among other objections, the CWCB argued in a pre-trial motion in limine that the water court should exclude all evidence concerning the economic value of the boating park to the City. 7 In this manner, the CWCB attempted to keep the water court from hearing from
the City's expert economist who put the value of the boating park to
the City 7at
approximately $7 million per year. The CWCB's motion was
3
denied.'
The CWCB asked the court to dismiss the RICD claim and void all
of the settlements that the City had reached with other water users on
the grounds that the City violated a fiduciary duty it owed its citizens
when it agreed to limit its RICD right in the settlements with other wa-

170. See id. The Court suggested an analysis of reasonableness "will vary from application to application depending on the stream involved and the availability of water
within the basin." Upper Gunnison, 109 P.3d at 602.
171. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Ct. at 9, In re
Application for Water Rights of the City of Steamboat Springs, Case No. 03CW86
(Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6 Mar. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Amended Decree, In re City
of Steamboat Springs].
172. Accompanying Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence, In re Application for
Water Rights of the City of Steamboat Springs, Case No. 03CW86 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6 May 2, 2005).
173. Order Denying CWCB and State Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence, In re
Application for Water Rights of the City of Steamboat Springs, Case No. 03CW86
(Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6June 8, 2005).
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ter users."' The court also denied this motion, and the case proceeded
to a two-week trial."'
The State brought twelve stuffed binders of exhibits to the trial
with over 600 exhibits."6 The court heard from all of the City's witnesses, despite the CWCB's motion to prevent former Olympic kayaker
Scott Shipley from testifying. In the court's eventual oral ruling from
the bench, Judge Michael O'Hara cited Mr. Shipley's testimony as particularly persuasive. '
The court also heard from the CWCB's "recreation experts" and
considered the data they had collected regarding use at the boating
park. The court heard extensive testimony from the CWCB's expert
on whitewater park design, who argued that more work and money
should have been invested by the City in the design process for the
boating park, and suggested that it might have been possible to design
the structures to achieve the same boating experience at lower flow
rates. At the close of trial, the court issued a rare and extensive ruling
from the bench.
In that oral ruling, the court discussed the Gunnison decision and
the five criteria required to be considered under SB 216. Again, the
CWCB had already recommended in the City's favor on three of these
issues. As for the two adverse CWCB recommendations, the court concluded that the City had overcome the presumptive weight accorded
the recommendations on the appropriate stream reach and maximum
utilization criteria.78' Concerning the CWCB's attempt to tell the City
that the reach of the Yampa River it selected for the boating park was
not appropriate, the court said the following: "The Court finds that
there was evidence presented by the Applicant that this was not only
the appropriate stream reach, but the only available stream reach for
this use on the Yampa River within the municipal boundaries."'79
With regard to the amount of money spent on the design process,
the court held:
This Court emphatically rejects the implication that this application
should be denied because the City did not spend enough money on
this project or that expenditures of hundreds of thousands of dollars
is de facto necessary to support such an application. I find that there

174. Order Denying State Motion to Dismiss, In re Application for Water Rights of
the City of Steamboat Springs, Case No. 03CW86 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6).
175. Id.
176. Reporter's Transcript at 2 11.20-23, In re Application of the City of Steamboat
Springs, Case No. 03CW86 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 6 Oct. 28, 2005).
177. See id. at 13 11.22-25.
178. Id. at 10 11.1-3.
179. Id. at 12!1. 4-8.
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is absolutely nothing improper with the municipality seeking a world
class facility at, to quote the State, WalMart prices.'s8
In conclusion, the court stated, "[t] his Court finds that the evidence presented by Applicant has proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that Applicant is entitled to the decree sought."8
The final decree, signed March 13, 2006, confirmed absolute water
rights for the City in the amounts requested for boating, kayaking, inner-tubing, rafting, and canoeing.82 The decree recognized the City's
purpose in constructing the park was to "create a recreational amenity
that would draw boaters and spectators to the region. Specifically, the
Boating Park was built to generate greater tourist revenue outside the
ski season by meeting the recreational boating and tubing demands of
the City's citizens and visitors, and creating a venue for special
events."'
The claimed flow amounts at the identified time intervals
were found to "meet these reasonable objectives. ''
The decree specifically addressed each of the five statutory criteria
set forth in SB 216, finding in all cases that the evidence supported the
City's application,' and that substantial unappropriated water remained for future upstream development, including exchanges."0
In summary, despite its vigorous opposition that included numerous motions, objections, depositions, the ordeal of a two day administrative hearing and a two week trial, Judge O'Hara ruled from the
bench the State failed to reduce the City's claim by a single drop of
water. It was such a devastating loss that it paved the way for the ascendance of more reasonable voices within the CWCB and a narrow
majority vote not to appeal.
X. THE CWCB RESPONSE TO THE GUNNISON DECISION: NEW
RICD RULEMAKING
In response to the Gunnison decision, the CWCB initiated a rulemaking process in the summer of 2005 to revise its existing RICD rules.
Remarkably, the new rules imposed a far greater burden on the applicant than the previous rules. The statute only requires the applicant to
provide a copy of its water court application to the CWCB.'87 Yet, the
new CWCB agency rules broke the five statutory review factors into
forty-five "sub-factors" for Board consideration, and required appli-
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cants to provide all information necessary for an extensive CWCB
evaluation on most of these forty-five sub-factors.' "
For example, the effect of an application on Colorado's ability to
develop its compact entitlements was given ten sub-elements."' These
elements went well beyond a finding of direct impairment (i.e., because of this appropriation, Colorado will be unable to develop its
compact entitlement) to a review of any and all potential uses of water
in a given basin, and whether such uses might be impaired by the application. Thus, under the rules the CWCB is to consider "exchange
opportunities... that may be adversely impacted .... ," the effect on "reasonably foreseeable uses," whether the application "shields water from
consumptive use" otherwise available, and whether consumptive use
"opportunities" upstream would be impaired."'
All appropriations of water necessarily have such effects under a
priority system. The very purpose of a prior appropriation water right
is to preserve a claim to a particular portion of water as against the effects of subsequent appropriations. These "considerations" clearly go
well beyond the statutory charge given to the CWCB and reflected the
CWCB's intention to evaluate potential other future uses of the water
claimed by the RICD, rather than determine compact impairment.
The CWCB rules similarly expanded the other statutory review criteria into multiple requirements. The "maximum utilization" factor,
for instance, was divided into twenty subparts, and the rules required
applicants to submit information on each one."'
In the Gunnison case, the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly admonished the CWCB for substituting its judgment about the flow rate
Nevertheless, the new rules once again
proposed by the applicant.'
called for the board to consider the appropriateness of the claimed
flow rate, both in the context of maximum utilization and whether the
amount claimed is the "minimum." 9 As further described in the
"Statement of Basis and Purpose" accompanying the rules, the Board's
purpose was to enable it to address "the ultimate policy question" of
how much water is needed, "to determine where in the middle of the
spectrum the RICD claim should be to constitute the minimum stream
188. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Recreational In-Channel Diversion Rules, 2
COLO. CODE REGS. § 408-3, at 1 7 (Nov. 15, 2005), available at http://www.cwcb.state.

co.us/watersupply/RICDRules.htm.
189. Id. 7(a).
190. Id., 1 7(a)(v), (vii), (viii), (ix).
191. Id. 7(e).
192. See Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy
does not give ...
Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 595 (Colo. 2005) ("SB 216, in its final form ....

the CWCB any authority to dictate a flow rate or recreation experience for RICD water
rights.").
193. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Recreational In-Channel Diversion Rules 1
7(e) (vii), (f).
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flow for a reasonable recreation experience."' 4 Yet, the Colorado Supreme Court had just rejected the CWCB's assertion that SB 216 had
given the Board "the authority to objectively determine what stream
flow is minimally necessary in order to provide a reasonable recreation
experience."'" Again, the court held:
After a careful analysis of the plain language of SB 216 as a whole, as
well as noting the legislative history, we hold that the General Assembly intended for the CWCB to analyze the application purely as submitted by the applicant, rather than to objectively determine what
recreation experience would be reasonable, 196and what minimum
stream flow would meet that recreational need.
Colorado often is referred to as a "pure" prior appropriation
state.'97 That reference reflects the state's long-standing policy of allowing the would-be user of water to establish its claim to public water,
subject only to court ratification that the appropriation meets certain
statutory requirements, rather than the administrative allocation system using permits followed by most prior appropriation states.' " Without doubt, the Colorado General Assembly modified this traditional
policy in the case of RICDs by providing for a partial, fact-finding review by the CWCB prior to water court determination. But that modification, as the Colorado Supreme Court found in the Gunnison case,
was a limited one-making the CWCB a "narrowly constrained factfinding and advisory body ... , The nature of the review called for by
the CWCB rules went far beyond the CWCB's statutorily-directed role.
Adoption of these rules represented an astonishing action by a
board that had just been reprimanded by the Colorado Supreme Court
for exercising authority not provided in SB 216. Apparently, the
CWCB failed to read the Gunnison decision or blatantly chose to ignore
it. But to those involved in this controversy, this action was entirely
consistent with the CWCB's behavior in its publicly-funded campaign
against recreation water rights.'
194.

COLO. WATER CONSERVATION

BD.,

REcREATIONAL IN-CHANNEL DIVERSIONS, RULES

5 (2005), available at
http://cwcb.state.co.us/WaterSupply/RICD/RICDSTATEMENTOFBASISANDPURP
OSEFINAL1105 FINAL.pdf.
195. Upper Gunnison, 109 P.3d at 593.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Thompson v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 575 P.2d 372, 381 (Colo.
1978) (en banc) (noting that Colorado only "rejected the pure prior appropriation
doctrine as to ground water").
198. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 138 (3d ed. 1997) ("Every state
but Colorado has vested authority in an administrative agency.").
199. Upper Gunnison, 109 P.3d at 593.
200. As a state agency, the CWCB has used state funding to oppose applications by
local governments. Not only has the CWCB committed considerable staff time to opposing RICDs, it has hired consultants and paid the costs of attorneys and paralegals
AND

REGULATIONS,

STATEMENT

OF BASIS AND PURPOSE

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

XI. SENATE BILL 62
After the filing of the Steamboat Springs application, but prior to
the trial in that case, Senator Taylor introduced SB 62 in the 2005
Colorado General Assembly."°' This was an outright effort by Senator
Taylor, Yampa Basin lawyer Tom Sharp, and the Upper Yampa Water
Conservancy District to undercut and legislatively defeat the Steamboat
RICD. It attempted to do this by adding as a factor for CWCB review
whether the RICD would "affect" development of future upstream
storage and water development projects. 12 The bill also declared water
diverted by a RICD to be wasted unless at least ten kayakers were using
the water at or near the structures. 3° It would have restricted the ability of the RICD to place a call unless the structure controls 100% of the
water, and concentration of flow would not constitute control of water.' Finally, it would have limited in-channel recreation to kayaking
only.' °0 A subsequent amendment would have restricted flow rates for
RICDs to no more than 350 cfs.'
Because the bill would have effectively undermined future water
rights for boating parks, the recreation community believed the only
option was its defeat, not its amendment. This opposition continued,
even when the bill was amended to exclude all existing applications
and decrees for RICDs. With the support of most traditional water
interests, the bill passed out of the Senate and through the House Agriculture Committee. However, as the result of an intensive lobbying

from the Office of Attorney General. As an example, we used Open Records requests
to obtain the identifiable direct costs of the CWCB's opposition to the Steamboat
Springs' application in Case No. 03CW86 between January 2004 and November 2005.
Payments to consultants totaled $69,108. Attorneys from the Colorado Department of
Law (Office of the Attorney General) billed 1,736 hours; legal assistants billed 791

hours. Assuming an average hourly rate of $100 (well below rates charged in the private sector), the CWCB spent $252,700 of taxpayer money on lawyers. No information
was available on the hours committed by CWCB staff or the members of the Board, or
on the expenses associated with holding a two-day hearing in Steamboat or participating in a ten-day trial in Steamboat. Nor does this accounting take into consideration
the additional expense incurred by the City of Steamboat Springs as a result of being
forced to go to trial. Supporting records on file with author.
201.

S.B. 62, 65th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2005) (introduced version Jan. 14,

2005).
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 2
Id. at 3
Id. at 3
Id. at 4

206.

S.B. 62, 65th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 2 11. 21-24 (Colo. 2005) (engrossed

11.9-10.
11.7-14.
11.15-23.
11.20-22.

version Feb. 28, 2005).
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campaign by a coalition of recreation water interests,207 the bill was finally killed on the House floor.' 8
XH. THE CHAFFEE COUNTY CLAIM (WATER DIVISION 2, CASE
NO. 04CW129)
The Upper Arkansas River in Chaffee County has become one of
the nation's premier locations for water-based recreation.' Commercial river use alone had an estimated economic impact of $64.7 million
on the Arkansas River in the year 2006." '° The Arkansas River in Chaffee County is not only a major center for commercial boating, it is also
widely used for private boating and recreational fishing. Chaffee
County also hosts the longest running boating event in the country
(Fibark boating festival) that draws large crowds to the City of Salida
every year.
The boating parks built in the City of Salida and Town of Buena
Vista provide a high quality recreation experience for a variety of different types of boats and users. The rationale for obtaining water
rights for the boating parks was the same as for every community-to
protect flows at the boating parks and, in the process, help protect the
local economy. The boating parks are a significant component of the
economic value of the Arkansas River in Chaffee County. Government
officials were concerned that the pressure on the upper Arkansas River
to provide water supplies for various users, including Front Range municipalities, that had been experienced over the past thirty years would
continue to grow in the future, leaving the boating parks vulnerable to
future water supply projects. In essence, the RICD application was an
effort to help protect Chaffee County's local economy.
Prior to filing for recreational water rights, Chaffee County officials
met with the recreational boating community, local business leaders,
and even the major water users on the Arkansas River that would later
become the objectors. After conducting a hearing on the matter,
Chaffee County filed an application for water rights for the two parks

207. Included in the coalition were seventeen local governments, six water districts,
sixteen nonprofits, and numerous businesses, associations, and individuals.
208. Summarized History for Bill Number SB05-062, http://www.leg.state.co.us/
Clics2005a/csl.nsf/BillFoldersAll?OpenFrameSet (select "Senate Bills 051-100"; then
follow "H.B. 05-062 History" hyperlink).
209. Colorado State Parks and the Bureau of Land Management cooperatively operate the Arkansas Headwaters Recreation Area, including almost 150 miles of the river
and adjacent lands. See Colo. State Parks, Arkansas Headwaters Recreation Area,
http://parks.state. co.us/Parks/ArkansasHeadwaters/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2006).
210. COLO. RIVER OUTFITTERS ASS'N, ExEcuTlrVE SUMMARY: COMMERCIAL RIVER USE IN
COLORADO - 2006 YEAR END REPORT 7 (2006), available at http://www.croa.org/pdf/
2006 Commerical Rafting Use Report.ndf.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

on December 30, 2004.1 Statements of opposition were filed by seventeen parties.2 Some of the more active objectors in the case included
trans-mountain diverters such as the Cities of Colorado Springs and
Aurora; in-basin water users such as Pueblo Board of Water Works,
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District ("SEWCD") and
Upper Arkansas Water Conservancy District; and State agencies such as
the CWCB, Colorado Department of Natural Resources ("CDNR") and
the State and Division Engineers.
The CWCB held its administrative review hearing under SB 216 in
May 2005, despite requests by many parties to postpone the hearing to
allow further settlement discussions that had started before the appli1 3 At the hearing held in Salida, many citizens
cation was even filed."
showed up and voiced their support for the application. In fact, not
one public comment was made against the claim. After the hearing,
the CWCB postponed making its recommendations to allow the parties
time to continue settlement negotiations.
The Arkansas River is a highly managed, intensively used source of
water that, in addition to being the focal point for the local, recreational-based economy, provides water for both agriculture and municipalities in the upper basin, the Front Range, and the eastern plains of
Colorado. Although existing in-basin and trans-basin uses limit opportunities for new uses of water on the Arkansas River, the potential for
large exchanges of existing water rights to points upstream of the boating parks clearly existed." ' The biggest challenge for Chaffee County
was to shape a water right that would protect its interests in the boating
parks against future exchanges and protect its local economy associated with these parks, at the same time recognizing the desire of other
communities and water users to have flexibility in developing their future water supplies.

211. Application for Surface Water Rights for Chaffee County at 2-5, Case No. 04CW
129 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 2 Dec. 30, 2004). The Salida Park consists of two structures located within 400 feet of one another in the City of Salida. Id. at 2-3. The
Buena Vista Park at that time had a single structure, but the town intended to build up

to three additional structures downstream of the original structure. Id. at 3. Claimed
beneficial uses were all recreational uses, including boating, kayaking, tubing, rafting,
floating, canoeing, and other such general recreational uses. Id. at 4.
212. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of the Ct. at 1, In re Application for Water Rights of Chaffee County, No. 04CW129 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 2
Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Decree, In re Chaffee County.

213.

Findings of Fact and Recommendations of the Colo. Water Conservation Bd. to

the Water Ct. at 1, In re Application of Chaffee County, No. 04CW129 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Water Div. 2 Apr. 14, 2006) [hereinafter CWCB Findings, In re Chaffee County].

214. The Otero pump station is located upstream of both boating parks and is used
to take water out of the Arkansas River basin for use by the Cities of Colorado Springs
and Aurora. In addition, Twin Lakes, Turquoise Reservoir, and Clear Creek Reservoir

are located upstream of both boating parks.
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Chaffee County ultimately negotiated a settlement with all of the
water users. The resulting compromise is a multi-tiered water right
that includes the largest recreational water rights in Colorado. The
water rights for both parks are measured at a gage just downstream of
Salida, and consist of: (1) 1800 cfs for up to eight event days in June;
(2) 1400 cfs for up to thirty consecutive days picked each year from the
Friday before Memorial Day to the end of June ("30-Day Period"), except for event days during that time; (3) 700 cfs from July 1 through
August 15, and any time between the Friday before Memorial Day and
the end of June that is not part of the 30-Day Period; and (4) 250 cfs
from March 15 to the Thursday before Memorial Day, and from August 16 to November 15.15

Various objectors asserted they reasonably anticipated filing for exchanges upstream of the boating parks in the near future. These exchanges totaled approximately 140,000 acre-feet and are junior to the
boating park water rights. 26 As part of the settlement, however, Chaffee County agreed that so long as certain conditions were met, it would
reduce its call during the 30-Day Period (but not event days) from 1400
cfs to as low as 1200 cfs, to the extent its water rights prevented these
future exchanges.2 1 ' This 200 cfs reduction-roughly 12,000 acre-feet if

over the entire 30-Day Period-is available to any user in priority. In
addition, under certain very limited conditions, where some water users are seeking to replace storage levels reduced by drought conditions, Chaffee County agreed to reduce its call on event days to as low
as 1500 cfs, and during the 30-Day Period to as low as 1100 cfs on
weekends and 1000 cfs on weekdays.218
Negotiations in the case were complicated by the Upper Arkansas
Voluntary Flow Management Program ("VFMP"), a year-to-year, voluntary flow management program whereby the Bureau of Reclamation, in
concurrence with the SEWCD and CDNR, operates upstream reservoir
releases, primarily involving trans-mountain water, so as to manage
flows in the Arkansas River above Pueblo Reservoir for recreation and
fishery purposes." 9 Although the boating park water rights are distinct
from the VFMP, some parties were concerned that opposition to the
boating park water rights would jeopardize this voluntary agreement.
To help ensure consistency between the VFMP and the water rights,
Chaffee County agreed to use the same river gage used in the VFMP to
administer both boating park water rights. Chaffee County further
tailored portions of its water rights to be consistent with the target flow
levels of the VFMP. This included 700 cfs from July 1 to August 15,
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Decree, In re Chaffee County, supra note 212, at 4-5.
See generally id. at Ex. C (Memorandum of Understanding).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at Ex. C.
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and 250 cfs on the shoulder seasons. These recreational water rights
work in tandem with the VFMP by protecting the native flows that the
program is designed to supplement. In short, although Chaffee
County cannot call for storage releases under the VFMP to satisfy its
water rights, it can prevent junior water rights from diminishing river
flows below these targets.
With the assistance of SEWCD, CDNR, Trout Unlimited, Arkansas
River Outfitters Association and others, negotiations in the Chaffee
County case resulted in a five-year VFMP agreement that provides
more certainty for local outfitters and businesses. As part of the larger
settlement agreement, there was also a greater commitment obtained
from water users to exercise water rights in a manner consistent with
the VFMP and commitments from some parties on limitations with
respect to water rights that would otherwise be senior to the RICDs.
The CWCB re-convened its hearing in March, 2006, during which
it heard evidence on the settlement agreements that, although not
signed, had largely been approved in concept.' Based on these negotiated agreements, the CWCB had little choice but to recommend approval of the application. Thereafter, the settlements were finalized
and a final decree issued without a trial.21
XII. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WEIGHS IN AGAIN: SENATE
BILL 37
The defeat of SB 62 and questions raised in the Gunnison decision
prompted the 2005 Colorado General Assembly to ask the Water Resources Review Committee, a standing committee of senators and representatives that consider water matters for possible legislative action,
to hold hearings to determine the need for legislation addressing
RICDs.2 n The Committee held several hearings in the summer and
early fall at which numerous parties testified. An initial draft was generated that prompted active review and comment. The outcome of
this process was introduced in the 2006 General Assembly as SB 37."
The bill's sponsors were the co-chairs of the Committee (and also the
chairs of the Senate and House Agriculture committees), Senator Isgar
and Representative Curry.
One major change proposed by SB 37 was to reduce the CWCB's
review role. To this end, the bill proposed removing the requirement
that the CWCB hold a hearing, and replaced the hearing with a public
220.
221.

CWCB Findings, In re Chaffee County, supranote 213, at 1.
Decree, In re Chaffee County, supranote 212, at 1.

222.

See Water Res. Review Comm. 2005, Staff Reports and Committee Memoranda,

http://www.state.co.us/gov dir/leg dir/lcsstaff/2005/comsched/05WaterResourcesS

ched.htm.
223. S.B. 37, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (introduced version Jan.
11,2006).
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meeting."4 It also proposed eliminating from CWCB review the "appropriate stream reach and access factors" first established in SB 216,
as well as the catchall "such other factors as may be deemed appropriate. " 22' While the CWCB was still required to provide written findings
to the water court on the remaining three factors, it no longer would
make recommendations.' The water court was specifically directed to
deny an application if it found the RICD would "materially impair the
ability of Colorado to fully develop and place to consumptive beneficial
use its compact entitlements...."'
To help address the concerns raised by the Colorado Supreme
Court in the Gunnison decision respecting guidance to the water court
in evaluating the reasonableness of the proposed RICD appropriation,
the bill offered the following as factors for the water court to consider:
(1) "the flow needed to accomplish the claimed recreational use"; (2)
"benefits to the community"; (3) "the intent of the appropriator"; (4)
"stream size and characteristics"; and (5) "total stream flow available at
the control structures" at the time claimed.'
Two especially controversial provisions in the original bill precluded the State Engineer from administering a call for a RICD unless
at least ninety percent of the decreed rate of flow was present, and required the water court to retain jurisdiction of a decreed RICD for at
least twenty years.'
The original bill was significantly modified in both the Senate and
the House. On the Senate side, the primary bill sponsor, Senator Isgar, attempted a number of amendments to limit the RICD right, and
successfully reintroduced the word "minimum" into the definition of
RICD." On the other hand, the call threshold was lowered to eightyfive percent, and it was clarified that this was the amount that had to be
generated by a call for it not to be deemed futile."'
Perhaps the most significant change made in the House that was
ultimately enacted into law was the incorporation of an alternative provision quantifying the claimed RICD appropriation volumetrically and
comparing that volumetric amount to the total average historical volume of water that would have passed through the structures during the
proposed days of use. 2 If the volumetric quantity of the RICD does
224. Id. at 2 11.9-12.
225. Id. at 2 11.4-10.
226. Id. at 2 11.4-8.
227. Id. at 5 11.18-24.
228. Id. at 6 11.5-13.
229. Id. at 6 11.18-24.
230. S.B. 37, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. at 4 11.21-22 (Colo. 2006) (engrossed
version Mar. 2, 2006).
231. Id. at 7 11.3-7.
232. S.B. 37, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. at 7 11.19-24 (Colo. 2006) (revised version Mar. 2, 2006) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(13) (f) (2006)).
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not exceed fifty percent of the total average historical volume during
the claimed period of use, then the amendment provided the eightyfive percent call threshold limitation would not apply."'
Moreover, the retained jurisdiction provision was stricken in the
House and clarifying language was added to the applicability provision
to ensure SB 37 would not apply to RICDs with decreed conditional
rights. Thus, the bill would not apply when such rights are brought
back to water court for either a finding of reasonable diligence or to
make a conditional right absolute."l
As the Bill was finally enacted, everyone seemed to feel it was an acceptable compromise. Most hoped its enactment would put an end to
legislative attempts to kill RICDs. In the final analysis, SB 37 was an
important victory for proponents of recreation water rights. Despite
constitutionally doubtful limitations imposed on this kind of appropriation, the ability to appropriate water for RICDs was again confirmed by the legislature. Most importantly, in the space of a few short
years, proponents of water rights for recreation had pushed the law
from the State's claim that such water rights could not exist at all, to
legislative recognition that fifty percent or more of the historic flow in
a river was likely a reasonable flow amount. In addition, there was the
Supreme Court case law recognizing that, in the right circumstances, a
'world-class" course claiming almost all of the flow in a stream might
be reasonable.
XIV.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In the end, recreational in-channel water rights won out because
they are a true beneficial use of water-Colorado's emerging heritage
and legacy. Recreation will only become more important to Colorado's economy in the future. RICDs provide a particular type of water-based recreation experience that not only serves growing demand
for this kind of activity, but promotes related economic development.
People are drawn to water, for recreation as well as for simple aesthetic
enjoyment.
Colorado water law is moving irretrievably into this changing
world, as it must. Taking the long view, it can be said much progress
has been made. From its modest origins acknowledging that a boat
chute through a dam could serve as a diversion of water for a beneficial
recreation use, to its current version under which fifty percent or more
of the volume of water in a stream may be appropriated during a specified period for boating use by a recreational in-channel diversion, the
law has broadened. In ten years, the bar moved from minimum
233.

S.B. 37, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. at 7 11.19-27 (revised version) (codified

at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(13) (f) (I)).
234. S.B. 37, 65th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. at 8 11.9-12

(revised version).

Issue 2

RECREATION WATER RIGHTS

amount to float a boat (35 cfs in Fort Collins) to appropriations as
great as 1800 cfs and fifty percent or more of historic average flows (as
codified by SB 37).
Unnecessary constraints, both administrative and legislative, still
remain, however, and should be removed. Given the increasing importance of such uses of water, we believe these limitations will disappear, and RICDs will be treated like any other beneficial use of Colorado water.
Looking back on this ten-year struggle for recognition of recreational in-channel water rights, a number of important lessons can be
drawn. First, significant change does not come easily in the water
rights arena. Anyone seeking to step outside traditional notions of
consumptive beneficial uses should expect a tough fight.
Second, be careful if you seek legislative fixes-you may get more
than you bargained for. The CWCB learned this lesson the hard way
when it sought to legislate RICDs out of existence, only to legislatively
confirm their very existence and cause the political defeat of one of the
CWCB's most vigorous defenders.
Third, the stipulated settlements with actual water users entered in
almost all RICD cases demonstrate that traditional water court proceedings work and, ultimately, even traditional water users are often
able to set aside philosophical differences to derive a mutually acceptable settlement in a water court case.
Fourth, the CWCB and State Engineer efforts to derail RICDs
demonstrate why there should be no absolute state control of water or
of state water policy. The prior appropriation doctrine works and is
the guiding principle that should not be fundamentally altered.
Fifth, future claims for RICD water rights should largely ignore the
CWCB's rules regarding RICDs. These rules are beyond the scope of
the authority delegated to the agency by the legislature and will have
little impact on the final water court determination that will dictate the
scope of any RICD right.
Sixth, Colorado water law is adaptable to changing times. That is
its beauty and its essence. Colorado might be said to use a marketbased test for allocating water. That is, a use of water is warranted if
there is demand sufficient to support payment of the costs necessary to
make the use (and if unappropriated water is available). By that measure, there is no question many Colorado local governments believe
boating parks are an important and valuable use of water, and there
now have been numerous studies documenting the economic benefits
to local communities from their boating parks.
The traditional concern that failure to consume water constitutes
waste no longer applies. Legitimate, non-consumptive instream uses of
water are increasingly important as the availability of such flows declines and the demands for their use increase. In most respects RICDs
represent a particularly smart use of water. They meet a growing hu-
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man demand and produce economic benefits without consuming any
water. Every drop of water passing through a boating park is available
for use downstream. RICDs are a non-polluting use of water. RICDs
make possible an additional use of water with no effects on existing
uses-the very definition of maximum utilization of Colorado's water.m Most importantly, RICDs protect meaningful quantities of water
for Colorado's recreation based economy. Once again, "the greater
the flow, the greater the dough for the State as a whole."

235. The court-made doctrine of maximum utilization emerged in the context of
enabling development of out-of-priority groundwater. Fellhauer v. Colorado, 447 P.2d
986, 994 (Colo. 1969) (en banc). It was enunciated to provide a policy basis for allowing additional uses of water that would otherwise have been barred by a strict application of the priority doctrine to protect existing water rights. It is somewhat ironic that
it was used by the CWCB in this context in an attempt to prevent a legitimate nonconsumptive use of water that has no effect whatsoever on existing water rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A governing principle of Colorado's prior appropriation system is
the protection of existing water users from injury caused by new water
rights applications. This principle applies both to senior water users
affected by a new junior right, and to junior water users adversely affected by a change or adaptation of a senior appropriation. As the
Colorado Supreme Court explained, 'junior appropriators have vested
rights in the continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the
time of their respective appropriations."'
The Colorado Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle on November 28, 2005, in Colorado Water Conservation Board v. City of Central,
when the Court unanimously ruled that an applicant for a new augmentation plan must protect existing Colorado Water Conservation
Board ("CWCB") instream flow rights from injurious changes in stream
conditions caused by new "adaptations" of existing rights. 2 The Colorado Supreme Court held that such a ruling was consistent with "the
principle that junior appropriators have vested rights in the continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the time of their respective
appropriations," and that the General Assembly, in creating Colorado's
Instream Flow Program, intended to rely upon this principle to "effect
a basic tenet of Colorado water law: 'to correlate the activities of man3
kind with some reasonable preservation of the natural environment.'
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision in City of Central,granting
protection for instream flow water rights from injury caused by new
plans for augmentation, is one of the most important in the history of
Colorado's Instream Flow Program. Environmental groups, such as
Trout Unlimited, supported the holding as essential to the continued
success of the CWCB Instream Flow Program in protecting Colorado's
environment.' Additionally, the Colorado State Engineer and some of
the largest water users' groups across the state, including the Colorado
River Water Conservation District, Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, and Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
supported the holding, understanding that the Colorado Supreme

1. Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 631
(Colo. 1954).
2. Colo.Water Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424, 435, 441 (Colo.
2005).
3. Id. at 440 (citation omitted).
4. Amicus Curiae Brief of Trout Unlimited, City of Centra4 125 P.3d 424 (2005)
(No. 04SA145).
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Court's decision was necessary to protect the orderly administration of
all water fights across Colorado.'
Notwithstanding this widespread support, the City of Central decision has faced some criticism.' To summarize the criticisms, the decision: (1) unjustly prevents water users from diverting according to
their decreed priority in a manner contrary to Colorado law; (2) unfairly grants instream flow water rights a unique ability to claim an interest in stream conditions during times of a senior downstream call7 in
a manner inconsistent with the intent of the Colorado General Assembly; (3) improperly ignores existing yet undecreed water uses in a
manner inconsistent with historical practice; and (4) impracticably
allows instream flow water rights and other junior water rights to "tie
up" stream reaches in a manner contrary to the future needs of Colorado's prior appropriation system.'
The authors strongly disagree with these criticisms. The Colorado
Supreme Court's decision in City of Central correctly recognizes that
instream flow water rights must have protection against injury that
changes or "adaptations" of senior water rights may cause, and that to
rule otherwise would be inconsistent with both the intent underlying
Colorado's Instream Flow Program and the basic principle of Colorado
water law granting water users a vested right in those stream conditions
existing at the time of appropriation. The Court's decision is thus consistent with existing Colorado law, with Colorado's Instream Flow Pro5. The State Engineer and the Division Engineer for Water Division 1 were appellants in the Central City appeal, and jointly filed a brief supporting the position of the
CWCB. Reply Brief of the State and Division Engineers in Support of the Colorado
Water Conservation Board, City of Central, 125 P.3d 424 (2005) (No. 04SA145). The
Colorado River Water Conservation District, the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, and the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, among others,
were granted permission to file amicus curiae briefs in support of the CWCB. See Amici
Curiae Brief of Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District & Colorado River
Water Conservation District, City of Central, 125 P.3d 424 (2005) (No. 04SA145);
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, City of Central, 125 P.3d 424 (2005) (No. 04SA145).
6. See, e.g. Case Comment, Colorado Supreme Court Requires Protectionfor Instream Flow
Water Rights in Plansfor Augmentation, 10 W. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 80, 82 (2006).
7. The language "claim an interest in stream conditions during times of a senior
downstream call" refers to the ability of junior water users to protect water flowing
within a stream reach during times of a downstream call from new or enlarged diversions caused by new water rights applications. Typically such new diversions occur as a
result of a new plan for augmentation, exchanges, plans for augmentation including
exchange, and changes of water rights. These new diversions may not result in a reduction in the amount of water available to a downstream senior calling right, but
would result in a reduction in the amount of water available within a particular reach
of stream, thus adversely affecting junior water users that rely upon the presence of
water within the affected stream reach.
8. See, e.g., Case Comment, supra note 6, at 82; see also City of Central 125 P.3d at
439 (discussing criticism that instream flow water rights complicate development by
"tying up" a stream).
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gram, and with the future needs of Colorado's prior appropriation
system.

Part I of this article describes the City of Central litigation, including
the factual background for the lower court's decision, the arguments
advanced on appeal by the parties, and the legal bases for the Colorado Supreme Court's decision.
Part II explains that the City of Central decision was correct under
Colorado law. Specifically, the decision is consistent with the principle,
as incorporated into Colorado law, that junior appropriators have
vested rights in the continuation of stream conditions as they existed at
the time of their respective appropriations.
Part III describes the history of Colorado's Instream Flow Program
and how the Colorado Supreme Court's decision is consistent with
both the legislative history and the historical administration of that
program. As the Colorado Supreme Court correctly recognized, the
General Assembly's intent in creating Colorado's Instream Flow Program was to protect Colorado's natural environment in a manner consistent with the principle granting junior appropriators a vested right
to existing stream conditions.
Part IV describes how Colorado's Instream Flow Program recognizes historical water uses in existence at the time of an instream flow
water right appropriation.
Part V discusses the ramifications of this decision on future water
rights administration and on Colorado's Instream Flow Program in
general.
In short, this article demonstrates how the Colorado Supreme
Court's decision in City of Central is the correct one for Colorado's
prior appropriation system, for Colorado's Instream Flow Program,
and for Colorado.
II. THE CITY OF CENTRAL DECISION
A. CENTRAL CITY's APPLICATION
The City of Central ("Central City") is a municipality located in the
mountains to the northwest of Denver, in the North Clear Creek basin,
tributary to Clear Creek. Central City has historically relied upon water
rights from a number of diversion structures within the North Clear
Creek basin for its municipal water supply. This includes water rights
from two diversion structures located on Miner's Gulch and Peck's
Gulch, two gulches that are tributary to North Clear Creek. Central
City's most senior water rights on Miner's and Peck's Gulches were
decreed for the amounts of 1.6 cubic foot per second ("cfs") and .101
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cfs, respectively.9 The appropriation dates for these senior rights were
1903 for the Miner's Gulch right and 1876 for the Peck's Gulch right."0
There has been some dispute as to the exact rate of Central City's historic diversions from these two locations, but physical limitations upon
Central City's water system limited the diversions from these locations
to approximately 150 gallons per minute, or one third of one cfs."
During the 1980s, the CWCB identified North Clear Creek as a
stream eligible for protection under the CWCB's Instream Flow Program. The CWCB accordingly applied to the Water Court for an instream flow water right on the reach of North Clear Creek extending
from the confluence of North Clear Creek and Pine Gulch downstream to the confluence of North Clear Creek and Chase Gulch. In
Case No. 87CW273, the Division 1 Water Court granted the CWCB's
application." The water court found that 1.5 cfs was the minimum
amount of streamflow necessary to preserve the environment to a reasonable degree within the identified stream reach, and awarded the
CWCB an instream flow water right for that amount under a 1987 priority as against other claims to water within that same stream reach."
This stream reach includes a section of North Clear Creek to which
Miner's Gulch and Peck's Gulch are tributary.'4
With the advent of gaming in Colorado and the resultant development in Central City, in the early 1990s Central City found need to
expand its water supply system. Central City's ability to take additional
water from the North Clear Creek basin was limited, however, both
physically by the size of its system, and legally by calls from senior calling rights downstream in the Clear Creek Basin. These downstream
calling rights were senior to Central City's rights, including Central
City's rights on Miner's and Peck's Gulches. Accordingly, these downstream calling rights had the right to call out Central City's rights to
prevent diversions under these rights from diminishing the amount of
water available to the downstream calling rights."
9. In re Application for Water Rights of the City of Central, No. 92CW168, slip op.
at 23, 45 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Jan. 16, 2007). Central City later obtained
junior water rights from these same locations, for the amount of 3.1 cfs. These junior
water rights were not at issue in the City of Centrallitigation.
10. City of Central 125 P.3d at 429.
11. In re Application for Water Rights of the City of Central, No. 92CW168, slip op.
at 39, 66.2 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. IJan. 16, 2007).

12.

In re Application for Water Rights of the Colorado Water Conservation Board

on Behalf of the People of the State of Colorado in North Clear Creek, No. 87CW273,
slip op. at 2, 8 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Sept. 30, 1988).

13.

Id. at 2,

14.

City of Centra4 125 P.3d at 429.

5-8.

15. Central City presented evidence that Central City's diversions had been allowed
to continue even during times of a downstream senior call on Clear Creek, as a result
of the water commissioner not administering diversion structures located in the North
Clear Creek basin. Id. at 433. However, as of the time of the City of Central decision,
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To increase its physical ability to take water out of the North Clear
Creek Basin, Central City increased the capacity of its physical system.'6
To increase its legal ability to take additional water out of North Clear
Creek, notwithstanding the existence of the downstream calling rights,
Central City applied to the water court for approval of a change of use
of water rights, plan for augmentation, and appropriative right of exchange. 7 By this application, Central City sought approval to divert
water out-of-priority at certain diversion points in the North Clear
Creek Basin, including its diversion structures on Miner's and Peck's
Gulches, and from certain wells owned by the Gilpin County School
District ("Gilpin County Wells") during times Central City otherwise
would have been legally
unable to make such diversions as a result of
18
the downstream call.

The change of water right portion of this application included a
request to change certain Farmers High Line Canal and Wannamaker
Ditch water rights that had previously been diverted downstream on
Clear Creek and used for irrigation purposes in Jefferson, Weld, and
Adams Counties, Colorado." Pursuant to the change application, Central City would be entitled to use these water rights for municipal uses
upstream in the North Clear Creek basin."0 The plan for augmentation
portion of this application relied upon engineering that identified the
amount and timing of Central City's out-of-priority diversions from,
and return flows to, the North Clear Creek Basin; and the amount and
timing of Farmers High Line Canal and Wannamaker Ditch water
needed to replace Central City's net depletions to the stream system
and to the downstream calling right." The exchange portion of Central City's application recognized that Central City's Farmers High Line
Canal and Wannamaker Ditch replacement sources would be located
downstream of the point for Central City's municipal diversion structures, including its Miner's Gulch and Peck's Gulch structures. This
portion of the application thus claimed an appropriative right of exchange, with a 1992 priority, to be administered as against other water
rights for that reach of North Clear Creek and Clear Creek located
between Central City's upstream diversion points and downstream replacement sources.'

Central City's North Clear Creek diversions had been curtailed to provide water to the
downstream senior call. Id. at 429.
16. Id. at 428.
17. Id.
18. See id.; In re Water Rights of the City of Central, No. 92CW168, slip op. at 23-26,
45-46 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. IJan. 16, 2007).
19. City of Centra 125 P.3d at 428.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 428-29.
22. Id. at 428.
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B. THE WATER COURT'S DECISION

The CWCB reviewed Central City's application for potential injury
to the CWCB's instream flow water right on North Clear Creek. The
CWCB determined that Central City's proposed plan for augmentation
and exchange would result in Central City diverting water out-ofpriority from North Clear Creek at times differing from and in
amounts exceeding Central City's historic diversions from Miner's
Gulch and Peck's Gulch." In addition, Central City's proposal would
allow Central City to divert water out-of-priority from the Gilpin
County Wells."4 Because the augmentation sources that would replace
these new out-of-priority diversions were downstream from the stream
reach containing CWCB's North Clear Creek instream flow water right,
this augmentation plan and exchange would reduce the amount of
water available to that instream right.'
Accordingly, the CWCB filed a statement of opposition to Central
City's application.' The CWCB requested that Central City include in
its plan for augmentation terms and conditions to ensure that its plan
would be operated in a manner that would not cause injury to the
CWCB's water right. Specifically, the CWCB requested that Central
City recognize that its plan for augmentation relies upon a new appropriative right of exchange, subject to a 1992 priority date, extending
from Central City's downstream Wannamaker Ditch and Farmers High
Line Canal replacement sources to its upstream Miner's Gulch and
Peck's Gulch diversion structures. 7 The CWCB requested that Central
City not make new out-of-priority diversions under this plan for augmentation including exchange when so doing would reduce the
amount of water available to the CWCB's 1987 North Clear Creek instream flow water right below the 1.5 cfs appropriated to that right.'
In short, the CWCB requested that Central City agree to operate the
exchange claimed under its plan for augmentation in priority as
against the CWCB's senior fight.
Central City refused the CWCB's request. Central City agreed that
diversions made under its 1992 appropriative right of exchange were
junior to and operated in priority as against the CWCB's 1987 instream
flow water right.' Central City argued, however, that the out-of-priority
diversions made under its augmentation plan were not made pursuant
23. & at 429-30.
24. Id. at 430.
25. Id. at 429.
26. Id. at 427.
27. Id. at 430.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also Motion for Determination of Questions of Law Pursuant to C.R.C.P.
Rule 56(h), In re Water Rights of the City of Central, No. 92CW168 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Water Div. 1 Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Central Motion].
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to this 1992 exchange.' Rather, Central City argued that the new outof-priority diversions from the Miner's and Peck's Gulch diversion
structures and from the Gilpin County Wells made under the plan
were actually made under its existing Miner's Gulch and Peck's Gulch
and Gilpin County Well rights. " Central City argued that these diversions were thus "senior" to the CWCB's existing instream flow water
right, and that Central City was under no obligation to protect the
CWCB's 'Junior" instream flow water right from injury resulting from
these "senior" diversions.
The CWCB responded that Central City was incorrect in claiming
that it could claim the senior priority date of an existing water right as
the priority date for its new out-of-priority diversions made pursuant to
a plan for augmentation including exchange." The CWCB argued that
Central City's position was not only inconsistent with Colorado law, but
would upset the administration of water rights, particularly those under exchanges and plans for augmentation, across Colorado." In addition, even if Central City's out-of-priority diversions could somehow be
considered diversions of its existing senior water rights, the CWCB was
entitled to protection from new out-of-priority diversions made from
these rights, pursuant to the explicit language of Colorado Revised
Statutes sections 37-92-305(3), -305(5), and -305(8), and pursuant to
Colorado's century-old principle granting water users a vested right in
those stream conditions existing at the time of appropriation.' Thus,
whether one considered Central City's out-of-priority diversions under
its plan to be new diversions made by a new junior exchange, or new
diversions made by adapting existing water rights, these out-of-priority
diversions were new diversions. Central City was required to protect
the CWCB against injury caused by changed stream conditions resulting from Central City's new plan for augmentation.
Unable to resolve their disagreement, the CWCB and Central City
filed opposing motions for determination of questions of law with the
water court, both parties requesting a ruling as to whether Colorado
law requires Central City to protect the CWCB's water rights from injury resulting from Central City's plan for augmentation.' The water

30.
31.
32.

City of Centra 125 P.3d at 430.
Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 431.

33. Id.; See also Motion for Determination of a Question of Law at 4, In re Water
Rights of the City of Central, No. 92CW168 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1 Mar. 13,
2003) [hereinafter CWCB Motion].
34. CWCB Motion, supra note 33 at 2.
35. Id. at 4-8.
36. See City of Central, 125 P.3d at 430-31; CWCB Motion, supra note 33; Central
Motion, supra note 29.
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court ruled in favor of Central City. 7 In so doing, the water court did
not address CWCB's arguments that Central City's diversions under its
plan for augmentation should be administered under the priority date
of a new junior exchange, and instead assumed, without discussion,
that Central City's new diversions under its plan for augmentation were
diversions made pursuant to the senior priority of Central City's curtailed rights.' The water court held, as a matter of law, that under
Colorado Revised Statute section 37-92-305, plans for augmentation
need not protect "junior" water rights from injury caused by reduced
streamflow."
The water court did recognize that, under Colorado law, junior water users have a vested interest in those stream conditions existing as of
the time of appropriation.' The water court held, however, that this
principle does not apply to new plans for augmentation.4 ' Rather, the
water court found that in enacting section 37-92-305(8), the legislature
intended to limit application of this principle only to changes of water
rights.

2

Moreover, the water court found that the CWCB was not enti-

tled to protection even if the principle did apply to plans for augmentation."3 Although the water court noted that the change in stream
conditions at issue occurred during a downstream call, it found that
the CWCB could not claim an interest in stream conditions existing
during times of a downstream call, and thus could not object to any
change in such stream conditions resulting from Central City's new
plan for augmentation."
C. THE CWCB's APPEAL

The CWCB appealed the Division 1 Water Court's decision, advancing three primary arguments.
First, the CWCB argued that the water court erred in accepting,
without discussion, Central City's argument that the diversions made
under its augmentation plan were entitled to the senior priority date of
Central City's out-of-priority water rights."5 Under Colorado law, diversions of water that are replaced from a downstream replacement
source are diversions made by exchange, and receive the priority date
37. See Amended Order re: Motions for Determination of Questions of Law at 10,
In re Water Rights of the City of Central, No. 92CW168 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 1
Apr. 2, 2004).

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Opening Brief of the Colorado Water Conservation Board at 15-16, Colo. Water

Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424 (Colo. 2005) (No. 04SA145).
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of the exchange, regardless of whether those diversions are made pursuant to a plan for augmentation." Indeed, Colorado law specifically
classifies augmentation plans that rely upon a downstream augmentation source to replace upstream out-of-priority diversions as "plans for
augmentation including exchange."47
Second, the CWCB argued that regardless of the priority date
awarded Central City's new diversions, under its plan Central City must
protect the CWCB against injury from changed stream conditions resulting from those new diversions.48 Colorado Revised Statute sections 37-92-305(3), -305(5), -305(8), and Colorado's principle protecting the rights ofjunior appropriators, entitle the CWCB to protection
against injury from changed stream conditions caused by "adaptations"
or changes in the manner of use of senior water rights, whether those
changed stream conditions occur as a result of a change of water right
or implementation of a plan for augmentation."
Third, the CWCB argued that the water court erred in finding that
the CWCB's instream flow water right did not entitle it to claim a right
to those stream conditions existing within a reach of stream during
times of a downstream call.' The CWCB noted that Colorado law had
long recognized that water users could claim such a right, most notably
through recognition of appropriative rights of exchange. 1
D. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of the
CWCB.
First, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the water court had
erred in finding that plans for augmentation are not subject to the
principle protecting junior water users from changes in stream conditions, at least as that principle applies to instream flow rights. 2 The
supreme court noted that it is through this principle that a water user
gains the ability to realize and protect the user's reasonable expectations in those general stream conditions in existence at the time of the
appropriation:
This court has often said, in substance, that a junior appropriator of
water to a beneficial use has a vested right, as against his senior, in a
continuation of the conditions on the stream as they existed at the
time he made his appropriation. If this means anything, it is that when

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 16-17.
Id.at 17.
Id. at 20.
See id. at 20-29.
See id. at 29-36.
Id. at 31-33.
City of Cenira4 125 P.3d at 439-40.
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the junior appropriatormakes his appropriationhe acquires a vested right in
the conditions then prevailing upon the stream, and surroundingthe general
method of use of water therefrom. He has a right to assume that these arefixed
conditions and will so remain, at least without substantial change, unless
it appears that a proposed change will not work harm to his vested
rights .... 53

The supreme court recognized that an important element of an adjudicated water right is also "the right to adapt an existing water right
to a new use,"" and that "[s] uch adaptations are, as here, accomplished
primarily through changes of water rights and plans for augmentation."" However, the court remarked: "Key to 56adapting an existing
water right to a new use is the question of injury.
The Colorado Supreme Court noted that the general injury standard applicable to changes of water rights and plans for augmentation,
set forth at Colorado Revised Statute section 37-92-305, requires that
the court approve changes and plans for augmentation if they do not
cause injury to vested water rights.17 The court remarked that other
provisions within section 37-92-305 focus in part on the maintenance of
historical use. The court held that this focus on historical use stems
from the recognition that water users are entitled to protection against
changes in stream conditions.'
Second, the court held that the protection from injury that plans
for augmentation must provide other water users includes protecting
CWCB instream flow water rights against changes in stream conditions
during times of a downstream call. 9 In reaching this holding, the
Colorado Supreme Court turned to the Colorado General Assembly's
intent in creating the CWCB Instream Flow Program.' The Colorado
Supreme Court held that the purpose of the legislation was to balance
the interests of Colorado's environment with the need to develop water.6' The Colorado Supreme Court held that the general assembly
struck this balance by allowing the CWCB to appropriate water to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree within stream
reaches and to protect this water from future development:
"The legislative intent is quite clear that these appropriations are to
protect and preserve the natural habitat and the decrees confirming
them award priorities [that] are superior to the rights of those who
53.
(Colo.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 434-35 (quoting Vogel v. Minn. Canal & Reservoir Co., 107 P. 1108, 1111
1910)).
Id. at 435 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302 (2005)).
Id.
Id. at 436.

Id
Id. at 439.
Id.
Id. at 438-439.
Id. at 439.
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may later appropriate. Otherwise, upstream appropriationscould later 6be2
made, the streams dried up, and the whole purpose of the legislation destroyed."
The court noted that, due to the overappropriated nature of Colorado's stream systems, the majority of new development would occur
through applications to adapt existing water rights through changes of
water rights, plans for augmentation, and exchanges:
Yet many Colorado basins are fully appropriated or overappropriated and it
is infeasible to obtain a reliable supply of water based on new appropriations. As a result, the majority of water right adjudications . . .involve
adapting old water rights to new water requirements through changes and
plans for augmentation, including exchanges.6
The court found that the general assembly thus recognized that the
value of instream flow rights would be to protect water remaining in
stream reaches after the senior calling rights are satisfied.'
Accordingly, the court held that the general assembly intended
that the CWCB would have the right to protect stream reaches from
changes in stream conditions caused by changes and plans for augmentation, including exchanges. The court concluded:
This rule best effectuates the clear legislative intent to protect and
preserve the natural habitat through minimum streamflows. In the
absence of this rule, senior diverters could simultaneously increase
the supply of water yet divert around or from an existing instream
flow right by a water project exchange or other means. Were this
permitted, the prohibited result we noted in Colorado River Water Conservation District would occur: upstream adaptations could later be
made, the streams dried up, and the whole purpose of the legislation
destroyed.65
Third, the Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with the water
court's assumption that Central City was not diverting by exchange
when it made new out-of-priority diversions under its plan for augmentation. The court held that due to Central City's reliance upon an upstream diversion point and a downstream replacement source, the
city's augmentation plan included a new exchange-at least with respect to the city's surface diversions from its Miner's Gulch and Peck's
Gulch diversion structures.6

62.

Id. (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation

Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 575 (Colo. 1979).

63. Id. (citing LEONARD RiCE & MICHAEL D.
LAw 77-78 (1987)) (citations omitted).
64.

WHITE, ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF WATER

Id. at 439.

65. Id. at 440.
66. Id. at 441. The Supreme Court found that Central City was operating an exchange with respect to its out-of-priority diversions made from its surface diversions,
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The court concluded that Central City's new out-of-priority diversions and new exchange made under its plan for augmentation could
constitute a change in stream conditions against which the CWCB was
entitled to protection. 7 The court found that, in order to protect
CWCB's rights, Central City's exchange to its Miner's and Peck's Gulch
diversion structures should be operated in priority as against the
CWCB's senior instream flow right.' The Court held that the CWCB
was also entitled to terms and conditions protecting its instream flow
water right from injury caused by out-of-priority diversions from the
Gilpin County Wells.'

m.

THE CITY OF CENTRAL DECISION AND COLORADO WATER
LAW

The Colorado State Engineer and the largest water user groups in
Colorado supported the CWCB's position in the City of Central appeal
as necessary to ensure the orderly administration of water rights across
the state. Supporters of the decision understood that the water court
must hold plans for augmentation to the same injury standard as
changes of water rights and other water rights applications, and those
plans must require protection of junior water users from injury caused
by changed stream conditions." Holding plans for augmentation to a
lesser standard would jeopardize not only instream flow rights, but exchanges, other augmentation plans including exchange, hydropower
rights, and other similarly situated water users.
Despite this support for the Colorado Supreme Court's decision,
the decision has also faced criticism. The most common criticism advanced is that the decision unfairly subordinates the priorities of senior
water rights to junior water users.7" According to this viewpoint, a water
user who diverts water out-of-priority by exchange under a new augmentation plan from a diversion structure associated with a curtailed
senior water right should be entitled to claim the senior priority date
of the curtailed water right for its new, out-of-priority diversions, rather
whether those diversions were characterized as being made by exchange or being
made under Central City's plan for augmentation. However, as is discussed below, the
Supreme Court did not address whether Central City was operating an exchange with
respect to its out-of-priority diversions made from the Gilpin County Wells.
67. Id. at 440-41.
68. Id. at 44243.
69. Id. at 443.
70. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
City of Centra 125 P.3d 424 (No. 04SA145); Amici Curiae Brief of Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District & Colorado River Water Conservation District, City of
Centra4 125 P.3d 424 (No. 04SA145); Reply Brief of the State & Division Engineers in
Support of the Colorado Water Conservation Board, City of Central 125 P.3d 424 (No.
04SA145).
71. See, e.g., Case Comment, supranote 6, at 82.
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than the junior priority date of the new exchange.' Requiring a water
user to divert water under a new junior priority date unjustly prevents
water users
from exercising their senior priority to its full decreed
7
amount.

1

This criticism, however, simply ignores Colorado law. First, this
criticism is inconsistent with Colorado law governing the priority date
of exchanges. Under Colorado law, the priority date for diversions
made by exchange is the date the exchange began operating, not the
date of a senior out-of-priority water right.74 The authors are aware of
no case law supporting the proposition that a water user may claim a
senior priority date for a new junior exchange. Moreover, as is discussed in Part V of this article, such a result would jeopardize the reasonable expectations of existing water users and confuse the administration of water rights across Colorado.
Second, this criticism ignores Colorado law governing the measurement, quantification, and administration of water rights in Colorado. Colorado law defines the measurement of a water right not by
the amount decreed to the right, but by the legal historical use of the
right.75 Thus, a water user may not change the point of diversion, the
type or place of use, or the timing of use of a right so as to reduce the
water supply that would otherwise be available to other water users.7"
This rule applies whether a change of water rights would reduce the
water available to holders of senior or junior water rights.77 Further,
this rule applies even if a new expanded use is less than the amount
decreed to the right:
a senior appropriator is not entitled to enlarge the historical use of a
water right by changing the point of diversion and then diverting
from the new location the full amount of water decreed to the origi72.

Id.

73. Id.
74. COLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(10) (2006); Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v.
Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1155 (Colo. 2001).
75. See In re Water Rights in Rio Grande County, 53 P.3d 1165, 1169 (Colo. 2002);
Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 (Colo. 1999);
In re Water Rights of Midway Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 938 P.2d 515, 521

(Colo. 1997).
76. See, In re Water Rights in Rio Grande County, 53 P.3d at 1168-70; Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799, 807 (Colo. 2001); SantaFe
Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, 990 P.2d at 54; Weibert v. Rothe Brothers, Inc., 618
P.2d 1367, 1372-73 (Colo. 1980).
77. See Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189,

197 (Colo. 1999) ("When a petition for a change in use or point of diversion is filed,
junior appropriators are given the opportunity to object to the change on the grounds
that it will encroach upon their vested water rights"); see also Rominiecki v. McIntyre
Livestock Corp., 633 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 1981) ("[A]n appropriator has no right as

against a junior appropriator... to extend the time of diversion to irrigate lands other
than those for which the appropriation was made").
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nal point of diversion, even though the historical use at the original
point of diversion might have been less than the decreed rate of diversion.78
The rule that a senior water user may not expand the historic use
of a senior right so as to injure junior water rights is, in effect, a restatement of the principle that junior water users are entitled to stream
conditions at the time of their appropriation. 9 The doctrine of historical use preserves the vested right of water users in those stream
conditions existing as of the time of appropriation by limiting the
amount of water that a water user may divert and consume under a
changed senior water right to the amount of water legally and historically diverted and consumed under that right.'
Accordingly, the criticism that the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in City of Central improperly limits senior water rights by preventing senior water users from relying upon new plans for augmentation
to increase the amount of water that they may legally divert under their
right is inconsistent with basic principles of Colorado law. The measure of a right is the legal historical use, not solely the terms of a decree.
A water user has never been entitled to use a water rights application to
enlarge the use of a senior water right beyond its historical use.8 The
Colorado Supreme Court's decision in City of Centralprohibiting water
users from using plans for augmentation to increase the amount of
water that they may legally divert under a senior water right is a continuation of existing Colorado law. The Colorado Supreme Court's
decision reaffirms the basic principle protecting the vested rights of
Colorado water users in those stream conditions existing as of the time
of appropriation.
IV. THE C1TY OF CENTRAL DECISION AND COLORADO'S
INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAM
A second criticism levied at the City of Central decision is that the
decision improperly defines "stream conditions" in a manner inconsistent with Colorado law.8" According to this viewpoint, the Colorado
Supreme Court erred in holding that CWCB instream flow rights could
claim an interest in stream conditions during times of a senior call, and
78.
79.

Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Colo. 1988).
See, e.g., FarmersReservoir & IrrigationCo., 33 P.3d at 807 (stating that the pur-

pose of the terms and conditions imposed on any change is to assure maintenance of
surface and tributary groundwater stream conditions); see also Weibert, 618 P.2d at 1372.
80. See, e.g., In re Water Rights in Rio Grande County, 53 P.3d at 1169; In re Water
Rights of Midway Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 938 P.2d at 521; Orr, 753 P.2d at 1224.
81. In re Water Rights of Midway Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 938 P.2d at 521

(stating that the doctrine of historical use as a measure of a water right applies to plans
for augmentation as well as changes of water rights); Orr,753 P.2d at 1224.
82. See, e.g., Case Comment, supra note 6, at 82.
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could assert this interest against reductions in streamflow caused by
new plans for augmentation and exchanges. These critics argue that
Colorado law requires the state engineer to curtail all junior water during times of a senior call, whether or not curtailing an individual junior
water right is necessary to provide water to the call.83 Thus, under this
criticism, the Colorado Supreme Court erred in finding that CWCB's
instream flow water rights entitle the CWCB to claim an interest in
maintaining stream conditions on North Clear Creek from changes
caused by a plan for augmentation during times that a senior downstream call is in effect. In so doing, the Colorado Supreme Court conferred upon CWCB instream flow water rights a unique vested interest
in stream conditions, beyond that recognized under Colorado law in
other water rights, and beyond that intended by the Colorado General
Assembly.
This criticism is legally incorrect. First, contrary to this criticism,
under Colorado law, junior water rights are not necessarily curtailed
during times of a downstream call. Rather, Colorado law only requires
the curtailment of junior rights when necessary to provide water to a
senior calling right.84 Thus, water rights that do not reduce the
amount of water available to downstream senior water users, and that
may continue to use water
the Division Engineer has not curtailed,
85
even when a downstream call is in effect.

Second, Colorado law has long specifically recognized that certain
types of water rights may operate within stream reaches during times
when a downstream call is in effect.8 6 For example, by definition, ex-

changes provide water to a downstream senior right, and thus operate
only during times of a downstream senior call.87 Moreover, Colorado
law provides that certain water rights may appropriate that water present within a stream reach during times of a downstream call. 8 Colorado law specifically recognizes an exchange as an appropriative water
83.

See Amicus Curiae Brief of the City of Golden, the Upper Eagle Regional Water

Authority, the Eagle River Water & Sanitation District, Wildcat Ranch Association, and

the Eagle Park Reservoir Company at 10-11, Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. City of
Central, 125 P.3d 424, 435, 441 (Colo. 2005) (No. 04SA145); Opening-Answer Brief of
the City of Central at 23, City of Central, 125 P.3d 424 (No. 04SA145) (hereinafter Central Answer Brief]; Answer Brief of the City and County of Denver, Acting By and
Through its Board of Water Commissioners at 7, City of Centra4 125 P.3d 424 (No.
04SA145); Case Comment, supranote 6, at 82.
84. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-501 to -502 (2006); City of Thornton v. Bijou
Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 81-82 (Colo. 1996).
85. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-501 to -502 (2006).
86. John J. Cyran, The City of CentralDecision and the FutureAdministration of Colorado
Water Rights, 10 W. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 151, 154 (2006).

87. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80-120(4) (2006) ("Whenever substitute water is supplied to a senior ditch, the supplier ...may take an equivalent amount for beneficial
use").
88. See id.
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right that "may be adjudicated or otherwise evidenced as any other
right of appropriation."8 9
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that exchanges rely upon the water
present within a stream reach during times of a downstream call, Colorado law entitles exchanges to appropriate that water, and to protect
this appropriation from injury caused by other exchanges, other plans
for augmentation, or other water rights seeking to make use of that
water. 90 In short, contrary to the critics of the City of Central decision,
Colorado law has long recognized the right of water users to claim an
interest in those stream conditions existing within a stream during
times of a downstream call. 9 Indeed, as argued in more detail in Part V
of this article, recognition of this right is essential to the administration
of Colorado's prior appropriation system.
Third, as the Colorado Supreme Court correctly held, the legislative
history of Colorado's Instream Flow Program demonstrates that the
General Assembly specifically intended that CWCB instream flow
rights, like exchanges, would have the right to claim an interest in
those stream conditions existing during times of a downstream call,
and assert that interest as against exchanges and plans for augmentation. 2 The City of Central decision thus holds special significance for
Colorado's Instream Flow Program in confirming that instream flow
water rights merit the same protection from injury that Colorado law
has granted other types of water rights. A brief background of the
program is helpful to understanding this significance.
The concept of Colorado's Instream Flow Program dates back to
the 1950s, when, in the context of the proposed Fryingpan-Arkansas
project, it became evident that future water projects could completely
dewater streams in the state." Efforts were made to address this issue
by creating a mechanism to protect instream flows, but these efforts
were complicated by the fact that Colorado's prior appropriation system only recognized appropriations of water based upon diversions of
water out of a stream." Eventually, in recognition of the need to "correlate the activities of mankind with some reasonable preservation of
the natural environment," the Colorado General Assembly created the

89. Id.; Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1155 (Colo.
2001).
90. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n, 39 P.3d at 1155; City of Florence v. Bd. of Waterworks of Pueblo, 793 P.2d 148, 156 (Colo. 1990).
91. Cyran, supra note 86, at 154.
92. Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424, 439 (Colo.

2005).
93. Steven J. Shupe, The Legal Evolution of Colorado'sInstream Flow Program, 17 COLO.
LAw. 861, 861 (1988).
94. City of Central, 125 P.3d at 438; Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo.
Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 573 (Colo. 1979).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

Instream Flow Program.9 5 This program vested in the CWCB the exclusive authority to appropriate water between two points on a stream
reach, without need for a diversion, "such waters of natural streams
and lakes as the board determines may be required for minimum
stream flows or for natural surface water levels.., to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree., 96 The Colorado Supreme
Court has held that this exclusive authority creates in the CWCB a
"unique statutory fiduciary duty" to the Colorado public.97 The CWCB
"may only appropriate such waters as 'may be required for minimum
stream flows ... to preserve the environment.' 98

However, once the

CWCB has determined this minimum amount of stream flow and made
an appropriation, the CWCB must act to ensure the protection of that
appropriation as against other water users.99
Over time, CWCB's Instream Flow Program has proven to be a remarkably effective tool for preserving Colorado's natural environment
The CWCB currently holds decrees for
"to a reasonable degree."'
approximately 1200 water rights, the largest number of water right decrees held by one entity in the State of Colorado. 1 These water rights
protect 8500 miles of stream and over 480 natural lakes in all seven
water divisions. 10 2 Since the inception of the Instream Flow Program,
the CWCB has reviewed the water court resumes in each water division
to assure that a proposed change of water rights, plan for augmentation, or exchange will not injuriously affect a decreed instream flow or
natural lake water right. If a water rights application has the potential
to injure an instream flow or natural lake water right, CWCB staff
works with the Office of the Attorney General to file a statement of
opposition, which the CWCB Board ratifies at a subsequent CWCB
meeting.0 3 The Office of the Attorney General and CWCB staff then
work with the water rights applicant to arrive at terms and conditions
that will permit the application to go forward while ensuring continued
maintenance of CWCB minimum stream and lake levels.
95. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2006).
96. Id.
97. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d
1251, 1260 (Colo. 1995).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1259-60.
100. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2006).
101. Edward (Ted) R. Kowalski, Colorado Water Conservation Board, in COLORADO
See also
WATER LAW BENCHBOOK 10-1, 10-3 (Carrie L. Ciliberto ed., 2006).

http://www.cwcb.state.co.us (follow "Water Information" hyperlink; then follow "Electronic Data Management" hyperlink; then follow "Instream Flow and Natural Lake
Level Water Rights Database" hyperlink) (provides a tabulation of all of the water
rights held by the CWCB).
102.

Kowalski, supra note 101, at 10-3.

103. Rules Concerning the Colorado Instream Flow and Natural Lake Level Program, 2 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 408-2(8a) to -2(8c) (2003).
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Over the more than three decades since the inception of the Instream Flow Program, the CWCB has filed statements of opposition in
countless water rights applications involving changes of water rights,
augmentation plans, and exchanges.' 4 Through these statements of
opposition, the CWCB has sought and obtained terms and conditions
protecting instream flow rights from injury due to changed stream
conditions resulting from such applications. These terms and conditions maintain existing stream conditions when necessary to preserve
minimum streamflows, typically by requiring applicants for plans for
augmentation to curtail new out-of-priority diversions made under the
plan, or to release water from upstream replacement sources, only at
such times when new out-of-priority diversions made under the plan
would otherwise injure an instream flow water right.'5 By requiring the
inclusion of these terms and conditions, the CWCB has sought not to
prevent the operation of new plans for augmentation and plans for
augmentation including exchanges, but rather to meet its statutory
fiduciary duty to balance "the activities of mankind with some reasonable preservation of the natural environment," by ensuring
that the operation of such plans will maintain the minimum amount of
streamflow necessary to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.
It was perhaps the success of the CWCB's Instream Flow Program
that has led to the criticisms now levied against it and the Colorado
Supreme Court's City of Central decision. The CWCB's success at requiring water rights applicants to include terms and conditions protecting minimum stream flows has led to the charge that the Instream
Flow Program impedes water development in Colorado by "tying up"
water within certain stream reaches, in a manner inconsistent with the
intent of the general assembly.' 6 These water users claim that the general assembly did not intend to authorize the CWCB to limit the removal of water from stream reaches pursuant to new plans for augmentation and exchanges during times of a senior call, for the asserted reason that granting the CWCB such authority that might constrain future
Colorado water development.
This claim is without merit. The general assembly created the
CWCB in 1937 to assist in the protection and development Colorado's
water resources for the benefit of the present and future inhabitants of
the state. 10 7 By granting the CWCB-the State entity whose role tradi-

104. Interview with Dan Merriman, Chief of the CWCB Stream and Lake Protection
Section (Feb. 13, 2007) (on file with author).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424, 439
(Colo. 2005) (discussing criticism that instream flow water rights complicate development by "tying up" a stream); Case Comment, supra note 6 at 82.
107. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-60-102 (2006).
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tionally has been to promote water development-with the unique
authority to protect the natural environment "to a reasonable degree"
by appropriating rights to instream flows and natural lake levels, the
general assembly clearly intended that the Instream Flow Program
would neither sacrifice Colorado's environment to its need for future
water development, nor sacrifice Colorado's need for future water development to its environment. Rather, as the Colorado Supreme Court
specifically found in upholding Colorado's Instream Flow Program
against one of the original challenges to the Program, the General Assembly's intent was that the Program would maintain a balance between the need for development, and the need to protect Colorado's
environment by preserving a minimum level of water in Colorado's
lakes and streams. 08
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision in City of Centralreaffirms
its earlier holding finding that the General Assembly's intent in vesting
the CWCB with the authority over the newly created Instream Flow
Program was to balance development with protection of stream flows
and lake levels.'1 9 The Court in City of Central reviewed the history of
Colorado's Instream Flow Program for the precise purpose of determining whether the General Assembly intended to authorize the
CWCB to protect a minimum flow within stream reaches from new
water developments resulting from plans for augmentation and plans
for augmentation including exchanges. The Court noted that, due to
the overappropriated nature of Colorado's stream systems, the majority
of new water rights applications involve applications to adapt existing
water rights through changes of water rights, plans for augmentation,
and exchanges, rather than applications for new water rights to divert
water from the stream.1 1 Such adaptations, which have the potential to
change stream conditions during the majority of times in which there
is a senior call, are the chief mechanism by which new water rights applicants seek to develop water within Colorado."' Accordingly, in order to meet the stated objective of the Instream Flow Program of protecting Colorado's environment, the general assembly must have intended that the program would provide a means for the CWCB to protect a minimum level of water within Colorado's streams as against
such adaptations during the majority of times in which Colorado's
streams are subject to a senior call." 2 To rule otherwise would defeat
the intent of the general assembly and effectively emasculate Colo-

108. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d
570, 574 (Colo. 1979).
109. City of Central, 125 P.3d at 440.
110. Id. at 439 (citing LEONARD RICE & MICHAEL D. WHITE, ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF
WATERLAw 77, 78 (1987)).

111.
112.

Id.
Id. at 440.
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rado's Instream Flow Program: "upstream adaptations could later be
made, the streams
dried up, and the whole purpose of the legislation
3
destroyed."

In sum, the Colorado Supreme Court correctly held that in creating Colorado's Instream Flow Program, the general assembly intended
to create not an impotent program but a program that works, by protecting the minimum amount of water necessary to preserve the environment to a reasonable degree. The general assembly did this by bestowing upon instream flow water rights the same rights that Colorado
has long granted other water users: the right to claim a vested interest
in those stream conditions existing as of the time of appropriation, and
the right to protect that interest from new appropriations or "adaptations" that could dry up Colorado's stream system.
V. THE CITY OF CENTRAL DECISION AND HISTORICAL WATER
USE
A third criticism that has been leveled at the City of Centraldecision
is that the Colorado Supreme Court, in issuing its decision, improperly
ignored actual historical use on North Clear Creek."' Specifically,
Central City asserted that it was justified in making out-of-priority diversions from its Miner's Gulch and Peck's Gulch diversions structures,
for the asserted reason that these out-of-priority diversions were historical practices in existence at the time the CWCB appropriated its
North Clear Creek instream flow water right, due to the water commissioner's alleged failure to administer Central City's water rights on
North Clear Creek."' The Colorado Supreme Court erred in not considering these diversions as a legitimate pre-existing use.
This criticism, however, is unfounded. First, the Colorado Supreme Court did not address issues pertaining to Central City's historic
out-of-priority diversions from North Clear Creek for a very good reason: these issues were not a subject of the appeal. The subject of the
City of Centralappeal was whether, as a matter of law, Colorado law required Central City to include terms and conditions protecting the
CWCB instream flow water right from injury caused by Central City's
plan for augmentation. The Colorado Supreme Court referred the
specific issue of whether and to what extent Central City's proposal
would result in such injury to the Water Court for consideration on
remand. Thus, any criticism arguing that the Colorado Supreme
Court should have addressed factual issues regarding pre-existing uses
is simply without merit.

113.

Id.

114.
115.

See, e.g., Case Comment, supra note 6 at 82.
See Central Motion, supra note 29 at 2-3.
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Second, even if Central City had argued on appeal that it factually
was not obligated to protect the CWCB's instream flow water right, this
argument would have failed. Central City did not argue that its past
out-of-priority diversions were made by virtue of a recognized exchange or court-approved plan for augmentation. Central City did
attempt to present evidence at trial that the water commissioner had
not curtailed such diversions."
However, the Colorado Supreme
Court has held that an illegal diversion of water may not provide a basis
for determining the historical use of a right. "7 This rule holds true
even if a water commissioner overlooked or previously permitted such
past diversions." 8 Thus, a water user may not rely upon past illegal uses
in an attempt to prove that its new uses are not causing injury to another water right.
Third, to the extent Central City could have proven its past out-ofpriority diversions to be a legal use, Colorado law provides a specific
avenue for recognizing such uses. The General Assembly enacted a
specific statutory section expressly intended to address the relationship
between instream flow water rights and legal pre-existing uses. Specifically, Colorado Revised Statute section 37-92-102(3) (b) expressly addresses the treatment of historical water uses under Colorado's Instream Flow Program."9 Colorado Revised Statute section 37-92-102(3)
governs the CWCB's appropriation of instream flow water rights. Subsection 102(3) (b) provides that:
Any such appropriation shall be subject to the present uses or exchanges of water being made by other water users pursuant to appropriation or practices in existence on the date of such appropriation,
whether or not previously confirmed by court order or decree."n
The General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 81-414 (codified at section 37-92-102(3) (b)) in part to address the concerns of agricultural
water users regarding their ability to operate their historical unadjudicated uses or exchanges if a water court decreed an instream flow water right to the CWCB.'"' According to a June 4, 1981 letter to Governor Richard Lamm from John M. Sayre and Gregory J. Hobbs, at the
time that Senate Bill 414 was enacted, many agricultural water users
were operating unadjudicated exchanges and were concerned that an

116. City of Centra4 125 P.3d at 433.
117. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 57 (Colo.
1999) (holding water user may not rely upon evidence of use of water for an unde-

creed purpose to prove historical use of a water right).
118.

119.
120.

Id. at 57-58.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (b) (2006).

Id.

121. Letter from John M Sayre & GregoryJ. Hobbs to Richard Lamm, Governor, in
Support of Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District for S.B. 414, Minimum
Stream Flows (June 4, 1981) (on file with author).
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instream flow appropriation could prevent such exchanges."n Another
concern at that time was the impact of instream flow appropriations on
water users who had changed their point of diversion, but had not obtained a decree for such change. ' The June 4, 1981 letter addressed
Governor Lamm's concerns that Senate Bill 414 would impose too
many limits on the CWCB's Instream Flow Program and pointed out
that the CWCB had always recognized ongoing uses and exchanges,
and that the statute was stating an existing practice of the CWCB.' 4
The CWCB interprets section 102(3) (b) to subject an instream flow
water right to actual, legal, but undecreed, uses of water occurring on
the date the CWCB appropriated the water right or within a reasonable
time period in proximity to that date, in the amounts and season in
which the water was used.2 5 Water users have invoked and the CWCB
has agreed to the applicability of this provision in numerous water
court cases, including both instream flow water right applications filed
by the CWCB and other water rights applications that the CWCB has
opposed to prevent injury to an instream flow water right. 6 Most often, section 102(3) (b) has applied to unadjudicated exchanges and
diversions 7of water rights at points other than the decreed point of
diversion.1

The CWCB staff implements section 37-92-102(3) (b) by requiring a
person claiming that a use of water existed at the time of an instream
flow water right appropriation to provide an affidavit from a person
with personal knowledge of the existing use. The affidavit should set
forth:
a) the person's name and how the person obtained personal knowledge of
the use;
b) a full description of the amount diverted, months diverted and type of
use; and
c) a statement that the use was occurring
on or about the date that the
28
CWCB appropriated the ISF water right.1
Upon receipt of such an affidavit, the CWCB staff consults with the

water commissioner for the affected area to verify the claimed use.'"
After receiving verification, the CWCB includes the description of the
claimed use in its instream flow water right decree so the Division of
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Interview with Dan Merriman, supra note 104.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Water Resources knows to administer the instream flow water right as
junior to the existing use." In the context of a water rights application
that the CWCB has opposed, the CWCB and the applicant include a
description of the claimed use in their stipulation and the resulting
decree, again to inform the division engineer of the relative priorities
of the two uses under the statute for administrative purposes."'
The CWCB does not, however, interpret section 37-92-102(3) (b) to
subject instream flow water rights to out-of-priority or otherwise illegal
diversions occurring on or near the date the CWCB appropriated an
instream flow water right, because such diversions were not in accordance with the priority system. In enacting section 37-92-102(3) (b), it
is presumed that the Colorado General Assembly intended that the
entire statute (Colorado Revised Statute Title 37, Article 92) would be
effective."' Because no provision of Colorado Revised Statute Title 37,
Article 92, allows illegal uses of water, such as diverting out-of-priority
to the detriment of other water rights, section 37-92-102(3) (b) cannot
reasonably be interpreted to apply to illegal uses."'
In the context of the City of Centrallitigation, Central City raised no
argument on appeal that any of its past out-of-priority diversions from
its Miner's Gulch or Peck's Gulch diversion structures were made pursuant to a legal, undecreed exchange or court approved plan for augmentation. At trial, Central City failed to provide the CWCB with an
affidavit or any other proof describing the existence and the amount of
such an exchange or plan." ' Thus, any argument that the Colorado
Supreme Court improperly failed to consider historic uses on North
Clear Creek in issuing its decision in City of Central, or that the Colorado Supreme Court's decision will hinder the CWCB's future ability to
consider such historic uses, is simply without merit.
VI. THE CITY OF CENTRAL DECISION AND COLORADO WATER
RIGHTS ADMINISTRATION
A final criticism levied at the City of Centraldecision is that it is the
wrong result for the future development of water in Colorado."' According to this criticism, the Colorado Supreme Court's decision
greatly complicates the ability of water users to develop water in Colo130. Id.
131. Id.
132. COLO. REv. STAT. § 2-4-201(1)(b) (2006).
133. See, e.g., Martinez v. Cont'l Enters., 730 P.2d 308, 315 (Colo. 1986) (discussing
that statutes must be construed as whole to further legislative intent by entire statutory

scheme).
134. Interview with Dan Merriman, supra note 104.
135. See, e.g., Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424, 440
(Colo. 2005) (discussing criticism that instream flow rights complicate development by

"tying up" a stream); Case Comment, supra note 6 at 82.
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rado, by allowing the CWCB, and potentially other water users, to
claim a right to stream conditions within stream reaches during times
of a downstream call. It has been argued that such a result allows water
users such as the CWCB to "tie up" stream reaches during times of a
downstream call, reducing the ability of other water users to divert water from such stream reaches pursuant to new exchanges, plans for
augmentation, or plans for augmentation including exchange. 3 ' This
argument is incorrect, both with respect to Colorado's Instream Flow
Program, and to the proper administration of Colorado's prior appropriation system.
First, the City of Centraldecision was clearly necessary to the continued success of Colorado's Instream Flow Program. The Colorado Supreme Court's decision recognizes that it is the ability of the Instream
Flow Program to protect stream conditions during times of a senior
call as against new "adaptations" of existing senior rights that gives instream flow water rights their value.'37 If the Colorado Supreme Court
held that CWCB instream flow water rights are not entitled to the
maintenance of historical stream conditions during the majority of
times when streams are subject to a senior call, "upstream adaptations
could later be made, the streams dried up, and the whole purpose of
the [instream flow] legislation destroyed."'1
The Colorado Supreme Court recognized that allowing instream
flow rights to actually maintain minimum flows on Colorado's streams
does complicate the development of new water projects. Yet, as the
court observed, "all water rights complicate the efforts of new or existing users to develop sources of supply. This result is endemic to the
priority system and property rights generally."'' 9 Nonetheless, in creating Colorado's Instream Flow Program, the Colorado General Assembly decided to offer some level of protection for Colorado's environment from continued efforts to divert water from Colorado's streams.
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision was necessary, and proper, to
effect this decision.
Second, as is evidenced by the support of water users groups such
as the Colorado River Water Conservation District, Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, and Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, the Colorado Supreme Court's decision is necessary
not only to Colorado's Instream Flow Program, but to the further development of water in Colorado. As noted, the court's decision in City
of Central recognizes that in an overappropriated stream system, the
majority of new water development projects do not seek to appropriate
water from the streams during the few times when there is no senior
136.
137.
138.
139.

City of Central 125 P.3d at 440.
Id. at 439.
Id.at 440.
Id. (citations omitted).
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call in effect and unappropriated water is available for diversion."
Rather, the majority of new water projects rely upon existing stream
conditions during times of a senior call in order to effectuate new exchanges, plans for augmentation including exchange, and changes of
Water users must be entitled to claim a right to the
water rights.'
maintenance of these stream conditions. Absent the ability to claim
such a right, Colorado law would have no method for water users to
sort out the various claims to water within stream reaches during the
majority of times when streams are subject to call. Indeed, water users
have historically attempted to protect stream conditions as against future developments or adaptations of existing rights by obtaining appropriative rights of exchange.' 3
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision is significant in addressing
the right of Colorado water users to claim a right to protect existing
stream conditions. The Colorado Supreme Court specifically addressed CWCB instream flow rights.' 3 However, the Court's decision
also protects the ability of other water users to claim a right to protect
water uses against new upstream adaptations. For example, the court
stated that an applicant for a new plan for augmentation including a
new junior exchange could not have its new diversions administered
under a senior priority as against other water users.'" Had the court
held otherwise, it would jeopardize the priority dates of exchanges
across Colorado. A water user who, thirty years ago, had obtained an
appropriative right of exchange to protect the amount of water available within a particular exchange reach could find the usefulness of
that right defeated by a new exchange operated under a new plan for
augmentation. Such a result would hinder the development of water
projects by removing the certainty that any water project including an
exchange would not be jeopardized by a new plan for augmentation.
Such a result does not serve the interest of Colorado water users.
As with any Colorado Supreme Court decision, there are questions
left unanswered. The first such question involves the operation of an
exchange to a well. Central City argued that no exchange exists between the point of depletion for the Gilpin County Wells and Central
City's replacement source for the wells, notwithstanding the fact that
the depletions from the Gilpin County Wells are upstream of replacement sources, for the asserted reason that an exchange cannot be operated to a well.' A contrary position would hold that an exchange
140.
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can operate to a well, or at least to the location where the wells depletions affect the stream. The Colorado Supreme Court declined to address this argument, in part because Central City had not provided
support of its argument or sufficient information regarding the location of the Wells, and in part because deciding this issue was not necessary to decide the legal issue of whether Central City must protect the
CWCB's water rights from injury.'" Accordingly, the failure of the
Colorado Supreme Court to address this issue is a failure of the record,
not of the court's decision.
Second, the Colorado Supreme Court did not hold that all types of
appropriations are entitled to the maintenance of historical stream
conditions during times of a downstream call. Based upon Colorado
statute, exchanges clearly should be entitled to claim such a right.'47
Based upon the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling in City of Central,
CWCB instream flow rights may also now claim such an interest. However, the Court based its conclusion regarding CWCB instream flow
water rights upon a detailed review of the legislative history of the Instream Flow Program. The court could conclude that the general assembly did not intend certain other types of water rights to operate in
a similar manner.
The limitations in the Colorado Supreme Court's decision do not,
however, overshadow the importance, or the correctness, of the decision. In basing its decision upon the principle granting water users a
vested right in those stream conditions existing at the time of appropriation, the court served both the interests of water rights developers
who seek to protect their investment, and the CWCB in its efforts to
protect instream flow water rights for the benefit of Colorado's environment and Colorado's future.

146. Id.
147. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-80-120(4) (2006) ("Whenever substitute water is supplied to a senior ditch, the supplier... may take an equivalent amount for beneficial
use").
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Colorado River has a reputation as a "much litigated" river
about which the states have had little success in agreeing on river management. But on February 3, 2006,' and again on April 30, 2007, representatives of the Colorado River Basin states beat the rap, arriving at
a significant milestone in the development of a more modern resource
management regime. The states' representatives recommended to the
Secretary of the Interior an approach for Colorado River reservoir operations including storage in Lake Mead, coordinated strategies for
* Mr. Davenport is a member of the Nevada and Washington State Bar Associations.
He serves as Special Counsel to the Colorado River Commission of Nevada, acting as
one of Nevada's representatives in negotiation of the Proposal discussed in this article.
He is past Chief of the Water Division of the Colorado River Commission of Nevada,
which he has also served as Senior Deputy Attorney General. His private law practice

includes water, real property, environmental, and administrative law.
1. Coincidentally, this was the 62"d anniversary of the United States' adoption of
the U.S./Mexican Water Treaty. See infra note 13.
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Lake Powell and Lake Mead under low reservoir conditions and Lower
Basin shortage guidelines. The states' representatives' agreement and
proposal are ensconced in several documents. The states' representatives' February 3 correspondence with the Secretary conveyed two
documents: the Seven Basin States' Preliminary Proposal Regarding
Colorado River Interim Operations and a draft Agreement between
the Colorado River states' water management agencies and water users.
Their April 30, 2007, correspondence with the Secretary, offered in the
context of comments on the Bureau of Reclamation's Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin
Shortages and Coordinated Operationsfor Lake Powell and Lake Mead, 2 conveyed a fully executed Agreement Concerning Colorado River Management and Operations ("States' Agreement"); Proposed Interim
Guidelines for Colorado River Operations ("Proposed Guidelines"); a
Forbearance Agreement between Lower Basin parties ("Forbearance
Agreement); a Shortage Sharing Agreement Between Arizona and Nevada ("Shortage Sharing Agreement") and described a "Delivery
Agreement" that would be necessary between the parties and the Secretary of the Interior to provide assurance for those parties developing
projects to augment water supplies that Colorado River deliveries will
be available. The fundamentals of the February 3, 2006, Preliminary
Proposal and Draft Agreement, and the subsequent developments reflected in the April 30, 2007 documents, are set forth below in section
II. The effect of the proposal is to begin to resolve and soften the divides in the hydrologic risk 3 distribution put in place by existing Colorado River law. The proposal does so without amending the law, but
by adopting some new approaches to the way in which it is applied.
II. THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS
The Colorado River is a legally bifurcated and segmented river.
Above Lee Ferry, which the Colorado River Compact established as the
division between the Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado River
Basin, the prior appropriation doctrine prevails and state water managers administer water rights, meeting only the needs of senior priority
right holders when hydrologic conditions dictate. Thus the highest
level hydrologic risk is assigned to the latest party to obtain a right. As
between the Upper Basin states, the hydrologic risk is apportioned in
terms of overuse of the respective states' Upper Basin Compact apportionments, which come into play when a "curtailment" is required so as

2. 72 Fed. Reg. 9026 (February 28, 2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/
reg on/programs/strategies/draftEIS/index.html (herinafter DEIS).
3. The risk is that the available water supply will not be large enough to meet the
current demand.
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not to interfere with deliveries to the Lower Basin. Below Lee Ferry,
the Secretary of the Interior is the "water master" pursuant to the
mandates of the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, s meeting the
needs of all parties holding contracts with the Secretary for the delivery
of Colorado River water.6 There, the hydrologic risk is contractually
and statutorily apportioned in favor of those California contractors,
whose facilities had been put in place before the 1968 Colorado River
Project Act,7 over Arizona's Central Arizona Project. As between the
upper and lower basins of the Colorado River, the Colorado River
Compact assigns the hydrologic risk to the Upper Basin by guaranteeing a minimum delivery to the Lower Basin.8 The hydrologic risk distributions necessarily following from the current law, which developed
over time to meet then-legitimate concerns and hard political realities,
make agreements between the Colorado River states difficult.
Federal law and practice, including Section 602(b) of the 1968
Colorado River Basin Project Act and the Secretary's Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs Pursuant
to the Colorado River Basin Project Act, call upon the Secretary of the
Interior to consult with the states through "Governors' Representatives," who represent the governors and their respective states, regarding the operation of Lakes Powell and Mead. 9 Through this law and
practice, the Governors' Representatives have, in the past, reached
agreements among themselves and with the Secretary on various aspects of Colorado River reservoir operation. The states developed the
documents forwarded to the Secretary on February 3, 2006, and April
30, 2007, in furtherance of this law and practice.
In 2001, the Secretary of the Interior adopted interim surplus
guidelines ("ISG") for utilization in the Lower Basin of the Colorado,
based in large part on a proposal from the states' representatives.0 In

4. Upper Colorado River Compact, art. IV, 63 Stat. 31 (1949).
5. Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (2000).
6. § 617d.
7. See id. § 1521(b). Within California, hydrologic risk is apportioned by the
"Seven Party Agreement," in which contractors are organized in groups with the municipal water users deriving their rights through the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California assuming the greatest risk.
8. Colorado River Compact of 1922, art. III, 42 Stat. 171 (1921).
9. 43 U.S.C. § 1552(b) (2000); Review of Existing Coordinated Long-Range Operating Criteria for Colorado River Reservoirs (Operating Criteria), 70 Fed. Reg. 15,873
(Mar. 29, 2005); see also MILTON N. NATHANSON, UPDATING THE HOOVER DAM
DOCUMENTS VIII-5 to -7 (1978).
10. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772 (Jan. 25, 2001)
(stating the ISG were adopted for the purpose of determining annually the conditions
under which the Secretary would declare the availability of surplus water for use within
the states of Arizona, California and Nevada in accordance with and under the authority of the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617v, and the Decree
of the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964). The
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the years following the adoption of the ISG, drought conditions in the
Colorado River Basin caused a significant reduction in water stored in
Lakes Powell and Mead, and precipitated discussions by and among
the states' representatives, and with the United States through the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Reclamation.
Upper Basin states-Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, and New Mexicobegan to express concern about actual shortages and insufficient water
availability in headwaters and tributaries to meet all permitted rights,
conditions which had been occurring in those states. Dendrochronological (tree ring) studies raised questions in the academic and environmental communities about the factual reliability of Colorado River
hydrological data as a basis for water allocation." The Honorable J.
Steven Griles, Deputy Secretary of the Interior, on behalf of Secretary
of the Interior Gale Norton, announced at the Colorado River Water
Users' Conference in Las Vegas in December 2004, that the Colorado
River drought of 2001-2004 compelled the Secretary to consider the
adoption of rules through which to govern the distribution of Colorado River water in the Lower Basin during shortage conditions. 2 He
requested, on behalf of Norton and the Department, that the Lower
Basin states, Arizona, California, and Nevada, negotiate to propose
rules for operation in a shortage regime. The states' representatives
began to discuss whether the United States has a right to deliver less
than 1.5 million acre feet to Mexico under the U.S. - Mexico 1944 Water Treaty's "extraordinary drought" provision when only Upper Basin
water users had suffered actual shortages.5
In early 2005, Upper Basin states sought a "mid-year review" by the
Secretary of the Interior of the operating determinations previously
made in the 2005 Annual Operating Plan. The Secretary had deterISG are currently effective through calendar year 2015 (through preparation of the

2016 Annual Operating Plan).
11. In this writer's view, whether dendrochronological data is included in the hydrologic record is academic. To the extent that the historic hydrologic record is not

sufficiently "dry" to provide accurate predictions of future water supply assumptions,
the matter can just as easily be resolved by applying a conservative risk assumption,
discounting the historic hydrologic record by some agreed value, e.g. 5-10%. Reliance
upon any historic data as a basis to predict the future is speculative at best, and a conservative supply assumption is the better course. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
WATER AND SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY BOARD, COLORADO RIvER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT:

EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY (2007).

Reliance upon the

historic record only is even less justified when taking the potential effects of climate
change into account. In that light, some greater agree discounting value, e.g. 15%,
may be in order.
12. HonorableJ. Steven Griles, Deputy Sec'y of the Interior, Building on Success Facing the Challenges Ahead, Address to the Colorado River Water Users Association
(Dec. 17, 2004).
13. Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico respecting utilization
of waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., art.
9(f), Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944 U.S. - Mexico Water Treaty].
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mined in the annual plan that the release of Colorado River water
from Lake Powell to Lake Mead would be 8.23 million acre feet.' 4 Up-

per and Lower Basin state representatives have long disagreed in their
interpretation of the Compact's provisions relating to the "deficiency"
referred to in Article 111(c) of the Compact, and the role of Lower Basin tributaries in meeting the U.S./Mexican Treaty obligation. 5 This
long-standing disagreement motivated the states' Congressional representatives to incorporate several defensive mechanisms into the 1968
Colorado River Basin Project Act, incorporating a strategy not unlike
that imposed by the prior appropriation doctrine, to protect parties
already enjoying Colorado River water rights at the expense of those
newly acquiring them, thus establishing the latest aspect of current
hydrologic risk distributions. For the Lower Basin, Congress adopted
Section 301 (b) of the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act to protect
California's more senior river diversion rights. 16 For the Upper Basin,
Section 602(a) of the same Act guaranteed sufficient water maintenance in Lake Powell to permit the Upper Basin states to meet their
obligations under Section 111(c) of the Colorado River Compact. 7
On May 2, 2005, the Secretary wrote to the governors of the seven
Colorado River Basin states, declining to review her earlier determinations in the 2005 Annual Operating Plan, reserving her authority and
discretion to release less than 8,230,000 acre feet of water from Lake
Powell into Lake Mead in any year, and announcing her intention to
undertake a process to develop Lower Basin shortage guidelines and to
explore management options for the operation of Lakes Powell and
14. Review of Existing Coordinated Long-Range Operating Criteria for Colorado
River Reservoirs (Operating Criteria), 70 Fed. Reg. at 15,875 (determining the amount
of water as mentioned in section 11(2) (b) by the phrase "the objective shall be to maintain a minimum release of water from Lake Powell of 8.23 million acre-feet."). That
number is arguably composed of 7.5 million acre feet (the amount stated in Article
III(a) of the Colorado River Compact), plus 750,000 acre feet (1/2 of the U.S. and
Mexico Treaty Obligation), minus 20,000 acre feet (presumed to flow into the Colorado River from the Paria River below Glen Canyon Dam and above Lee Ferry). The
Upper and Lower Basin states have long disagreed over both the origin of this number
and their respective obligations regarding it.
15. If as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall hereafter recognize in the United States of Mexico any right to the use of any waters of the
Colorado River system, such waters shall be supplied first from the waters which are
surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified in paragraphs (a) and
(b); and if such surplus shall prove insufficient for this purpose, then, the burden of
such deficiency shall be equally borne by the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, and
whenever necessary the States of the Upper Division shall deliver at Lee Ferry water to
supply one-half of the deficiency so recognized in addition to that provided in paragraph (d). Colorado River Compact of 1922, art. III, 42 Stat. 171 (1921); see alsoJames
S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California's Claims to Water From the Colorado
River, 4 U. DENY. WATERL. REv. 290, 320 (2001).
16. 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b) (2000).
17. Id. § 1552(b).
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Mead in low reservoir conditions. " On June 19, 2005, the Secretary
initiated a decision-making process pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),'9 beginning with the Bureau of Reclamation's "Notice to Solicit Comments and Hold Public Meetings on the
development of management strategies for Lakes Powell and Mead,
including Lower Basin shortage guidelines, under low reservoir conditions."2 0 The Bureau of Reclamation proceeded to undertake scoping

and develop alternatives pursuant to NEPA in anticipation of development of an environmental impact statement supporting a record of
decision ("ROD") on Colorado River Reservoir Operations: Development of
Lower Basin Shortage Guidelines and Coordinated Management Strategiesfor
Lake Powell and Lake Mead UnderLow Reservoir Conditions.'
For more than a year, the states' representatives, including the author of this article, the Bureau of Reclamation, and others, engaged in
discussions on a variety of potential management options to address
the system-wide drought in the Colorado River Basin. Initially, by August 15, 2005, they agreed that shortage guidelines should be designed
to delay the onset and minimize the extent and duration of shortages
in the Lower Basin, that management strategies should maximize the
protection afforded to the Upper Basin by Lake Powell against possible
calls upon the Upper Basin to curtail uses, and that shortage guidelines
should be premised upon proportionate sharing of shortages by Mexico pursuant to the U.S./Mexico Water Treaty.
On August 25, 2005, the states' representatives' corresponded with
the Secretary expressing conceptual agreement in the development
and implementation of three broad concepts for improved management and operation of the Colorado River: coordinated reservoir
management and Lower Basin shortage strategies, system efficiency
and management, and augmentation of supply. 2 The states agreed to
refine these concepts into an interrelated suite of management strategies that should be analyzed during the Secretary's environmental
compliance process. They emphasized, in their correspondence to the
Secretary, that the coordinated reservoir management and Lower Ba18.

Letter from Gale Norton, Sec'y of the Interior, to Honorable Jon Huntsman,

Jr., Governor of Utah et al. (May 2, 2005), availableat http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
g4000/AOP2005/DOIDecision.pdf.
19. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
20. Colorado River Reservoir Operations: Development of Management Strategies
for Lake Powell and Lake Mead Under Low Reservoir Conditions, 70 Fed. Reg. 34794

(June 15, 2005).
21. Colorado River Reservoir Operations: Development of Lower Basin Shortage
Guidelines and Coordinated Management Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead
Under Low Reservoir Conditions, 70 Fed. Reg. 57322 (Sept. 30, 2005).
22. Letter from The States of Ariz., Cal., Colo., Nev., N.M., Utah and Wyo. Gover-

nor's Representatives on Colo. River Operations to Gale A. Norton, Sec'y of the Interior (Aug. 25, 2005), available at http://wwa.colorado.edu/resources/colorado river/
interior/letter to Norton 08-05.pdf.
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sin shortage strategies under development by the seven states were essential and integral parts of a larger, more comprehensive management arrangement developing between them. The objectives of their
developing agreement were to avoid political and legal confrontation
over the meaning of fundamental aspects of the law pertaining to the
Colorado River; to augment the supply of Colorado River water; and to
realize a common goal to implement management strategies that allow
more efficient, flexible, responsive and reliable operation of the system
reservoirs for the benefit of all interests in the Colorado River Basin.
The states emphasized that their coordinated reservoir management
and shortage strategy recommendation, outlined in their correspondence to the Secretary, was tentative and conditional on final agreement of all the other aspects of that more comprehensive management
arrangement by the states.
The states proposed that any reservoir operating strategy that the
Secretary developed be explicitly limited to an interim period for the
purpose of gaining operational experience. They recommended tying
interim operations to the implementation of additional measures that
would accomplish the dual objectives of augmenting the supply of the
River and operating the existing infrastructure in the system more efficiently. They reserved the issue of their differing interpretations of
Article 111(c) of the Compact and mainstream and tributary development, hoping to find practical resolution of their differences in ensuing discussions. The states generally recommended system augmentation through weather modification and desalination, individual supply
augmentation through additions of non-system water or retired use of
tributary rights in exchange for mainstem diversions, and generally
greater use of the concepts of forbearance, replacement, or exchange.
The states also recommended coordinated reservoir management
and a Lower Basin shortage strategy using the water surface elevations
or volumetric contents of both Lake Mead and Lake Powell to determine the beginning and end of a Lower Basin shortage condition, and
incorporating various water management strategies including tiered
deliveries, content balancing, alternative release schedules, Section
602(a) and other equalization, and storage of water in Lake Mead.
The states pointed out that the ISG, which had been adopted by the
Secretary in January 2001, might need modification and extension.
The states reiterated that shortages to the Lower Basin states should be
shared proportionately with Mexico under the 1944 Treaty. The probability that shortage guidelines will impose shortages should be reduced by the implementation of the coordinated reservoir operation
strategy, benefiting Lower Basin as well as Mexican users.
At the request of Upper Basin states, the states' representatives began to discuss whether to agree that during the interim period they
would not raise issues of the meaning, interpretation, or enforcement
of the Colorado River Compact, the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project
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Act, or other aspects of Colorado River law concerning any obligation
of the Upper Basin to meet any requirement at Lee Ferry, as the coordinated operations of Lakes Powell and Mead might change the volume of water retained in Lake Powell under existing operations so as
to meet current hydrologic risk distributions.
The states also offered to work with the Department of the Interior
to analyze and implement a program of tamarisk eradication throughout the basin, yielding multiple benefits to the environment and water
supply of the basin, to develop a prioritized list of specific measures
that could result in the more efficient management of the River in the
2 and to implement measures, together with the SecreLower Basin, 23
tary, to better coordinate daily system operations and water orders of
contractors in the Lower Basin. The states requested that the Department take all necessary actions to replace water that has been released
to Mexico through the bypass drain since 2004, and continue to minimize over-deliveries to Mexico.
A technical committee-comprised of representatives from each of
the seven states and the Upper Colorado River Commission-formed
in the summer of 2004 to identify an operating regime for the coordinated operation of Lakes Powell and Mead under low reservoir conditions. The Bureau of Reclamation provided technical assistance in the
form of hydrologic modeling. The technical committee examined a
number of potential operational strategies for times of extended
drought or periods of below-average runoff in order to minimize
shortages in the Lower Basin and avoid the risk of curtailment in the
Upper Basin. In the ensuing months after the creation of the technical
committee, the technical committee and the Bureau of Reclamation
performed numerous hydrologic modeling runs and analyzed the results. When evaluating a particular operational strategy, the Committee examined the effects of the strategy on key lake elevations (for both
Lakes Powell and Mead), energy generation, and probability and magnitude of shortage. On January 25, 2006, the Committee reached consensus and recommended the strategy now incorporated into the
states' recommendations to the Secretary.
Negotiations between the states continued through the fall of 2005,
progressing and regressing at times. Given the disparity of the expectations under which the discussion had begun, the disproportionate
hydrologic risk distributions, the Colorado River's litigious reputation,
and the non-institutionalized framework of multi-state discussion, it
came as a surprise to some that, on February 3, 2006, the seven Colorado River Basin states were able to correspond with the Secretary of
the Interior recommending a common approach to management of
23.

Initial priorities for implementation include full utilization of Senator Wash

Reservoir, development of Drop 2 and Wellton-Mohawk regulatory storage, and evacuating accumulated sediments behind Laguna Dam.
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Lakes Powell and Mead and for management of shortages in the Lower
Basin of the Colorado River.24
Taking the states' representatives' Proposal and Draft Agreement
into account, along with the proposals of others, Bureau of Reclamation staff immediately began work developing and defining alternative
proposals for action that the Bureau could consider and compare in an
environmental impact statement, which would be published in support
of a Secretarial record of decision that would be published-if on
schedule-in December 2007. Subjecting each of those alternatives to
hydrologic analysis, as well as the broad perspective of analysis otherwise required by the National Environmental Policy Act, the Bureau of
Reclamation published a Draft Environmental Impact Statement
("DEIS") on February 28, 2007. The DEIS analyzed five alternatives:
No Action, the "Basin States Alternative, 25 the "Conservation Before
Storage Alternative",26 the "Water Supply Alternative,
and the "Reser
voir Storage Alternative. 28
Throughout 2006, the states' representatives met to draft further
agreements between themselves, particularly in the Lower Basin, that
would be necessary to make the states' earlier proposal work, under the
presumption that the Secretary of the Interior would adopt the proposal. Negotiations between the states' representatives responding to
the Bureau of Reclamation's request for comments on its DEIS ensued
immediately upon that document's publication, resulting in the April
23, 2007, execution of the States Agreement and the April 30, 2007,
correspondence forwarding it and other documents to the Secretary.
Again, the Colorado River Basin states demonstrated a new-found
commitment toward working together to enhance the collaborative
spirit of Colorado River management and the natural resource value of
their common resource.

24. Letter from The States of Ariz., Cal., Colo., Nev., N.M., Utah and Wyo. Governor's Representatives on Colo. River Operations to Gale A. Norton, Sec'y of the Interior (Feb. 3, 2006), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/re~gon/programs/stratgies/
consultation /Feb06BasinStatesTransmittalLetter.pdf.
It is unfair to suggest that the

states' representatives' recommendation was the only viable proposal made to the Secretary, both before and after February 3. Representatives of the Colorado River hydropower community made several valuable suggestions. Representatives of environmental groups also offered valuable suggestions under the moniker "Conservation
Before Shortage." Recreation concerns have also been expressed through the National Park Service directly to the Bureau of Reclamation.
25. DEIS, supra note 2, at 2-8.
26. Id. at 2-11.
27.

Id. at 2-13.

28.

Id. at 2-14.
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BASIN STATES' RECOMMENDATION

A. SEVEN BASIN STATES' PROPOSAL REGARDING COLORADO RIVER
INTERIM OPERATIONS

The seven Colorado River Basin states recommended interim operations that would minimize shortages in the Lower Basin and avoid the
risk of curtailment in the Upper Basin through conservation, more
efficient reservoir operations, and long-term alternatives to bring additional water into the Colorado River community. The states' recommendation has three key elements: management of Lake Powell and
Lake Mead to minimize shortages and avoid curtailments; actions that
fully utilize and conserve water in the Lower Basin; and apportionment
of shortages in the Lower Basin.2
1. Coordinated Operation of Lakes Powell and Mead
The states' representatives recommended improvements in coordination for the operation of Lake Mead and Lake Powell. Under the
proposal, the Secretary would determine the amount of water to release from Lake Powell to Lake Mead each year using the elevation of
the two lakes to occur on the following January 1 as predicted by the
Bureau of Reclamation's 24 month study performed in August.
In years when Lake Powell's projected content is at or above an
elevation between 3636 and 3666, as stated in a "Lake Powell Equalization Elevation" table reflecting anticipated growth in Upper Basin water use, the Secretary would release water from Lake Powell to Lake
Mead at a rate greater than 8,230,000 acre-feet per year to the extent
necessary to equalize storage in the two reservoirs, or would otherwise
release 8,230,000 acre-feet from Lake Powell.3° In years when Lake
Powell's projected content is below the elevation stated in the same
table but at or above 3575 ft., the secretary would release 8,230,000
acre-feet from Lake Powell if the projected elevation of Lake Mead
were at or above 1075 ft." If the projected elevation of Lake Mead
were below 1075 ft., the Secretary would balance the contents of Lake
Mead and Lake Powell, but release no more than 9,000,000 acre-feet
and no less than 7,000,000 acre-feet from Lake Powell. 2

29. Seven Basin States' Proposed Interim Guidelines for Colorado River Operation
(April
30,
2007)
[hereinafter
Proposed
Guidelines]
available
at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/stratelies/DEIScomments/State/BasinStat
espdf (Attachment B to the Basin States Comments on Draft EnvironmentalImpact Statement, Colorado River Interim Guidelinesfor Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations

for Lake Powell and Lake Mead).
30. Id. § 3.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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In years when Lake Powell's projected content is below 3575 ft. but
at or above 3525 ft., 7,480,000 acre-feet would be released from Lake
Powell if the projected elevation of Lake Mead were at or above 1025
ft.3 3 If the projected elevation of Lake Mead is below 1025 ft., the Sec-

retary would release 8,230,000 acre-feet from Lake Powell. 4 In years
when Lake Powell's projected content is below 3525 ft., the Secretary
would balance the contents of Lake Mead and Lake Powell, but would
release no more than 9,500,000 acre-feet and no less than 7,000,000
acre-feet from Lake Powell.
Coordinated reservoir operation, as proposed by the states, raises
only one legal conundrum-one which the representatives of the seven
states had earlier agreed to set aside. The issue arises from Section 602
of the 1968 Colorado River Projects Act. That section sets forth the
elements which the Secretary must be consider in making an annual
determination about when "equalization" of the two reservoirs should
occur (but provides no specific numeric requirements),3 and is the
putative premise for disagreement regarding the annual release of
8,230,000 acre feet from Lake Powell. By agreeing that predictive lake
elevations would guide the Secretary's determinations, the states' representatives set aside the controversy.
regarding the application of the
37
requirement.
storage
602(a)
Section
2. Actions That Fully Utilize and Conserve Water in the Lower Basin
Modification and Extension of the Interim Surplus Guidelines
The Proposed Interim Guidelines forwarded to the Secretary by
the states' representatives on April 30, 2007, are drafted into the In33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Colorado River Basin Project Act, sec. 602, Pub. L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885
(1968).
37. Article 9 of the States Agreement provides that "The Parties' Recommendation
has been developed with the intent to be consistent with existing law. The Parties
expressly agree, for purposes of this Agreement, that the storage of water in and release of water from Lakes Powell and Mead pursuant to a ROD issued by the Secretary
in substantial conformance with the Parties' Recommendation and this Agreement,

and any agreements, rules and regulations adopted by the Secretary or the parties to
implement such ROD, shall not constitute a violation of Article III(a)-(e) inclusive of
the Colorado River Compact, or Sections 601 and 602(a) of the Colorado River Basin
Project Act of 1968 (43 U.S.C. §§ 1551 and 1552(a)), and all applicable rules and regulations promulgated thereunder." Agreement Concerning Colorado River Management and Operations (April 23, 2007) [hereinafter Agreement], available at

http:/ /www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/DEIScomments/State/BasinStat
gptf (attachment A to the Basin States' Comments on Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, Colorado River Interim Guidelinesfor Lower Basin Shortages and CoordinatedOperations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead).
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terim Surplus Guidelines adopted by the Secretary in 2001,3 and are

intended as a replacement for those Guidelines. The Proposed Interim Guidelines extend the interim period to 2025 (through operating year 2026) ,9 and removes those provisions of the current Interim
Surplus Guidelines that have become redundant due to passage of
time. The Proposed Interim Guidelines delete one surplus operating
condition under the existing Interim Surplus Guidelines, "Partial Domestic Surplus." Until 2017, "Domestic Surplus" water distribution
would occur as currently specified by the ISG:40
(a) For Direct Delivery Domestic Use4l by MWD, 1.250 million acrefeet (maf) reduced by the amount of basic apportionment available to
MWD.
(b) For use by SNWA, the Direct Delivery Domestic Use within the
SNWA Service Area in excess of the State of Nevada's basic apportionment.
(c) For use in Arizona, the Direct
Delivery Domestic Use in excess of
42
apportionment.
basic
Arizona's
During the years 2017 through 2025, the Secretary should distribute
"Domestic Surplus" water as follows:
(a) For use by MWD, 250,000 acre-feet per Year in addition to the
amount of California's basic apportionment available to MWD;
(b) For use by SNWA, 100,000 acre-feet per Year in addition to the
amount of Nevada's basic apportion available to SNWA;

38.
39.

Interim Shortage Guidelines, supra note 10.
Proposed Guidelines, supra note 29, § 9(A)-(B).

40. Id. § 4(B)(1) ("In years when Lake Mead elevation is projected on January 1 to
be above 1145 ft and below [the] 70R Strategy elevation determination, the Secretary
would determine a Domestic Surplus....").
41. "Direct Delivery Domestic Use" means "direct delivery of water to domestic end
users or other municipal and industrial water providers within the contractor's area of
normal service, including incidental regulation of Colorado River water supplies within
the Year of operation but not including Off-stream Banking. For the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California (MWD), Direct Delivery Domestic Use shall include delivery of water to end users within its area of normal service, incidental regulation of Colorado River water supplies within the Year of operation and Off-stream
Banking only with water delivered through the Colorado River Aqueduct." "Domestic
Use" has the same meaning as defined in the 1922 Colorado River Compact. Id. §
1 (A) (8)-(9).
42.

Id. § (4)(B)(1).
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(c) For use by Arizona, 100,000 acre-feet per Year in addition to the
amount of Arizona's basic apportionment available to Arizona contractors.4 3

In years in which the Secretary makes space building or flood control releases, having determined a "Flood Control Surplus" for the remainder of that year or the subsequent year, releases would "be made
to satisfy all beneficial uses within the United States, including unlimited off-stream banking."4 4 In years when the Secretary determines that
water release is necessary to reduce the risk of potential reservoir spills
based on the 70R Strategy,45 and that a "Quantified Surplus" is therefore available, the Secretary would first establish the volume of the
Quantified Surplus (discounting the volume of Intentionally Created
Surplus credits) then allocate and distribute the Quantified Surplus
50% to California, 46% to Arizona, and 4% to Nevada. 46
Storage of Water in Lake Mead
The states' representatives proposed that the Secretary develop a
policy and accounting procedure that would create opportunities for
Lower Basin Colorado River contractors to store water in Lake Mead
on a multi-year basis. As recommended by the states, the storage program is intended to help avoid shortages to the Lower Basin, benefit
both Lake Mead and Lake Powell, and increase the surface elevations
of Lakes Powell and Mead to higher levels than would have otherwise
occurred. Storage under the shortage program would permit augmentation of water supplies through "projects that create water system effi-

43. Id. § (4)(B)(2).
44. Id. § (4) (B) (4). Surplus declarations for Mexico under the U.S./Mexico Water
Treaty "are declared when flood control releases are made.... These Guidelines are
not intended to identify, or change in any manner, conditions when Mexico may
schedule up to an additional 0.2 [million acre-feet]." Id.
45. The "70R Strategy" is a determination that there is at least a 70% probability
that a flood control release will be required to create reservoir space to receive anticipated flood water flows. The probability is modeled using the historic hydrologic record for the Colorado River.
46. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 29, § 4(B) (3) (b). California's share would be
distributed first to meet basic apportionment demands and MWD's demands and then
to California Priorities 6 and 7 and other surplus contracts. Id. § 4(B) (3) (c). Nevada's
share would be distributed first to meet basic apportionment demands and the Southern Nevada Water Authority's demands. Id. Arizona's share would be distributed to
surplus demands in Arizona including off stream banking and interstate banking demands. Id. Arizona, California and Nevada have agreed that Nevada would get first

priority for interstate banking in Arizona. Id. Any unused share of the Quantified
Surplus would be distributed in accordance Article 11 (B) (6) of the Decree in Arizona
v. California. Id.
§ 4(B) (3)(d).
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nonciency, extraordinary conservation, and the importation of 47
Colorado River System water into the Colorado River Mainstream.
The seven states' Proposed Interim Guidelines recommend an accounting approach referred to as "intentionally created surplus" or
"ICS." That approach develops the notion that water intentionally not
used in a given year creates a "surplus" available for use in another
year. The approach rests upon the Secretary's use of the term "surplus" in the Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs,48 to declare an annual operating condition and
the U.S. Supreme Court's use of the term "surplus" in Article 11(B) (2)
of the 2006 Consolidated Decree in Arizona v. California("Consolidated
Decree") .9 The States' Proposed Interim Guidelines define ICS as
"surplus available for use under the terms and conditions of the Forbearance Agreement and a Delivery Agreement."5 The Proposed
Guidelines subdivide ICS into four groups: Extraordinary Conservation ICS, Tributary Conservation ICS, System Efficiency ICS, and Imported ICS. Contractors that create surplus within each of these categories 5 would recover them by requesting delivery of a volume of
Colorado River water equivalent to previously stored water at the time
the contractor submits its annual water order for a year a following the
creation of the credit. The Secretary would declare an "ICS Surplus"
in years when Lake Mead's elevation was at or above 1075 feet, 52 the

same elevation which would cause the Secretary to determine that a
"normal" operation condition exist. 53 The additional water would be
added to the Contractor's approved water order for that following
year. 54
47.

Proposed Guidelines, supra note 29, § 5(A).

48.

Criteria for Coordinated Long Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs,

35 Fed. Reg. 8951 (June 10, 1970).
49. Arizona v. California,547 U.S. 150 (2006).
50. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 29, § 1 (A) (11).
51. See id. § 5(D) (5) (describing of process by which ICS is created).
52. Id. § 4(B) (5)(a).
53. Id. § 4(A).
54. Id. § 5 (D) (6). The Secretary has not yet offered a detailed plan for implemen-

tation of this approach to Lake Mead storage. Because the "intentionally created surplus" notion utilizes the concept of surplus operations, as envisioned by the Criteria for
Coordinated Long Range Operation of the Colorado River Reservoirs, designation of
stored water as surplus water suggests that stored water may only be recovered in years
when the Secretary has determined to operate system reservoirs under conditions
where significant supplies of new inflow are available-conditions under which con-

tractors that had stored water would not need it. The ICS concept's reliance on the
language of Article II(B) (2) of the Decree would seem to constrain the recovery opportunities for contractors storing water in Lake Mead, as the antecedent of that Arti-

cle's "such surplus" reference is "mainstream water is available for release, as determined by the Secretary of the Interior, to satisfy annual consumptive use in the aforesaid states in excess of 7,500,000 acre feet." Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. at 342. Because most contractors would more likely desire to store water as a hedge against drier
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Utilizing the concept of surplus, as contemplated by Article
II(B)(2) of the Decree, raises the question whether existing parties
having prior, potentially conflicting claims, to that "surplus" must waive
them. The approach adopted by the states' representatives is to execute a "Forbearance Agreement"' 5 in which those existing parties declare that they will not assert those rights. 56 The Proposed Interim
Guidelines that the states' representatives transmitted to the Secretary
on April 30, 2007, provided:
Under these Guidelines, Colorado River water will continue to be allocated for use among the Lower Division States in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Consolidated Decree. It is expected
that Lower Division States and individual Contractors for Colorado
River water have or will adopt arrangements that will affect utilization
of Colorado River water during the Interim Period.

It is expected

that water orders from Colorado River Contractors will be submitted
to reflect forbearance arrangements by Lower Division States and individual Contractors. The Secretary will deliver Colorado River water
to Contractors in a manner consistent with these arrangements. Surplus water will be delivered only to entities with contracts that are eli51
gible to receive surplus water.

ExtraordinaryConservationICS
Lake Mead storage opportunities depend, in a number of instances
upon "extraordinary conservation" by Colorado River contractors.
"Extraordinary conservation" activities include: fallowing of land that

times, and because storage of water as a hedge against future growth in demand is
advisable, the states also developed the concept of "Developed Shortage Supply."
55. The Proposed Interim Guidelines define "Forbearance Agreement" by reference to a particular document, which the parties in the Lower Basin States agreed to,
and which was tendered to the Secretary of the Interior on April 30, 2007. Proposed
Guidelines, supra note 29, § (1) (A) (10).
56. "Forbearance" is inaction-its closest synonym is "abstention." Declaration of
intent to abstain from exercise of a future right is forbearance. The definition poses
the question whether the future right involved is a right of states identified in Article
II(B) (2) of the Decree to protect the surplus "apportioned" to the respective states
pursuant to that provision, or alternatively the fight of individual Section 5 contractors
to order water pursuant to their contracts. The Forbearance Agreement accompanying the states' representatives' April 30, 2007, correspondence forbears "[any fight [a
party] may have to delivery of any ICS released in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in this Forbearance Agreement and the Delivery Agreement for use
within the [alternate party states]." Lower Colo. River Basin Intentionally Created
Surplus Forbearance Agreement 13-14 (April 30, 2007) available at http://www.
usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategles/DEIScomments/State/BasinStates.pdf
(Attachment C to the Basin States Comments on Draft EnvironmentalImpact Statement, Colorado River Interim Guidelinesfor Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operationsfor Lake
Powell and Lake Mead).
57. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 29, § 4(C).

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 10

is, was, or would in the next year be irrigated; canal lining; desalination; "extraordinary conservation" programs existing as of January 1,
2006; extraordinary conservation ICS credit programs predating the
effective date of the Proposed Interim Guidelines; Tributary Conservation ICS not released in the year created; Imported ICS not released in
the year of creation; and other "extraordinary conservation" measures
as agreed upon by the states.58 The Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California ("MWD") and the Imperial Irrigation District
("IID") were the first contractors to arrange for Lake Mead storage,
even in advance of the Secretary's adoption of guidelines establishing
any process for recovery of the stored water. In 2006, utilizing a "pilot
program" approach, established through correspondence with the Bureau of Reclamation, MWD and IID left water in Lake Mead of which
they were entitled to take delivery. 59 Extraordinary Conservation ICS
may only be created if the stored water would otherwise have been
beneficially used in the storage year. 60 The maximum amount of water
that states could store during any year on the basis of extraordinary
conservation would be subject to the following limitations: California:
400,000 acre-feet per year; Arizona: 100,000 acre-feet per year; Nevada:
125,000 acre-feet per year.6 ' Additionally, the maximum cumulative
amount of water that states could store on the basis of extraordinary
conservation would be subject to the following limitations: California:
1,500,000 acre-feet; Arizona: 300,000 acre-feet: Nevada: 300,000 acrefeet. 6' The states must dedicate five percent of the stored water to the
system on a one-time basis to provide a water supply benefit to the system. If the Bureau of Reclamation released water for flood control
purposes, such action would reduce the right to recover stored water
on a pro-rata basis among all parties having stored water.6
System Efficiency ICS
Another means by which contractors can create ICS under the
states' representatives' proposal is through the creation of system effi65
ciencies. The states' representatives recommended that a contractor
58. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 29, § 5(D) (1). What conservation is "extraordinary" tends to be in the eye of the beholder, and will necessarily be the subject of
some additional discussion.
59. MWI and IID intend to do the same in 2007.
60. Proposed Guidelines, supranote 29, § 5(D) (5) (e)(1).
61. Id. § 5(D) (5) (e) (2).
62. Id. §5(D)(5) (e) (3).
63. Id. § 5(D) (5) (c). Additionally, stored water would be subject to annual evapora-

tion loss of 3% annually. Id. § 5(D) (5) (e) (5).
64.

Id. § 5(D) (6) (e) (3).

65.

The term "contractor" here means any party holding a Colorado River water

delivery contract with the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to Section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act. Id. § 1 (A) (5).
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be able to make contributions of capital to the Secretary for use in Secretarial projects designed to realize efficiencies that save water that
would otherwise be lost from the Colorado River system in the United
States. The Secretary, in consultation with the states, would identify
system efficiency projects, terms for capital participation in such projects, and types and amounts of benefits the Secretary would provide in
consideration of non-federal capital contributions to system efficiency
projects, including a portion of the water saved by the project.67 Water
that the Secretary made available to contractors as a result of system
efficiencies would be released to the contributing contractor on a predetermined schedule of annual deliveries for a period of years as
agreed in advance.68 System efficiency projects would only provide
temporary water supplies and would not create permanent use rights.
Tributary Conservation ICS
Under the states' representatives' proposal, a contractor could create "Tributary Conservation ICS" by purchasing documented water
rights on Colorado River System tributaries upstream of Hoover Dam
within the contractor's state. 69 The water rights must have been used
for a significant period of years and have been created prior to the effective date of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (June 25, 1929) .7 The
Secretary would verify the amount of water resulting form the augmentation that actually flows into Lake Mead, and the Tributary Augmentation would be limited to that amount to the extent that the amount is
less than allowed under the Forbearance Agreement. 7 The recovered
water would be available for domestic use only.7 2 This water would be
in addition to the state's basic apportionment and would be available
'
during declared shortages as "Developed Shortage Supply. 73
The con-

tractor could take this water on a real-time basis and could not recover
more than 95% of the water. 4 If storage were required, the Secretary
would administer the stored water under the 7rules
for establishment
5
and recovery of extraordinary conservation ICS.

66.
67.

Id.§5(D)(3).
Id.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.§5(D)(2).
Id.
Id.
Id.

73.
74.

Id. §§ 1(A)(7), 6(A)(1).
Id. § 5(D)(5)(c).

75.

Id.§5(D)(2).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

Imported ICS
The states' representatives' proposal would allow creation of an ICS
by introduction of non-Colorado River system water in a contractor's
state into the Colorado River Mainstream. 6 This water is in addition to
a state's basic apportionment and may be used whenever the Secretary
declared the existence of an "ICS Surplus', 77 or a shortage condition. 8
Contractors would recover no more than 95% of the water introduced.7 The intent is to take the non-Colorado River system water on
a real-time basis, and hence not spill from system reservoirs. However,
if storage were required, such stored water would be subject to all provisions applicable to extraordinary conservation ICS.8 ° Any agreements
made with the Secretary to introduce and recover this water would survive the termination of the states' proposed program for coordinated
operations of Lakes Powell and Mead.
Normal Operations
In years when Lake Mead elevation as of January 1 is projected to
be above elevation 1075 ft. and below 1145 ft., the Secretary would determine a normal operating condition."' ICS water would be available
during the normal operating condition, provided
the Secretary had
2
also determined that an "ICS Surplus" exists.

Shortage Operations
On February 3, 2006, the states representatives proposed to the
Secretary that, in years when the projected content of Lake Mead on
January 1 is at or below an elevation of 1075 ft. but at or above 1050 ft.,
a quantity
400,000.83
acre-feet would not be delivered to the Lower
Basi of
staes
ad
Basin states and Mexico. In years when Lake Mead projected content
is below elevation 1050 ft. but at or above 1025 ft., a quantity of 500,000
acre-feet would not be delivered to the Lower Basin states and Mexico.8 4 In years when Lake Mead projected content is below 1025 ft., a

quantity of 600,000 acre-feet would not be delivered to the Lower Basin
76.

Id. § 5(D)(4).

77.

Id. § 4(B) (5).

78.

Id.§ 6(B).

79.
80.
81.

Id. § 5(D) (5).
Id. § 5(D)(4).
Id.§ 4(A).

82. Id. § 4(C).
83. Seven Basin States' Preliminary Proposal Regarding Colo. River Interim Operations to Gale A. Norton, Sec'y of the Interior, § 3(F) (1) (Feb. 3, 2006) [hereinafter
Preliminary Proposal] available at http:/ /www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strate-

gies/consultation/Feb06SevenBasinStatesPreliminaryProposal.pdf.
84. Ik § 3(F)(2).
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states and Mexico.85 Under the states' representatives' February 3,
2006, proposal, whenever Lake Mead reaches elevation 1025 ft., the
Secretary would consult with the states to determine whether Colorado
River hydrologic conditions, together with the delivery of 8.4 million
acre-feet of Colorado River water to Lower Basin users and Mexico,
would cause the elevation of Lake Mead to fall below 1000 ft.8 6 Discussion would then ensue regarding further measures that may then need
to be undertaken to avoid or reduce further increases in shortage determinations.
The states' representatives also proposed that United States should
reduce deliveries to Mexico pursuant to Article 10 of the 1944 Treaty
in any year in which the Secretary had declared that a shortage condition existed pursuant to Article II(B) (3) of the Decree in Arizona v.
California. The Secretary would base the total quantity of water that
would not be delivered to Mexico on Lower Basin water deliveries during normal water supply conditions. The states' recommendation proposed that Mexico bear 17% of any declared shortage.87
Although the hydrologic modeling incorporated in the Bureau of
Reclamation's Draft Environmental Impact Statement published on
February 28, 2007, incorporated the states' representatives' recommendation that Mexico share 17% of any reduced deliveries of Colorado River water in a declared shortage, the text of the DEIS itself was
somewhat more equivocal on the willingness or commitment of the
United States to do so:
In order to assess the potential effects of the alternatives, it was assumed that Mexico would share proportionately in Lower Basin
shortages. Allocation of Colorado River water to Mexico is governed
by the 1944 Treaty. The proposed federal action is for the purpose of
adopting additional operational strategies to improve the Department's annual management and operation of key Colorado River reservoirs for an interim period through 2026. However, in order to assess the potential effects of the proposed federal action in this Draft
EIS, certain modeling assumptions are used that display projected wa85. Id. §3(F)(3).
86. Id. §3(F)(7).
87. Id. This component of the state representatives' recommendation raises issues
of interpretation of the 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty. Notwithstanding these issues,
at least one proposal recommended by other parties suggests a palliative measure by
which the effect of under-deliveries to Mexico can be ameliorated-creation of opportunities to permit Mexico to store water in reservoirs in the United States. Article 10 of
the Treaty creates a U.S. obligation to deliver a minimum of 1.5 MAF of Colorado
River water to Mexico each year. 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty, supra note 13, art.
10(a). The corollary of that obligation is, of course, a Treaty right of the state of Mexico to receive that much water each year. Mexico could offer to waive some portion of
its annual Treaty right in exchange for deliveries of larger amounts of water in later
years, perhaps on a schedule or upon demand given the existence of pre-defined circumstances.
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ter deliveries to Mexico. Reclamation's modeling assumptions are not

intended to constitute an interpretation or application of the 1944
Treaty or to represent current or future United States policy regarding deliveries to Mexico. The United States will conduct all necessary
and appropriate discussions regarding the proposed federal action
and implementation of the 1944 Treaty with Mexico through the

IBWC in consultation with the Department of State.8
Understanding the uncertainty of the shortage allotment relationship of the United States and Mexico, Arizona, and Nevada negotiated
a Shortage Sharing Agreement between themselves in February 2007,
which divided 83% of the reduced deliveries that had been recommended to the Secretary on February 3, 2006 between those two
states. 89 Arizona agreed to assume 320,000 acre-feet of the first tier of
those reduced deliveries. 90 Nevada agreed to assume 13,000 acre-feet
thereof.9' Arizona agreed to assume 400,000 acre feet of the second
tier of reduced deliveries.92 Nevada agreed to assume 17,000 acre feet
thereof.93 Arizona agreed to assume 480,000 acre feet of the third tier
of reduced deliveries. 94 Nevada agreed to assume 20,000 acre feet
thereof.95 Subsequently, upon reviewing the Bureau of Reclamation's
February 28, 2007, Draft Environmental Impact Statement, the states'
representatives amended their proposal regarding stepped shortages to
reflect only those reduced water deliveries which would occur within
the United States. The Proposed Interim Guidelines transmitted to
the Secretary on April 30, 2007, thus proposed a three-step reduction
program in which the reductions of deliveries that would be made in
the Lower Division states were96stated as 333,000, 417,000, and 500,000
acre-feet per year, respectively.
B. INTERSTATE AGREEMENT

The states' representatives' February 3, 2006, proposal contemplated that state water agencies, major water users, and parties holding
Colorado River water delivery contracts would become parties to an

88. DEIS, supra note 2, at 4-9.
89. Arizona-Nevada Shortage-Sharing Agreement (Feb. 9, 2007) available at
http: / /www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/DEIScomments/State/BasinStat
es.pdf (Attachment D to the Basin States Comments on Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, ColoradoRiver Interim Guidelinesfor Lower Basin Shortages and CoordinatedOperationsfor Lake Powell and Lake Mead).
90. Id.§ 3(A).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 3(B).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 3(C).
95. Id.
96. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 29, § 4(D).
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interstate agreement 97 Those parties would enter into the agreement
in furtherance of the same federal law and practice through which they
have consulted with the Secretary in the preparation of the preliminary
proposal described above.98 The states' representatives executed that
Agreement Concerning Colorado River Management and Operations
on April 23, 2007, and forwarded it to the Secretary together with their
April 30, 2007, correspondence." The States' Agreement espouses
that, through its terms, cooperation and communication among the
parties will improve; additional security and certainty in the water sup97. Some early hesitancy to enter a multiparty, multi-state agreement was premised
on an apprehension of the implication of the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
Art I, § 10, cl. 3. However, the question whether an association of governments in
different states, be they the sovereign states themselves, or another entity like an
agency or a political subdivision, constitutes a "compact" is not a question of who the
parties are, but what the effect of the association is on the political power of Congress.
See generally United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978)
(upholding the creation of an interstate agency (Multistate Tax Commission) by seven
states, later joined by 14 other states); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976)
(stating that the boundary was first established by King George II); North Carolina v.
Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914) (stating that the boundary was established by cession act
of North Carolina Legislature and later marked out by Commissioners appointed by
North and Carolina and Tennessee); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893) (stating that the boundary was established by charters of English sovereigns (James I,
Charles II) by whom colonies of Virginia and North Carolina were formed). In all of
these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out that not all "compacts" or "agreements" invoke the Compact Clause. The test for implication of the Compact Clause is
most succinctly stated in New Hampshire v. Maine "The application of the Compact
Clause is limited to agreements that are 'directed to the formation of any combination
tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.'" New Hampshire v. Maine, 426
U.S. at 369 (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 519). Applying the New Hampshire v. Maine "encroachment" test to the states agreement, there is clearly no "encroachment" on federal authority, as the agreement permits a federal officer, the Secretary of the Interior, to perform his/her statutory, and U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned, responsibilities more easily. Nor does the agreement interfere with any Congressional scheme.
In all these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the interstate agreements were ratified by formal action of the state legislatures-so there is no question of
the exercise of state sovereignty in all cases. The exercise of state sovereignty through
legislative action is not the test. Nor is the identity of states as parties. As evident from
the United States Steel case, the modem attitude about multi-state (some say "regional")
government is to permit its enhancement, not judicially preclude it. Therefore, only in
those cases where states are trying to politically aggrandize themselves, at the expense
of Congress, is judicial intervention against multi-state agreements likely to occur. See
United States Stee 434 U.S. at 472-73. If then, the only consequence is invalidation as in
the boundary cases.
98. See generally 43 U.S.C. § 1552(b) (2000); Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range
Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs Pursuant to the Colorado River Basin Project
Act, 35 Fed. Reg. 8951 (June 10, 1970). The Secretary of the Interior consults with the
States through Governors' Representatives who represent the Governors and their
respective States regarding the operation of Lakes Powell and Mead.
99. Agreement, supra note 37.
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ply of the Colorado River system would accrue to the benefit of the
people that the Colorado River serves; and, the parties would avoid
circumstances which might otherwise form the basis for claims or controversies over interpretation or implementation of the Colorado River
Compact and other applicable provisions of the law of the river.'00
The agreement provides the parties' mutual and aggregate support
for the recommendation to the Secretary as contained in the April 30,
2007, comments to the Secretary regarding the DEIS, stating that the
Secretary's adoption of the Parties' Recommendation in a Record of
Decision ("ROD") is in the best interests of the respective parties and
promoting the health and welfare of the public in the Colorado River
Basin states.0 " If circumstances change or the Secretary issues a ROD
not in substantial conformance with the seven states' recommendation,
notice and consultation ensues, both between the parties, and with the
Secretary of the Interior. If differences are irreconcilable, all of the
parties' rights are reserved. In the event that one party withdraws, the
others may continue or disaggregate.
The agreement provides that the parties would take all necessary
actions to implement the terms of the Secretary's ROD, including approval and execution of agreements necessary for that implementation. The agreement also provides that the parties would confer
among themselves, at least annually, to assess the operations of Lakes
Powell and Mead. Any party may request consultation with the other
parties on any proposed adjustment or modification of those operations, based on changed circumstances, unanticipated conditions, or
other factors. Upon such a request, the parties would confer "in good
faith" to resolve any conflicted issues, and thereafter to request consultation by the other states and with the Secretary on adjustments to or
modifications of operations under the ROD. The agreement would
require, in any event, that the parties confer, before December 31,
2020, to determine whether to extend their agreement and recommend that the Secretary continue operations under the ROD for an
additional period, modify the agreement and recommend that the
Secretary modify operations under the ROD, or terminate the agree100.

Id. at 4.

101.
Id. at 6. The Agreement requests that the Secretary recognize its specific provisions as part of the Secretary's NEPA compliance, and that specific provisions be included in the ROD that references the Agreement as a basis for the ROD, including
the provision that the Secretary will first consult with all the States, through their designated Governor's Representatives, before making any substantive modification to the
ROD. The Agreement also requests that the Secretary include in the ROD specific
provision that, upon any state's request for modification of the ROD, request to resolve
claims or controversies arising under the Agreement or regarding the operation of
Lakes Powell and Mead pursuant to the ROD, the ISG, or any other applicable provision of federal law, the Secretary shall invite all of the governors, or their designated
representatives, to consult with the Secretary in an attempt to resolve that claim or

controversy by mutual agreement.
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ment and recommend that the Secretary not continue operations un10
der the ROD after the agreement's expiration.
The agreement provides for diligent pursuit of augmentation
within the Colorado River system including thorough determination of
the feasibility of projects which increase precipitation in the basin or
augment available supplies through desalination. The agreement also
provides for cooperative pursuit of an interim water supply of at least
280,000 acre-feet for use in Nevada "while long-term augmentation
projects are being pursued."'' 03 The agreement anticipates that "this
interim water supply will be made available in return for Nevada's
funding of the [United States'] Drop 2 Reservoir" on the All American
Canal. 10 4 Significant additional saved water would inure to the benefit
of the entire Colorado River system.
The parties agreed that all aspects of the proposal made to the Secretary were intended to be "consistent with existing law" and specifically that:

102. Id. at 8.
103. Id. "In consideration of the Parties' diligent pursuit of long-term augmentation
and the availability of the interim water supply, the Southern Nevada Water Authority
(SNWA) agree[d] that it [would] withdraw [its] right-of-way application ... filed with
the Bureau of Land Management ... for the purpose of developing" its Nevada permit.
Id. at 9. This permit's purpose is to develop its 1993 Virgin River water rights. SNWA
would not refile its application prior to 2014 "so long as Nevada is allowed to utilize its
pre-Boulder Canyon Project Act Virgin and Muddy River rights" in accordance with the
Parties' April 30, 2007 comments to the Secretary, "the interim water supply made
available to Nevada is reasonably certain to remain available," and "diligent pursuit of
system augmentation is proceeding to provide Nevada an annual supply of 75,000 acrefeet by the year 2020." Id. at 9. In its April 27, 2007, correspondence to the Secretary
of the Interior tendering Nevada's comments on the DEIS, Nevada stated: "Nevada is
currently pursuing three separate projects to develop System Efficiency, Tributary
Conservation and Imported ICS, as those terms are defined in the Basin States Proposal, with delivery taken by SNWA from Lake Mead. Each of these projects has been
agreed to among the parties to the Forbearance Agreement and final details regarding
these projects will be set forth in exhibits to the Forbearance Agreement. During
shortages, water from projects that would otherwise qualify as Tributary Conservation
ICS and Imported ICS would be available for creation, release and delivery as Developed Shortage Supply." Basin States Comments on Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Colorado River Interim Guidelinesfor Lower Basin Shortages and CoordinatedOperations
for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (April 30, 2007) available at http://
www.usbr.gov/lc/ region /programs/strategies/DEIScomments/State/BasinStates.pdf.
These three projects are the Drop 2 Reservoir Storage Project in Imperial County,
California, the Coyote Spring Well and Moapa Transmission System Project in Clark
County, Nevada, and tributary conservation along the Virgin and Muddy Rivers in
Nevada. The hydrologic modeling incorporated within the DEIS assumed the development of these projects. DEIS, supranote 2, at 5-12.
104. Agreement, supra note 37, at 9. Nevada's annual water supply from this arrangement would not exceed 40,000 acre-feet. All water available to Nevada in consideration for funding the Drop 2 Reservoir would remain available during all shortage
conditions declared by the Secretary. Id.
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the storage of water in and release of water from Lakes Powell and
Mead pursuant to a ROD issued by the Secretary in substantial conformance with Parties' Recommendation and this Agreement, and
any agreements, rules and regulations adopted by the Secretary or the
parties to implement such ROD, shall not constitute a violation of Article III(a)-(e) inclusive of the Colorado River Compact, or Sections
601 and 602(a) of the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968... and
all applicable rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. 1°5
Regarding extended controversies about violation of the Colorado
River Compact, the parties agreed, at least for the time being, to bury
the hatchet, 10 6 but reserved their rights. °7
Ill.

CONCLUSIONS

Sweeping statements regarding the significance of the seven states'
February 3, 2006, recommendation to the Secretary burgeoned quickly

105. Id. at 10. See also 43 U.S.C. § 1551, 1552(a) (2000).
106. Agreement, supra note 37, at 10. "The Parties recognize thatjudicial or administrative proceedings are not preferred alternatives to the resolution of claims or controversies concerning the law of the river. In furtherance of this Agreement, the Parties desire to avoid judicial or administrative proceedings, and agree to pursue a consultative approach to the resolution of any claim or controversy. In the event that any
Party becomes concerned that there may be a claim or controversy under this Agreement, the ROD, Article III(a)-(e) inclusive of the Colorado River Compact, or Sections
601 and 602(a) of the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 (43 U.S.C. §§ 1551 and
1552(a)), and all applicable rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, such Party
shall notify all other Parties in writing, and the Parties shall in good faith meet in order
to resolve such claim or controversy by mutual agreement prior to initiating any judicial or administrative proceeding. No Party shall initiate any judicial or administrative
proceeding against any other Party or against the Secretary under Article III(a)-(e)
inclusive of the Colorado River Compact, or Sections 601 and 602(a) of the Colorado
River Basin Project Act of 1968 (43 U.S.C. §§ 1551 and 1552(a)), or any other applicable provision of federal law, regulation, criteria, policy, rule or guideline, and no claim
thereunder shall be ripe, until such conference has been completed. All States shall
comply with any request by the Secretary for consultation in order to resolve any claim
or controversy. In addition, any State may invoke the provisions of Article VI of the
Colorado River Compact. Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, the terms of this Paragraph shall survive for a period of five years following the
termination or expiration of this Agreement, and shall apply to any withdrawing Party
after withdrawal for such period." Id.
107. Id. at 11-12. "Notwithstanding the terms of this Agreement and the Parties'
Recommendation, in the event that for any reason this Agreement is terminated, or
that the term of this Agreement is not extended, or upon the withdrawal of any Party
from this Agreement, the Parties reserve, and shall not be deemed to have waived, any
and all rights, including any claims or defenses, they may have as of the date hereof or
as may accrue during the term hereof, under any existing federal or state law or administrative rule, regulation or guideline, including without limitation the Colorado
River Compact, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, the Decree in Arizona v.
California, the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, and any other applicable provision of federal law, rule, regulation, or guideline." Id.
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in the early months of 2006. Reducing principles of agreement to operational agreement language presented new issues of detail upon
which the states' representatives worked resolvedly throughout 2006
and early 2007. In December 15, 2006, now-Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation Robert W. Johnson, prior Regional Director of the
Lower Colorado region of the Bureau, and longtime participant in the
affairs of the seven states of the Colorado River, hailed the seven states'
proposal as one of the more significant events having occurred since
the signing of the 1922 Colorado River Compact.'0 8 Although the
states' representatives have together corresponded with the Secretary
on various matters in recent years, the April 23, 2007 States' Agreement
is the first document establishing mutual promises between the seven
states of the Colorado River since execution of the Colorado River
Compact in 1922. Hopefully it portends a new era in relations between
them.
The onus now is on the Secretary of the Interior to act. There is a
great deal of compromise between the states incorporated into the
seven states' recommendation and States' Agreement. This alone
should recommend its adoption to the Secretary. Perhaps a more
compelling suasion upon the Secretary, however, is the trend that the
states' recommendation makes toward softening the divides of the disproportionate hydrologic risk distribution consequent of the current
law. The recommendation puts more water into and through the
Colorado River. It better distributes interim supply without threatening rights to future development. It reduces risk to those to whom the
law apportions the greatest risk. As the Colorado's risk distribution
becomes more even, it becomes more possible to think of the River as
a unified whole where common approaches and common solutions
become more palatable. That is the future that the seven states' recommendation and Agreement portends. In June of 2007, the Secretary indicated that the preferred alternative that the Final Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision will analyze "incorporates the key elements of the plan submitted to the Secretary by the
seven Colorado River Basin states." 0 9

108. Robert W. Johnson, Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, Address at
the Colorado River Water Users Association 61st Annual Conference (December 15,
2006), availableat http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/speech/detail.cfm?RecordlD=361.
109.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR - BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REcLAMATION
ANNOUNCES PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE FOR COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR
LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS OF LAKE POWELL AND LAKE

MEAD (June 18, 2007) available at http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/detail.cfm?RecordlD= 17341.

PROMOTING CONSERVATION BY LAW: WATER
CONSERVATION AND WESTERN STATE

INITIATIVESt
CRAIG BELL'

I. Introduction ......................................................
313
H. The Legislative Approach to Encouraging Water Conservation... 314
A. Agricultural Conservation Incentives ..............................
315
1. C aliforn ia ...............................................
3 15
316
2. W ashington .............................................
3. M on tan a ................................................
317
4. O regon ................................................
3 17
B. Municipal Water Conservation Incentives ..........................
318
1. W ashington .............................................
319
2. Californ ia ...............................................
319
3. A rizon a ................................................
320
III. Water Banking: Depositing Conserved Water for Other Uses...321
IV. The Watershed Approach to Incentivize Water Conservation .....
322
V. Legal and Policy Issues .............................................
323
A . Third Party Im pacts ..........................................
323
B. "Public Interest" Review .......................................
324
C. Endangered Species Act .......................................
325
VI. Conclusion ......................................................
325

I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the West's arid climate and booming population, water
conservation has become an increasingly important issue to the western states. Even in those states where water resources appear to be
relatively abundant, such as the Northwest, regulatory and societal det This article also appeared in the conference materials for the American Bar Association Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources' 25' Annual Water Law Conference: Changing Values, Changing Conflicts, in San Diego, California, on February 22-23,
2007 as a part of a panel discussion entitled "Promoting Conservation by Law." For
more information on this conference see the conference report this issue of the WATER
LAW REVIEW beginning on page 433.
Craig Bell is executive director of the Western States Water Council ("WSWC"). The
views represented in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Western States
Water Council, or any of its member states.
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mands to preserve instream flows for fish, wildlife, recreation, and aesthetics have made providing an adequate water supply a pressing issue.'
This issue is made more pressing by the fact that the governing body of
water law in the West-the prior appropriation doctrine with its principles of "first in time, first in right" and "use it or lose it"-can act as a
disincentive for water conservation. Thus, water users who do implement conservation measures stand to lose or forfeit the amount of water conserved.
At the same time, it is important to understand that conservation is
a tool that can help ensure future water supplies and get us through
temporary shortages, rather than an end in and of itself. Further, because of potential drawbacks-principally third party adverse impacts
to the environment and other uses-water conservation measures must
be evaluated on a site-specific basis. Nevertheless, while every state in
the West noted the need for additional storage in meeting future demands in a report to the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission, their report made this significant statement: "States will carefully consider opportunities to 'stretch' existing supplies of water
through water conservation, reuse, and reservoir reoperation prior to
the development of new storage facilities."2
With this in mind, both states and local governments, as well as private individuals and organizations have set about finding ways to conserve water. State efforts have resulted in water statutes to mitigate or
remove the disincentive inherent in the prior appropriation doctrine.
While typically targeted at agriculture, state programs also address municipal conservation. Additionally, the states, as well as private organizations, have provided incentives to conserve water using water banks.
Lastly, local governments and private organizations have taken a grassroots approach, banding together as stakeholders in a watershed to
conserve its water resources. Each strategy is examined below.
H. THE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO ENCOURAGING WATER
CONSERVATION
One of the challenges facing western states is how to encourage water conservation within the prior appropriation system, which was designed to provide for the orderly development of the resource, as well
as to discourage speculative endeavors and prohibit waste. Agricultural
conservation is typically seen as the primary source of new water for
other uses because agriculture is by far the largest user and usually
holds the most senior water rights. On the other hand, municipal con1.
STATES'

See D. CRAIG

BELL, W. STATES WATER COUNCIL, WATER IN THE WEST TODAY: A
PERSPECTIVE: REPORT TO THE WESTERN WATER POLICY REvIEw ADvIsoRY

COMMISSION 16 (1997) [hereinafter WATER IN THE WEST TODAY].

2.

Id. at S-2 to S-3.
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servation is widely emphasized in state and local programs, and is often
a prerequisite for state funding.
A. AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION INCENTIVES
Prior appropriation has been criticized for discouraging agricultural conservation for two reasons. First, conserving water-using less
water for the same purpose-has traditionally been regarded as evidence of waste. Second, appropriative law generally prevents the expansion of the water right by "spreading" the conserved water to additional lands. In an attempt to promote agricultural water conservation,
at least four western states have removed legal disincentives inherent in
the prior• appropriation
doctrine. 6These states include California,
4
5
Washington, Montana, and Oregon.
1. California
Recognizing that potential forfeiture for non-use can discourage
conservation of water, section 1011 of the California Water Code, enacted in 1979, allows water users to retain their rights to all water
"saved" as a result of water conservation efforts. Conserved water can
be "sold, leased, exchanged, or otherwise transferred."7 Section 1011
specifically targets agricultural conservation by recognizing fallowing
and crop rotations as conservation methods." "[L] and conversion from
agricultural use to urban use would typically not qualify as a water conservation effort under Water Code 1011."9
The impact of section 1011 on water consumption and conservation is difficult to quantify.1 ° Most water transfers authorized through
section 1011 "involve conservation efforts that apparently would have
occurred for other reasons. [However,] [s]ection 1011 probably has
served to reduce resistance to water conservation."11 It should also be
noted that not all water saved can be transferred, as there are provisions to protect other water
users, as well as fish and wildlife, from in2
jury and adverse effects.
3.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1011 (West Supp. 2007).

4.

WASH. REv. CODE. ANN. §§ 90.42.005 (West 2004).

5.
6.
7.
8.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-419 (2005).
OR. REv. STAT. § 537.500(1) (2005).
CAL. WATERCODE § 1011(b).
Id. § 1011(a).

9. Div. OF WATER RIGHTS, STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., CAL. ENVrL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, A GUIDE TO WATER TRANSFERS 6-6 (1999) [hereinafter WATER TRANSFER GUIDE],
availableat http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/watertransferguide.pdf.

10.

See Andrew H. Sawyer, Improving Efficiency Incrementally: The Governor's Commis-

sion Attacks Waste and UnreasonableUse, 36 McGEORGE L. REv. 209, 241 (2005).

11. Id.
12. Id. at 240-41 (citing In re Licenses 1050, 2814, 3109, 3110, 9794, and 9989, Order No. WR 99-012 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Dec. 28, 1999), available at
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2. Washington
Washington also provides an incentive for water users to conserve
through the "trust water rights" program ("trust program") established
in 1992."' The state may acquire "net saved water" for various uses
through negotiation where a state or federal agency provides public
funding for water conservation projects.' 4 The trust program is administered through the Department of Ecology ("Ecology") 15 Ecology has
been particularly active in the Yakima River Basin, frequently in concert with the United States Bureau of Reclamation. Through the
Yakima Enhancement Project, the Washington State Legislature and
United States Congress authorized federal, state, and local cost-sharing
for conservation projects. 6 Where state funding is provided, however,
a portion of net water savings, typically proportionate to the percentage of state funds invested in the project, is acquired by contract for
the trust program.' 7 Negotiations between the state and the water right
holder determine the exact amount of conserved water that will become a trust water right.'8 Allocations are accomplished though transfer, lease, or other agreement.' 9 Under the trust program, rights retain
the original priority date, unless the water right is split between the
the state, in which case the trust water right is infeoriginal user and
20
rior in priority.

Ecology considers Washington's trust water rights program success2

ful. ' State and federal funding of conservation projects has been key,

along with the fact that the water saver may be permitted to retain and
use some of the saved water.2 2 Further, conserved water that is not

http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/hearings/WaterRightsOrders/WR099.l2.pdf)

(holding

that water conserved pursuant to section 1011 may only be transferred in compliance
with California Water Code section 1725)).
13. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.42.030 (West 2004); see alsoJanet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28
ENvrL. L. 919, 957 (1998).
14. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN.
15. Id. § 90.42.040(1).
16. See id. § 43.21A.470.

§ 90.42.030.

17. Id. § 90.42.030(2); HEDIA ADELSMAN, WATER REs. PROGRAM, DEP'T OF ECOLOGY,
PUBL'N No. 03-11-005, WASHINGTON WATER AcQUISMON PROGRAM: FINDING WATER TO

32 (Curt Hart ed., 2003) available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/
0311005.pdf.
18. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.42.030(2)-(3); ADELSMAN, supra note 17, at 32; see
also E-mail from Ken Slattery, Program Manager, Dep't of Ecology, Water Res. Program, to Elizabeth A. Crane, Law Clerk, WSWC (June 23, 2006, 09:31:10 PST) [hereinafter Slattery E-mail] (on file with author).
WASH. REv. CODE. ANN. § 90.42.030(2).
19.
RESTORE STREAMS

20.

ADELSMAN, supra note 17, at 50.

21.

Slattery E-mail, supranote 18.

22.

Id.
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managed through the trust program may be considered waste, subject
to relinquishment."3
3. Montana
Another state that allows water right holders to maintain their right
to "salvaged" water is Montana.2 4 Typically, Montana does not allow
water users on their own initiative to spread salvaged water to additional land.2' However, if a user applies to do so through a change-ofuse permit, it may put the conserved water to beneficial use on other
lands provided the user can demonstrate that the proposed method
will salvage at least the amount of water asserted, that all other change
application criteria are met-including beneficial use and injury requirements, and that water quality will not be adversely affected.26
While Montana's salvage statute provides the opportunity to better
use limited water resources, determining whether the conservation
measures implemented actually save water can be difficult and complex. These difficulties have limited the success of Montana's program. The Department of Natural Resources and Conservation has
noted that permitting an applicant to enlarge their irrigated acreage
based on the water saved when switching from flood irrigation to a
sprinkler system may diminish return flows, thereby injuring junior
appropriators or other third parties. 27
4. Oregon
Oregon also has a state policy of aggressively promoting conservation and its Allocation of Conserved Water Program ("Program") reflects this ethic. 28 Since 1987, under Oregon law a water user who has
either conserved water within the last five years or who plans on conserving water may apply to use the water on additional land, sell or
lease the water, or dedicate it to instream flows. 29 The original water
right holder has the option of fixing the new priority date as either the
same or one minute after the priority of the original water right.30
However, the water user must allocate at least twenty-five percent of the
23.
SeeWASHREV. CODEANN. § 90.14.160.
24. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-419 (2005).
25. Id. §§ 85-2-410, -419.
26. Id. §§ 85-2-402(1), -402(2),- 419.
27. CLARK FORCE RIVER BASIN TASK FORCE, CLARK FORK RIVER BASIN WATER
MANAGEMENT PLAN ch. 9, at 1 (2004), available at http://dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water

mgmt/clarkforkbasin taskforce/pdfs/chapter 9.pdf.
28. See generally OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.455-.500 (2005).

29.

WATER RES. DEP'T, STATE OF OR., APPLYING FOR THE ALLOCATION OF CONSERVED

WATER PROGRAM 1 (2006), available at http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/conserved.
pf [hereinafter APPLYING FOR ALLOCATION].

30.

OR. REv. STAT. § 537.485(1).
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water conserved to the State, either for instream dedication or for future appropriation. 3' Additionally, agencies and other State political
subdivisions have authority to purchase rights to conserved water.32
Previously, the burden of proof was on the water-saver to demonstrate
that water saved would otherwise have been irrecoverably lost; however,
subsequent changes eliminated this obstacle.33
Until recently, Oregon's Program had not met with success.3 The
Legislative Assembly initiated the Program in 1988; however, by 2000,
the Water Resources Department had received only ten applications..
At least part of the reason there were not more applicants was the expense of installing conservation measures that would comply with the
Program's demands. 36 Despite the expense, however, there appears to
be increasing interest in the Program.37 In 2005, the Oregon Water
Resources reported that thirty new applications had been received
since 2000, partially attributable to increased support for stream flow
restoration.3
B.

MUNICIPAL WATER CONSERVATION INCENTIVES

In addition to encouraging efficient irrigation practices, statutory
incentives have targeted municipal water use, encouraging cities to
better manage their water resources and ensure sustainable supplies.39
Both state and local action encourage municipal conservation using
educational
programs,
planning mandates, funding incentives, 40 and
statuory
"41
statutory requirements.
While state and local incentives have largely
been successful,42 there are drawbacks to municipal conservation that
need to be considered. Possible problems range from "higher waste

31.
Id. § 537.470(3).
32. Id. § 537.495.
33.
See H.B. 2155, 67th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1993) (changing the definition
of "conservation" from meaning "the reduction of the amount of water consumed or
irretrievably" to "the reduction of the amount of water diverted to satisfy" an existing
beneficial use).
34. Or. Water Res. Dep't, Allocation of Conserved Water, http://www.wrd.state.or.
us /OWRD/mgmt conserved water.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
35. Id.
36. See id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id; see also APPLYING FOR ALLOCATION, supra note 29, at 1 (noting that changes to
the Program have removed legal obstacles to conservation).
39. See e.g., NEv. DIV. OF WATER PLANNING, NEVADA STATE WATER PLAN at lA-I to 1A-2
[hereinafter NEVADA WATER PLAN], available at http:/ /water.nv.gov/Water%20planning
/wat-plan/pt3-la.pdf.
40. Id.
41. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.330 (West 2004).
42. See Peter D. Nichols & Douglas S. Kenney, Watering Growth in Colorado: Swept
Along by the Current or Choosing a Better Line?, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 411, 440-47
(2003), for a discussion of the successes of various incentives in Colorado.
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concentrations in the wastewater" to "less water available for reuse,"
reduced return flows, less groundwater recharge, 3 and "hardening" of
demand, thereby reducing a city's cushion during drought periods."
The following three examples from Washington, California, and Arizona illustrate some of the ways states have encouraged municipal conservation.
1. Washington
The 2003 Municipal Water Law changed water management in
Washington.4 5 Among other things, all municipalities were required to
implement "cost effective" conservation measures.4 Washington permits municipalities, in compliance with their water conservation goals,
to change or transfer unperfected water rights, provided the municipality has also established instream flows and a watershed plan, and the
change will not increase consumptive use. 7 To help municipalities set
and achieve their conservation goals, the Department of Health
("DOH") may provide technical assistance. DOH may use the "full
range of compliance mechanisms available to [it]," in order to ensure
municipal compliance.4 ' DOH, along with the Department of Ecology,
also considers whether the municipality has implemented a conservation program when considering development schedules for municipal
water supply ights. 49
2. California
California's Urban Water Management Planning Act ("Act") requires all "urban water suppliers" to prepare an Urban Water Management Plan ("UWMP")." ° Urban water suppliers must describe any
conservation measures planned or implemented, including efficiency
and demand management measures. 51 State grants and loans for various programs, as well as drought assistance, are contingent on compli43. NEVADA WATER PLAN, supra note 39, at 1A-I.
44. Nichols & Kenny, supra note 42, at 441 (noting that Denver Water "only realized eighteen percent annual savings from drought restrictions in 2002" resulting from
a previous emphasis on water conservation).
45. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.119A.180.
46. Id. § 70.119A.180(4)(A).
47. See H.B. 1338, 58th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess., at 13 11.5-37, 14 11.1-25 (Wash. 2003)
(2d engrossed 2d substitute Sept. 9, 2003).
48. Id. § 70.119A.180(7).
49.

Id. § 70.119A.180(4)(c)(ii). Water right permits contain a development sched-

ule that outlines when a project may begin, when it must be completed, and when the
water must be fully applied to a beneficial use. WATER RES. PROGRAM, DEP'T OF
ECOLOGY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT WATER RIGHTS IN WASHINGTON 3-4

(2006), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/961804swr.pdf.
50.
See CAL. WATER CODE § 10631 (West Supp. 2007).
51.
Id. § 10631(h).
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ance with the Act and submission of a UWMP to the Department of
Water Resources every five years.52 Additionally, UWMPs must comply
with the conservation and information requirements of both the State
Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB")5 3 or any other requirement
imposed by "state law, regulation, or order."
3. Arizona
Arizona's 1980 Groundwater Management Act set the State on a
course to achieve safe and sustainable aquifer yields through an aggressive water conservation program with specific plans and goals that
require developers to demonstrate that they have an assured an adequate supply of water.54 It also requires water providers to meet gallon
per capita per day ("GPCD") targets in five different Active Management Areas ("AMAs") . At present, the target for interior water use for
new residential development is fifty-seven GPCD for all AMAs, and
outdoor targets ranging from 178 gallons per housing unit per day
("GPHUD") in Phoenix and 118 GPHUD in Tucson, to seventy-five
GPHUD in Prescott. 6 There are also "individual user" requirements
for deliveries to new, large cooling users, turf-related facilities, and
landscaping in public rights of way. 7 In addition, large providers
(those that serve more than 250 acre-feet per year) must limit lost and
unaccounted for water to no more than ten percent, and small providers to not more than fifteen percent. 58 While developers are not specifically subject to these requirements, water use by new developments
can affect the ability of the provider to meet its requirements. Arizona
Department of Water Resources developed water use models for new
residential development, which assume water conservation practices
and devices, and used those models in determining the provider's
GPCD goals.5 9 The Arizona Water Efficient Plumbing Act of 1992 requires installation of fixtures compatible with the Department's inte-

52. Id. §§ 10621(b), 10631.5.
53. Id. § 10653.
54. Ariz. Dep't of Water Res., Assured/Adequate Water, http://www.azwater.gov/
WaterManagement 2005/Content/OAAWS/default.asp. (last visitedJuly 9, 2007).

55. Water Conservation Div., City of Peoria Utils. Dep't, Groundwater Management
Act of 1980, http://www.peoriaaz.com/Utilities/oldfiles/groundwatermgtactf.htm.
(last visited July 9, 2007).
56. OFFICE OF ASSURED & ADEQUATE WATER SUPPLY, ARiz. DEP'T OF WATER RES.,
PUBL'N No. DWR-28-000001, APPLICATION GUIDELINES: ANALYSIS OF ASSURED WATER
SUPPLY (2002)
[hereinafter APPLICATION GUIDELINES],
available at http://
www.azwater.gov/dwr/Cotent/Find by Category/Permits Forms Applications/Files/

AssuredWaterSupply/analysisapp.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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rior water use models. 60 An alternative conservation program is available in areas where the GPCD has proven infeasible.1
III. WATER BANKING: DEPOSITING CONSERVED WATER FOR
OTHER USES
Water banking is yet another way to promote conservation. Conservation in a water banking program lies in the ability to "deposit,"
rather than forfeit or abandon, temporarily excess water.62 Because the
creation of a water bank necessarily includes removal of the threat of
forfeiture or abandonment, excess water is thereby "conserved" for
alternative uses at a future date.63 Often, the incentive may be primarily financial-a user receives money in exchange for permanently or
temporarily transferring all or a portion of their water right to the water bank.6
An example of a state water bank that encouraged water conservation to provide emergency drought relief is California's Drought Water
Bank. In 1991, 1992, and 1994, California experienced severe drought
conditions. To obtain water for critical needs, the Department of Water Resources ("DWR") contracted with voluntary sellers to use
groundwater instead of surface water, fallow their agricultural land, or
sell rights to water that was being stored in reservoirs.65 Acting as a
broker, DWR then resold most of the water to purchasers who were
prioritized according to need. 66 By all accounts, the California
Drought Water Bank was successful, both for agriculture generally and
the State as a whole.67
Idaho's water banking system banks conserved water for subsequent use in augmenting instream flows to meet environmental regulatory requirements. 61 Idaho's water banking system is comprised of the
Water Supply Bank, administered by the State, and five rental pools,
administered by local water districts. 69 Water deposited or rented from

60. Id.
61. Ariz. Dep't of Water Res., Third Management Plan Review Stakeholder Meeting
Summary (Feb. 3, 2006), available at http://www.azwater.gov/dwr/content/
Hot Topics/Municipal conservation program-TMP Review/files/Meeting Summary2-3-06.doc.
62.
PEGGY CLIFFORD ET AL., WASH. DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, PUBL'N No. 04-11-011,
ANALYSIS OF WATER BANKS IN THE WESTERN STATES ii (2004), available at,

http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/0411011.pdf.
63. Id. at 26.
64. See id. at 3.
65. Id. at 40-41.
66. Id. at 42.
67. RICHARD Howirr, NANCY MOORE, & RODNEY T. SMITH, A RETROSPECTIVE ON
CALIFORNIA'S 1991 EMERGENCY DROUGHT WATER BANK 20 (1992).
68.
See CLIFFORD ETAL., supra note 62, at 61, 63, 66.

69.

Id. at 62.
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7
any of Idaho's water banks is not subject to water right forfeiture. 0
Although primarily used to facilitate voluntary transfers between agricultural uses, Idaho has adapted and expanded its water banking system to meet environmental objectives and Endangered Species Act
("ESA") requirements. The United States Bureau of Reclamation
("BOR") has participated in the water banking system for a number of
years, leasing water from the Water Supply Bank and rental pools for
the benefit of endangered fish species, primarily salmon and steelhead.7' Of note, special state legislation was required to allow federal

leasing of water. 72

IV. THE WATERSHED APPROACH TO INCENTIVIZE WATER
CONSERVATION
In addition to legislative reform and water banking programs,
smaller projects involving local players and state agencies have also
arisen. These projects have the ability to respond quickly and to tailor
their efforts to the needs of their particular watershed. Such watershed
efforts have successfully encouraged water conservation, despite the
disincentives inherent in appropriative law. Idaho's Upper Salmon
Basin Watershed Project and watershed efforts in Washington's Walla
Walla Basin are excellent examples of successful local water conservation initiatives.
The Upper Salmon Basin Watershed Project ("Watershed Project")
is Idaho's largest watershed project located off of federal lands.7 Financed by state agencies, the Lemhi and Custer water conservation
districts, and the Bonneville Power Administration, the Watershed Project is led by an advisory committee that represents many stakeholders,
including private, state, federal, tribal, and other local interests.74 One
of the Watershed Project's primary objectives is to encourage and assist
the surrounding irrigators to implement more efficient irrigation systems. 7" These conservation measures "allow[] more water to remain in
and rearing habitat, as well as
streams, providing more spawning
76
eliminating passage barriers."

The Walla Walla Basin provides another example of a local watershed conservation initiative. The year 2001 marked two significant
70. Id. at 64.
71. 1& at 62.
72. See IDAHO CODEANN. § 42-1763B (2006).
73. Nw. Power & Conservation Council, Fish & Wildlife Success Stories - Upper
Salmon River Basin Watershed Restoration, http://www.nwcouncil.org/fw/stories/
uppersalmon.htm (last visited March 26, 2007).
74. Id.
75. Upper Salmon Basin Watershed Project, Projects, http://www.modelwatershed.
org/ Proijects2.html (last visited March 26, 2007).
76. Id.
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water supply events: water under a BOR contract for delivery for irrigation use was cut off in favor of meeting ESA requirements during a
drought year;77 and Walla Walla Basin stakeholders took drastic steps to
ensure that nothing of that sort happened to them.8 As a result, the
Walla Walla River flowed continuously for the first time in over 100
years. 9 Voluntary efforts by the local agricultural community received
funding assistance from the Walla Walla Basin Watershed Council.80
Water conservation measures, including replacing dirt diversion canals
with piping, were implemented to provide the instream flows."' The
success of the watershed effort was evident in that the annual bull trout
and steelhead salmon rescues are no longer necessary-the fish could
navigate the river without the assistance of bucket or truck.2
V. LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
In evaluating conservation measures on a case-by-case basis, one
must realize that unless consumptive use is reduced, "conservation has
limited impacts to overall water supply ...

Further, as previously

mentioned, conservation measures may reduce return flows and aquifer recharge, injuring third parties. 4 Additionally, state public interest
criterion and federal laws such as the ESA may limit the implementation of conservation measures.5
A. THIRD PARrY IMPACTS
Preventing water conservation measures from injuring third parties
can be difficult. Leveling agricultural fields, lining irrigation ditches,
and installing ultra-low flush toilets may reduce the amount of water
diverted from a river, but may not necessarily result in actual net benefits. "Many of the wetlands and wildlife habitat areas . . .have devel-

oped due to the use of irrigation water.
,, 6 As a result, "the impacts
of conservation, at least from agricultural uses, need to be carefully

77. Rebecca Clarren, No Refuge in the Klamath Basin, HIGH COUNTRY NEWs, Aug. 13,
2001, availableat http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcnArticle?article id=10647.
78. Matthew Preusch, Walla Walla Basin Sidesteps a Water War, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Aug. 19, 2002, available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.PrintableArticle?article id
=11356.
79. Id.
80. Basin ESA Accord, WALLA WALLA BASIN WATERSHED COUNCIL NEWSLETTER, Aug.
2006, at 1, available at http://wwbwc.org/media%20&%20maps/newsletter/WWBWCnewsletter-2006-08.pdf.
81.
Preusch, supra note 78.
82.
See id.
83. WATER IN THE WEST TODAY, supra note 1, at 33.
84. See WATER TRANSFER GUIDE, supra note 9, at 6-4.
85.
Nichols & Kenney, supra note 42, at 430-31.
86. WATER IN THE WEST TODAY, supra note 1, at 34.
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examined." 87 For example, agricultural conservation measures implemented in the area overlying the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer reduced
the aquifer's recharge rate." The aquifer is hydraulically connected to
the Thousand Springs area of the Snake River.88 As a result, discharges
into Thousand Springs have also declined, negatively impacting trout
farms with senior surface water rights. 9°
B. "PUBLIC INTEREST" REVIEW
The history of the Salton Sea in California illustrates other issues
that may arise from water conservation-namely, the potential for conflict with the public interest. Irrigation diversion losses and return flow
runoff from water delivered by the Imperial Irrigation District ("ID")
both created and maintain the Salton Sea.9' In 1998, IID entered a
water conservation and transfer agreement with the San Diego County
Water Authority. 92 IID was persuaded by the California State Water
Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") to conserve water for transfer by
improving the water delivery system, promoting irrigation efficiency,
and encouraging land fallowing. 93 Imperial County challenged the
agreement. 94 In its final order, SWRCB noted that the transfer was subject to public interest review because of the potential impacts to the
fish and wildlife and the surrounding economy. 95 SWRCB approved
the transfer after weighing the public and private costs and benefits, as
well as California's interstate obligations under the Colorado River
Compact. 6 However, SWRCB tasked the applicant with proposing to
California's DWR a plan to save the Salton Sea. 7

87.

Id.

88.

W. STATES WATER COUNCIL, ADMINISTRATION UPDATE/WATER RESOURCES, SPECIAL
REPORT No. 1517 (2003).

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Imperial Irrigation Dist., Salton Sea, http://www.iid.com/Water_Index.
php?pid=600 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).
92. In re Imperial Irrigation Dist., Rev. Order No. WRO 2002-0013 (Cal. Water Res.
Control Bd.Oct. 28, 2002), availableat, http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/hearings/Water
RightOrders/WRO2002-13Revised.pdf; see also Aaron Ralph, Drain the Water and Pull the
Plug on the Economy of One Community So that Another Community Can Brim Over with Economic Development: Is It Any of the State Water Resource Control Board's Business?, 34
MCGEORGE L. REv. 903,915 (2003).
93. In re Imperial Irrigation Dist., Rev. Order No. WRO 2002-0013, at 23.

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 56.
Id.
Id.
at 84.
Id. at 86-87.
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C. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

Adding to potential state law complications are federal laws such as
the ESA. 8 Water conservation measures may implicate the ESA in two
different ways. First, as in the Lemhi and Walla Walla Basins, compliance with the ESA may be the driving incentive to conserve water. Alternatively, the ESA may inhibit water conservation measures if the
measures reduce return flows and thereby take critical habitat. 99 For
example, lID implemented conservation measures that have reduced
farm runoff and increased the salinity of the Salton Sea, making the
water body less habitable for endangered species. °°
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, given the increasing pressure on the western appropriative system, conservation will continue to be an important management option for the states in their effort to provide sustainable water supplies for the future. To this end, some western states have removed the traditional disincentive for agricultural water conservation,
in addition to encouraging municipal water use efficiency. Additionally, water banking programs and watershed groups have encouraged
water conservation efforts. However, conservation is not an end unto
itself. Rather, it is important that each project be evaluated individually to ensure it actually results in net benefits. Where such net benefits exist, water conservation measures should be seen as a top priority
in meeting the increasing demands for this vital resource.

98. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
99. Cal. Dep't of Water Res., Salton Sea Ecosystem Restoration Program,
http://www.saltonsea.water.ca.gov/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2007); see also Imperial Irrigation Dist., Salton Sea, http://www.iid.com/WaterIndex.php?pid=600 (last visited Mar.
26, 2007).
100. In re Imperial Irrigation Dist., Rev. Order No. WRO 2002-0013, at 2, 20 (noting
that IID's conservation project "has the potential to 'take' certain threatened and endangered species.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Water rights adjudications have been underway for several decades
in the western U.S. to clarify the validity, scope, and priority date of
water rights. In principle, adjudications allow public agencies and
claimants to submit and scrutinize evidence supporting water rights in
t This paper also appeared in the conference materials for the American Bar
Association Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources' 25th Annual Water Law
Conference: Changing Values, Changing Conflicts, in San Diego, California, on February
22-23, 2007, as a part of panel discussion entitled "Forum for Changing Values: Do We
Still Need Adjudications?" For more information on this conference see the confer-

ence report in this issue of the WATER LAW REVIEW beginning on page 433.
1:. Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Arizona. The
author appreciates and acknowledges the research assistance of Izetta Chambers and
Lana Jones in preparing this article and comments from fellow ABA Water Law Conference panelists Peter Sly, Charles Dumars and Ramsey Kropf. The author acknowledges the financial and intellectual support provided by the Climate Assessment for
the Southwest (CLIMAS) Project at the University of Arizona, with funding from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
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a neutral court venue, accessible to all parties with standing, and
through a fair process. Comprehensive adjudications can lead to court
decisions that improve certainty for water claimants, provide direction
for future cases, and permanently ameliorate some water right ambiguities.
Disadvantages of the adjudication process include: excessive opportunities for water right holders to present evidence, necessitating a
burdensome number of hearings and costs for all parties; incentives to
make spurious and exaggerated water claims; and the requirement that
an entire basin be adjudicated even if a smaller section would suffice.
While water right changes and transfers generally can transpire during
an adjudication process, the process raises uncertainties that are likely
to have a dampening effect on such activities.
Many factors contribute to the need for the increased certainty that
adjudications are intended to provide. These include looming federal
reserved rights and the exercise of state authority over water rights
based on the McCarran Amendment.3 Rapid population growth in the
West, coupled with the emerging federal reserved rights doctrine and
the need to secure water for growing cities, contributed to the adjudications that started in the 1970s. 4 During this time the West was also
becoming increasingly urban, concentrating in "urban archipelagos"
like Denver, Las Vegas, and Phoenix.5 Numerous environmental needs
for water became evident, along with increased demand for water to
maintain stream flows and lake levels for recreation. 6 The energy crisis

1. For example, in one ruling in Washington State's Yakima Basin, Acquavella, the
court held that the interests of individuals can be represented by a larger entity like an
irrigation district or a ditch company. This ruling will reduce the time and cost of
future adjudications by reducing the number of parties involved. See WASH. DEP'T OF
ECOLOGY,
THE

ATTORNEY

WATER

GEN. OF WASH.,

RIGHTS

GENERAL

2002

REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: STREAMLINING

ADJUDICATION

PROCEDURES

10

(2002),

http://www.ecy.wa.gov/pubs/0211019.pdf.

2.

Id.

3. See 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000); see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564-67
(1963).
4.

See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF

THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 PART 1, 22

(1975), available at
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970pl-Ol.pdf;
see
also
PAMELA CASE & GREGORY ALWARD, REPORT TO THE WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW

ADVISORY COMMISSION - PATTERNS OF DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND VALUE CHANGE IN
THE WESTERN UNITED STATES: IMPLICATION FOR WATER USE AND MANAGEMENT 1 (1997),

available

at

https://repository.unm.edu/dspace/bitstream/1928/2793/ 1/PATTERNS.pdf.
5. A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western
Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 163,
163-65 (1999).
6. Id. at 168; see generally Office of Counsel, Corps of Engineers, Missouri River
Division, Dep't of the Army, The Role of Recreation in the Regulation of the Corps of Engineers
Constructed and OperatedMain Stem Reservoirs of the Missouri River, 4 GREAT PLAINS NAT.
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prompted by the oil embargo of 1973 led to increased water demand
7
in the energy-producing sector.
As federal support for new water development projects evaporated,
improved water management emerged as a goal of states, many of
which created new water management agencies. As population and
energy needs continued to grow, so did interstate conflicts over water.
States turned to adjudications as a way to demonstrate water use, helpful in securing water from interstate river negotiations. Federal involvement in western water became more evident, not only from postWorld War II Supreme Court decisions that affirmed federal authority
over water under specific circumstances, 8 but also from the Endangered Species Act,9 and other pollution control and conservation acts.' °
The erosion of states' control over local water added to the impetus for
adjudication of water rights."
There is a substantial body of literature describing various forms of
water rights adjudication processes and progress, or lack thereof, in
specific proceedings. 2 This article takes a different perspective, laying
out a framework for systematically considering the costs and benefits of
adjudications and discussing economic aspects of a question that is
being posed more frequently: are water rights adjudications a "worthwhile" use of scarce resources?
Economic evaluation of public expenditures in the United States
can be traced to the early 1800s when the Secretary of the Treasury
26, 43-44 (1999) (discussing the role of Corps of Engineers in establishing and regulating recreational facilities).
7. See e.g. ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 497-99 (1988).
8. See First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 16667, 181 (1946) (establishing federal authority over water diverted in navigable
streams); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon (Pelton Dam), 349 U.S. 435, 437 (1955) (establishing federal authority over non-navigable streams with dams next to federal lands).
9. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000) (limiting actions that threaten to modify or
destroy critical habitat for threatened and endangered species).
10. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (requiring federal permits for "dredge and fill" activities affecting navigable waters); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (allowing the federal government to determine the
relevant and appropriate environmental standards for the cleanup of hazardous waste
sites); Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 715 (limiting actions which interfere with the migration of certain birds).
11. See D. Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water Uses:
The History of Conflict, the Prospectsfor Accommodation, 21 ENvIL. L. 1, 3 (1991) (discussing federal assertion of management interests in western water resources).
12. See e.g., John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating
Rivers and Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 355 (Spring 2006) (discussing specific comprehensive general stream adjudications); see also Christopher W. Moore,
Foreword to TAMRA PEARSON D'ESTREE & BONNI G. COLBY, BRAVING THE CURRENTS:
REsoURCESJ.

EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE RIVER BASINS OF THE
AMERICAN WEST ix-x (Ariel Dinar & David Zilberman eds., 2004) (discussing the re-

sponse to increasing and costly conflicts over water).
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In the

nearly two centuries since then, economic analysis has become commonplace for major federal projects and for new regulations, and is
now mandatory for many types of federal actions. 4 Given the emphasis
on evaluation of public expenditures in the United States, the time is
ripe to consider how best to evaluate the financial and economic aspects of adjudications. Policymakers and the public seek accountability. Public agencies are often stakeholders in adjudications, addressing
conflict expends public resources, and issues of public interest are at
stake. Public officials and taxpayers understandably want to know how
much money, time, and other resources are involved and whether positive results of the process justify incurred costs incurred.
Economic and financial evaluation can serve a number of purposes. First, it may help direct the use of public money and agency

staff toward processes that will be the most effective in fulfilling adjudication objectives. Economic analysis of past efforts will also generate
information to help courts, management agencies, and stakeholders
learn what strategies are likely to be the most effective in resolving water right disputes. In addition, thoughtful evaluation may suggest
changes in public policies and institutions to facilitate more efficient
resolution of conflicts.
The article begins with a discussion of the economic functions of
water rights adjudication in a setting in which decisions potentially
affected by adjudication proceedings face multiple uncertainties.
Next, the article presents a conceptual framework for evaluating the
costs and benefits of adjudications, including practical matters such as
evaluation criteria and collection of data to support future analyses.
Finally, the article briefly summarizes the existing literature on adjudication costs and benefits, concluding with recommendations for evaluating adjudication processes and for enhancing the cost-benefit tradeoffs of these proceedings.
II. ADJUDICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC
DECISIONS AND PERVASIVE UNCERTAINTY
Adjudications are intended to reduce uncertainties in the quantity
and priority of water rights. In principle, this can facilitate economic
development that requires reliable supplies; allow all parties and water
administrators to plan better for the future; separate real water claims
from "paper water"; and quantify federal, Indian and other reserved

13.

See NICK HANLEY & CLIVE SPASH, COST-BENEFrr ANALYSIS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 4

(Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 1993).
14. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, sec. 2 (Feb. 17, 1981).
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rights, reducing
this specific source of uncertainty for water right
15
claimants.
Although their objectives are well appreciated, adjudications are
not without critics. 1 Even successful adjudications face limited ability
to address risk, as courts only seek to define specific characteristics of7
rights, not the policies that guide future changes in use of rights.
Ambiguous and changing state, federal, and tribal policies are a key
source of risk to right holders even when rights themselves are welldefined. A host of other uncertainties result from regional hydrology
and climate, changing economic conditions, agency actions taken under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") or Clean Water Act ("CWA'),
and changing political administrations. Adjudications attempt to reduce one specific source of uncertainty in a context beset by multiple
risks.
While improved certainty has been a central objective of adjudications, economic decisions routinely proceed in the face of uncertainty.
The risks inherent in stock market and real estate investments are just
a few of many potential examples. As always in the field of economics,
the issue is tradeoffs. There are costs of achieving greater certainty
and there are costs of proceeding with economic decisions in the face
of uncertainty. Legitimate differences of opinion exist as to the proper
role of government in reducing risk for the public and the private sectors. Various government agencies are involved in a diverse array of
risk-related policies such as vehicle airbag regulations, airport security,
drought assistance for farmers, limits on arsenic concentrations in
drinking water, and truth-in-lending regulations. In this broad context, the debate over adjudications can be seen as part of a larger debate on the appropriate level of public investment in reducing risk.
In the case of water, the risks associated with ill-defined rights significantly affect both the public and private sectors. Economic decisions that adjudications are likely to affect include water acquisitions
for various purposes such as implementing water settlements involving
Native American tribes or multiple states, assuring flows for recreation

and environmental needs, and securing reliable dry year supplies for
cities and industry. Water rights ambiguities also affect decisions to
15.

See, e.g.,

NORMAN K. JOHNSON, WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, INDIAN WATER

(1983) (estimating a total potential reserved rights claim of
about 46 million acre-feet of water per year by Indian tribes in the western states).
16. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Illusion ofFinality in General Water Rights Adjudications, 25
IDAHO L. REv. 271, 272-73 (1989); Scott B. McElroy &JeffJ. Davis, Revisiting Colorado
River Water ConservationDistrict v. United States - There Must Be a Better Way, 27 Ariz. St. L.
J. 597, 648 (Summer 1995); Frances Levine, Dividing the Water: The Impact of Water Rights
Adjudication on New Mexican Communities, 32J. SW. 268, 268-69 (Autumn 1990).
17. Adjudicators usually take a narrow view of their role. Setting the quantity, priority and other essential elements of a water right is the statutory burden adjudications
carry. Any further involvement transgresses the separation of powers doctrine.
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invest in water storage, treatment, and delivery infrastructure. These
decisions are crucial to states, cities, counties, tribes, private firms, and
non-profit organizations across the West. Moreover, water rights affect
multiple public interests such as endangered species and municipal
water supply reliability. Pervasive public agency involvement and expenditures substantially affect taxpayers.,8
In recognition of the substantial public interests at stake, the federal government developed principles and standards for evaluating
water projects. 9 The U.S. Department of Interior also created guidelines for Indian water settlements. 20 The Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB") plays a critical role in reviewing proposed water projects and tribal settlements and OMB has consistently opposed settlements on fiscal grounds, recommending a presidential veto in the case
of the majority of settlements.2' The political power of states and their
congressional delegations has driven administrative approval of settlements, overcoming OMB objections. Similarly, despite the existence of
cost-benefit standards22 to evaluate proposed water development projects, approval of these projects hinged heavily on political matters
It is important to acknowlrather than objective economic analysis.
edge that politics often trumps analytical findings when developing
systematic economic analysis for the evaluation of adjudications.

M.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC
EVALUATION OF ADJUDICATIONS

Assessing the benefits and costs of water rights adjudications is not
a simple undertaking, even though the science of benefit-cost analysis
has advanced over several decades from its early application to examining infrastructure projects such as construction of highways and reservoirs. It is worth asking why one might take the trouble to conduct a
18.

For more information on the role of Cost-Benefit analyses in federal projects,

see generally U.S.

WATER

RESOURCES

COUNCIL,

ECONOMIC AND

ENVIRONMENTAL

PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES IMPLEMENTATION

(1983), [hereinafter PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES] (discussing the costs and
benefits of water resources development alternatives and providing more information
on the role of benefit-cost analyses in federal projects); Maynard M. Hufschmidt, BeneSTUDIES iii

fit-Cost Analysis: 1933-1985, WATER RESOURCES UPDATES: REFLECTIONS
WATER SCIENCE AND POLICY: ISSUE NO. 166, Mar. 2000, at 42; Warren

Overview of President Carter'sWater Policy (1978), 3
19.

ENVIRON. MGT.

ON A CENTURY OF

Viessman, Jr., An
189 (1979).

See 42 U.S.C. § 1962a-2 (2000) (establishing principles, standards, and proce-

dures for federal projects).
20. See Criteria and Procedures for Indian Water Rights Settlements, 55 Fed. Reg.
9223 (Mar. 12, 1990); see also BONNIE G. COLBY, JOHN E. THORSON & SARAH BRITrON,
NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS: FULFILLING PROMISES IN THE ARID WEST 38 (2005).
21. COLBY, THORSON & BRrrrON, supra note 20, at 38, 60-61.
22. See generally PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra notel8, at iii.
23. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL WATER POLICY
INITIATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 95-347, at 1 (1978).
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systematic evaluation? After all, establishing an evaluation framework
and collecting and analyzing data is not itself a costless process.
Perhaps the strongest rationale for establishing such a framework is
to inform the creation of more effective processes for accomplishing
adjudication objectives. Documentation can also help guide the appropriate level of public and private investment in these lengthy and
expensive processes. At minimum, it would be useful to gauge how
cumulative expenditures on water rights adjudications compare to the
value of the water assets being adjudicated. In those regions where
water rights have high financial value and adjudication costs represent
a modest fraction of that value adjudications may be considered a reasonable "cost of doing business." Likewise, it would be useful to identify areas where adjudication costs are high and significantly out of
proportion to the value of water rights.
"Effectiveness" refers to achieved results relative to the time, money
and other expended resources. 4 The importance of assessing the effectiveness of adjudications has been intensifying. Those who bear the
costs, particularly in the public sector, desire result based accountability that requires adjudication programs to provide evidence about what
they aim to achieve and the results they have achieved.
A. COSTS
The adjudication costs that an informed analysis must consider are
generally more straightforward than adjudication benefits. Costs include ongoing financial expenditures by all parties, including the value
of staff and managerial time. These costs are borne by the taxpayers
through multiple avenues of public agency involvement and the operation of the court system, as well as by all of the parties to the proceeding. Other costs include time delays and uncertainties that affect water
management decisions, non-cooperative behavior among parties in
withholding useful technical information and failing to address regional water problems, and the stress and acrimony that may accompany court proceeding. If an adjudication is successful, many of these
costs will be reduced once the proceedings are well-established and
progressing.
Comprehensive cost data is difficult to collect because costs incurred by private parties are not public information and public agencies often do not systematically compile their incurred costs. Cost information can be categorized as: (1) costs to parties participating in
the process; (2) costs to the public including agencies, courts, and
24. Andy Rowe, Bonnie Colby, Michael Niemeyer, and Will Hall, Economic and
Environmental Effects of Environmental Conflict Resolution, Presented to the William
and Flora Hewlett Foundation (Dec. 2005).
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other costs paid through taxes; and (3) costs to others that are not participating in the process-and are not paying with tax dollars-such as
water utility ratepayers. Cost-benefit analysis of adjudications must
"count" expenditures of staff, time, money, resources, water, and other
assets as costs. It is important to carefully distinguish between costs
attributable to the adjudication and more general costs that would
have occurred anyway. The analysis must only include those costs that
are attributable to the adjudication process.
Transaction costs are a special consideration that, as contemplated
by this paper, relates to the effect of adjudications on water transactions. Transaction costs are information, contracting, and enforcement costs, including verifying water rights and regulatory requirements, gathering data on compliance, assessing and collecting of penalties, and monitoring the condition of the water resources that are the
subject of the transaction. Transaction costs may arise from public
policies that require stakeholders to follow specific procedures, such as
state agency review of proposed changes in water rights.2 5 In principle,
a successful adjudication will reduce future transaction costs of transferring water rights by providing increased certainty. However, during
the period that the adjudication is active, transaction costs may well
increase due to heightened levels of scrutiny of proposed water right
changes by other claimants and by management agencies.26 Eliminating transaction costs is neither feasible nor desirable. The goal is a
balancing of the costs of improving certainty with the benefits of that
certainty. Transaction costs are part of the "price" of having transferable private property rights in a resource with pervasive public interests
and community implications.
The most compelling category of costs is particularly elusive to describe and quantify. An "opportunity cost" is not a direct expense paid
out of someone's pocket. Rather, it is an opportunity-or flow of expected benefits-that is given up in order to obtain something else.
For instance, the use of state and federal agency staff time to support
adjudication proceedings could have instead gone towards implementation of water conservation programs. Monies that irrigation districts
expend on adjudication could instead go towards modernization of the
district's water conveyance infrastructure. Urban water suppliers could
spend their adjudication budgets on acquiring water rights instead.
All expenditures of time and money have an opportunity cost-the
sacrifice of alternative accomplishments that could have been secured.
With respect to adjudications, opportunity cost considerations pose the
25. See generally Bonnie G. Colby, Transaction Costs and Efficiency in Western Water
Allocation, 72 AM.J. AGRIC. ECON. 1184 (Dec. 1990)
26. Charles T. DuMars, Some Thoughts on the Future of Water Rights Adjudications in
Western Water Law, in ABA 25th Annual Water Law Conference Materials 7 (ABA 25th
Annual Water Law Conference Feb. 23, 2007).
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question: Is there some more effective process and/or goal that could
be accomplished with the resources being expended on adjudications?
Table 1: Adjudication Costs
" Expenditures of money and time
" Delayed problem-solving, resource degradation
" Delayed investment, foregone returns
" Opportunity costs - what could we have done instead with $ expended?
Table 2: Parties Who Bear Adjudication Costs
" Costs to parties (claimants)
" Costs to public agencies and taxpayers
" Costs to "others" (rate payers, instream flow beneficiaries)
B.

BENEFITS

The potential benefits of an adjudication are difficult to identify
precisely, even harder to quantify, and are dependent upon the effectiveness of the adjudication in accomplishing its objectives. The economic benefits of reducing uncertainties in water rights depend on the
extent to which uncertainty is reduced and the financial value of the
rights. The literature on valuing water rights has evolved substantially
in the last fifteen years.2 7 Economic values, generally expressed in
terms of per acre-foot, can be estimated, even in regions where there
are no active market transactions. The higher the economic value of
water, the greater the financial returns from reducing uncertainty over
water rights.
27. See e.g., James F. Booker & Bonnie G. Colby, Competing Water Uses in the Southwestern US.: Valuing Drought Damages, 31 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 877 (1995); David S.
Brookshire et al, Market Pricesfor Water in the Semi-Arid West of the United States, 40 WATER
RESOURCES RES. W09S04 (Sept. 2004); Bonnie G. Colby, Applying Fair Market Value Concepts to Water Rights, 18 REAL EST. ISSUES 8 (1993); Bonnie G. Colby, Estimating the Value

of Water in Alternative Uses, in ECONOMICS OF WATER RESOURCES: INSTITUTIONS,
INSTRUMENTS AND POLICIES FOR MANAGING ScARcITy 3 (K. William Easter & Mary E.
Renwick eds., 2004); Bonnie G. Colby & Steve Wishart, Quantifying the Influence of Desert
RiparianAreas on Residential Property Values, 70 APPRAISALJ. 304 (2002); Bonnie G. Colby,
Recent Trends in Southwestern Water Values, 59 APPRAISAL J. 488 (1991) [hereinafter
Southwestern Water Values]; Bonnie G. Colby et al., Water Right Transactions:Market Values
and Price Dispersion, 29 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1565 (June 1993) [hereinafter Water
Right Transactions];Julie Leones et al., MeasuringRegionalEconomic Impacts of Streamflow
Depletions, 33 WATER RESOURCES RES. 831 (Apr. 1997); STEVEN J. HERZOG, GUIDELINES
FOR THE APPRAISAL OF WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA,

ES-3 to ES-12 (prepared for U.S.

Fish
and
Wildlife
Service,
September
2006),
available
at
http://www.fws.gov/cno/fisheries/docs/Guidelines%20for%2Appraisal%20of% 20W
ater%20Rights.pdf.
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An adjudication that successfully resolves uncertainty over water
rights may lead to improved regional economic output and productivity, enhanced ability to plan for growth, endangered species recovery,
improvements in water dependent habitat, and recreation opportunities. In addition, there may be better cooperation amongst jurisdictions
and stakeholders, improved organizational morale and credibility, increased confidence in the system to solve problems, and decreased
anxiety and tension.
One tangible benefit of a successful adjudication is to enable
straightforward enforcement of water rights in times of shortage. As A.
Dan Tarlock has noted, many areas of the West have little history of
enforcing a priority system and cutting off junior users.28 However,
enforcement of priorities will become more commonplace and necessary as the effects of climate change unfold. Feller has noted extensive
costs and delays endured by a prominent senior right holder in central
Arizona attempting to curtail upstream juniors in the midst of a slow
and cumbersome ongoing adjudication.2
Other benefits from an effective adjudication can be conceptualized in standard economic terms that consider adaptation to risk. For
simplicity, assume that the water right characteristics of central interest
to claimants are the mean yield of the right in "average" hydrologic
years and the variance around this mean in dry years.
Suppose the adjudication succeeds in reducing the variance
around the mean yield so that a claimant can know with more certainty
the lowest yield of the right in foreseeable hydrologic circumstances.
Economists have developed the concept of a "risk premium"-a willingness to pay to reduce risk-in this case to reduce the variance in the
yield of a water right.3° The risk premium is larger when the economic
consequences of the variance in water right yield are higher. For instance, a farmer growing high-profit specialty crops would have a
higher willingness to pay to reduce uncertainty than a farmer growing
less profitable crops. Risk premiums increase as water rights become
more financially valuable. Climate change is likely to increase water
demand in agricultural and urban sectors due to the effect of higher
temperatures on evapo-transpiration in crops and urban landscapes.
Climate change is also likely to increase the variance around the his-

28.

See Dan Tarlock, General Stream Adjudications: A Good Public Investment?, 133

CONTEMP. WATER REs.

J.

& EDUC. 52, 56 (2006).

29. see alsoJoseph M. Feller, The Adjudication That Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 ARIz. L.
REv. 405 (2007).
30.
See W. DOUGLASS SHAW, WATER RESOURCE ECONOMICS AND POLICY: AN
INTRODUCTION 185 (2005).
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toric mean water yield for water rights, due to increased temperature,
3
reduced winter snowpack, and more erratic precipitation events.

The value to the right holder of eliminating uncertainty in yield
during dry years is the maximum they would pay to eliminate the variance and be assured of the average yield under all hydrologic conditions. Rationally, this dollar amount has an upper limit. There is a cost
of achieving certainty for a specific water right at which the right
holder would rather adapt to the existing uncertainty through acquiring additional, also uncertain, rights, investing in storage facilities, water banking, etc. In fact, the willingness to pay to reduce uncertainty in
water supply portfolios has motivated many of the water3 2 transactions
undertaken by cities, businesses, and agricultural districts.
The clearest benefit that has emerged from actual adjudications is
the incentive that the costly morass of the process creates for negotiated settlements. Thorson et al. cite these settlements as the single
33
most evident accomplishment of adjudications. However, one must
inquire whether a less costly and cumbersome process could induce
such settlements.
An analogy from the transportation sector is in order here. If
roads become sufficiently congested in the central part of a city, then
commuters, weighing the tradeoffs, will opt for more use of public
transportation. Without the excessive delays of congested, this shift
might never happen. However, significant cumulative costs accrue as
congestion increases. The same incentives to switch to public transit
could have been created instead by a tax on driving into the center of
the city, with tax revenues used to provide a superb public transit system.
In the same way, it is conceivable that a carefully designed system of
fees for claiming and holding water rights could reproduce the incentives to negotiate a settlement that slow, costly, and uncertain adjudications generate. Trivial and unsubstantiated claims will decline as these
claimants will no longer find it worthwhile to maintain an active claim.
However, urban traffic congestion reaches a costly stage before significant investments are made in public transit because no elected body is
willing to levy a driving fee unless dire circumstances are evident. This
same inertia applies to the water policy arena. The imposition of user
fees per unit of water consumed (for agricultural and urban users),
along with substantive fees for holding water rights and participating in
31.

WORKING GROUP II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE

CHANGE 2001: IMPAcTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILrIY 742-43, 745 (2001), available at

http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wg2/index.htm.
32. See Water Right Transactions,supra note 27, at 1565-72 (discussing market transactions involving a scarce resource); Southwestern Water Values, supra note 27, at 488-500
(discussing the development and trends of the water market in the southwest United

States).
33. See Thorson et al., supra note 12, at 355.
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adjudications could substantially reduce many water problems. Those
parties with relatively low economic returns from their water use and
their ownership of rights would release their water for other purposes.
Political antipathy to imposing new fees, legitimate equity considerations, and jurisdictional tangles make this approach difficult to implement. Moreover, prior court decisions limit the manner in which
such fees can be imposed.4 Nevertheless, even modest fees linked to
the quantity claimed would be a beginning in creating appropriate
incentives.3 5
C. THE COUNTERFACTUAL - CONSTRUCTING "WITH AND WITHOUT"

SCENARIOS
An important aspect of a benefit cost assessment is the counterfac-

tual, constructing the baseline against which the adjudication will be
assessed. This requires identifying a clear counterfactual-what would
take place in the absence of the adjudication process? Evaluation of
adjudications must explicitly consider alternative processes and compare the results achieved through adjudication to those that each alternative counterfactual-the likely process and outcome absent adjudication-would have achieved. Among the questions that an analysis
must address are: Would the ambiguities in water rights have continued without any resolution? Would a different water rights clarification process have occurred? Case-by-case litigation of rights seems a
natural baseline for a comprehensive adjudication. However, there are
many difficulties with using litigation as a baseline. 6
First, adjudication, piecemeal litigation, and other processes are
not mutually exclusive options. All of these processes require collection and analysis of technical information, preparing positions and
analyzing tradeoffs among different outcomes. Which costs should be
assigned to which process? Litigation often provides the incentives
necessary for negotiated agreements to be achieved. In addition, different processes generate different "products" such that comparison of
costs alone would neglect potentially large differences in the benefits
generated by negotiation versus litigation to the various parties. An
administrative water rights hearing and ruling may constitute the most
realistic baseline. Still, one must conjecture regarding the length, costliness, and outcome of such a hearing. There is a dearth of closely
comparable cases that have been addressed by different processes and

34.

See e.g., U.S. v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1 (1993).

35. For fee purposes, the consumptive use quantity of the claim would be most
relevant and instream flow claims would need to be assessed in a different manner.
36.

See GAIL BINGHAM,
128-32 (1986).

EXPERIENCE

RESOLVING

ENVIRONMENTAL

DISPuTEs:

A DECADE

OF

Issue 2

ASSESSING THE VALUE OFADJUDICATIONS

have been carefully documented such that rigorous comparisons can
be made.
A systematic assessment of adjudications must clearly define the
counterfactual in order to determine what difference the adjudication
process made in comparison to the most likely outcome absent the
adjudication. Results-based accountability requirements direct programs to assess this difference. Economists refer to this as the incremental contribution, or marginal net benefit when measured in dollars. This is a central question of program evaluation-what difference
did the program make?
The analytical goal is to identify effects that the evaluated adjudication process specifically caused. Effects due to the adjudication are
those that would not have occurred without it. This is the "with and
without" principle-attributing to the adjudication only those effects
that would not have occurred in absence of the adjudication. 37 It is

essential to separate the economic effects of general regional changes
in resource use and management from impacts which are properly
attributable to the process being evaluated. Professional judgment
calls are inevitable in attempting to isolate the impacts of adjudication
from other events that affect water resources in the region.
In previous studies of similarly complex multi-party processes, researchers have asked parties to identify their preferred alternative to
the process being evaluated. "Candidate counterfactuals" may consist
of prior and/or concurrent processes used by parties, alternatives used
elsewhere to address similar issues with a different process, and constructed alternatives-plausible and likely processes that could have
been used but were not. The counterfactual must be credible to the
parties and to professionals involved, as well as to agencies concerned
with results-based accountability.38
Thorson et al. highlighted several likely alternatives to general
stream adjudications. As one alternative, significant changes could be
made in the role of the federal and state governments with respect to
federal reserved rights. s9 The federal government could take action to:
give deference to state law, inventory or quantify reserved rights,
4
amend the McCarran Amendment, or adjudicate in federal court. 0
Early versions of the Western Water Rights Settlement Act, proposed in
195641 would have required the government to declare when it was reserving water, compensate states when federal rights affected state

37. See JOHN B. LOOMIS, INTEGRATED PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATIONS TO NATIONAL FORESTS, PARKS, WILDLIFE REFUGES, AND BLM LANDS 158-60
(2d ed. Columbia University Press 2002).
38. SeeD'ESTRkE&COLBY, supra note 12, at x.
39.

Thorson et al., supra note 12, at 464.

40.

Id. at 464-70.

41.

S. 863, 84th Cong. (1956).
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rights, and guarantee reserved rights would not affect rights established before the creation of the reservations. A number of amendments have been proposed to McCarran. Michael White recommended changing general requirements to allow a "straight-forward
determination of federal water rights," and charging the federal government for litigation.2 Crapo introduced a bill that would have required the United States to abide by state laws and fees when appropriating water, to abide by the same laws as individuals in seeking water
rights, and to waive sovereign immunity in certain cases.43 Section 2(c)
in the bill denied that the reservation of lands by the United States
guaranteed water with the designation.4 4
McElroy and Davis recommend the adjudication of Indian rights in
federal courts, citing the small number of Indian adjudications completed by state courts.45 They believe that federal court would provide
the speediest fair trial. 46 Federal courts were involved in the Klamath
Tribe Adair litigation in Oregon. 4' The district court recognized reserved rights
for fishing and other uses but let the state court quantify
48
the rights.

As another strategy, administrative inventories could be pursued
instead of judicial proceedings. The Public Land Law Review Commission gave recommendations for handling federal and Indian reserve
rights in the early 1970s. They proposed a plan where federal land
agencies would "ascertain and give notice of their projected water requirements for the next 40 years for reserved areas ...

Additional

protections would also be in place to protect states against conflicting
rights or rights created in the future. 5°
The National Water Commission advocated a different approach.
Existing and future federal reserved rights would be established, recorded, and quantified in accordance with state laws. The Commission
recommended an inventory and recording of Indian reserve rights in
state records regardless of whether or not adjudications would be nec-

42.

Michael D. White, McCarranAmendment Adjudications-Problems,Solutions, Alterna-

tives, 22 LAND & WATERL. REv. 619, 628-29 (1987).
43. S. 561,108th Cong. §§ 3(a), 3(b)(2)(A), 5 (2003).
44.
45.
trict v.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. § 2(c).
Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis, Revisiting Colorado River Water Conservation DisUnited States - There Must Be a Better Way, 27 ARiz. ST.L.J. 597, 648 (1995).
Id.
United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1397, 1399.
U.S. PuB. LAND LAw REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD Or THE NATION'S LAND: A
Interestingly, Senator
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 147 (1970).

McCarran proposed such an inventory as part of his bill in 1951. See S. Rep. No. 82-755
at 1-2 (1951). The inventory proposal did not pass the Senate.
50. Id. at 147-149.
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essary as a means to inform other water users. 1 In the event that Indian rights displaced local water right holders, the commission recommended either the federal government lease up to the entire Indian water right, compensate displaced right holders, or supply the
displaced water through alternative means.52
Various proposals would have required federal agencies prepare
detailed inventories of all water rights in each state.53 Carter's water
policy statement in 1978 required administrative inventory of all nonIndian reserved rights based on actual needs "rather than theoretical
or hypothetical needs based on full legal extension of
all possible
55
rights. 54 This plan was vague in respect to Indian rights.
Legislative quantification has been considered as an alternative to
adjudications. There have been repeated efforts to induce Congress to
quantify Indian water rights. For example, in 1977, Carter's appointed
Federal Reserved Water Rights Task Force recommended legislation,
which was subsequently introduced in the House of Representatives
that year, that would assign priority dates and quantify existing Indian
reserve rights. 5" The determinations would be based on reservation
date and past five years water use.57 The bill did not address undeveloped Indian rights.
Regional settlements and negotiated agreements could become the
primary process. Indian water right settlements in the West have been
moving forward although states and tribes generally feel that the federal government is not contributing resources on the level it should. 8
Former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt advised tribes to coop51. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 477-78 (1973).
52. Id. at 481-83.
53. A similar proposal in 1974 recommended that the inventory and quantification
should occur by a neutral federal agency independent of the Department of Interior
and Department of Justice. This agency or commission would include some Indian
representatives, water scholars, and resource planners. Susan Millington Campbell,
Note, A Proposalfor the Quantification of Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
1299, 1320 (1974); see also Walter Kiechel, Jr. & Kenneth J. Burke, Federal-StateRelations
in Water Resources Adjudication and Administration:Integration of Reserved Rights With AppropriativeRights, 18 ROCKV MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 531, 538 (1973) (arguing that quantification of reserved rights by administrative process is a better approach).
54. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL AND INDIAN
RESERVATIONS: A GROWING CONTROVERSY IN NEED OF RESOLUTION app.II (1978) [here-

inafter GAO REPORT].
55. Id.
56. H.R. 9951, 95th Cong. (1977).
57. H.R. 9951, 95th Cong. (1977).
58. See Bonnie G. Colby, What Makes Water Settlements Successful?, in TRIBAL WATER
RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY LAW, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS 171,

173

(John E.

Thorson et al. eds., 2006) (noting that non-federal parties bear a significant portion of
settlement costs); see also DANIEL McCOOL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN
WATER SETTLEMENTS AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA 31, 48-49 (2002) (noting the time
involved in the passage of various settlement acts).
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erate in settling Indian water claims. 59 Others have proposed regional
settlements. The Arizona Water Settlements Act of 2004, which involved the Gila River Indian Community's rights, the State of New Mexico's fights, and the Bureau of Reclamation's bill for the Central Arizona Project, is an example of a regional settlement. 6 The creation of
an Indian Water Rights Commission appointed by the President has
also been suggested to draft model water agreements. 6' The Commission would make guidelines for the different stages of adjudication. 2 A
surcharge on reclamation63 projects could fund its operation and some
of its settled agreements.
One example of an alternative model is CALFED, created out of
the Bay-Delta Accord of 1994.6 This intergovernmental agency is a
collaborative effort between the State of California, the Federal government, and numerous other signatories. Another example of an
alternative model is the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan
(CERP), authorized under the Water Resources Development Act of
2000. 65 It is important to note that the threat of lengthy, uncertain,
and expensive litigation motivates carefully crafted regional agreements, but that even established settlements are fraught with uncertainty. For instance, former Interior Secretary Babbitt worked hard
under his administration to establish that "a deal is a deal." 66 This encouraged major efforts to complete habitat conservation plans under
the Endangered Species Act. 67 However, the "no surprises" policy itself
is under challenge in district court in Washington D.C. 68 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") has re-opener clauses in its li-

59. Keith Bagwell, Babbitt to Indians: Unity May Aid Water Fight,ARIz. DAILY STAR, Mar.
19, 1997, at 2B.
60. S. 437, 108th Cong., 118 Stat. 3478 (2004).
61. Lloyd Burton, The American Indian Water Rights Dilemma: Historical Perspective and Dispute-Settling Policy Recommendations, 7 UCIAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'v 1, 4749 (1987).
62. Id. at 50.
63. Id. at 54.
64. The Bay-Delta Accord, signed in 1994, set forth principles towards the implementation of a permanent Bay-Delta protection plan. Among its complex provisions,
the agreement sets water quality standards, requires the state to conduct water rights
proceedings, and specifies that compliance with the "take" provisions of the Endangered Species Act is not intended to result in any additional loss of water supply. To
meet that goal, the Accord allows for operational flexibility, developed through a state
and federal operations group. The parties also agreed to fund ecosystem restoration,
including water and habitat purchases.
See CALFED Delta-Bay Program,
http://www.calwater.ca.gov/AboutCalfed/ (last visited March 20, 2007).
65. Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 601, 114 Stat. 2572, 2680 (2000).
66. See Peter Sly, Address at ABA 22nd Annual Water Law Conference: Environmental Water Settlements: Can We Make a Deal? (Feb. 19, 2004).
67. See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg.
8859 (February 23, 1998); see also Donald C. Baur & Karen L. Donovan, The No Surprises
Policy: Contracts 101 Meets the EndangeredSpecies Act, 27 ENVTL. L. 767, 767 (Fall 1997).
68. Spirit of the Sage v. Babbitt, No. 98-CV-01873-EGS (D. D.C. filedJuly 29, 1998)
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censes for hydroelectric projects and this uncertainty impels FERC lisuch conservation groups, to seek
censees and other stakeholders,
69
binding regulatory agreements.
Other suggestions for simplifying adjudications include: limiting
the number of necessary parties, allowing states to represent nonIndian users, and allowing class action procedures. ° John Leshy, former Solicitor of the United States Department of the Interior, suggested a focus on improved relations between federal and state governments, including agreements for federal agencies and states to notify each other promptly in the case of proposed water right changes
and to cooperation on research initiatives.
Identifying appropriate counterfactuals to compare adjudications is
challenging, but not impossible. A study conducted by Rowe et al. assumed that complex environmental disputes were highly unique, and
this would prevent identification of a good counterfactual. However,
Rowe et al. found that highly complex environmental disputes can
have good naturally occurring counterfactuals. v This study suggested
construction of a counterfactual for comparison when environmental
disputes were unique in the sense that an observed alternative was not
present. Rowe found that the use of observed and constructed alternatives together, when placed before an expert science panel to compare
effects of the process under evaluation to both alternatives, maximized
effectiveness.7 3 This method greatly enhanced cross-case comparisons
and may be an efficient approach to learning from complex processes.
D. STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ON ADJUDICATION COSTS, BENEFITS

Below, this article summarizes the existing anecdotal literature on
costs associated with adjudications for each state in which information
is readily available.
Adjudication of all Montana water rights issued prior to July 1,
1973 began in 1979. TM As of 2004, six decrees have been finalized out
69. See generally, Michael A. Swiger et al., Payingfor the Change: Can the FERC Force
Dam Decommissioning at Relicensing? 17 ENERGY L.J. 163 (1996) (reprinted in the ABA
18th Annual Water Law Conference materials) (discussing the impact of FERC hydroelectric dam decommissioning on the property interests of hydropower licensees).
70. See, e.g., Miller v. Jennings, 243 F.2d 157, 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1957) (noting the
limited circumstances in which a court may join the United States as a party defendant
in a water rights lawsuit and the importance of including all water claimants in a water
rights adjudication, whether members of a class or parties thereto).
71. John D. Leshy, U.S. Department of Interior, Discussion Draft, Memorandum of
Understanding, Nov. 21, 1994; see also Thorson et al., supra note 14, at 472-73.
72. Rowe et al., supranote 24.
73. Id.
74. Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Comm., White Paper on the Montana
Water Rights Adjudication 3 (Mar. 2, 2004), http://water.montana.edu/watersheds/pdfs/FinalAdjudiction WhitePaper 030204.pdf.
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of 219,413 water rights claims.75 There is no indication of when the
state will finish the adjudication. When the process began, the legislature estimated that one hundred full time positions would be necessary
to complete it within ten years. 6 The funding that the legislature provided was inadequate so the process has been slow, even though the
State of Montana has spent over $37.5 million dollars." This estimate
does not include costs to individuals or economic losses due to uncertainty in land and water transactions.78
The Gila River water adjudication began in 1974, 79 and its end is
nowhere in sight."O By the mid-1990s Arizona had spent an estimated
$100 million on adjudications including costs to the Department of
Water Resources and lawyers' fees.81 Idaho spent around $68 million
from 1980-2003.2 Estimates place Wyoming's litigation expenses up to
1993 at $20 million. 3 The state of Texas spent around $10 million on

75. Id. "While six decrees are issued which DRNC describes as 'final,' they will have
to be re-opened, so, arguably, even those 'final' decrees are not truly final." Id. at 2, n.
2 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-237 (2005) (titled reopening and review of decrees)).
76. Id. at 4.
77. Id. at 1.
78. Id. The Steering Committee's 1991 statutory mandate included drafting a water
management plan for the basin, which the Committee completed in December 1994.
In 1995, the mandate was changed to include implementing and revising the initial
plan. See MONT.

CODE ANN.

§ 85-2-238 (2005);

see also UPPER CLARK FORK RIVER BASIN

(December
2004), available at http://dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water mgmt/montana state waterplan/
pdfs/upper clarkforkriverbasin watermngmt plan.pdf.
79. See United States v. County of Maricopa (San Carlos Apache Tribe), 697 P.2d
658, 661-64 (1985); see also Feller, supra note 29. Petitioners filed the case before the
Arizona State Land Department, which transferred it to the Maricopa County Superior
Court in 1979, when Arizona amended applicable statutes to require that parties bring
stream adjudications in the Superior Courts. San CarlosApache Tribe, 697 P.2d at 663-64.
80. The Arizona Supreme Court observed in 1985, "The case has been pending
more than ten years and may well take another twenty for decision." San CarlosApache
Tribe, 697 P.2d at 662. The court underestimated the time that the case would require,
as did the Arizona Department of Water Resources in predicting that the required
Comprehensive Report on the Adjudication would be completed in 1996 or 1997. See
STEERING COMM., UPPER CLARK FORK RIVER BASIN: WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN

DONALDJ. GROSS, STATUS REPORT: GENERAL ADJUDICATION OF THE GILA RIVER SYSTEM AND
SOURCE 63, 70 (1988).
81. Thorson et al., supra note 12, at 432; see also OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL MASTER,
GENERAL STREAM ADJUDICATION BULLETIN, October 1996, available at
http://supreme.state.az.us/waternews/issue/oct96.htm (discussing Indian tribe claims
for attorneys fees).
82.
Memorandum from Krista Lee Evans to Envtl. Quality Council 2 (Feb. 23,
2004), available at http://leg.state.mt.us/content/lepo/2003 2004/environmental
quality council/staffmemos/adjudication funding.pdf.
83. Teno Roncalio, The Big Horns of a Dilemma, in INDIAN WATER IN THE NEW WEST
209,211 (Thomas R. McGuire et al eds., 1993).
ARIZONA
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court costs and attorney fees to complete its surface water adjudication. 4
Determining the total costs of adjudications to all parties is complicated and has led to speculation that a comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis would reveal benefits insufficient to justify the costs. While
studies conducted to date shed light on the magnitude and types of
costs, there have not been any systematic comparisons of adjudication
costs with the potential cost of likely alternative processes.
The high cost of extended adjudications has caused litigants to call
on state legislators for reform. In Idaho and Arizona, efforts to reduce
costs by changing adjudication statutes have not been successful due to
legal challenges and costs brought on by the proposed changes.85 High
costs have had an additional side effect in Idaho. The federal government challenged Idaho's fee structure because of a $10 million fee assessment. 6 The United States Supreme Court decided the case against
Idaho.8 7 As a result, the federal government-a large land owner and
water user in Idaho-will not have to pay filing fees for the Snake River
Basin Adjudication.8
Sources of funding to cover state court and agency adjudication
costs differ across states. Some western states provide annual appropriations for agencies that bear the cost of adjudications, related hydrologic study, and notices. In Montana, funding also comes in the
form of special revenue funds 89 coupled with water right fees. 90 Other
states use filing fees to defray to costs of adjudication. South Dakota, 9'
92
Washington, 92 and Nevada 93 all require claimants to pay filing fees ranging from $25 to $100.

84. Doug Caroom & Paul Elliot, Water Rights Adjudication - Texas Style, 44 TEX. B.J.
1183,1184 (1981).
85. Arizona's legislature amended its adjudication statute in 1995 with H.B. 2276,
signed into law on March 17, 1995. The United States and several Indian tribes challenged the Arizona legislature's 1995 amendments to its adjudication statute in state
court. See Press Release, United States Dep't of Justice Env't and Natural Res. Div.,
State Court Strikes Down Amendments to Arizona Water Adjudication Statute: Decision Insures Laws Governing Water Rights Applied Fairly (Sept. 9, 1996), available at
Idaho's
legislature
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1996/Sept96/435enr.htm.
amended its adjudication statute one year earlier, with the Act of April 12, 1994, chs.
454-55, 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 1443-91 (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-1401-28
(2003)).
86. United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
87. Id. at 8-9.
88. Id.
89. See Legislative Fiscal Div., Legislative Fiscal Report 2007 Biennium, at F-29, available
at http://leg.mt.gov/content/publications/fiscal/fr_-2007/fr_f/lf df.pdf.
90. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-276 (2005).
91. S.D. CODIFED LAws § 46-2-13 (2004).
92. WASH. REV. CODEANN. §§ 36.18.016(17), 90.03.180 (West 2006).
93. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.135(2) (LexisNexis 2006).
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The non-financial costs of adjudications are also substantial. The
case can bring about conflicts that can undo local cooperative agreements. 94 Some have argued that the acequia system in New Mexico

represents a cooperative effort that may be vulnerable to damage by
state adjudications. 5 The adversarial process also impedes the sharing
of technical information and cooperation in addressing regional water
problems. Based on the available evidence, there is little basis for determining whether negotiated settlements are less costly than adjudication processes.
E. DATA NEEDS

Systematic collection of data related to costs and benefits can further our collective learning. Ideally, an adjudication process should
specify reporting requirements for cost data as part of the process.
Such a program could ask parties to make monthly reports on their
expenses to a central repository, which could then compile and track
such information. This systematic reporting of benefits will be more
challenging-likely requiring a carefully designed survey and perhaps
follow up interviews. Nevertheless, better cost data would be a valuable
step forward. At minimum, it is valuable to be able to compare adjudication expenditures to the financial value of water rights and determine whether costs are reasonable when compared to the value of
what is being adjudicated. 96
Perhaps the effort most analogous to systematic benefit-cost analysis of adjudications is a series of studies evaluating resolution of environmental disputes in the western United States. A pilot study that
began in 1998 instructed case researchers to rely only on publicly available sources to evaluate resolution of each case based on twenty-six

94. See generally Charlotte Benson Crossland, Acequia Rights in Law and Tradition, 32
J. Sw. 278, 284-87 (1990) (discussing the effect of water rights adjudications on the
traditional water allocation methods of acequias in New Mexico); Frances Levine, Dividing the Water: The Impact of Water Rights Adjudication on New Mexican Communities,32 J.
Sw. 268, 269-70 (1990) (discussing the impact of water rights adjudications on the
traditional water sharing and reallocation practices of communities in New Mexico);
Frances Leon Quintana, Land, Water, and Pueblo-HispanicRelations in Northern New Mexico, 32J. Sw. 288, 288, 292 (1990) (discussing the historical collaboration between the
Puebloans and Hispanics to share water and the effects of current and future water
projects on this historical system of water allocation).
95. See, e.g., STANLEY CRAWFORD, MAYORDOMO: CHRONICLE OF AN ACEQUIA IN
NORTHERN NEW MExico 86 (1988).
96. Data on the financial value of water rights is available for most regions of the
western U.S., based on either comparable market transactions or on analysis of the
financial returns to water in alternative uses. See, e.g., Bonnie Colby, K. Crandall & D.
Bush, Water Right Transactions,Market Values and Price Dispersion, 29 WATER RESOURCES
REs. 1565-1572 (1993); Bonnie Colby, Southwestern Water Values and Market Activity, 59
APPRAISALJ. 488-500 (1991)
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criteria. 97 The study intended the reliance on accessible sources to test
whether it was possible to evaluate dispute resolution processes and
outcomes in a low cost and non-intrusive manner, without the use of
stakeholder interviews. 98
Results indicate that economic aspects can be difficult to assess
without obtaining additional information directly from stakeholders.
However, for conflicts involving the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") processes, economic data are available from Environmental
Assessments and Impact Statements. For conflicts involving expenditures of federal dollars, the Office of Management Budget, the General
Accounting Office, the Department of Interior's Office of Policy Analysis, and the Congressional Budget Office perform economic or financial assessments. Access to economic data varied substantially across
the pilot cases. In principle, expenditures by public agencies are public information. However, agencies rarely compile cost data in a systematic manner on a case-by-case basis. Expenditures by corporations
and non-profit organizations generally are not a matter of public record and are available at the discretion of the organization. Subsequent to the pilot study, several evaluations of environmental conflict
resolution provided valuable indicators of how systematic evaluation of
adjudications might be conducted. 99
F. WELL-DEFINED ACCOUNTING STANCE
Careful definition of accounting stance is a crucial analytic step in
evaluating adjudication. The accounting stance determines the
width-across time, layers of parties, and geographically-of any cost,
benefit, and other impact, analysis. In general, this definition should
include the geographic area encompassed by the adjudication plus
those parties that are substantially affected but are located outside the
geographic scope.
Here is an example of an explicit statement regarding accounting
stance for a hypothetical case: The adjudication on the Grand River
has been ongoing since the early 1970s. In this evaluation, we examine
the period 1985 to the present due to lack of reliable data from earlier
periods. The primary claimants are farmers, cities, and a mining company. Stream flows for boaters and anglers may be affected by the adjudication, but these constituencies do not hold water rights and are
direct participants in the adjudication. Consequently, we do not include boater and angler impacts in our detailed analysis. We count

97.
98.

d'Estr~e & Colby, supra note 12, at 64-65.
Id.

99. See, for instance, evaluation work sponsored by the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution, www.ecr.gov (last visited May 15, 2007).
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costs and benefits to federal and state taxpayers, attributable to agency
participation. Inadequate data is available to consider costs to participating cities and counties.
As the example illustrates, an evaluation must state clearly the time
period, the geographical area, and the range of parties that the anaylsis
will consider. There may be legitimate reasons for excluding some
time periods, regions, and parties-such as that they are not central to
the case, or there is limited information available-and these need to
be explained. The issue of whether to focus on local, regional, or national costs and benefits is one that researchers commonly encountered in benefit cost analysis. However, the selection of a time period
to cover is uniquely complicated for adjudications where many processes continue in varying forms over decades.
G. BENEFITS AND COSTS OVER TIME
With respect to accounting for benefits and costs over time,
economists have well-defined techniques for comparing benefits and
costs occurring at different points in time using net present values and
discounting procedures. However, one must estimate the longevity of
benefits that arise from an adjudication successfully resolving issues.
For instance, a successful adjudication may produce improved certainty
and better working relationships and information sharing among parties. Are these benefits assumed to grow or decay over time, to remain
robust or dissipate in the face of new conflicts?
IV. POTENTIAL CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING ADJUDICATIONS

Any evaluation process requires a clear definition of the criteria
against which a process is assessed. d'Estree and Colby offered a relatively comprehensive menu of criteria for evaluating dispute resolution
processes and outcomes.1°° Rowe et al., 2006, focused upon economic
and environmental aspects in evaluating dispute resolution processes
and outcomes. °1 A few criteria most likely to be relevant to evaluating
adjudications are summarized below.
The criterion "positive net benefits" examines whether the adjudication creates net benefits1 °2 for the parties that would not have been
available otherwise. 10 3 Voluntary, negotiated agreements satisfy this
100.
101.
102.
103.

See n'EsTRfE & COLBY, supranote 12, at 30.

Rowe et al., supranote 24.
"Net benefits" are benefits minus costs.
D'ESTRtE & COLBY, supra note 12, at 34 (calling this "perceived economic efficiency").
See also ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WrrHouT GMNG IN 56-61, 70-71 ( Bruce Patton ed., 1991) (utilizing the
concept of weighing benefits and costs in the "mutual gains" negotiation framework);
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, PAUL F. LEVY & JENNIFER THOMAS-LARMER, NEGOTIATING
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: HOW TO AVOID ESCALATING CONFRONTATION, NEEDLESS
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criterion for the signatory parties. If the agreement fails to provide
incentive beyond their most likely alternative for those who sign on,
they would decline to bind themselves to the agreement. 0 4 Adjudication outcomes, which do not require voluntary consent of the parties,
are unlikely to satisfy this criterion. In adjudications, net benefits may
arise from reducing or eliminating the costs associated with water right
ambiguities, from improvements in water management, and from better cooperation such as the sharing of information, technology, and
problem-solving capacities among the parties. As previously discussed,
many analytic challenges arise in documenting and quantifying various
adjudication costs and benefits.
The criterion "cost-effective implementation" considers costs of
implementation decisions coming from an adjudication court. When a
ruling sets specific requirements (e.g., a 10% increase in summer
stream flows for fish), this criterion asks whether compliance is
achieved in a cost-effective manner. Implementation costs are likely to
be higher under court rulings. Courts are not required to consider
costs in crafting their ruling, focusing instead on rights and consistency
with the existing body of law.

Nevertheless, stake holders must care-

fully weigh costs, taking into consideration the financial burdens on
adjudication participants, taxpayers, and property owners."'
Effective "incentive compatibility" means that the adjudication
process and rulings generate signals that assist, rather than obstruct,
successful implementation. Two specific elements of incentive compatibility in the adjudication context are incentives for compliance and
incentives for more efficient water use and conservation.
Rulings that incorporate economic incentives for compliance will
involve lower monitoring and enforcement costs than those that fail to
consider incentives. Compliance incentives can be in the form of penalties, with specific consequences for violations-and adequate money
and technical staff for monitoring and enforcement. High penalties
are not effective in inducing compliance if there is little monitoring
fines. 107
and therefore little probability of detection and imposition of
With respect to incentives for better resource management, adjudications may encourage water transactions. Market transactions create
incentives by providing a known market price for the resource being
traded-e.g., water rights. That established market price can signal
COSTS, AND UNNECESSARY LITIGATION 236-38, 273-74 (2001)

(applying mutual gains

negotiation to disputes with a process called "creating value" or converting zero sum
negotiations to positive sum negotiations).
104. A broader version of this criterion could inquire whether the outcome provides

net gains to the larger community and society, beyond the immediate signatories.
105. See DONALD L. HOROWITz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 34-35 (1977).

106. See id.
107. See SUSSKIND ETAL., supranote 103, at 212-13 (discussing economic sanctions in
enforcing environmental laws).
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resource users that water has value beyond their own immediate use of
it. For example, irrigators will realize that on-farm water conservation
may enable them to sell or lease the water no longer needed for irrigation and this opportunity provides an incentive for more efficient water
use. 108
Although judicial processes can send an incentive signal, courts
generally do not have jurisdiction to set water prices. The compliance
that the process encourages to the degree that violation will bring the
violator before the court and expose them to the attendant costs and
uncertainties, serve to improve the environment in which market
transactions occur more readily.
Charles DuMars has addressed the potential effects of adjudications on market transactions. 1°9 This article will add a few points to his
discussion. Market prices, negotiated between buyers and sellers, lie in
a bargaining space defined by the other options available to the buyer,
which determine the most the buyer could reasonably pay for a specific
water right, and the least the seller could reasonably accept based on
net financial returns they currently earn from owning the water rights
and the expected increase in the value of the water right over time.
Buyers' and sellers' negotiating skills and bargaining power determine
where, within this range, the negotiated price will fall. Transaction
costs resulting from ambiguity in water rights "chip away" at this bargaining space and make some transfers financially infeasible. °
Studies in the 1990s collected and analyzed primary data on costs
to applicants and objectors for proposed water transfers in several
states."' This article will briefly review the results to demonstrate that
transactions occur even when burdened with a range of transaction
costs. Costs include attorneys' fees, engineering studies and state
agency fees. The relevant costs are only those to get change applications approved by the state, and do not including the purchase of water, conveyance costs, engineering for diversion works, and other costs
of implementing the transfer and actually moving water to a new use.
Across Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Nevada, average applicants'
costs were 6-12% of the price paid for the water right being trans108. See TERRY L. ANDERSON

& PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE

PUMP 8-12 (1997); see also Bonnie G. Colby, Negotiated Transactions as Conflict Resolution
Mechanisms: Water Bargainingin the U.S. West, in MARKETS FOR WATER: POTENTIAL AND
PERFORMANCE 77, 79, 87, 89-91 (K. William Easter, Mark W. Rosegrant & Ariel Dinar
eds., 1998).
109. See DuMars, supranote 26.
110. See Bonnie G. Colby, Regulation, Imperfect Markets and Transaction Costs: The Elusive Quest for Efficiency in Water Allocation, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
475, 483, 498-500 (Daniel W. Bromley ed., 1995).
111. See generally DR. LAWRENCEJ. MACDONNELL, THE WATER TRANSFER PROCESS AS A
MANAGEMENT OPTION FOR MEETING CHANGING WATER DEMANDS VOL. I, 1, 2 (Natural
Resources Law Center 1990) (discussing water transfer activities in six western states).
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ferred."12 The filing of an objection (protest) to1 3 a change in water right
application raised applicant costs substantially.
Colorado had much higher costs and much longer time delays to
approve a water right change application.1 1 4 These higher costs likely
are due to the fact that the Colorado cases involved a higher proportion of transfers that moved water out of agriculture, the most controversial type of transfer, and a higher proportion of surface water
change applications, which have more direct and immediate third
party impacts than with groundwater." 5 Moreover, water right prices
during the period of the study were much higher in Colorado than in
New Mexico and Utah."" Where water is more valuable, it is worth
spending more for a careful review of the transfer impacts.
There are multiple implications of the limited prior research on
transaction costs for the present discussion of adjudications. First,
market transactions occur in the presence of non-trivial costs and uncertainties. The state with the highest transaction costs also has the
most active market. Second, it is economically rational to spend more
on reducing water rights uncertainties in areas where water rights have
a comparatively high economic value. Third, the incentives that the
parties to an adjudication face are somewhat similar to those that applicants and objectors to water right changes face. Those parties with
large financial interests at stake will rationally expend more asserting
their rights and objecting to assertions by others. Those with a smaller
economic interest at stake will reasonably expend less. In this way, the
claimants themselves naturally balance the costs and benefits of participation in adjudication to some extent.
Another criterion with economic implications is "improved problem solving capacity." The stakeholders engaged in water conflicts often must address multiple problems over a period of years. 1 7 For instance, the dispute in the adjudication may involve the nature, quantity, and priority of water rights. However, the same parties may later
find themselves engaged in conflict over providing water in-stream for
endangered fish recovery or may confront a drought or a water quality
problem. Consequently, the ability of the parties to work together effectively can be an important asset. Negotiated settlements provide
some advantages over adjudications because they engage stakeholders
in identifying strategies, debating their merits, allocating the cost bur112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See Colby, supra note 25, at 1188.
See MAcDONNELL, supranote 111, at 56.
See id. vol. I, at 47b, 57, vol. II, chapter 3, at 33.
Seeid. vol. II, chapter 3, at 18.
See BONNIE COLBY SALIBA & DAVID B. BUSH, WATER

MARKETS IN THEORY AND

172 (1987).
117. Bonnie G. Colby, Negotiated Transactionsas Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Water
Bargainingin the U.S. West, in MARKETS FOR WATER: POTENTIAL AND PERFORMANCE 77 (K.
William Easter, Mark W. Rosegrant & Ariel Dinar eds., 1998).
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den, and building consensus for a particular approach." 8 The process
gives the stakeholders experience in working together and may make it
easier to solve the next regional water problem. Litigation encourages
an adversarial approach among the parties rather than a problemsolving stance. 9 One would expect improved problem-solving capacity
when stakeholders face a subsequent dispute after they have successfully resolved an earlier conflict through multi-party negotiations, as
compared to having resolved the earlier conflict through litigation.
However, there is little empirical evidence to either support or negate
this hypothesis.
A broad criterion applicable to adjudications is "durability under
uncertainty." This criterion assesses the degree to which the adjudication process and rulings consider drought, environmental factors, and
other natural contingencies that may create new uncertainties for water users in the future. While these considerations may not be the
mandate of the court, to the extent that rulings are specific about adaptation to drought and other uncertainties that affect exercise of water rights, they can be helpful in planning for these contingencies.
Climate change is one looming source of uncertainty facing the western water community. Careful evaluation of adjudications should inquire whether these processes will help address the future effects of
climate change, and do so in a more cost effective manner than other
possible alternatives.
One important factor that affects the durability of the positive results that adjudication can achieve is the degree to which various interests are represented in the process. Ramsey Kropf has pointed out that
adjudications have a specific mandate and are not intended to resolve
regional water challenges or to be "all things to all people."

20

Never-

theless, to the degree possible, it is useful for adjudication proceedings
to consider a diverse range of regional interests and claims. Environmental needs for water are a pressing water management challenge in
nearly every western basin, but one not likely to be addressed where
environmental interests and agencies do not hold water rights. One

possible way to incorporate these interests into adjudications is for
those unrepresented interests to become water right owners to a
greater degree than through the environmental acquisitions that already have occurred. The facilitation of broader participation of envi118.

See

CHALLENGE

WESTERN WATER POLIcY REvIEW ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST:
FOR
THE
NEXT CENTuRY
3-41
(1998),
available at http://

bioe.oregonstate.edu/Faulty/selker/Oregon%2Water%2OPolicy%20and%20Law%20
Website/Report%20of%20the%20WWPRAC/WATER.PDF.
119. See id.
120. Comments by Ramsey L. Kropf, panelist of Forum for Changing Values: Do We
Still Need Adjudications? presentation at the American Bar Association Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources' 25th Annual Water Law Conference: Changing Values, ChangingConflicts, San Diego, California (February 22-23, 2007).

Issue 2

ASSESSING THE VALUE OF ADJUDICATIONS

ronmental interests as right holders will require policies that provide
funds for water right purchases or that provide a share of water for
environmental purposes when a water right is transferred. This is possible through environmental trust funds, which could essentially take a
"cut for the environment" from a transferred water right. Environmental advocates can participate directly in adjudication processes
where they are right holders. Bringing them directly into the process
may be necessary to help alleviate long running conflicts over water for
environmental needs in many western river basins.
VI. CLOSING THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Analysis of the costs and benefits of adjudications and alternative
proceedings may be a task well-suited to the Water Resource Research
Institutes found in each U.S. state and territory, usually at the land
grant university.12' Such institutes typically have good communication
with the water stakeholders in their state and may be effective at collecting the necessary data for systematic adjudication assessments.
The insurance industry has become quite sophisticated in assessing
risk and establishing fees for policies that reduce the effects of risk on
policyholders. Major ski resorts, for instance, often purchase policies
that stabilize their revenues in the event of a poor snow year. In principle (and for a profit), private firms could offer insurance for the financial repercussions linked to uncertain water right yields by systematically and scientifically assessing risk and charging fees accordingly.
The federal government absorbs some of the economic consequences
of drought for farmers through its crop insurance programs and disaster relief payments.
One of the largest challenges water adjudications face is the uncertainty of a system dependent on climate, with precipitation and tem22
perature being major determinants of water supply and demand.
Global warming will change the hydrologic cycles of the western
United States in innumerable ways, many of which we can only roughly
anticipate. Assessment of the likely yield of water rights under dry
conditions will continue to become more crucial. Enforcement of priorities is likely to become the norm in the future, despite the fact that
it is largely theoretical at the present time. l The financial value of
improved water right certainty is likely to increase steadily in the face
of climate change combined with population growth.

121. SeeWater Resources Research, 42 U.S.C. § 10301(9) (2000).
122. Crammond, Dar. CountingRaindrops:Prospectsfor Northwestern Water Rights Adjudications, N.W. Water L. & Policy Project, 15 (Jan. 31, 2001),(available at
http://www.lclark. edu/dept/water).
123. See Dan Tarlock, General Stream Adjudications: A Good Public Investment?, 133 J.
CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 52, 56 (2006).
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The economically "optimal" balance of certainty in water rights differs across regions and over time. It is not worthwhile to create sophisticated property right regimes and to clarify all contingencies in advance of need when water is plentiful and cheap. However, in overappropriated river basins there is sound economic rationale for investing in more certainty. The tradeoff in spending money to create more
certainty is a delicate one. It is counterproductive if ambiguities burden the water acquisition process so heavily that socially desirable
transfers fail to occur. However, it is unreasonable to expend so much
money trying to reduce uncertainty that the costs of adjudication or an
alternative process are out of proportion to the economic stakes, the
value of water, and decisions that hinge on more certainty about water
rights.
The fact that stakeholders receive different "products" for the
money that they invest in different processes confounds comparisons
of benefits and costs across alternative adjudicatory processes. In litigation, the ideal payoff for environmental advocates is a ruling that both
favors their position in the particular case at hand and sets a favorable
precedent for future disputes. In market transactions, the payoff is
acquisition of water. Investment in alternative dispute resolution
strategies provides differing types of results. An assessment strategy
needs to consider the different mix of benefits that each alternative
process produces given that, with existing data, we cannot conduct a
systematic comparison of costs. The potential criteria for evaluating
adjudications presented earlier in this article can provide a framework
for comparing different kinds of end "products."
While a thorough economic assessment of adjudications will require several years of systematic data collection and analysis, practical
steps can be adopted now. First, parties should be required to report
costs of participating in adjudication processes in a regular and systematic manner, such a filing standardized quarterly reports. 2 4 Second,
information that the parties use in the adjudication venue should become part of the public record and be available to others. Over time,
this will create a valuable body of data, models and other information
on hydrology, fish biology, wildlife needs, recreation use, etc. Finally, a
cooperative effort amongst land grant universities, state water agencies,
and federal agencies to initiate a research effort aimed at carefully
identifying principal costs and benefits of these processes could help
guide future adjudications.

124. See U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution, Program Evaluation
System, available at http://www.ecr.gov/multiagency/program-eval.htm (discussing
protocols for collecting data on the cost of multi-party dispute resolution processes
from participants).
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In closing, two words add pressing impetus to the need to resolve
water right ambiguities: climate change. Climate change over the next
several decades is likely to substantially alter temperature, water demand, and water supply conditions throughout the western U.S., compounding current water conflicts. The socio-economic stakes associated with water rights and water management will increase exponentially. The next generation of water attorneys, economists, engineers,
planners, managers, and public officials will need to be much more
innovative than those of us currently filling those roles. One positive
legacy we can leave for the future is carefully structured and effective
process for addressing water rights ambiguities. Systematic evaluation
of current adjudication processes is an important first step.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Produced water is water resulting from the process of bringing oil or
gas from its source to the surface. In 2003, the volume of produced
water in Alberta was 1.6 million cubic metres per day ("m3/day") of
water, which is about 10 million barrels per day ("bbl/day"), or nearly
1300 acre feet per day ("AF/day").' About half of this amount (0.8
m 3/day, or about 5 million bbl/day or 649 AF/day) was re-injected for
reservoir maintenance purposes and enhanced recovery projects. 2 Injections into steam recovery projects, such as the steam assisted gravity
drainage ("SAGD") thermal recovery process used for in-situ bitumen
projects, accounted for a smaller volume-16,000 m/day or 0.1 million bbl/day or nearly 13 AF/day.s The remaining 0.8 m/day, or
5 million bbl/day or 649 AF/day, was deep well injected and arguably
wasted.4
One can expect an increase in quantities of produced water in Alberta as coal bed methane ("CBM"--or natural gas in coal, "NGC")
exploration and production intensifies. According to the Alberta Department of Energy ("Department"), there is an immense amount of
natural gas in Alberta's coal beds. The Department estimates that Alberta's coalbed resource could contain 500 trillion cubic feet ("tcf') of
natural gas.5 The Department figures that this unconventional source
1. FLORENCE HUM ET AL., UNIV. OF CALGARY INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, ENV'T, &
ECON., ALTA. ENERGY FUTURES PROJECT PAPER No. 19, REVrEw OF PRODUCED WATER
RECYCLE AND BENEFICIAL REUSE 3 (Nov. 2006), availableat http://www.iseee.ca/images/
pdf/ABEnergyFutures-19.pdf.
2. Id.
3.

Id.

4.

Id.

5. ALTA. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ALBERTA COAL OCCURRENCES AND POTENTIAL
CoALBFD METHANE (CBM) EXPLORATION AREAS 1 (Mar. 22, 2005), http://www.ab.ca/

activities/CBMcoal and cbm intro.shtml.
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of natural gas could help supplement Alberta's recoverable conventional natural gas reserves of 39 tcf.6 Given that Alberta uses about 1.36

tcf per year,7 even though it is not known how much CBM is recoverable, it is clear that reserves could serve Alberta's and other's needs for
the foreseeable future.8
CBM is a natural gas trapped in coal seams, a byproduct of the decomposition of organic matter. 9 The CBM is adsorbed in the coal and,
where a seam contains water, the water must be withdrawn to depressurize the reservoir to start production. 10 CBM produced water is
groundwater and, depending on depth and other factors, may be part
of or connected to aquifers that service domestic, agricultural, commercial, or industrial needs. About ninety percent of the CBM wells
drilled in Alberta in 2004 were dry coal seams; accordingly, these CBM
wells did not require dewatering for production." However, the remaining wells in the Province as of December 2004 mainly targeted
seams that contained water. 2 Depending on the depth of the coal
seam, the water may be saline or non-saline. Alberta experts have
noted that
in some cases it can even be fresh water of drinking water
3
quality.'

In the western United States, where CBM production has been ongoing for some time, intense rifts have developed between landowners,
environmentalists, operators, and governmental entities over waterrelated impacts from exploration or production. The dewatering and
production process itself can impact and contaminate aquifers, and
pollute groundwater supplies. Local landowners worry about longterm impacts from groundwater depletion. Land and water surface
discharge of produced water comes with its own hosts of problems,

6.

ALTA. GOV'T, DEP'T OF ENERGY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT NATURAL

GAS IN COAL (2004), http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/364.asp.
7. ALTA. GOV'T, DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY FACTS (2004),

http://www.energy.

gov.ab.ca/1899.asp.
8. Jason Gray, Allan Ingelson, & Angelo Rizzuto, Regulation of CBM Produced
Water in British Columbia and Alberta, Tab 4, at 1 (Nov. 14-15, 2005) (unpublished
materials from Insight Conference, Calgary, AB) (on file with author).
9. Thomas F. Darin, Waste or Wasted? - Rethinking the Regulation of Coalbed Methane
Byproduct Water in the Rocky Mountains: A Comparative Analysis of Approaches to Coalbed
Methane Produced Water Quantity Legal Issues in Utah, New Mexico, Colorado, Montana and
Wyoming, 17J. ENVrL. L. & LITIG. 281, 293 (2002).
10. CBM/NGC MULTI-STAKEHOLDERADVISORY COMM., COALBED METHANE/NATURAL
GAS IN COAL: FINAL REPORT 17 (2006), available at http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/docs/
naturalgas/pdfs/cbm/THE FINAL REPORT.pdf [hereinafter MAC FINAL REPORT].
11. Id.

12.
13.

Id.
Gray et al., supranote 8.
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including erosion, soil salinization to the14 detriment of agriculture, and
aquatic and land ecosystem impairment.
In Alberta, although CBM production is relatively new, landowner/operator problems are developing. One reason behind these
problems is that Alberta officials regulate CBM like conventional natural gas with a few unique twists. Given the rather mind-boggling prospects for CBM production in the future and likelihood of production
from wet coal, there are serious questions about the suitability of the
conventional model. Conventional production results in fewer land
impacts (because fewer wells are necessary) and conventional wells are
typically much deeper than CBM wells, consequently there are fewer
potential groundwater impacts. In response to concerns regarding the
CBM regulatory framework, in 2003 the Province initiated a CBM regulatory review process headed by the Coalbed Methane/Natural Gas in
Coal Multistakeholder Advisory Committee ("MAC").15 In January of
2006, MAC produced a Final Report.' 6 It is notable that fifteen of the
Final Report's forty-three recommendations specifically
7 dealt with wacomponent.
water-related
a
had
others
many
ter, and
There are numerous legal and policy issues concerning produced
water in Alberta requiring clarification, including:
(a) Initial water rights issues regarding the right to bring produced
water to the surface - Does the operator need a water right permit?
(b) Subsequent water rights issues such as:
"

*

The right to deal with water after it is brought to the surface Must it always be re-injected? Can the operator treat it and
transfer it for a useful purpose (e.g. irrigation, stockwatering,
industrial, or other) for monetary consideration?
The nature of the operator's water rights vis-i-vis other water
rights holders - Does the operator have any water right priority
over produced water before or after it is treated?

(c) Aquifer impacts issues - What are the operator's common law and
regulatory obligations and liabilities for impacts to aquifers that cause

14. See, e.g., Amy Beatie, Wyo. Outdoor Council, U.S. EPA & MontanaJoin WOC in
Concerns Over CBM Water Discharge (2001), http://www.wyomingoutdoorcouncil.org/
news/newsletter/docs/2001a/h2o.php; see also Powder River Basin Res. Council, Coalbed Methane Development in Wyoming's Powder River Basin is Transforming the Landscape,
PRBRC and Landowners Respond to Prevent Damage, http://www.powderriverbasin.org/
cbm/general background cbm.shtml (last visited April, 21, 2007).
15. MAC FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 3.

16.

Id.

17.

See generally id.
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or potentially cause injury or damage to the environment or to other
aquifer users?
(d) Water discharge issues - What are the operator's common law and
regulatory obligations and liabilities regarding water discharge?
Although all of these issues are of great interest to operators and
those affected by oil and gas operations, this article focuses on (a) and
(b) above. This article demonstrates inadequacies in Alberta's legislative framework governing both the initial grants of water rights in respect of produced water and water right holders' ability to put produced water to a purpose other than simply bringing a resource to the
surface. This article draws conclusions following an analysis and assessment of two U.S. state water rights frameworks involving produced
water. The analysis and assessment shed light on the best path forward
for Alberta.
Part I describes water scarcity in the Province. It points out that,
because of scarcity, Alberta should look at whether the use of produced water could alleviate water shortages. Part II cautions that Alberta should be careful using the expression "beneficial use of produced water" in Canada because this expression can lead to confusion
given differences between western United States water law and western
Canada water law. This Article uses the term "useful purpose" with
respect to Alberta water rights and reserves the term "beneficial use"
for western United States water rights. Part III describes and assesses
how two U.S. states with considerable CBM production experienceColorado and Wyoming-deal with the initial granting of rights to
produce water, and rights to put produced water to a beneficial use.
Part IV reviews Alberta's legal and policy water rights framework involving produced water. It points out numerous shortcomings in the
framework that make it difficult for the framework to accommodate or
facilitate the re-use of produced water for a useful purpose. Part V
considers the lessons learned from Colorado, Wyoming, and Alberta.
It makes recommendations to begin to develop a suitable regulatory
water rights framework for Alberta for the re-use of produced water.
II. WATER SCARCITY IN ALBERTA AND THE NEED FOR NEW
SOURCES
Water is scarce in Alberta, especially in southern Alberta. According to background studies produced in connection with the Province's South Saskatchewan River Basin ("SSRB") Management Plan,
there are currently about 20,000 statutory withdrawal allocation au-
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thorizations with respect to the SSRB.' 8 The SSRB includes the subbasins of the Red Deer, Bow, South Saskatchewan, and Oldman Rivers. 9
The basin's urban centers include Calgary, Lethbridge,
Red Deer, and Medicine Hat. 20 The basin contains all of the Province's thirteen irrigation districts, whose licences account for about
seventy-five percent of the total volume of allocations. 2' Because of
actual and potential water scarcity, the Alberta government no
longer accepts water allocation licence applications for the Bow,
South Saskatchewan, and Oldman sub-basins in the SSRB.22 According to Alberta's water supply outlook, for August through September of 2006, natural runoff volumes were much below average.23
Volumes in parts of the Bow River (which runs from the mountains
in Banff east through Calgary) were the lowest recorded in ninety24
one years.
Natural runoff volumes in the Oldman River basin
ranged from thirtieth to fortieth lowest on record, except for a location in the Belly River where they were the lowest on record. 25 The
Alberta government has acknowledged that, in some areas of the
SSRB, all allocations cannot be satisfied and, accordingly, junior
allocators-those whose licence applications were made later in
time than more senior allocators-have frequent and even substantial deficits. 2 6 Assessment of thirty-three river reaches identified in
the SSRB studies for riparian and aquatic condition revealed that
thirty-one of those reaches range from near or approaching ecologically unacceptable values to below ecologically acceptable values.2 7 There is not enough water in this basin to meet existing water
allocations, not enough for the system itself, and not enough to at18. ALTA. ENV'T, SOUTH SASKATCHEWAN RIVER BASIN WATER ALLOCATION, at ii (2003,
rev. 2005), availableat http: / /www3.gov.ab.ca/env/water/regjons /ssrb/studies.asp.
19. ALTA. ENV'T, APPROVED WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE SOUTH
1 (2006), available at http://www3.gov.ab.ca/
env/water/regions/ssrb/plan.html [hereinafter SSWB APPROVED WATER MANAGEMENT
SASKATCHEWAN RIVER BASIN (ALBERTA)
PLAN].

20. Alta. Env't, Alberta River Basins, http://www3.gov.ab.ca/env/water/basins/
BasinForm.cfm (select "South Saskatchewan River Sub Basin" under first drop-down
menu).
21.

See id.; SSWB APPROVED WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 19, at 4.
SSWB APPROVED WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 19, at 6.
23. Alta. Env't, Water Supply Outlook for Alberta October 2006, http://www3.
gov.ab.ca/env/water/WS/WaterSupply/oct2006/octTOC.html; Alta. Env't, Water

22.

Supply Outlook for Alberta, September
2006, http://www3.gov.ab.ca/
env/water/WS/WaterSupply/Sep2006/sepTOC.html.
24. Alta. Env't, Water Supply Outlook for Alberta October 2006, supra note 23.
25. Id.
26. ALTA. ENV'T, SOUTH SASKATCHEWAN RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN,
PHASE Two: BACKGROUND STUDIES 11-12 (2003), available at http://www3.gov.ab.ca/

env/water/regions/ssrb/pdf phase2/SSRB%2OBackgroud%2Studies%2Web%20FI
NALp [hereinafter SSRB PHASE TWO: BACKGROUND STUDIES].
27.

Id. at 16.
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tract new users to this dry region.
Water conservation and moving from supply-side to demand-side
management approaches will go some way towards addressing water
shortages. 8 However, it is unlikely that these approaches alone will
be sufficient. This is especially so when factoring in climate change.
It makes sense to consider new sources in Alberta; produced water is
an obvious source for consideration, especially produced water from
CBM operations, which may be fresh or only marginally saline.
I.

"USEFUL PURPOSE" VS. "BENEFICIAL USE"
A.

"BENEFICIAL USE" - A U.S. CONCEPT

Discussions regarding the use of produced water for a purpose other
than bringing a resource to the surface typically employ the idea of
putting produced water to a "beneficial use." The phrase is attractive
because it captures the idea that users other than operators, such as
irrigators, livestock producers, municipalities, industries, and other
various users can benefit from water that did not previously go towards
any beneficial purpose (except, perhaps in the limited sense that it can
assist in oil and gas production). Nevertheless, it is not technically appropriate to use "beneficial use" in relation to Alberta and other western provinces' water rights systems. Although the phrase "beneficial
use" plays a critical role in U.S. water law, it has no formal role in statutory allocation rights systems in the Canadian prairies. Indeed, to understand, compare, and assess water rights models to use and re-use
produced water, it is critical to correctly use and understand the notion
of "beneficial use." Hence, this Article only uses "beneficial use" with
respect to U.S. water rights frameworks, and uses the term "useful purpose" for Alberta water rights frameworks.
Beneficial use plays a number of roles in western United States water
law. Two key roles particularly relevant to produced water are:
(a) Beneficial use is the "measure and the limit of an appropriation
right";2 and
(b) A licenced purpose is allowable only if law recognizes it as a beneficial use.

28, The Province's Waterfor Life strategy set a goal of thirty percent improvement in
the efficiency and productivity of water use between 2005 and 2015. WATER FOR LIFE,
ALTA. ENV'T, ALBERTA'S STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABILITY 27 (2003), available at
www.waterforlife.gov.ab.ca/docs/strategyNov03.pdf.
29.

JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL,

MATERIALS 152 (4th ed. 2006).

LEGAL CONTROLS

OF WATER

RESOURCES: CASES

AND
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Regarding (a), prior appropriation water rights systems in the western United States originally developed to meet the needs of miners on
federal lands. Miners needed water, and water rights based on riparian
ownership or occupancy did not facilitate mining development. A water rights system evolved based on the principle of prior appropriation-an earlier appropriator who put water to a beneficial use had prior
rights to water for that use senior any later water appropriators. In
time, prior appropriation rights extended to farmers and other users
of water for use on public or private lands. In the United States, appropriation rights are common law rights that courts recognize and
enforce as a species of property rights. The property right is perfected
when water is taken from a natural stream or lake and is applied to a
beneficial use, without waste, and with due diligence.3 0 A water right
does not come into being until a user puts the water to a beneficial use.
Courts enforce appropriation rights as against other appropriators in
accordance with the "first in time, first in right" principle ("FT'FR").
Earlier appropriation rights have greater right, or priority, to water put
to a beneficial use than later appropriation rights.
Regarding (b), in the western United States, what constitutes a
"beneficial use" is primarily a product of court decisions. Although
state legislation may list uses that are recognized beneficial uses," no
appropriation-state legislation has shut the door to new beneficial uses
recognized at common law.32 Historically, prior appropriation states
recognized household, agricultural, municipal, and industrial uses as
beneficial uses. Over time, lists grew. For example, many states now
recognize-either statutorily or through case law-recreational or instream uses as beneficial uses.
The common law door is open for

30.
31.

Id. at 125.
See, e.g., DAvID GETCHES, WATER

LAW INA NUTSHELL

98 (3d ed. 1997), for a chart

setting out beneficial uses recognized in prior appropriation states by statute or case

law.
32.

For example, the Alaska legislature defined "beneficial use" to mean:

[A] use of water for the benefit of the appropriator, other persons or the public, that is
reasonable and consistent with the public interest, including, but not limited to, domestic, agricultural, irrigation, industrial, manufacturing, fish and shellfish processing,

navigation and transportation, mining, power, public, sanitary, fish and wildlife, recreational uses, and maintenance of water quality.
AIASKA STAT. § 46.15.260(3) (2006). According to the Arizona legislature, "'beneficial
use' includes but is not limited to use for domestic, municipal, recreation, wildlife,

including fish, agricultural, mining, stockwatering and power purposes." ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §45-181 (1) (2006).
33. For a summary regarding states recognizing instream uses as beneficial uses, see
TOM ANNEAR
ed. 2002).

ET AL., INSTREAM FLOWS FOR RIVERINE RESOURCE STEWARDSHIP

74-75 (rev.
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states to recognize new beneficial uses, or possibly to eliminate existing
uses as beneficial uses.'
B. ALBERTA'S "PRIOR ALLOCATION" AND STATUTORY WATER DIVERSION
RIGHTS

In contrast to the western United States, FITFR water rights in Alberta are statutory rights. The Alberta government allocates water to
users pursuant to statutory authority in contrast to users in western
United States who appropriatewater in accordance with common law
and legislation. Hence, statutory FTFR rights in Alberta are prior allocation rights, in contrast to western United States prior appropriation
rights. Whether an Alberta statute that creates water rights confers a
property right has not been settled by law, though legal scholars have
suggested that they do not." The point about property rights is not
critical to this Article, but in any event, there is no case authority in the
prairie provinces that recognizes prior allocation rights as property
rights. What is critical to this discussion is the core nature of an Alberta prior allocation right. In Alberta "beneficial use" is not the measure or the limit of a prior allocation right. In fact, although historically
an Alberta water rights statute mentioned "beneficial use," the notion
plays no formal legal role in determining the nature of an Alberta water right.36 There was likely no need to incorporate the notion of
"beneficial use" into legislation since the legislation itself sets out the
measure and limits of a prior allocation right. As explained in greater
detail in Part IV, under Alberta legislation, the water right is the right to
divert, the measure and limits are the quantity of water, rate, and diver-

34. SAX ET AL., supra note 29, at 156. Those authors raise the question of whether
the rule "once a beneficial use always a beneficial use" is written in stone. The authors
refer to an Idaho Supreme Court opinion in which the court stated "the concept of
what is or is not a beneficial use must necessarily change with changing conditions....
[W]e cannot say that such uses will always be beneficial... [T] here is always a possibility that other uses beneficial in one era will not be in another. .. ." Dep't. of Parks v.
Idaho Dep't. of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 931-32 (Idaho 1974) (Bakes, J., concurring). An interesting question is whether a determination that a use is no longer beneficial (e.g., water-intensive agriculture in the desert) would constitute a taking of property. An argument against this is that because beneficial use is the measure and limit
of an appropriation right, where a use is no longer beneficial the right is not taken
away; it simply no longer exists.
35. See, e.g., ALASTAIR R. LUCAS, SECURITY OF TITLE IN CANADIAN WATER RIGHTS 31
(1990). Note that this claim only is made of licenced water allocation rights and not of
water rights generally. Riparian rights for domestic use-the limited common law
right of riparian owners and occupiers to use water for household purposes-have to a
degree survived water resource legislation. Riparian rights are property rights.
36. Water Resources Act, R.S.A., ch. 71, §§ 66 (a), (b) (1931). The original Alberta
Water Resources Act gave the Minister the right to adopt measures to promote beneficial use and to examine studies of water sources to assist in determining potential
beneficial uses.
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sion point stated in the license, the express purpose or purposes for
the diversion (if any), the stated conditions of use (if any), and the
applicable rights and limitations under prevailing legislation.
IV. PRODUCED WATER AND BENEFICIAL USE IN THE
WESTERN UNITED STATES - TWO KEY JURISDICTIONS
A. BENEFICIAL USE AND PRODUCED WATER

Produced water is invariably groundwater, even though its source
may be connected to surface streams or bodies of water. Western
United States may treat groundwater rights differently from surface
water rights; therefore, the way in which "beneficial use" features with
respect to groundwater rights may vary from state to state. This Part
looks first at the way in which the water rights systems of two U.S.
states-Colorado and Wyoming-treat the initial use of water involved
in oil or gas production, and then at how they treat subsequent re-use
of produced water for other purposes. In both of these states, considerable amounts of water are produced from oil and gas activities. Recent focus has been on produced water and CBM development owing
to increased CBM development in these states.
The author chose these states for analysis because of a key difference
in how each state's water rights system initially deals with produced
water. Colorado law does not consider producing water as part of oil
and gas development to be a beneficial use, and accordingly, it must
legally accommodate this use outside of its water rights regime. Wyoming takes a different tack. It considers that water facilitating or being
part of bringing CBM (but not conventional gas) to the surface to be a
beneficial use in and of itself. The following section discusses shortcomings and regulatory complexities of each approach in order to
shed light on legal and policy issues involving the right to use and reuse produced water.
B. COLORADO

1. Produced Water as Waste
In 2002, there were over 2000 wells producing CBM in the two producing basins in Colorado (San Juan and Raton). 7 There were between 1000 and 2000 additional wells planned over the next 10 years.
A 2006 U.S. government report indicates that annual groundwater
withdrawals from the CBM wells in Huerfano and Las Animas counties
increased from 1.45 billion gallons (about 5.49 billion litres) from 480

37.
38.

Darin, supra note 9, at 308-09.
Id. at 309.
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wells to 3.64 billion gallons (over 13 billion litres) from 1568 wells between 1999 and 2004."' The rapid increase in well development, coupled with future projections, indicates that CBM extraction will produce enormous amounts of water.
Colorado, like a number of other western U.S. states, treats water
brought to the surface in oil and gas production as waste. Produced
water just happens. Under this view, produced water technically is not
appropriated and therefore does not require application to a beneficial use. Such mental and legal gymnastics do not provide a sound
basis for a legal water regime for produced water, especially where oil
and gas extraction produce enormous quantities of water with numerous known-and a multitude of indefinite-environmental and social
impacts.
From a water rights perspective, the way in which Colorado regards
produced water depends on the classification of the source groundwater. In Colorado, there are five types of groundwater. 4 ' Tributary and
non-tributary groundwater are most relevant to this discussion:
(a) Surface or underground flows hydrologically connect tributary
groundwater to a natural stream; and
(b) Non-tributary groundwater exists outside of any designated
groundwater basin, where the withdrawal of the water will not, within
100 years, deplete the natural flow of a stream at an annual rate higher
than one-tenth of one percent of the annual rate of withdrawal.42
Colorado bases tributary groundwater rights on a modified system of
prior appropriation. 43 Therefore, in order to obtain a tributary
groundwater right in Colorado, an appropriator must put the water to
a beneficial use.4 4 However, Colorado bases non-tributary groundwater
rights on the surface ownership of land overlying the non-tributary

39. KENNETH R. WATrS, A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF VERTICAL SEPARATION
BETWEEN PRODUCTION INTERVALS OF COALBED-METHANE WELLS AND WATER -SUPPLY
WELLS IN THE RATON BASIN, HUERFANO AND LAS ANIMAS COUNTIES, COLORADO, 19992004, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS

REPORT 2006-5109, at 1 (2006), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2006/5109/.
40. DICK WOLFE & GLENN GRAHAM, COLO. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., Div. OF WATER
RES., WATER RIGHTS AND BENEFICIAL USE OF COAL BED METHANE PRODUCED WATER IN

COLORADO 5 (2002),

available at http://water.state.co.us/pubs/Rule-reg/coalbedmethane.pdf.
41. Colorado recognizes tributary, non-tributary, not non-tributary, designated, and
geothermal groundwater. For a discussion of all five types, see id. at 2.
42. Id.
43. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a) (2006).
44. See id.
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source." In other words, Colorado recognizes the right to use nontributary groundwater as a function of ownership of the overlying land,
not prior appropriation. Where there are a number of landowners
who own land above a non-tributary source, they have, roughly speaking, pro rata rights to use the groundwater.46 Colorado law presumes
groundwater is tributary; a person47 claiming that a source is nontributary faces a "very rigorous" test.

This legal overview prompts a number of questions regarding the
use and re-use of produced water:
(a) If the right to use tributary groundwater requires that an appropriator put the water to a beneficial use, how does an operator obtain a
right to divert groundwater in oil and gas exploitation activities, where
the operator has no plan to put the water to a beneficial use? That is,
the operator simply wants to produce an energy resource and needs to
divert water in order to do so.
(b) How does an operator put produced water from a tributary
groundwater source to a beneficial use? That is, how does the legal
character of the water change from waste to beneficially used water?
(c) When a source is non-tributary, how can an operator who does not
own a surface interest obtain a right to produce water to exploit oil or
gas resources?
(d) How can an operator who does not own a surface interest put nontributary groundwater to a beneficial use?
Colorado has dealt with questions (a) and (c) in part by removing
non-beneficially used produced water from the FTFR water rights system.48 Colorado accomplishes this by classifying produced water as
waste water.49 Produced water is not subject to the state water diversion
authority, the state engineer, or the Colorado Division of Water Resources ("CDWR"), all of whom have jurisdiction over beneficial uses
of water. 50 A person seeking a groundwater diversion right for a bene-

45.

Id. § 37-9-102(2).

46. See id. § 37-90-137(4)(b)(II); see also Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. KiowaBijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77 P.3d 62, 72 (Colo. 2003) (en banc).
47. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt. Nat'l Science & Tech. Ctr., Western States Water
Laws: Colorado Water Rights Fact Sheet (Aug. 15, 2001), http://www.blm.gov/nstc/WaterLaws/colorado.html.
48. See generally Darin, supra note 9, at 309-11, cited in JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., Supra
note 29, at 414.
49. Darin, supra note 9, at 312.
50. Seeid. at310-11; seealsoCOLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-107(1) (2006).
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ficial use through a well must obtain a permit from CDWR. 5' However,
taking produced water outside of the beneficial use sphere and legally
characterizing it as waste water removes CDWR jurisdiction.52 Instead,
permits to extract produced water along with the sought resource and
the disposal of produced water are subject to state energy resource
authorities, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
("COGCC"), and water quality regulator, the Colorado Water Quality
Control Division ("CWQCD").53
Applying COGCC rules to produced water leads to significant waste.
Under the rules, there are five acceptable ways for one to deal with
produced
water:
(1) re-injection;
(2) putting it in evaporation/percolation pits; (3) disposal at approved commercial facilitates;
(4) road spreading; and (5) discharging it into state waters, provided
one meets state water quality and other requirements. 4 The rules also
allow for limited use for enhanced recovery and related purposes, or to
provide an alternate domestic supply to surface owners within the oil
and gas field.55 However, the latter is limited and provides little incentive for operators to offer water for this use. The rules deem such use
to inure solely to the benefit of local surface owners.56 In other words,
one may not attribute any beneficial use to the operator's use but
rather to the local surface user. The rules call this use "mitigation" and
explicitly state that the mitigation in no way implies that dewatering
processes have impacted the vested interests of local groundwater users.5 ' Because the water is still waste from the operator's perspective,
COGCC retains its jurisdiction. If, however, it was the operator's beneficial use, then the state engineer's office acquires jurisdiction. The
rules avoid jurisdiction shifting by deeming produced water used on
local owners' land to effectively replace local owners' water (which dewatering might have depleted), without implying that the operator's
dewatering actually caused any such depletion! Practically speaking,
this bending-over-backwards to enable limited beneficial use without a
transfer of jurisdiction is not likely to result in much re-use of pro51. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-301(1) ("The state engineer shall be responsible
for the administration and distribution of the waters of the state, and, in each division,
such administration and distribution shall be accomplished through the offices of the
division engineer as specified in this article."); see also Darin, supra note 7, at 310,
cited in SAX ETAL., supra note 29, at 414.
52. See Darin, supranote 9, at 313.
53. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-202(1)(d) (2006) (discussing CWQCD's role);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-503(6) (2006) (discussing CWQCD permits); Darin, supra note
9, at 313 (discussing COGCC's role).
54. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 404-907(c)(2)(A)-(E) (2006), available at http://oilgas.state.co.us/ (follow "Rules" link to "900 Series Exploration and Production Waste
Management") [hereinafter COGCC Rules].
55. Id. §§ 404-907(c)(3)-(4).
56. Id. § 404-907(c)(4).
57. Id.
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duced water. This is because the operator must first ensure that the
water meets state water quality standards before putting the water to
this use, which may require water treatment. However, because the
operator may not sell or trade the water,' there is little or no incentive
for this use, except to gain the good graces of the locals.
2. Putting Wastewater to a Beneficial Use
Determining how the operator may put produced water to a beneficial use addresses questions (b) and (d) above. Once an operator puts
the water to a beneficial use, the water loses its character as "waste" and
thus falls within the state's ordinary water appropriation rights system
under the jurisdiction of the CDWR. The CDWR issues groundwater
permits pursuant to the 1965 Colorado Ground Water Management
Act. 59 If a source is tributary (for which, as mentioned above, there is a

strong presumption), the applicant must demonstrate that unappropriated water is available. 6° If water were not available, then presumably existing water right holders would have rights to the produced water in accordance with their priorities. This would be the case even if
the operator treated the water in order to bring it up to a quality sufficient for beneficial use. In addition, the state engineer must determine that no material interference with vested water rights would oc61

cur.

Addressing question three above, where water is non-tributary, the
legislation exempts operators from the land ownership requirement
and provides that land ownership is not the sole basis for the operator's right to water use.62 Furthermore, the operator need not prove
that there is unappropriated water available. However, the state engineer still must find that there is no material interference with vested
water rights. 63 Unless a source is already established as non-tributary,
the Colorado Ground Water Commission must make a determination
whether the source is tributary or non-tributary.64
3. Critique of the Colorado Approach
A significant problem with the Colorado approach is that it denies
the CDWR initial jurisdiction. Given the huge amounts of produced
water in the state, the fact that some of it is only marginally saline and
58.

Id.

59.

Colorado Ground Water Management Act, ch. 319, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1246

(codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§37-90-101 to -143.
60. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-137(1),(2) (b) (I).
61. Id. § 37-90-137(2) (b) (I).
62. See id. § 37-90-137(7) (a).
63. Id. § 37-90-137(7)(b).

64.

Id. § 37-90-106.
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some even potable, the potential for contamination of aquifers,65 and
impacts on holders of surface and groundwater rights including potential interferences with priority, 66 it is remarkable that the office regulating water rights is not involved when operators receive their initial authority to produce water.
Another problem is that classifying produced water initially as waste
offers little incentive to move beyond this classification. In Colorado,
water is scarce and a different regulatory climate might facilitate re-use
of produced water to help address low supplies. Much of the state's
CBM produced water is of low salinity; therefore, operators could easily
make it suitable for beneficial use.67 Surely if operators in Colorado
had to consider, straight off, whether water that they produce could be
put to a beneficial use-especially when it is of a low saline quality or
better-less of this water would go to waste or to minimally useful purposes and more would go to beneficial uses.
Finally, the number of cooks involved in regulating produced water
tend to spoil the broth. The COGCC, the CWQCD, and the CDWR all
could have a vital role in regulating produced water in the public interest. However, conflicting mandates and overlapping jurisdiction
almost guarantee the end-product will not be as palatable as it should
be. From the perspective of industries, prior-water-right holders, and
environmental interests, a one-window approach dealing with all
agency concerns would be preferable.
C. WYOMING

1. Produced Water: Byproduct Water or Beneficially-Used Water
Most of Wyoming's CBM lies within the Powder River Basin, which it
shares with Montana. The basin is one of the most productive CBM
reservoirs in the United States. 68 The Wyoming State Geological Survey
estimates Wyoming's share of total recoverable reserves is 31.7 tcf of
gas.69 From 1987 to 2004, cumulative water production was just over
380,000 AF (almost 469 million liters), most of which came from the
65. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ENERGY REs. SURVEYS PROGRAM, USGS FACT SHEET No.
FS-019-97, COALBED METHANE - AN UNTAPPED ENERGY RESOURCE AND AN ENVIRONMENTAL
CONCERN (1997), http://energy.usgs.gov/factsheets/Coalbed/coalmeth.html; see also
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, COAL-BED METHANE: POTENTIAL AND CONCERNS (Oct. 2000),
available at http://pubs.usg.gov/fs/fs123-00/fs123-00.pdf

[hereinafter USGS, CBM:

POTENTIAL & CONCERNS].

66.
67.
68.

See USGS, CBM: POTENTIAL & CONCERNS, supra note 65.
See Darin, supra note 9, at 313.
USGS, CBM: POTENTIAL & CONCERNS, supra note 65.

69.

RUCKELSHAUS

INST. OF ENVTL.

& NATURAL RES., WATER PRODUCTION FROM

COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN WYOMING: A SUMMARY OF QUANTITY, QUALITY AND

MANAGEMENT OPTIONS - FINAL REPORT 6 (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.uwyo,
edu/enr/ienr/CBMWaterFinalReportDec2005.pdf [hereinafter RUCKELSHAUS].
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Powder River Basin.
Produced water quality in the Powder River Basin varies from relatively high (within or close to drinking water quality
standards) to fairly saline.7 ' Along this spectrum, water is usable
for a
72
variety of applications, including irrigation and stockwatering.
The Wyoming water rights regime governing produced water is intriguing. Under Wyoming law, by-product water means "water which
has not been put to prior beneficial use, and which is a by-product of
some non-water related economic activity and has been developed only
as a result of such activity. 73 The state's oil and gas agency, the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission ("WOGCC"), regulates
by-water that an operator has not put to a beneficial use, namely the
"[d] isposal of salt water, nonpotable water, drilling fluids and other oilfield wastes which are uniquely associated with exploration and production operations. . . ,74

The Wyoming Department of Environ-

mental Quality ("WDEQ") regulates water quality aspects relating to
disposal of water."
Until 1997, Wyoming law considered all produced water to be byproduct water. However, in 1997 the Wyoming State Engineer's Office
("WSEO") declared the production of water for CBM development to
be a beneficial use. 76 Thus, Wyoming distinguishes between conventional water production and CBM non-conventional water production.
This distinction, prima facie, makes sense from a water conservation
point of view, as CBM produced water in Wyoming normally substantially exceeds conventional produced water quality. There is also more
potential for CBM extraction to impact vested water rights than with
the production of conventional oil and gas because conventional production wells are considerably deeper than CBM wells. Accordingly, it
makes sense for a state to put CBM water initially under the auspices of
the state engineer's office, even if that water sometimes will be brackish. However, this initial plausibility breaks down upon examination of
the nature of the beneficial use related to the dewatering of coal for
CBM production.
An operator may put CBM produced water to a different beneficial
use than conventional oil or gas produced by-product water, although
the operator might lose all or part its water right. To appropriate byproduct water for an existing or new beneficial use, the operator must
obtain a permit from the WSEO 7 Usually, this will be water that the
operator has stored and upgraded as necessary to qualify for a benefi70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 20.

Wyo.

STAT. ANN. § 41-3-903 (2005).
Id. § 30-5-104(d) (ii) (D).
See id. § 35-11-302(a) (i).
RucKELsHAus, supra note 69, at 35.
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-904(a).
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cial use or, in the case of CBM produced water, to change its beneficial
use. The water is subject to the FTFR system and the WSEO has the
right to make an order establishing priorities. When a senior appropriator files a complaint stating that a junior appropriator has interfered with the senior water right, the WSEO determines whether the
alleged interference exists."' If so, the WSEO can order the junior appropriator to cease appropriation until the senior water right is satisfied. 8 With respect to treated water, the SEO could, in theory, order
that the senior appropriator's rights are superior to those of a junior
appropriator.
2. Critique of the Wyoming Approach
One problem with the Wyoming approach is that the so-called
"beneficial use" of water in the oil or gas production process is incongruous with commonly recognized beneficial uses such as stock watering, agricultural, municipal, instream, commercial, or industrial uses,
all of which involve an appropriation (a claiming or taking of water)
and subsequent application to a beneficial use. In contrast, under
Wyoming law, the taking of water when dewatering is a beneficial use
in itself. In an attempt to explain how releasing water from coal can be
a beneficial use, WSEO documents state that after the initial "appropriation" in the dewatering process, if there is no subsequent beneficial
use, the WSEO considers the water unappropriated. 8) This is similar to
non-consumptive appropriations such as those for hydropower developments or for instream flows.8 ' This explanation leaves much to be
desired. First, it borders on the perverse to compare CBM produced
water with beneficial uses with a 100% return flow (e.g., hydropower)
or with uses that do not involve water leaving its source (e.g., instream
uses). Unless an operator puts CBM water to a subsequent beneficial
use, except for any produced water discharged into Wyoming waterways, the operator will either re-inject it or otherwise substantially waste
it. Water with a 100% return flow is available for further appropriation, and certain instream uses are themselves beneficial. Second, with
hydropower or instream uses, there is both a claiming of water and a
78. Id. § 41-3-911(b).
79. Id. § 41-3-911(a).
80. Revised Memorandum from Patrick T. Tyrrell, State Eng'r, Wyo. State Eng'r's
Office, to State Eng'r's Office 1 (Apr. 26, 2004), available at http://seo.state.wy.us/
PDF/CBMpolicy SW 2.pdf (outlining how the WSEO handles groundwater permits),
cited in Response of Wyoming Outdoor Council to Attorney General Opinion No. 200601, Petition to Amend Wyoming Water Quality Rule, Chapter 2, Appendix H, No. 053102, at 13 nn. 31, 34 (June 16, 2006), available at http://deq.state.wy.us/eqc/ (follow
"EQC Docket" hyperlink; then follow "05-3102" hyperlink; then follow "Response to
AG Opinion 2006-01" hyperlink) [hereinafter Wyoming Water Quality Rule Response].
81. RucKELsHAus, supra note 69, at 35. The Report bases this analogy on a personal
communication with H. LaBonde of the SEO office on May 16, 2005. Id. at 61.
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separate beneficial use. With hydropower, the production of electricity
is the beneficial use; with instream uses, a variety of beneficial uses exist, such as pollution assimilation, recreation enhancement, aesthetic
improvements, or aquatic habitat restoration.
Another problem is that considering CBM dewatering as a beneficial
use encourages no further beneficial use. It takes effort and incentive
to change the status quo. Moreover, calling the production of water a
"beneficial use" gives the impression that CBM producers used water
for a useful purpose when, in fact, they used the water for no purpose
at all or for only minimally beneficial use following the extraction.
A further problem concerns the notion of "waste." In Wyoming, as
in the other prior appropriation states, a key element of the notion of
"beneficial use" is that water users must not waste water. 82 Putting water to beneficial use means to put it to a legally recognized beneficial
use without waste. In Wyoming, like the other prior appropriation
states, the WSEO may ask the Attorney General to bring action against
any appropriator who wastes water.8 3 A potential problem for the
beneficial use of conventional produced water or a change of beneficial use for CBM produced water is that, given the huge quantities of
water, it is highly unlikely that there would be no waste.84 Finally, as in
Colorado, the number of agencies and overlapping, and sometimes
inconsistent or conflicting, mandates involved in the regulation of
produced water unnecessarily complicates the regulatory system and
results in regulatory deficiencies. For example, the WOGCC's and the
WDEQ's handling of the disposal of water has recently come under
considerable fire. Numerous affected landowners commenced a petition to the Wyoming Environmental Quality Council ("WEQC") urging
an amendment to rules under the State Environmental Quality Act to
ensure that the WDEQ has the right to limit quantities of discharged
water and notjust the right to regulate the overall quality of discharged
water without setting limits on dischargeable quantities. 5 The petitioners argued that they, their livestock, their farms and ranches, as
well as wildlife and ecosystems suffered grievous damage because of the
82.
83.

See Darin, supra note 9, at 295-96; see also RUCKELSHAus, supra note 69, at 35.
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-111(a).

84.

See Darin, supranote 9, at 330. Darin points out that in the Powder River Basin

there are a total of 500,000 cattle and sheep.
One cow, or seven sheep, drinks about 14.5 gallons [about 54.9 litres of water] per day.
At peak production of 51,000 wells at 9.5 [gallons per minute], this will amount to
nearly 700 million gallons [about 2650 litres] per day. At this rate, for this use alone to
account for all of the produced water, the Powder River Basin would be overrun with
over 45 million cows or 325 million sheep.
Id.
85. Petition to Amend Wyoming Water Quality Rule, Chapter 2, Appendix H, at 45, 15, No. 05-3102 (Dec. 7, 2005), availableat http://deq.state.wy.us/eqc (follow "EQC

Docket" hyperlink; then follow "05-3102" hyperlink; then follow "petition" hyperlink)
[hereinafter Wyoming Water Quality Rule Petition].
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lack of WDEQ quantity limitations. 6 The WDEQ, on the other hand,
took the position that it lacks jurisdiction to impose quantity limits,
arguing that this would interfere with WSEO jurisdiction, which its legislation prohibits. 7 The result is that the quality of water receiving discharged produced water is poor, with no agency willing to step up to
the plate to address it.
V. THE ALBERTA SYSTEM AND LESSONS FROM THE UNITED
STATES
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON ALBERTA WATER DIVERSION RIGHTS

Alberta and the other prairie provinces' water rights are based on
two common law theories: the English riparian doctrine, and the
American prior appropriation doctrine. 8 The former became applicable in Canada as part of the body of common law inherited from England; 9 the latter, though never a part of the Canadian common law,
influenced the development of water legislation in the prairie provinces.
Prior to the prairie provinces' joining the Confederation (Manitoba
in 1870; Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1905), the federal government
solely regulated water rights in the prairies. The federal government
realized early that riparian water rights system would not attract settlers
to this arid region. In 1894, the United Kingdom Parliament passed
the Northwest Irrigation Act which introduced a water rights system
based largely on the principle of FTFR.9° As mentioned in part III, the
principle in Canada is called "prior allocation" in contrast to the
United States' "prior appropriation" because, in Canada, governments
allocate first in time first in right water entitlements in accordance with
water legislation, whereas in the western states early users appropriated
rights. Hence, in Canada the nature and scope of a water right largely
is a matter of public law, in contrast to the western United States,
where water rights developed at private law. In the prairie provinces,
86.

Id. at 1, 7-8.

87. See id. at 8. The Environmental Quality Act provides that "nothing in this act..
[1]imits or interferes with the jurisdiction, duties or authority of the state engineer"
and a number of other agencies. See WvO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1104(a)(iii). In the
Wyoming Outdoor Council's response to the Wyoming Attorney General's opinion
concerning the jurisdiction of the state engineer and the Environmental Quality
Council, the Wyoming Outdoor Council argues that WSEO jurisdiction in effect terminates once the initial appropriation - the dewatering - has occurred and therefore
there can be no interference with WSEO jurisdiction. See generally Wyoming Water
Quality Rule Response, supranote 80.

88.

LUCAS, supranote 35, at 4.

89. DAVID R. PERCY, THE FRAMEWORK OF WATER RIGHTS LEGISLATION IN CANADA 3
(1988).
90. See The North-west Irrigation Act, 1894, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 30, § 8 (U.K.).
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priority is based on date of completed application to the public authority, in contrast to the date of appropriation for a beneficial use.91
The federal government transferred ownership of public lands and
resources to the prairie provinces through natural resources transfer
agreements in 1930.92 The recipients then developed their own water
rights legislation, based on the federal Act. For example, in 1931 the
Alberta Legislature passed the Water Resources Act. 93 Although
amended many times, this Act remained the law in Alberta until January 1, 1999, when the Legislature enacted the Water Act, 94 which re-

pealed and replaced its predecessor. 95
B. ALBERTA WATER DIVERSION RIGHTS
As explained in Part II, it can be confusing to talk about the "beneficial use" of produced water in Alberta. Alberta's water rights are statutory diversion rights and the notion of "beneficial use" plays no formal
legal role. Accordingly, this article uses the term "useful purpose"
when discussing legal uses of water in the province under a water right.
The key to understanding Alberta water rights is that they are diversion rights, not rights arising from already having diverted water and
putting it to a beneficial use. The Water Act defines "diversion" to
mean:
[T] he impoundment, storage, consumption, taking or removal
of water for any purpose, except the taking or removal for the
sole purpose of removing an ice jam, drainage, flood control,
erosion control or channel realignment, and...
...any

other thing defined as a diversion in the regulations for

96
the purposes of this Act ....

Note that this definition does not even mention "use." Under Alberta
law, a diversion is not putting water to a use. It simply is the taking,
removing, storing, or consuming of water from a source.

91.
See id.
92. Constitution Act, 1930 (formerly British North America Act (1930)), 20-21 Geo.
V, c. 26, app. II, scheds. 1, 2, 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No 26 (Appendix 1985)

(Can.).
93. Water Resources Act, R.S.A., ch. 71 (1931).
94. Water Act, R.S.A., ch. W-3 (2000).
95. The text in this "Historical background on Alberta Water Diversion Rights"
portion of this article is adapted from Arlene J. Kwasniak, Quenching Instream Thirst: A
Role for Water Trusts in the PrairieProvinces, 16J. ENVrL. L. & PRACTIcE 211, 218 (2006).
96. Water Act, R.S.A., ch. W-3, § 1 (m). No other regulation further defines "diversion."

Issue 2

USE AND RE-USE OF PRODUCED WA TER

1. Types of Water Diversion Rights
A right to divert under the Water Act can take a number of forms.
The most common is a "licence" to divert water. 97 Licences gives the
holder the right to divert water from a specified source for a purpose
recognized in regulations under the Act, 98 in accordance with any licence conditions. There are a number of other diversion rights under
the Act. A "registration" is a diversion right held by "traditional" agricultural users diverting up to 6250 cubic metres of water a year for pesticide application or stock watering prior to the Act coming into force
in 1999 who registered their use prior to 2002." A "preliminary certificate" is not a diversion right per se, but rather a virtual guarantee of a
diversion right in the form of a licence if the user meets certain conditions.' ° A legislated "exemption" is a right to divert water without a
licence or other further statutory authorization. The main exemption
is the "household user" exemption that enables riparian owners and
occupiers, or owners or occupiers with groundwater, to use up to 1250
cubic metres of water a year for household purposes without a licence. 0 ' Another common exemption is for "exempt agricultural users." This applies to farmers or agricultural producers who used up to
6250 cubic metres of water per year for pesticide application or stockwatering prior to the Act coming into force (January 1, 1999) who did
not register their use by 2002.102
Of particular interest to this Article are "regulatorily exempt diversions." The authorizing provision states that "[a] person who commences or continues the diversion of water.., that is designated in the
regulations as exempt from the requirement for a licence . . . is not
required to hold a licence for that diversion of water .... ,,0 The regu-

lations specify a number of exemptions, including the one discussed in
the next section-diversions of saline water-an
exemption that is of
0 4
great relevance to the oil and gas industry.
2. Rights to Divert Saline Produced Water
In Alberta, the nature of the statutory right to divert produced water
depends on whether the diverted water is saline. This is because the
97. See id. § 34.
98. See id. §§ 49-51; Water (Ministerial) Regulation, C.R.A. 205/98, § 11 (Alta.).
99. See Water Act, R.S.A., ch. W-3, §§ 73(1)-(3). The actual quantity of water users
may divert (up to 6250 cubic meters per year) is based on the amount of water actually
used for these purposes prior to the Act coming into force, and priority goes back to
first use.
100. See id. §§ 66(1)-(2).
101. Id. §§ 21-23.
102. Id.§ 24.
103. Id. § 49(2) (d).
104. SeeWater (Ministerial) Regulation, G.RA. 205/98, §§ 5, sched. 3 (Alta.).
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Water (Ministerial) Regulation (the "Regulation") under the Water Act
provides that, "[t]he following diversions of water and any operations
of works associated with those diversions do not require a licence: ... a
diversion of saline groundwater ....0'
The Regulation defines "saline groundwater" to mean "water that
. .."'06
has total dissolved solids exceeding 4000 milligrams per litre.
This means that users may divert saline groundwater through the exploration or production process from its source-normally a permeable geological formation-without a licence under the Water Act. It
does not mean, as the author has often enough heard, that the Water
Act does not apply to diversions of saline water. The Water Act does
not cease to apply to water simply because a diversion is exempt from
the licencing provisions. Under the Water Act, the "property in and
the right to the diversion and use of all water in the Province is vested
in right of Alberta except as provided for in the regulain Her10 Majesty
7
tions."

A number of provisions are relevant to regulatorily exempt diversions. For example, the purposes of the Water Act apply, which recognize "the need to manage and conserve water resources to sustain our
environment and to ensure a healthy environment and high quality of
life in the present and in the future. . .

."'

The priorities and the en-

forcement of priorities provisions also apply. Under the Act, household users have no priority vis-ti-vis each other, but have priority over
licences and registrations.1 °9 Licencees and registrants have priorities
among themselves in accordance with the priority number assigned to
a licence or registration." 0 The Act specifically states that exempted
agricultural users have no priority."' Neither the Act nor the regulations specifically express whether other exempt diversions have a priority. In any case, even if they had some common law priority vis-ai-vis
each other (for which there is no evidence known to the author), for
the purposes of administering priorities they certainly would be behind
household users, registrants, and licencees. Accordingly, under the
Act, if one of these diverters complains that an exempted saline water
diversion has interfered with a diversion with a priority, under the Act
the administrator could issue an order requiring the saline water diverter to cease diverting or:

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. sched. 3(1).
Id.§ 1(1)(z).
See Water Act, R.S.A., ch. W-3, § 3(2) (2000).
Id. § 2(a).
Id. § 27.

110.

Id.§ 30(l).

111. Id. § 19(1). The Act does provide priority for a diversion if the user has obtained an approval, licence, or registration with respect to that diversion. Id.
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cause the works of the person responsible for the diversion of
water to be closed, or take any other action that is necessary to
ensure that the supply of water to which a household user, licencee or traditional agriculture user is entitled can be diverted
by the household user, licencee or traditional agriculture user
in accordance with the household
user's, licencee's or tradi' 2
tional agriculture user's priority.
3. Saline Diversions and Regulation by the Energy and Utilities Board
Where a diversion was exempt because the water contained more
than 4000 parts per million ("ppm") total dissolved solids ("TDS"),
although no Water Act licence is required, the Energy and Utilities
Board ("EUB") must grant statutory authorization for production and
disposal pursuant to the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 1 3 The EUB
requires, as a matter of policy, the return of all produced saline water
to the zone of origin, if that zone is below base of groundwater protection." 4 Alberta Environment defines an aquifer containing usable
groundwater as any "strata capable of producing water with a total dissolved solids content of less than 4,000 mg/L" (or ppm)." 5 If the zone

of origin is above the base of groundwater protection, then the produced saline water must be
returned to a lower zone than the base of
6
groundwater protection.

4. Non-Saline Diversions
Where water to be diverted in oil and gas operations is below 4000
TDS ppm, the operator must obtain a water diversion licence under

112. Id.§ 32(5).
113. See Oil and Gas Conservation Act, R.S.A., ch. 0-6, §§ 37, 39(1)(c) (2000); see
also Tom Byrnes, Res. Applications, Presentation to CBM/NGC Water Working Group,
EUB Requirements for Disposal of Produced Water (July 14, 2004), available at
http://www.waterforlife.gov.ab.ca/docs/water disposal wwg.pdf.
114.

ALTA. ENERGY & UTILS. BD., PRE-CONSULTATION BACKGROUNDER: NATuRAL GAS IN

COAL 11-12,

available at http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/docs/naturalgas/pdfs/cbm/

GAM AppB3 Backgrounder.pdf.
115. ALTA. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ALTA. ENERGY & UTILS. BD., BASE OF GROUNDWATER
PROTECTION,
http://www.ags.gov.ab.ca/activiies/Groundwater/base groundwater

protection.html.
116. See generally ALTA. ENERGY & UTILS. BD., DIRECTIVE 051: INJECTION AND DIsPOsAL
WELLS - WELL CLASSIFICATIONS COMPLETION,

(Mar.

1994),

LOGGING, AND TESTING REQUIREMENTS

available at

http://www.eub.ca/docs/documents/directives/Directive051.pdf; ALTA. ENERGY & UTILS. BD., DIRECTIVE 065: RESOURCES APPLICATIONS FOR
CONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS RESERVOIRS (Jan. 26, 2007), available at http://
www.eub.ca/docs/documents/directives/Directive065.pdf; ALTA. ENERGY & UTILS. BD.,
EUB GUIDE ST-55: ALBERTA'S USABLE GROUNDWATER BASE OF GROUNDWATER
PROTECTION INFORMATION (1995) (database of various groundwater levels throughout
Alberta).
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the Water Act.11 7 The operator must comply with the "Guidelines for
Groundwater Diversion for CBM/NGC Development" ("GuideThe Guidelines require the CBM/NGC operator to comlines").,"
plete a preliminary groundwater assessment, a technical report, and an
application. 9 Public notice of the application is required and there
are opportunities for participation by directly affected parties.1 20 In
addition to quantities diverted, the licence addresses the disposal of
non-saline produced water.1 2 ' The Guidelines state that Alberta Environment and the EUB may consider surface discharge or re-injection
of non-saline produced water.12 2 The Federal Department of Fisheries
and Oceans may need to approve surface water body discharge.2
VI. RE-USE OF PRODUCED WATER
Academics and scientists contend that much produced water can be
treated and thus made acceptable for a variety of uses. Hum and
Tsang describe a number of potentially available water treatment technologies that could upgrade produced water to various degrees of usability, including industrial, commercial, irrigation, agricultural, and
human use.124 Additionally, they note the need for the development of
clear guidelines regarding both the ownership of produced water and
the transfer of it for "beneficial use."1 25 Substituting the term "useful
purpose" for "beneficial use," Hum and Tsang thus note the need for
the development of clear rules regarding the ownership of produced
water and the its transfer for a useful purpose, such as irrigation application, commercial or industrial, livestock watering, replenishing aquatic
systems for instream needs, and so on. However, being scientists and
not legal academics, it is not surprising that Hum and Tsang do not
provide an analysis of what is "unclear" about the current legislative
framework for ownership and re-use of both non-saline and saline pro117. ALTA. ENv'T, GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER DIVERSION FOR COALBED
METHANE/NATURAL GAS IN COAL DEVELOPMENT 2 (Apr. 2004), available at
http:/ /www3.go.ab.ca/env/water/Legislation/Guidelines/groundwaterdiversionguid
FOR
GROUNDWATER
GUIDELINES
[hereinafter
elines-methgasnatgasincoal.pdf
DIVERSION].

118. Id. at 1.
See id.
119.
120. Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
121.
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans approval may be necessary under
section 35 of the Fisheries Act, which requires approval for an operation or works to
legally that cause a harmful alteration, disturbance, or destruction of fish habitat, or
section 36 which requires an approval (unless a regulation applies) for the release of
any deleterious substance into water frequented by fish. Fisheries Act, R.S.C., ch. F-14,

§§ 35, 36(5) (1985.).
124. HUM ETAL., supra note 1, at 17-25.
125. Id.at 35.
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duced water. The following sections set out this framework and conclude that, indeed, there is serious need to develop clearer, more appropriate rules.
A. NON-SALINE WATER

1. Initial Authorization Allows Re-Use
One way for operators to have authorization to re-use non-saline water for a useful purpose would be for the operator initially to negotiate
licence terms that allow re-use. The Guidelines for Groundwater Diversion for CBM/NGC Development already suggest that surface discharge may be acceptable.1 2 6 This may accommodate re-use for irrigation and other agricultural purposes; however, for other re-use, government policy revisions would be necessary.
2. Amendment to Licence
What if an operator's licence requires re-injection or another undesired disposal method, and the operator wishes instead to provide the
water (for a price, presumably) to others for useful purposes? The
operator cannot do this without violating the Water Act, since the Water Act prohibits a person from knowingly or unknowingly commencing or continuing the diversion except in accordance with the licence. 2 7 Even though the diversion technically has ceased once the
water has been diverted from its geological source, the licence condition regarding disposal continues to apply, just as any conditions in a
licence that govern use of diverted water continue to apply after a diversion. May the operator apply to Alberta Environment to change the
condition relating to disposal so that the operator can transfer the water to buyers for useful purposes?
The language of the Water Act poses difficulties for the operator.
Nothing in the Water Act specifically enables a licencee to apply to a
Director'28 to remove or change a condition of a licence, except those
conditions relating to points, rates, or timing of diversions.29 The Water Act also specifically enables a licencee to apply to amend a licence
to "add terms or conditions to the licence." 3 ° A problem is that removing a disposal requirement is not adding a term or condition; it is removing a condition. Arguably, there is a measure of discretion in the
amendment provisions such that a court might read into them a Direc126.
127.
128.
other
129.

130.

See GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER DIVERSION, supranote 117, at 3.
Water Act, R.S.A., ch. W-3, § 142(1)(n), (2)(e) (2000).
Directors carry out many key functions of the Water Act involving licences and
authorizations. See id. § 163 (enabling the Minister to designate Directors).
Seeid. §54(1)(b).

Id.§ 54(1)(b) (iii).
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tor's right to remove a term and change the purpose of a licence. '
Ideally the Water Act would be more specific. In any event, a Director
may not amend a licence if the Director believes that there could be an
adverse effect on the rights of household users, other licencees, or traditional agricultural users, or if the change would adversely affect the
"ability to conserve or manage a water body." 3 2 Note that this provi-

sion does not mention priorities, and therefore applies whether the
adverse impact could be on a licencee either more senior or more junior to the operator.
3. Transfer of a Licenced Non-Saline Allocation to a Useful Purpose?
Another possibility is that an operator might transfer an allocation so
that another user may use the water for useful purposes. Although the
Water Act enables transfers of all or part of an allocation, 133 the provisions clearly contemplate ongoing diversions where the activity of diverting water will be transferred from one parcel of land to another.TM
The provisions, as written, apply when a licencee who has an allocation
relating to a parcel of land no longer needs all or part of the allocation, and transfers all or part of the allocation to someone else who will
then use it at another location. The provisions do not contemplate a
simple transfer of the already diverted water to other users. Accordingly, the transfer provision will not help an operator whose licence
requires disposal, but who wishes to transfer diverted water for a useful
purpose.
4. Assignment of a Licenced Non-Saline Allocation for Useful Purposes?
The Water Act enables a licencee or registrant to temporarily assign
water under a licence or registration to another licencee or registrant
where, because of limitations of water supplies, there is not enough
water for the assignee to divert its entire allocation. 135 These provisions, like the transfer provisions, were not intended to apply to already diverted water. In fact, the section specifically states that, "an
131. Id. § 54(1)(b). The Director may, on application of the licencee, amend a
licence "including but not limited to" the specific matters mentioned in the text of this
Article. The use of "including" suggests that the Director may consider amendments
of kinds other than those set out. However, by application of the statutory interpretation tool expressio unious est exclusio alterius, (expressing one thing, excludes another)

the specificity of the provision that a Director may amend a licence to "add terms or
conditions to a licence" suggests that the Director may not remove terms or conditions

to a licence. Id.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. § 54(1).
Id. §§ 81, 82.
See id. § 82.
Id. § 33(1).
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agreement to assign water may not be made with
respect to water that
36
licence."1
a
under
diverted
has been previously
5. Summary - Putting Diverted Non-Saline Water to a Useful Purpose
This discussion has shown that Alberta's legislative scheme contains
significant gaps in dealing with putting diverted non-saline water to a
useful purpose. Unless the parties contemplated re-use for a useful
purpose during the initial licencing, the Water Act does not adequately
accommodate changes to allow re-use for useful purposes. As the next
section will show, the legal situation is even more uncertain for diversions of saline water.
B. RE-USE OF SALINE WATER
As previously discussed, Colorado does not consider water produced
in oil and gas operations as a beneficial use of water, which consequently exempts such water use from the permitting process of the
state engineer. If the operator wants to put produced water to a beneficial use, the operator could apply to the state engineer for a water
permit to do so. Wyoming initially characterizes mine dewatering as a
beneficial use, and so an operator needs a water permit to produce
water in the context of CBM operations. If the operator wants to put
the water to another beneficial use, the operator must apply to the
state engineer for a change of beneficial use relating to that water.
How does it work in Alberta? The main complexity and difficulty for
an operator in Alberta who wants to put saline produced water, before
or after treatment, to a useful purpose lies in the fact that the original
diversion was exempt. Walking through the relevant provisions of the
Water Act exposes the difficulties.
Subsection 3(2) of the Act provides that "it]he property in and the
right to the diversion and use of all water in the Province is vested in
Her Majesty in right of Alberta except as provided in the regulations."'37 The Water Act defines "water" to include groundwater'
The specification that the Crown owns the right to use water might
suggest that the Crown regulates changes of use following an exempt
diversion of saline water. Although the Crown may regulate in this
manner, it has not yet done this in either the Water Act or regulations
under it. This lacuna is the rub for operators.
Recall that subsection 49(1) prohibits a person from commencing or
continuing "a diversion of water for any purpose.. .except pursuant to a39
49(2)]."1
licence unless it is otherwise authorized by [subsection
136. Id. § 33(2).
137. Id. § 3(2) (emphasis added).
138. Id. § 1(1)(ff).
139. Id. § 49(1).
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Clause 49(2) (d) provides that a "person who commences or continues
the diversion of water or operates a works... that is designated or is
part of a class of diversions or works that is designated in the regulations as exempt from the requirement for a licence.., is not required
to hold a licence for that diversion...

."'40

The regulations exempt diver-

sions of saline water and therefore do not require a licence for a diversion of saline water in oil and gas activities.14' How does an operator
move on to convert a water right arising from a saline diversion to a
water right designated for a useful purpose?
If the exemption in the regulations stated a purpose for the exempt
diversion, then subsection 49(1) would prohibit an operator from diverting water for any purpose other than the purpose of the exemption. However, the regulations do not specify a purpose. The exemption simply reads: "The following diversions of water ... do not require
a licence: ...

a diversion of saline groundwater. ..

Once an opera-

tor diverts saline water from its underground source to the surface in
connection with oil and gas activities, the water is diverted. There is no
further diversion of water and nothing under the Water Act requires
anything specific be done with the water. This is not like other exempt
uses, such as a household exemption, where once water is removed
from the source, it must be used for certain purposes, namely household purposes. 134 If a person with a household exemption wishes to use
diverted water for some other purpose, the person would have to apply
for a licence to use diverted water for the other purpose. There are no
such restrictions with respect to the diversion of saline water.
Can an exempt diversion be transferred or assigned for a useful purpose? As mentioned earlier, the Water Act transfer provisions are very
limited and are not appropriate for produced water situations. In any
case, only an allocation under a licence is transferable.'" Because an
exempt diversion does not require a licence, the transfer provisions are
inapplicable. Similarly, the Water Act assignment provisions are inapplicable to exempt diversions.' 5 The assignment provisions are relevant only to diversions under licences or registrations.
Would the offence provisions prohibit an operator from using produced water for a useful purpose? Clause 142(1) (n) of the Water Act
states that it is an offence to commence or continue a "diversion of
water for any purpose . . . except under a licence or as otherwise authorized by this Act. . . ."'4 Clause 142(2) (e) is nearly identical except
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. § 49(2)(d) (emphasis added).
Water (Ministerial) Regulation, C.R.A. 205/98, sched. 3, § 1(e) (Alta.).
Id.
See Water Act, R.S.A., ch. W-3, § 21.

144. Seeid. §81(1)(d).
145. See id. § 33.
146. Id. § 142(1)(n).
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that it applies to a person who knowingly commences or carries out a
diversion without statutory authorization.

'

Except for the diversion of

saline water, these provisions do not seem to apply to an exempt diversion that does not mention a purpose. Accordingly, a person would
commit an offence if the person diverted non-saline water allegedly
under the saline exemption. However, as long as an operator diverts
saline water in accordance with an exemption, and then uses the water
for some other purpose, it is hard to see how the operator could commit an offence. This puts operators in a particularly favored situation
vis-A-vis other water users who would be committing an offence by using diverted water other than for authorized purposes.
Does this mean that an operator may treat saline water and transfer
it for a useful purpose without worrying about further authorizations?
Certainly the operator must get approval from the EUB to alter any
previous disposal requirements set out in an EUB authorization. But
does the operator need further authorization (in addition to the exemption) under the Water Act?'"8 Review of the Water Act and the
regulations set forth above suggests not. However, since the Crown
owns the water and the right to use it, an inquiry to a Director under
the Water Act regarding the permissibility of use of saline water or
treated saline water for a useful purpose is prudent.

147. Id. § 142(2)(e).
148. A user may need a number of other statutory authorizations to upgrade and use
the water or transfer the water for a useful purpose. For example, produced water
could likely fall under the definition of "wastewater" in regulations under the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act ("EPEA"), R.S.A., ch. E-12 (2000).
Treated wastewater may be drinkable if it meets the treatment requirements in the
federal Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality and the provincial Standards
and Guidelines for Municipal Waterworks, Wastewater and Storm Drainage Systems.
See Potable Water Regulation, C.R.A. 277/2003 § 6(1) (Alta.). To use treated wastewater for irrigation, an operator must either comply with a Code of Practice under EPEA
or the Wastewater and Storm Drainage Regulations, whose definitions provide:

"[I] ndustrial wastewater" means wastewater that is the composite of
liquid and water-carried wastes from a plant;.. . "[P]lant" means all
buildings, structures, process equipment, pipelines, vessels, storage
and material handling facilities, roadways and other installations,

used in and for any activity listed in section 2 of the Schedule of Activities in the Act, including the land, other than undeveloped land,
that is used for the purposes of the activity;... "[W]astewater" means

domestic wastewater and may include industrial wastewater....
Wastewater and Storm Drainage Regulation, C.R.A. 119/93, § I(f), 1(j), 1(r)

(Alta.).
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VII. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS, LESSONS LEARNED, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALBERTA
A. OVERALL APPROACH TO WATER RIGHTS

This Article has shown how none of the three jurisdictions has a water rights legal system that rationally accommodates and facilitates the
re-use of produced water for a useful purpose. The author believes
that the core reason for this is that these water rights systems were designed to or evolved to accommodate and facilitate diversions for useful purposes (or beneficial use in the United States), such as diversions
for household uses, irrigation, livestock watering, industrial or commercial activities, hydropower production, or for enhancing recreation, tourism, aquatic ecosystem needs, or other instream uses. They
were not designed to accommodate or facilitate diversions that simply
happen in the course of some other activity. None of the three approaches examined-treating water production in oil and gas operations as being beyond water rights systems (Colorado and others),
treating water production in these activities as a beneficial use (Wyoming), or making the diversion itself the basis of a water right (Alberta)-provides a reasonable and appropriate water management
framework for produced water re-use rights.
It is beyond the scope of this article to make detailed recommendations on the basis of lessons learned from the regulatory frameworks
reviewed. However, general observations and recommendations for
law and policy reform in Alberta are in order.
THE INITIAL CHARACTERIZATION OF A WATER RIGHT TO PRODUCED
WATER SHOULD NOT ACT AS A DISINCENTWE TO PUTING WATER TO A
USEFUL PURPOSE
Colorado, like a number of other western U.S. states, considers water
brought to the surface in oil and gas production to be waste. Wyoming
considers producing water in connection with CBM operations to be a
beneficial use of water. Alberta exempts saline water from the licencing provisions. In all three cases, the initial characterization suggests that there is only one purpose or use of the water (waste or accompanying resources to the surface). Changing this characterization
in Wyoming and Colorado will take effort, and under Alberta law, for
saline water, changing the characterization might not even be possible.
Contemplating a useful purpose-or at least a potential useful purpose-in the initial characterization of the water right would help address this disincentive.
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REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS THAT REQUIRE PERVERSE OR TWISTED
INTERPRETATIONS TO MAKE PRODUCED WATER FIT SHOULD BE
RECTIFIED

In all three jurisdictions, regulators and policy-makers perform mental gymnastics to fit produced water into frameworks designed for water rights issued for activities that are directly water-related. As suggested earlier, the reason for this perversion could be that with produced water, the economic activity involved with the diversion or useresource development-is not directly water related. Surely there are
ways to fit produced water into water rights frameworks in a straightforward, sensible manner. Legislators and policy makers should review
and change the regulatory frameworks to remove distortions.
LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES SHOULD AVOID JURISDICTIONAL TUG-OFWARS, CONFLICTING MANDATES, AND REGULATORY GAPS

The rights to produce and re-use produced water in all three jurisdictions involve a number of regulatory agencies. These agencies include: (1) an agency that issues water rights (state engineer in the
states, Alberta Environment, Water Rights Division in Alberta); (2) an
environmental agency that deals with water quality; and (3) a resource
exploration and development agency. The Article has shown that conflicting mandates and overlapping jurisdiction almost guarantee unnecessary complexities and regulatory gaps. To avoid this, governments should ensure that all three agencies work together to provide
proper resource management in the public interest. To better accommodate industry, governments should adopt a reasonable onewindow approach to address all agency mandates and interests.
INVOLVE THE WATER RIGHTS AGENCY UP FRONT

Following up on the last observation, in Colorado and Alberta, problems can arise because the water rights agency is not involved up front.
This is especially true where the activity of producing water could interfere with other water rights holders. Issues of potential priority impacts can be adequately dealt with only if the water rights agency considers the proposed water right before the right is granted or approved. To involve the rights agency up front, produced waterespecially from shallow resource developments-should not be considered waste, nor should there be an exemption.
B. ALBERTA-SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the analysis in this Article, the author makes the following Alberta-specific recommendations:

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

LEGISLATORS SHOULD REVISiT BASING ALL (OR ANY) ALBERTA WATER
RIGHTS ON DiVERSIONS OF WATER

This article has shown that Alberta's practice of basing water rights
on diversions provides a major difficulty for operators. One problem
involves obtaining a water right to put saline water to a useful purpose.
Because Alberta bases water rights on diversions, once an exempt diversion is complete, there is no mechanism in the Water Act to enable
the water to be licenced for a useful purpose. One way to address this
1 49
difficulty might be to not base all (or any) water rights on diversions.
Water rights in the western United States are based on beneficial use.1 50
In the Canadian prairies, only Alberta bases water rights on diversions
of water. Water rights legislation in Manitoba enables the Minister to
issue a licence "to any person who applies therefore, authorizing...
the use or diversion of water for any purpose..."'5 Accordingly, a Manitoba water right may be a right to use or a right to divert. Similarly,
Saskatchewan legislation gives considerable discretion to its Adminis1 52
trator to grant licences and does not even mention purpose of use.
REVIEW THE SALINE WATER EXEmPTION

Where there is a reasonable possibility that a water diversion could
impact other water users, whether the impact concerns quality or quantity, there should be no exemption for saline diversions. Although
there may be a justification for the exemption with respect to conventional oil and gas because wells are very deep and there is, allegedly,
little chance for aquifer impact, the same justification does not apply to
shallower, unconventional CBM wells. Wherever there could be aquifer-dewatering impacts on other users, or quality impacts from migrating gas or other events, there should be no exemption, whether or not
the produced water is saline. The entire schema of the Water Act depends on water rights with priority not being impacted by junior rights
and there should be no exemptions from the licencing provisions
where ajunior right could impact a senior one.

149. Dropping the requirement for a diversion would also clearly open up the door
for private instream licences. The current definition of "diversion" in the Water Act is
ambiguous with respect to whether an instream use could be considered a diversion.
See Kwasniak, supranote 95, at 224-27.
150. All prior-appropriation states require an appropriation, though not all states
require that the appropriation involve a diversion.
151. Water Rights Act, R.S.M., ch. W80, § 5(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
152. See Saskatchewan Watershed Authority Act, S.S., ch. S-35.03, §§ 50-52 (2005)
(amended 2006).
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EXEMPTIONS MUST BE FOR A STATED PURPOSE

In any event, policy makers and legislators should amend the Water
Act to ensure that all exemptions are for a purpose. This Article has
shown that a shortcoming of the Water Act is that there is no regulatory way to manage exempt diversions that are not for a stated purpose.
The legislation also should clarify that any use of water other than for
the exempt purpose requires a licence.
LICENCED PRODUCED WATER DIVERSIONS MUST BE FOR A PURPOSE

Similarly, any licence issued in respect of produced water must set
out the purpose for the diversion. This way the Water Act would prohibit any use other than for stated purposes.
CONTEMPLATE RE-USE IN INITIAL AUTHORIZATION
To avoid the initial characterization of a water right acting as a disincentive to re-use, legislators and policy makers should make appropriate legislative and policy changes so that the initial authorization contemplates re-use of licenced produced water diversions. The initial
licence need not state the specific re-use, but could tie it to future
regulations and guidelines.
REVISE GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER DIVERSIONS FOR CBM/NGC
DEVELOPMENT
Legislators should amend the Guidelines to allow for useful purposes of CBM produced water, and develop regulations and guidelines
to ensure appropriate and safe use in the public interest.
AMEND WATER ACT TO ALLOW FOR LIMITED CHANGES

Legislators should amend the Water Act to allow for change of purposes and the removal of licence conditions to accomplish this.15 This
amendment should be carefully proscribed and limited, but it should
enable an operator to put produced water to a useful purpose if the
initial water right did not contemplate such authorization.
REVISE OFFENCE AND PENALTY PROVISIONS
Legislators should amend the offence and penalty provisions of the
Water Act to make it an offence to use water subject to an exemption
for any purpose other than the purpose for the exemption. 54 The Water Act also must be clear that an operator cannot use water diverted
153. See supra text accompanying notes 124-38.
154. See supra text accompanying notes - 50.
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under an exemption for another purpose without a licence under the
Water Act.
DEVELOP A WATER CONSERVATION GUIDELINE REGARDING WASTE

The government should develop a water conservation guideline respecting wastage of water. The guideline could set out standards and
policies regarding the re-use of produced water.
CONSIDER A HOLDBACK MECHANISM

The government should consider whether there should be a holdback-type mechanism 5 5 where an operator "sells"'5 6 produced water for
useful purposes. A holdback could achieve a number of purposes: it
could reserve water to mitigate local impacts; it could help restore water to water systems to meet or enhance instream flow needs; and it
could help address concerns (if any) that the industry is making a
profit off of water-a public resource-without returning water to the
system.
ALL MANDATES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN A ONE-WINDOW APPROACH

Alberta Environment (both water quality and water quantity divisions) and the EUB should, as far as possible, develop a one-window
approach for water rights relating to produced water. It is essential
that such an approach appropriately address mandates.

155. The transfer provisions of the Water Act enable conservation holdbacks of up to
ten percent of the amount being transferred where allowed by Cabinet order or in an
approved water management plan. Water Act, R.SA.., ch. W-3, § 83 (2000).
156. "Sells" is in quotes because underlying ownership of water remains in the Crown.
See id. § 3(2).

ARTICLE UPDATE
FIFrH UPDATE TO COLORADO WATER LAW: AN
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
THE HONORABLE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.
To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law information, the editors periodically include updates of works previously published in the Water Law Review. The following is the fifth update to
Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, Appendix-Colorado Water
Law: A Synopsis of Statutes and Case Law,' selected by the Honorable
GregoryJ. Hobbs,Jr.
Fort Morgan Reservoir and Irrigation Co. v. Groundwater Appropriators of the South Platte River Basin, Inc.
"At the point at which a water rights case ceases to be a dispute
handled informally by a water referee, and becomes litigation involving
pre-trial discovery, sworn live testimony, and expert witnesses, it rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether, at
the trial's conclusion, there is a prevailing party entitled to costs.
Since there is no statute or rule prohibiting the award of costs, and
the unique nature of water right proceedings does not preclude the
applicability of Rule 54(d), the award of costs necessarily rests in the
sound discretion of the water court."
Fort Morgan Reservoir and Irrigation Co.v. Groundwater Appropriators of the South
Platte River Basin, Inc., 85 P.3d 536, 541 (Colo. 2004).

United States of America v. Colorado State Engineer
"The McCarran Amendment does not assert or imply that a state
court would have jurisdiction to review the decision making process of
federal entities, such as Interior or the Park Service, for compliance
with federal law.

1.

Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. DENV.

WATER L. REv. 1, 27 (1997). The first update to Justice Hobbs' article appears at 2 U.
DENV. WATER L. REv. 223 (1999); the second update is at 4 U. DENV. WATER L. Rv. 111

(2000); the third update is at 6 U. DENV.WATER L. REv. 116 (2002), and the fourth
update is at 8 U. DENV.WATER L. REv. 213 (2004).
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Indeed, such a conclusion would run contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act, the federal statute which establishes the practices
and procedures followed by administrative agencies in rulemaking and
adjudication. The language and legislative history of the APA'sjudicial
review provisions make clear that Congress intended to hold federal
administrative agencies answerable for their conduct only in federal
courts. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (2004). Section 706 provides that a reviewing court shall 'compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.' 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Section 702 defines the scope
of that review: 'A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute' is entitled to judicial review and may
bring suit against the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 702. However, the suit must
be brought 'in a court of the United States.' Id. Thus, the waiver of
sovereign immunity is expressly limited to federal court. The APA's
legislative history underscores this intent, explicitly stating that the
United States will remain immune from suit in state courts.
The scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment is not so broad that it allows state courts to evaluate or
adjudicate the federal agency decision making processes leading the
United States to make a particular water application in a given case.
The Environmental Opposers have brought claims in federal court that
can only be decided by that court. Thus, there is no question that
there will be both state and federal proceedings before the United
States' reserved water right for the Black Canyon can be fully resolved.
The federal case will decide whether the United States' amended application complied with the applicable federal law, and the state case
will quantify the reserved water right. We recognize that the federal
case may have an impact on the water court proceeding. Indeed, if the
federal case had no impact on the state case, there would be no need
for a stay. However, the water court will decide the quantification of
the federal reserved right even if the federal court finds that the
agency decision making was flawed and must be redone."
United States v. Colo. State Eng'r, 101 P.3d 1072, 1080 (Colo. 2004) (case citations
omitted).

City of Aurora v. Colorado State Engineer
"Water resulting from reduced consumption by native plants is
commonly referred to as 'salvaged water.' An applicant may not claim
credit for salvaged water in a plan for augmentation. § 37-92-103(9),
C.R.S. (2004). This rule applies to all native vegetation, whether or not
it is classified as phreatophytic. There are two exceptions to this rule
for unlined gravel pits, section 37-92-305(12) (a), C.R.S. (2004), and
on-stream reservoirs, section 37-84-117(5), C.R.S. (2004)."
City of Aurora v. Colo. State Eng'r, 105 P.3d 595, 608 (Colo. 2005) (case citations and
footnotes omitted).
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"In Colorado, CRE 702 governs the admission of scientific evidence
and expert testimony. The focus of a CRE 702 inquiry is whether the
proffered scientific evidence is both reliable and relevant. To determine the reliability of scientific evidence under CRE 702, the court's
inquiry should be broad in scope and consider the totality of the circumstances presented in each case. In performing its inquiry, the
court may consider a wide range of factors that are pertinent to the
case at issue. The court should also apply its discretionary authority
under CRE 403 to 'ensure that the probative value of the evidence is
not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.' The court must issue specific findings as it performs its CRE 702 and 403 analyses.
Trial courts are vested with broad discretion to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. The trial court is vested with this discretion because it has a superior opportunity to determine the competence of the expert. In addition, this deference reflects the superior
opportunity of the trial judge to gauge both the competence of the
expert and the extent to which his opinion would be helpful.
As
such, a trial court's exercise of its discretion will not be overturned
unless manifestly erroneous.
We hold that the water court's exercise of discretion was not manifestly erroneous. The water court properly considered factors pertinent to this case, and issued specific findings regarding the reliability
of the groundwater and surface water models. Specifically, the water
court found that:
'[T]he model itself, is widely used to model aquifer parameters,
among other uses, and... it is capable of producing reliable, relevant
results. However, the court concludes that, in order for computer
modeling results to be reliable, and hence relevant, for predicting the
timing and amount of both depletions and recharge, the model must
be operated in a manner that is consistent with accepted modeling
techniques. If the model is operated in some other manner, there
must be sufficient evidence that such other method produces valid
and reliable results.'
The water court then carefully analyzed the evidence as to the
modeling techniques that PCSR's experts employed to operate the
groundwater and surface water models used in this case. After noting
the relevant techniques, the water court determined PCSR's experts
committed errors in technique with respect to the groundwater model
because they failed to conduct a sensitivity analysis on the model, failed
to properly calibrate the model, failed to explain anomalous results
and residual errors, ignored another expert's report suggesting further
evaluation, and failed to complete an independent peer review of the
model.
The court further determined that PCSR's experts committed errors in technique with respect to the surface water model because
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PCSR failed to adjust calculations for the changing call regime, failed
to factor out irrigation run-off, failed to consider variables other than
precipitation, and failed to determine the range of errors for its simulated stream flows.
Relying on these findings, the water court held that the groundwater model, as operated in this case, failed to produce sufficiently reliable results to permit a reasonably accurate determination of the timing, amount, and location of depletions, or the timing and amount of
aquifer recharge. The water court further held that the surface water
model, as operated in this case, failed to produce sufficiently reliable
results to permit a reasonably accurate determination of either average
stream flow or legal availability of augmentation water. Because the
water court's exercise of discretion was not manifestly erroneous, we
refuse to overturn it on appeal."
Id. at 612-13 (case citations and footnotes omitted).

"[T]he water court properly held that PCSR's groundwater and
surface water models failed to produce sufficiently reliable results to
permit a reasonably accurate determination of the timing, amount,
and location of stream depletions or the legal availability of replacement water. Additionally, it is clear that PCSR had better access to probative evidence of those elements by virtue of its designing both the
models and the augmentation plan.
Hence, the water court correctly held that, in the absence of sufficient proof, it could not determine the issue of injury with respect to
PCSR's augmentation plan. Accordingly, we conclude that the water
court applied the proper standard of review pursuant to Rule 41 (b) (1)
in dismissing PCSR's augmentation plan."
Id at 616.

East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation District v. Rangeview
Metropolitan District
"The anti-speculation doctrine, which was first developed as a limitation on conditional decrees and which mandates a threshold showing
of a proposed non-speculative, beneficial use before the development
of a water project, is not applicable to a judicial determination of available nontributary ground water, as a matter of legislative design. The
protection of potential appropriators is unnecessary in this context
because, by statute, there can be none, see § 37-90-102(2); protection
against waste at this stage is unnecessary because, by statute, a structure
to withdraw nontributary ground water may not be constructed without
satisfying the state engineer of a non-speculative, beneficial use to
which the water will be put, see § 37-90-137(4); and perhaps most importantly, to require a showing of non-speculative, beneficial use at an
adjudication proceeding would thwart a clearly expressed legislative
intent to permit adjudication for future uses without a corresponding
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obligation to develop them. See § 37-90-137(6); § 37-92-305(11). Although, to be sure, adjudication results in a vested right, the legislature
has nevertheless reserved the authority to modify such a right if necessary to prevent waste, promote beneficial use, or require reasonable
conservation. § 37-92-305(11)."
East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation Dist. v. Rangeview Metro. Dist., 109
P.3d 154, 158 (Colo. 2005).

"In sharp contrast to nontributary ground water, designated
ground water is regulated by the state ground water commission. See
§§ 37-90-104 to -108. Although designated ground water in the Denver
Basin aquifers is allocated on the basis of overlying land ownership, in
the manner of nontributary ground water rather than other designated
ground water, the commission has the dual responsibility of determining availability and issuing permits for its withdrawal.
§ 37-90107(7) (a) and (8). While a conditional well permit is still a prerequisite to withdrawing and using the water, see § 37-90-107(7)(d), and
application for a well permit requires a showing of beneficial use, id.,
the statutory scheme for designated ground water does not evince any
intent to permit adjudication of a use right without plans for development and use of the resource.
Unlike nontributary ground water, the statutes governing Denver
Basin designated ground water not only fail to place the authority for
determining availability and issuing well permits in different bodies;
they also fail to sanction the 'adjudication' of vested rights for 'future'
uses or to excuse showings or findings of reasonable diligence following a determination of availability. In the absence of any clear expression of legislative intent to permit the adjudication of a vested right to
an amount of underlying Denver Basin designated ground water, separate and distinct from obtaining a conditional permit and diligently
constructing a well to extract and apply the water to a beneficial use,
we found a threshold showing of a non-speculative, beneficial use to be
required, prior even to a determination of availability by the commission, in order to prevent waste and promote beneficial use. The same
concerns do not arise in the general assembly's significantly different
treatment of nontributary ground water."
Id. at 158-59.

"As the water court in the current proceeding expressly recognized,
judgments and decrees entered prior to July 1, 1985 with respect to
nontributary ground water must be given full effect and enforced according to their terms. See § 37-92-203(1). Such prior decrees were
not nullified or superseded by subsequent statutory changes, but at the
same time, an overlying landowner is in no way barred from an adjudication of the full amount of nontributary ground water to which he is
statutorily entitled, merely because he had already been decreed the
use of a portion of that amount. While the statutory provisions creat-
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ing an inchoate right in overlying landowners preserve the pre-existing
vested use rights of others, see § 37-90-137(2) and (4), the scheme
cannot be reasonably understood to reduce the underlying nontributary ground water available to a landowner as a result of his own prior
decree."
Id. at 159.

Colorado Water Conservation Board v. Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy District
".... SB 216, in its final form, limits the entities that can claim RICD
[Recreational In-Channel Diversion] water rights, and specifically delineates the role of the CWCB [Colorado Water Conservation Board],
only authorizing it to conduct fact-finding with respect to specific factors and to make a recommendation. Yet, the final version does not
give the CWCB the extensive oversight and adjudicatory authority it
sought, nor does it give the CWCB any authority to dictate a flow rate
or recreation experience for RICD water rights.
While constrained, the CWCB's role under SB 216 is not unimportant. Reviewing a RICD application under the five statutory factors no
doubt requires the Board to undertake a careful, probing analysis. For
example, section 37-92-102(6) (b) (I) directs the CWCB to find whether
the adjudication and administration of the sought RICD 'would impair
the ability of Colorado to fully develop and place to consumptive beneficial use its compact entitlements.' Thus, whether a RICD shields waters from a consumptive use that would otherwise be available under a
particular compact is a factor for the CWCB to consider in reaching its
recommendation. This duty is consistent with the CWCB's enabling
statute which in turn, directs the Board to pay particular attention to
development of Colorado's interstate water apportionments. See § 3760-106(1) (h), (i), C.R.S. (2004).
In addition, section 37-92-102(6) (b) (V) directs the CWCB to find
whether adjudication and administration of the RICD application
'would promote maximum utilization of waters of the state' as envisioned by section 37-92-102(1) (a) which incorporates a basic tenet of
Colorado water law into RICD applications. Again, this duty is consistent with the Board's enabling statute, under which the CWCB has the
duty 'to promote the conservation of the waters of the state of Colorado in order to secure the greatest utilization of such waters.' § 37-60106(1). To this end, the CWCB is to promote the implementation of
'sound measures to enhance water use efficiency in order to serve all
the water needs of the state.' § 37-60-106(1) (r).
If in considering an applicant's claimed stream flows for compliance
with the five statutory factors, the CWCB determined, for example, that
the RICD would impair the availability of upstream consumptive uses
of compact-entitled water, or that the RICD would not conserve or effi-
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ciently use the claimed water, thereby promoting maximum utilization
of Colorado's available water, then the Board could recommend to the
water court that the application be denied. An applicant does not have
an entitlement to a 'grant' recommendation from the CWCB merely
upon a showing of water availability. Rather, the Board has the authority to recommend denial where an application strictly as submitted by
the applicant does not comport with the five statutory factors in section
37-92-102 (6) (b).
In the case before us, the CWCB has not made findings on whether
beneficial consumptive water use opportunities upstream from the
claimed RICD would further develop Colorado's compact entitlements
and would be impaired by Applicant's sought for stream flow amounts.
Moreover, no findings were made on whether Applicant's claimed
stream flows would conserve and efficiently use the available Gunnison
River flow, thereby promoting maximum utilization of Colorado's waters. Since the CWCB has not made all of the findings required by
these and the other statutory factors codified at section 37-92102(6) (b) (I) -(V), the water court lacks information that the General
Assembly considered material to the water court's ultimate determination regarding the amounts of water to which the RICD decree must be
restricted."
Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109
P.3d 585, 595 (Colo. 2005).

"Putting the ... legislative history together with the language of the
statute, we hold that the phrases 'minimum stream flow' 'for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water' should be interpreted
in the following manner. Initially, the water court must determine
whether an application is for a RICD as defined in section 37-92103(10.3). To do so, the water court first must determine whether the
appropriation sought by the applicant, viewed objectively, is for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water - more specifically,
are the requested flow amounts reasonable on the particular stream?
This determination necessarily will vary from application to application, depending on the stream involved and the availability of water
within the basin. Once the water court has determined whether a
RICD application is for an objectively reasonable recreation experience in and on the stream in question, then it must determine the
minimum amount of stream flow necessary to accomplish that intended recreation experience. Hence, the water court may be required to weigh conflicting expert testimony given by course designers
or other interested parties, and make a finding as to the least necessary
stream flow to achieve an applicant's objectively reasonable recreation
experience.
In any event, it is clear from the plain language of the statutory
definition of a RICD, as well as SB 216's legislative history, that the water court may not take the appropriator's suggestion, as set forth in the
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application, of what a reasonable recreation experience is for the
stream involved at face value, nor should the water court accept without scrutiny the applicant's analysis of what stream flow is necessary to
achieve that objective.
Finally, in making the above determinations, the water court must
carefully evaluate the factors set forth in section 37-92-102(6) (b), giving presumptive effect to unrebutted CWCB findings, and also considering the Board's recommendation and any other evidence submitted
in the course of the trial. An applicant is not entitled to a decreed
RICD merely upon a showing of water availability. The water court
only may decree a RICD that is appropriate under the five statutory
factors - compact impairment, stream reach appropriateness, access
availability, instream flow rights injury, and maximum utilization."
Id. at 602-03.

East Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer and Weld Irrigation Co.
"East Ridge does not hold any shares in the Irrigation Company.
East Ridge is also not the decreed owner of a water right that has been
adjudicated in water court. To the contrary, the water that East Ridge
has been using is, in fact, decreed to the Irrigation Company, and East
Ridge's predecessor's dates of appropriation were used in obtaining
that decree.
Where the water consumer is neither an appropriator nor a shareholder, he may nonetheless have contractual rights to make use of water. However, the instrument granting rights of use becomes the dispositive instrument rather than the statutes."
East Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer and Weld Irrigation Co., 109 P.3d 969, 973

(Colo. 2005) (case citations omitted).
"We conclude that East Ridge's rights must be determined by the
terms of the water contracts through and on which the claims for water
are based. East Ridge has a right to use water as provided in the water
contracts, and these rights are governed by the contract and not by
section 37-92-305(3).
The language of the Contracts is ambiguous, but an examination of
extrinsic evidence leads us to believe that the parties intended to restrict the delivery of water to irrigation on property owned by Plummer
and McGinley at the time.
Accordingly, we affirm the Water Court's decision that the rights
may not be changed from the location or use to which the contract
assigns them."
Id.at 976.
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Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden
"Appellants contend the water court's cost award to Golden is erroneous and contest three aspects of the costs award. First, they argue
that they, and not Golden, are the prevailing parties under C.R.C.P.
54(d). Second, Appellants argue that, even if Golden is the prevailing
party, Golden presented insufficient evidence to establish costs. Third,
the municipal appellants, the cities of Westminster, Thornton, Northglenn and Arvada, argue that neither Rule 54(d) nor section 13-51-114
authorize courts to enter cost awards against the State or its political
subdivisions. We conclude the water court's finding that Golden was
the prevailing party is supported by the record. Golden also presented
sufficient evidence regarding costs to support the amount of the award.
We agree with the municipal appellants, however, that the award of
costs against them were not permitted by law."
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 113 P.3d 119, 127 (Colo. 2005).

Ready Mixed Concrete Company in Adams County v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company
"By the close of the Nineteenth Century, agricultural ditches interlaced the South Platte Basin along Colorado's Front Range and downstream to Nebraska. Constructed independently of each other and
operating with differing priorities, downstream ditches often depended for a portion or all of their supply upon return flow water percolating into groundwater from ditch seepage and field irrigation or
returning overland to the river via drainage ditches or 'wasteways.'
Ready Mixed Concrete Co. v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co., 115 P.3d 638, 64243 (Colo. 2005) (footnotes omitted).

"Taking all of the decree provisions together, we must construe
them contrary to the developed water theory Ready Mixed Concrete
argues. The referee's report and the decree are explicit that the decreed use of the McCanne Ditch water is for irrigation of 300 acres of
land, not to exceed 900 acre-feet per year. It appears that the referee
found that loss of water back to the stream from conveyance and irrigation through porous soil near the river was so great as to warrant the
application of three acre-feet of water to every acre of land to grow a
crop, and included the 900 acre-foot volumetric limitation as a condition to prohibit wasteful irrigation of the 300 acres. This 900 acre-foot
condition was not intended to be a volumetric water consumption allowance."
I& at 644.

"'[O]ur cases hold that water 'salvaged' by reducing evaporation or
cutting vegetation cannot result in a decree free of the river's call for a
new or changed appropriation. To permit such a practice would en-
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courage stripping the environment . . .Accordingly, our decisions in

R.J.A., Inc. v. Water Users Assn. of Dist. No. 6 and Giffen v. State of
Colorado prevent water rights priorities from being created or
enlarged free of the call of other water rights, by draining wetlands,
marshes, and seeps, or by paving lands. In the name of reducing
evaporation or transpiration, such 'developed water' schemes seek to
establish super priorities in the river system."
Id. at 644 (case citations omitted).

High Plains A & M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy
District
"A change of water right decree recognizes that the priority of the
existing right can be operated for new uses at different locations under
conditions necessary to maintain the appropriation without injury to
other decreed appropriations. Our seminal change of water rights
decision, Strickler, involved a city's purchase of agricultural water
rights for change to municipal uses. In that case, we established the
following points of Colorado water law applicable to changes of water
rights: (1) the water resource is the property of the public; (2) the priority of a use right obtained by irrigating a particular parcel of land is a
property right that can be separated from the land; (3) the owner of
the use right may sell it to another person or governmental entity; and
(4) the courts may decree a change in the point of diversion, type,
time, and/or place of beneficial use, subject to no injury of other water
rights.
In 1919, the General Assembly required adjudication of all water
rights in order to establish their priorities and enforce them. Act of
Apr. 9, ch. 147, sec. 2, 1919 Colo. Sess. Laws 487, 488-89. From the
water right owner's standpoint, the reason for adjudicating the right is
to realize the value and expectations secured through administration
of that right's priority; if not adjudicated, the priority will not be enforced. An express feature of the water law is maximization of as many
decreed uses as possible within Colorado's allocation of interstateapportioned waters."
High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo.Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 718 (Colo.
2005) (case citations omitted).

"The subject of a change decree proceeding is a conditional or an
absolute water right. As shown by Strickler and our subsequent change
cases, the status of the appropriation and the appropriator are subject
to identification, examination, and verification in the change proceeding. Priority of appropriation for beneficial use is the foundation upon
which the exercise of decreed water rights in their original or changed
form depends in Colorado. Under the statutes and the case law, the
appropriator or the appropriator's agent appears for the purpose of
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demonstrating the actual historical beneficial use of an absolute water
right and the appropriation's new actual beneficial uses.
Section 37-92-103(3) (a) (I) and (II) apply in a change in type and
place of use proceeding because the absolute decree for a water right is
reopened by virtue of a change application, and the contemplated result is operation of the absolute appropriation under changed conditions pursuant to a new decree. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (II), C.R.S. (2005).
Accordingly, the change applicant must show a legally vested interest
in the land to be served by the change of use and a specific plan and
intent to use the water for specific purposes. This statutory requirement can be satisfied by a showing that the appropriator of record for
purposes of the change decree is a governmental agency, or a person
who will use the changed water right for his or her own lands or business or has an agreement to provide water to a public entity and/or
private lands or businesses to be served by the changed water right. §
37-92-103(3) (a) (I), C.R.S. (2005)."
Id. at 720 (case citations omitted).

"As our cases repeatedly demonstrate, each water right has a situs
identified by the point of the diversion and the place to which the water is delivered for actual beneficial use. A water right requires both an
appropriator and a place where the appropriation is put to actual
beneficial use. Accordingly, a change decree recognizes a new situs for
the appropriation. In defining '[c]hange of water right' to include 'a
change in the type, place, or time of use' and 'a change in the point of
diversion,' section 37-92-103(5), C.R.S. (2005), and in defining 'appropriation' in section 37-92-103(3) (a)(I) and (1I), the 1969 Act anticipates, as a basic predicate of an application for a decree changing
the place of use, that there is a sufficiently described actual beneficial
use to be made at an identified location or locations under the change
decree."
Id. at 720-21 (footnotes omitted).

ISG, LLC v. Arkansas Valley Ditch Association
"In addition to permanent changes of water rights, state water law
now allows for a variety of means by which the type or place of use decreed to a water appropriator may be changed temporarily. See. e.g., §
37-80.5-104 to -106, C.R.S. (2005) (allowing for creation of water banking programs for leasing, loaning, and exchanging stored water rights
when approved by the state engineer); § 37-83-104, C.R.S.
(2005) (providing for exchange of water between streams or between
reservoirs and ditches when approved by the state engineer); § 37-83105, C.R.S. (2005) (allowing decreed agricultural users to loan all or a
portion of their water right to another agricultural user in the same
stream system for up to 180 days in a year when approved by the division engineer); § 37-92-309, C.R.S. (2005) (providing for temporary
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interruptible water supply agreements between decreed owners and
loaning use of water for up to three out of ten years when approved by
the state engineer)."
ISG, LLC v. Arkansas Valley Ditch Ass'n, 120 P.3d 724, 732 (Colo. 2005).

"Nothing in our decisions in High Plains or this case prevents ISG
shareholders from proceeding under statutes that provide for a variety
of means by which changes can be made on a temporary basis with
approval by the state or division engineer. See, e.g., §§ 37-80.5-104 to 106, 37-83-104, 37-83-105, 37-92-309, C.R.S. (2005).
The statutorily authorized temporary changes of use proceed
through the state or division engineer, and the water court reviews on
appeal questions of injury; the court may review the applicant's initial
estimate of the historic consumptive use of water and the state or division engineer's determination that no injury to other users will result.
See, e.g., § 37-80.5-104.5(1) (c), C.R.S. (2005) (for deposit into stored
water bank, state engineer requires proof of 'legal parameters of the
water for use' and must administer any water withdrawn from a bank
'[w]ithout causing material injury to the owner of or persons entitled
to use water under a vested water right'); § 37-83-105(2) (b), C.R.S.
(2005) (for temporary agricultural loan, applicant must submit 'reasonable estimate of the historic consumptive use of the loaned water
right' and division engineer must ensure that no injury will result from
the loan); § 37-92-309(3) (a) & (b), C.R.S. (2005) (applicant for interruptible water supply agreement must submit report evaluating 'the
historical consumptive use, return flows, and the potential for material
injury to other water rights;' and state engineer approval is dependent
on a determination that the agreement 'will effect only a temporary
change in the historic consumptive use of the water right in a manner
that will not cause injury to other water rights').
Each of the temporary changes requires particular evidence to be
presented to the state or division engineer regarding the timing, duration, purpose, and volumetric measure of the temporary change to be
made and approved.
See, e.g., § 37-80.5-104.5(1)(c), C.R.S.
(2005) (deposit into and withdrawal from stored water banks requires a
definition of the quantities of water involved and the proposed uses); §
37-83-104, C.RS. (2005) (requiring those exchanging reservoir and
ditch rights to build measurement devices so the engineer 'may readily
determine and secure the just and equitable exchange of water'); § 3783-105(2) (b) (I), C.R.S. (2005) (requiring applicant for temporary agricultural loan to supply proof of, among other things, decreed water
right, duration of plan, description of diversions, return flow patterns,
and a reasonable estimate of historic consumptive use); § 37-92309(3) (a), (4) (a), C.R.S. (2005) (requiring applicant for interruptible
water supply agreement to submit written report estimating historical
consumptive use, return flows, potential for injury; state engineer pro-
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vides copies of approval or denial to all parties and the decision can be
reviewed by the water court).
By enacting these statutes, the General Assembly has authorized
short-term changes that do not penalize the appropriator in any subsequent change of water right proceeding. The methodology for calculating historic consumptive use of the water rights over a representative
period of time for a permanent change will not count or discount the
years of authorized temporary use. See An Act Concerning Conditions
under which the Owner of a Water Right can Overcome a Presumption
of Abandonment of the Water Right, S.B. 05-133, 65th Gen. Assem., 1st
Sess. (Colo. 2005) (§ 37-92-103(2), providing that temporary nonuse of
water under state conservation programs, municipal conservation programs, approved land fallowing programs, or water banks does not
indicate an intent to discontinue permanent use).
ISG's argument that it will suffer an 'historic consumptive use penalty' by taking advantage of statutory temporary changes to its water
rights without a change decree is not correct. Unlike the applicant for
a permanent change of water rights in Santa Fe Trail Ranches, any authorized temporary changes to type or place of use made by ISG will
not serve to reduce its historic consumptive use allocation as measured
by operation of the FLCC decreed water rights. Nor will those changes
give rise to a presumption of discontinuance or abandonment. The
legislature clearly intended to promote flexibility in the administration
of water rights, especially in the circumstances of temporarily transferring water from agricultural use to municipal use on a contract basis.
It did not intend to penalize owners of decreed appropriations for
properly taking advantage of these statutes according to their terms."
Id. at 733-34 (case citations and footnotes omitted).

Tatum v. People ex rel. Simpson
"Section 37-84-112(1) requires the owner of an irrigation ditch to
install and maintain at the point of intake a suitable and proper
headgate to control the water at all ordinary stages. The statute provides in relevant part:
The owners of any irrigation ditch ... taking water from any stream,

shall erect where necessary and maintain in good repair, at the point of
intake of such ditch ..., a suitable and proper headgate of height and

strength and with embankments sufficient to control the water at all
ordinary stages ....

§ 37-84-112(1). The statute also requires an owner to install and
maintain a suitable and proper measuring flume and wastegate in connection with the ditch. Id.
A headgate must be sufficient to control the waters entering a
ditch. It is the duty of every person taking water from an irrigation
ditch, upon finding that he is receiving more water from the ditch

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

through his headgate or any other means whatsoever, to take immediate steps to prevent more water from entering the ditch than that to
which he is entitled." See § 37-84-125, C.R.S. (2005).
Tatum v. People ex reL Simpson, 122 P.3d 997, 998 (Colo. 2005) (case citations omitted).

"The record clearly indicates that although a headgate was present
at the point of diversion, it nonetheless failed to serve its function to
control the inflow of water at all ordinary stages. Given this evidence,
the record amply supports the water court's conclusion that Tatum was
in violation of section 37-84-112(1)."
Id. at 999.

Colorado Water Conservation Board v. City of Central
"We conclude the legislature instead envisioned the primary value
of an instream flow right to derive from a basic tenet of water law: its
ability to preserve the stream conditions existing at the time of its appropriation. To effectuate this goal, this court has rejected the argument that subsequent junior appropriators may adjudicate rights superior to those instream flow water rights decreed to the Board.
In rejecting this contention, we emphasized that the purpose of the legislation was to ensure that streams could not be dried up by subsequent
upstream appropriators:
"The legislative intent is quite clear that these appropriations are to
protect and preserve the natural habitat and the decrees confirming
them award priorities [that] are superior to the rights of those who
may later appropriate. Otherwise, upstream appropriations could later
be made, the streams dried up, and the whole purpose of the legislation destroyed."
In short, although a junior instream flow cannot preserve minimum streamflows by taking water from existing uses, it can protect flow
from subsequent appropriators: an instream flow may protect flow remaining in the stream after decreed senior rights are satisfied.
We now further conclude that, to effectuate the General Assembly's purpose of preserving the environment through minimum
streamflows, the Board is entitled to necessary protective terms and
conditions in a decree approving an augmentation plan. Water right
proceedings are typically concerned with either appropriating a new
water right or adapting an existing water right to a new use. Yet many
Colorado basins are fully appropriated or overappropriated and it is
infeasible to obtain a reliable supply of water based on new appropriations. As a result, the majority of water right adjudications - and,
therefore, the biggest threat to maintaining minimum flows - involve
adapting old water rights to new water requirements through changes
and plans for augmentation, including exchanges. Absent an ability to
assert injury against a senior water right adapting to a new or enlarged
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use, instream flows could be eliminated by a change of water right or
plan for augmentation.
It has long been the rule that a senior water right adapting to a new
or enlarged use through a change of water right proceeding may do so
only if it does not injure senior or junior users. This noninjury requirement derives from the longstanding tenet of water law that ajunior appropriator is entitled to expect that stream conditions existing at
the time of appropriation will be maintained. Under the noninjury
rule, an application for a change of water right is always subject to the
limitation that such change not injure the rights of junior appropriators: 'ajunior appropriator may successfully resist all proposed changes
in points of diversion and use of water from that source which in any
way materially injures or adversely affects their rights.' As a result, the
right to change a water right is limited in quantity by historical use at
the original decreed point of diversion. 'Historical use' as a limitation
on the right to change a water right applies the principle that junior
appropriators have vested rights in the continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the time of their respective appropriations.
Subsections 37-92-305(3) and (4) codify this noninjury standard for a
change of water right: '[b]efore the water court may grant an application for a change of water rights, the applicant must demonstrate that
the proposed change will not injuriously affect the vested rights of
other water users.'
Thus, a junior instream flow right may resist all proposed changes
in time, place, or use of water from a source which in any way materially injures or adversely affects the decreed minimum flow in the absence of adequate protective conditions in the change of water right or
augmentation decree.
We hold the noninjury requirement applicable to changes of water
rights also applies to augmentation plans affecting instream flow rights.
We likewise hold that an adjudicated instream flow right entitles its
holder to maintain the stream conditions existing at the time of its appropriation and to resist proposed developments through changes of
water rights or augmentation plans, regardless of the means, that in
any way materially injure instream flow rights.
This rule best effectuates the clear legislative intent to protect and
preserve the natural habitat through minimum streamflows. In the
absence of this rule, senior diverters could simultaneously increase the
supply of water yet divert around or from an existing instream flow
right by a water project exchange or other means. Were this permitted, the prohibited result we noted in Colorado River Water Conservation District would occur: upstream adaptations could later be made,
the streams dried up, and the whole purpose of the legislation destroyed. This, the legislature did not intend. To the contrary, the
General Assembly identified instream flows as the mechanism to effect
a basic tenet of Colorado water law: 'to correlate the activities of man-
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kind with some reasonable preservation of the natural environment.' §
37-92-102 (3), C.R.S. (2005)."
Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424, 439-40 (Colo. 2005)
(case and article citations omitted).

Public Service Company of Colorado v. Meadow Island Ditch Company No. 2
"Colorado law distinguishes between an adjudicated water right
and a contractual entitlement to make use of water. The value of an
adjudicated water right is such that, absent consent, only the owner of
the decreed water right may change it. In this regard, we have emphasized that '[a] contrary view would severely undermine the rights and
obligations acquired by persons granted decrees as the result of water
adjudication proceedings.'
In contrast, the rights represented by contract are not water rights
with a statutory right to change the use. Indeed, the authority to obtain water rights under contract 'does not include the ability to obtain
a change in a water right owned by another person or entity absent a
Instead, '[a]
grant of such authority . .. by such person or entity.'
contract user is, in effect, a consumer whose rights are determined by
the terms of that contract.'
Thus, contractually-delivered water rights are 'far different' than a
water right acquired by original appropriation, diversion, and application to beneficial use. Hence, we interpret contractual grants to use a
decreed water right narrowly to avoid depriving a decreed rights
holder of property that it did not specifically grant for use."
Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Meadow Island Ditch Co. No. 2, 132 P.3d 333, 340-41
(2006).

"Accordingly, we decline to interpret the Agreements' silence as a
bargain for a change of use of water right, one of the most important
sticks in the bundle constituting a water right. A contrary conclusion
'would severely undermine the rights and obligations acquired [under
Meadow Island's decrees] as a result of water adjudication proceedings.' Allowing a change of use for the excess water without the consent of Meadow Island would enlarge PSCo's consumer benefits beyond those for which it contracted, and 'would require the court to
make a new and different contract for the parties, which it cannot do."'
Id. at 342 (case citations omitted).

Vaughn v. People ex rel. Simpson

"Upon non-compliance with an order mandating partial or total
discontinuance of any diversion, see § 37-92-502(1), (2), C.R.S. (2005),
section 37-92-503, C.R.S. (2005), imposes a duty on the state and division engineers to apply for an injunction enjoining the person to
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whom the order was directed from further violations, and it makes
clear an intent that contempt sanctions punish any violation of such an
injunction. § 37-92-503(1),(4). In addition, subsection (6) mandates
civil penalties for a range of conduct involving ground water and well
operation. In particular, subsection (6) (a) provides that:
'Any person who diverts ground water contrary to a valid order of the
state engineer or division engineer issued pursuant to section 37-92502, in violation of a plan approved pursuant to rules and regulations
adopted by the state engineer, or otherwise in violation of rules and
regulations adopted by the state engineer to regulate or measure diversions of ground water shall forfeit and pay a sum not to exceed five
hundred dollars for each day such violation continues.'"
Vaughn v. People ex rel. Simpson, 135 P.3d 721, 723 (Colo. 2006).
"In particular, the court heard evidence that Vaughn had authorized family members to irrigate and grow an alfalfa crop in previous
years, up to and including 2002, and that the well was decreed and
used for that purpose. Despite the engineer's order, the same fields
produced another alfalfa crop in the 2003 season, with which Vaughn
personally assisted. In addition, the more than six million gallons of
water diverted through the well could not have been removed by fewer
than 1100 trips of a tanker truck and would have filled the nearby detention pond to overflowing about 18 times, no signs of which were
noticed by the water commissioner.
These circumstances, in conjunction with the court's determination based on independent evidence that Vaughn had actual knowledge of both the order and the continued use of his well, easily supported the court's inference that Vaughn knew what was being done
with his water and yet did nothing to stop it. Unless the court believed
Vaughn's unsubstantiated testimony of ignorance and his suggestion of
intruders, which the court openly rejected as incredible, virtually the
only logical inference to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence
before it was that Vaughn's well continued to be used for the irrigation
of his fields, with either his authorization or his actual participation, or
both.
Because a ground water rights owner or user whose well is pumped
with his authorization is a "person who diverts ground water" within
the meaning of section 37-92-503(6) (a), and because the People presented sufficient evidence to support the water court's finding that
Vaughn diverted ground water contrary to the division engineer's order, the judgment of the water court is affirmed."
Id. at 725.
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Harmony Ditch Company v. Ground Water Management Subdistrict of
the Central Colorado Water Conservancy District
"[T]he water court entered a decree approving the plan for augmentation, which provides, in pertinent part: 'Pursuant to § 37-92305(8), C.R.S., the State Engineer shall curtail all out-of-priority diversions, the depletions from which are not so replaced as to prevent injury to vested water rights.'
The mandate of section 37-92-305(8) - that decrees approving
plans for augmentation impose a duty of curtailment, under certain
circumstances, on the state engineer - is entirely a creature of statute,
and the statute itself specifies what the decree must demand of the
state engineer. By imposing a duty of curtailment on the state engineer in terms of the precise formula required by statute, the water
court has complied with the mandate of the statute. Should a party
suffer injury as a result of the state engineer's attempt to comply with
his obligation, avenues exist to challenge the scope of his authority, as
intended by the legislature and decreed by the water court, in the context of the particular circumstances."
Harmony Ditch Co. v. Ground Water Mgmt. Subdist. of the Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 136 P.3d 899, 901-2 (Colo. 2006).

McNichols v. Elk Dance Colorado
"The doctrine of issue preclusion provides that a court's final decision on an issue actually litigated and decided in a previous suit is conclusive of that issue in a subsequent suit between the same parties or
their privies, and may not be relitigated. Issue preclusion is an equitable doctrine intended to 'relieve parties of multiple lawsuits, conserve
judicial resources, and promote reliance on the judicial system by preIn Colorado, the doctrine of issue
venting inconsistent decisions.'
preclusion bars relitigation of an issue when:
(1) The issue precluded is identical to an issue actually litigated and
necessarily adjudicated in the prior proceeding;
(2) The party against whom estoppel was sought was a party to or was
in privity with a party to the prior proceeding;
(3) There was a final judgment on the merits in the prior proceeding;
and
(4) The party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior proceeding.
McNichols v. Elk Dance Colo., 139 P.3d 660, 667 (Colo. 2006) (case citations omitted).
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"In the present case, Appellants did not challenge the jurisdiction of
the Summit County District Court at trial or on direct appeal of the
Summit County Judgment. Instead, Appellants seek to defeat the doctrine of issue preclusion and re-litigate the issue of ownership of the
disputed water rights in an entirely new and only tangentially related
proceeding, by arguing that the Summit County Judgment is void for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. If Appellants could collaterally attack the jurisdiction of the Summit County District Court at any time,
even years after that court's final decision, it would undermine the finality of the judgment and could lead to conflicting factual determinations on the issue of ownership of the disputed water. Therefore, as in
O'Neill, we hold that the doctrine of issue preclusion bars Appellants
from re-litigating the subject matter jurisdiction of the Summit County
District Court."
Id at 671.

Natural Energy Resources Company v. Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy District
"The purpose of the 'can and will' statute is to subject conditional
rights 'to continued scrutiny to prevent the hoarding of priorities to
the detriment of those seeking to apply the state's water beneficially.'
The General Assembly intended 'to reduce speculation associated with
conditional decrees and to increase the certainty of the administration
of water rights in Colorado.' Accordingly, the 'substantial probability'
standard is employed to curb indefinite speculation, not to protect a
conditional water right where only the thinnest possibility remains that
the project can and will be completed."
Natural Energy Res. Co. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 142 P.3d
1265, 1277 (Colo. 2006).

"Here, the courts have examined the relevant facts and circumstances and determined that it is 'not reasonable to expect that the
Applicant can ever obtain consent of the United States to so materially
alter the use of the Taylor Park Reservoir,' that NECO's proposed use
of the Taylor Park Reservoir 'would disrupt decreed rights and would
require a major operational change of the reservoir,' and that such use
is altogether 'inimical' to its present use. Implicit within these findings
is the determination that there are no 'other facts and circumstances'
which show NECO's diligence in effectuating the conditional Decree."
Id. at 1278.

"Throughout all of the litigation concerning the Decree, NECO
and NECO's predecessor in interest, Arapahoe, have had an interest in
demonstrating the feasibility of the Union Park Project in order to satisfy the 'can and will' requirement underlying the conditional water
right awarded in the 1982 Decree. The feasibility of the project de-
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pended, in part, upon the proposed use of Taylor Park Reservoir as a
forebay and afterbay and the installation and use of a pumping station
at Taylor Park Reservoir. It is plain from the history of the case that
NECO has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the feasibility of
the proposed Union Park Project and by inclusion, the feasibility of the
proposals related to Taylor Park Reservoir."
Id at 1282-83.

Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Commission (No. 05SA253, November 6, 2006)
"[W]e have previously noted that designated ground water 'includes water not tributary to any stream, and other water not available
for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights.' We have also observed
that designated ground water falls into a category of ground water not
part of the natural stream, and any use of this water has a 'de minimus
[sic] effect on any surface stream.' These statements stand for the rule
that designated ground water cannot, as a matter of law, impact surface
flows by greater than a de minimis amount.
Furthermore, the Management Act defines "designated ground water basin" as "that area established by the ground water commission in
accordance with section 37-90-106," the definition of designated
ground water. § 37-90-103(7). Reading these definitions and our prior
case law together leads to the conclusion that all ground water contained within the geographic boundaries of a designated basin is to be
considered designated ground water - i.e., ground water that has no
more than a de minimis impact on any surface stream."
"Section 37-90-106(1) (a) of the Management Act states that the
Commission 'shall, from time to time as adequate factual data becomes
available, determine designated ground water basins and subdivisions
thereof by geographic description and, as future conditions require
and factual data justify, shall alter the boundaries or description
thereof.' § 37-90-106(1) (a) (emphasis added). Notably, this provision
was originally part of the Management Act. § 148-18-5, 9 C.R.S. (1963
& Perm. Cum. Supp. 1965). As this provision makes clear, the General
Assembly anticipated that a designated ground water basin could include ground water that does not properly fall within the definition of
designated ground water. When future conditions and factual data
reveal this to be the case, the Management Act requires that the Commission redraw the boundaries of the designated basin. § 37-90106(1) (a) ('shall alter the boundaries or description thereof") (emphasis added).
Based upon section 37-90-106(1) (a), we hold that the Commission
has jurisdiction over surface water rights to the extent that a holder of
those rights seeks changes to a designated basin's boundaries. The
surface right holder, in order to receive relief, must prove that the

Issue 2

ARTICLE UPDATE

pumping of then-designated ground water has more than a de minimis
impact on their surface water rights and is causing injury to those
rights. Upon such a showing, the Management Act requires the Commission redraw the boundaries of the designated basin to exclude the
surface water rights and those wells pumping designated ground water
that has been proven to fall more properly within the definition of
ground water subject to the 1969 Act. After the boundaries are redrawn, the State Engineer and the water courts regain jurisdiction and
can administer the relative water rights under the 1969 Act. Of course,
when an appropriator initiates a proceeding before the Commission
claiming ground water has been improperly designated and seeking
changes to the boundaries of the basin, the procedural requirements
of section 37-90-106 must be followed."
"[A] surface water right holder, such as the Gallegos Family, claiming injury caused by pumping within a designated ground water basin
has the burden of proving that the ground water being pumped is hydrologically connected and causing injury to the surface water rights at
issue. This is but another way of saying that the surface water right
holder must prove the ground water alleged to cause injury is not designated ground water."
Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Dist., 147 P.3d 20, 28-9 (Colo. 2006).

Central Colorado Water Conservancy District v. City of Greeley
(Nos. 05SA120 and 05SA121, November 6, 2006)
"We agree with the water court's determination that the 1882 Decree was for an absolute water right. The water court based its determination on Mr. Jones's testimony that he irrigated all of his land that
needed irrigation. Nothing in either the language of the 1882 Decree
or Mr. Jones's testimony suggests that he intended to include a condition for irrigating additional acres in the future. The nature of Mr.
Jones's request confirms that the 1882 Decree was for an absolute appropriation that created a vested property right that 'entitles the subsequent operation of that right through its decreed point of diversion
in a specified amount.'
Having established that the 1882 Decree was an absolute appropriation, the water court was charged with determining the 'specified
amount' of that appropriation. Absolute water rights 'are limited to an
amount sufficient for the purpose for which the appropriation was
made, even though such limitation may be less than the decreed rate
of diversion.' Thus 'the right to change a ... type, place or time of
For change puruse, is limited by the appropriation's historic use.'
poses, the lawful historic use of an absolute decree is measured over a
representative period of time for the appropriation made. When usage is decreed for irrigation purposes, the change decree is limited to
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both the express volume of water utilized and the specific acreage irrigated.
These black-letter principles of Colorado water law lead us to the
same conclusion reached by the water court: a water right decreed for
irrigation purposes cannot lawfully be enlarged beyond the amount of
water necessary to irrigate the lands for which the appropriation was
made."
"Thus, while it is true that over 80 years have passed since Mr. Jones
first began to irrigate lands beyond the 344 acres subject to the decree,
we agree with the water court's rejection of Central's laches defense.
Central could not meet the heightened burden for establishing its laches defense against the Opposers, principally because it was unable to
show that the Opposers acted deceitfully or fraudulently in waiting to
challenge Central's usage."
"In 1992, the water court decreed in a separate action that Central's ownership of 62 shares in the Jones Ditch Company (i.e., the
shares that are not at issue in this case) entitled Central to 401.4 acre
feet per year of consumptive use from the Jones Ditch. Thus Central
conceivably has been awarded 40 more acre feet per year than it is entitled to receive as a shareholder in the Jones Ditch Company, apart
from the additional 66.65 acre-feet awarded to Central by the water
court in this case.
Central persuaded the water court to avoid a ditch-wide analysis of
the Jones Ditch Water Right by asserting the doctrine of claim preclusion. Central concedes that a ditch-wide analysis would limit its share
of the Jones Ditch Water Right to approximately 361 acre feet, and
that-under such an analysis-it already has received an overdraft of consumptive use as a result of the 1992 Decree. Because a ditch-wide
analysis, in Central's view, would hopelessly conflict with the 1992 Decree, and because the time for challenging the 1992 Decree has long
since passed, Central argued below and in this appeal that claim preclusion bars a ditch-wide adjudication of the Jones Ditch Water Right
in this case.
While we understand why the water court was persuaded by Central's reasoning, we ultimately are not convinced. In our view, claim
preclusion is not implicated because the Opposers are not requesting a
reduction or any other reconsideration of the 401.4 acre feet of consumptive use awarded to Central in 1992. Without question, '[t]he
application of [claim preclusion] in appropriate circumstances is important to the stability and reliability of Colorado water rights.' For
this reason, the Opposers cannot challenge Central's award of 401.4
acre feet per year of water from the Jones Ditch, since the time for contesting the 1992 Decree has long since passed. However, the Opposers
in this case are not challenging the amount of consumptive use
awarded in the 1992 Decree, and consequently, claim preclusion is
inapplicable."
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"The salient issue raised by the applications filed below is whether
Central is entitled to any additional consumptive use credit for its remaining shares that were not adjudicated in 1992. As to this issue,
Colorado law generally teaches that Central only is entitled to water
from the Jones Ditch in proportion to its ownership of shares in the
Jones Ditch Company. Ditch-wide analyses are preferable for many
reasons, among them that they prevent expensive relitigation of consumptive use. In this case, the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion
are not proper bases for avoiding a ditch-wide analysis of the Jones
Ditch Water Right for purposes of ruling on Central's applications."
Central Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. City of Greeley, 147 P.3d 9, 14, 17-19 (Colo.
2006).

Cherokee Metropolitan District v. Harold D. Simpson, Colorado State
Engineer (No. 06SA95 November 27, 2006)
"Examining the language of the stipulated decree provision in light
of the extrinsic evidence, the water court concluded that Wells No. 1-8
may be used to supply water outside of the Designated Basin only for
emergency and backup purposes when its Sweetwater Wells are unable
to produce a sufficient supply of water to meet the commitments that
existed at the time the parties entered into this stipulation. We agree.
Any scenario that would place Wells No. 1-8 into permanent operation as a primary supply for service areas outside of the Designated
Basin would undermine the principal anti-export language and purpose of the stipulated decree provision, which dedicates those wells for
use only within the Designated Basin, except for short-term emergency
and backup situations. Cherokee's version of the agreement would
deprive the Management District of the benefit of the bargain by reversing the intended operation of the provision: anti-export would be
the short-term feature of the provision and permanent export the longterm feature as Cherokee water demand grows outside of the Designated Basin."
"Had the parties intended to maintain Cherokee's ability to utilize
Wells No. 1-8 as a primary supply outside of the Designated Basin in
the event the Sweetwater Wells did not turn out to be capable of producing the 6,285 acre feet per year of primary water supply anticipated
from them in the diligence decree, they could have said so. The circumstances surrounding the 1999 agreement demonstrate that the
parties were addressing the then-current water demands of Cherokee.
In doing so, they devised a way to allow short-term exports of water
from Wells No. 1-8 to meet those commitments should the Sweetwater
Wells experience a disruption in service.
As part of the agreement, Cherokee pledged that development of
the Sweetwater Wells to their full extent and acquisition of water from
other sources would supply Cherokee's future growth outside of the
Designated Basin. Whereas, at the time of the 1999 stipulation Cimar-
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ron Hills was the primary area served outside of the Designated Basin,
Cherokee has since added other areas of service. The addition of these
other areas has caused Cherokee to advance the position that Wells
No. 1-8 can be used for a primary supply of water outside of the Designated Basin.
The 1999 stipulation reflects no language or intent showing that
the principal anti-export feature of the agreement relating to Wells No.
1-8 would become non-operational in the event of future Cherokee
development. In reaching their 1999 agreement, Cherokee and the
Management District overcame polar opposite positions. Cherokee
argued that the Management District could place no export restrictions on any of its groundwater supply taken from the Designated Basin; the Management District contended that it had authority to do so.
Regardless of who had the better of the argument, a party may stipulate away valuable rights provided it is not in violation of public policy."
(case citations omitted).

THE REGULATION OF WETLANDS ADJACENT TO
NON-NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED
STATES: RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES
I. Introduction..........................................................................................
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Rapanos v. United States, the United States Supreme Court delivered a 4-1-4 split decision that created two distinct alternatives for determination of the United States Army Corps of Engineers' ("Corps")
jurisdiction over wetlands "neighboring" non-navigable waters, or
tributaries of traditional "navigable waters."' Rapanos was a consolidated action of two cases from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:
United States v. Rapanos and Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.' In both cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held in favor of Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to
"tributaries" of navigable waters.3 In the consolidated action, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded both Circuit decisions for consideration of the facts of each case in light of the Court's alternative descriptions of the Corps' jurisdiction.4
As the Justices who filed opinions in Rapanos pointed out, the difficulty in specifying the extent of the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands is

1. Rapanos v. United States (Rapanos I1), 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006). "Neighboring" is
a qualifier used to describe the term "adjacent" in the Corps regulations. 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(c).
2. Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Rapanos (Rapanos 1), 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004).
3. The courts in both these cases used the word "tributaries" to describe the drains
and streams adjacent to the wetlands at issue. Carabell,391 F.3d at 708-09; Rapanos I,
376 F.3d at 642.
4. Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct. at 2235.
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largely due to the language of the Clean Water Act ("CWA").5 The
CWA uses the words "navigable waters" to designate those watercourses
that Congress sought to protect with the CWA. The definition of
"navigable waters" engenders confusion and litigation and is at the
heart of the dispute in Rapanos. The CWA's stated purpose is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters.6 In order to accomplish that objective, section
404 of the CWA requires a permit from the Corps for the "discharge of
dredged or fill material" into the Nation's "navigable waters."7 Consequently, a developer wishing to fill wetlands may have to expend significant time and resources in obtaining the required permits.8 Aside
from the resource expenditures, though, the real dilemma for developers is determining which watercourses on their land are regulated
waters.9 The Corps regulates wetlands to the extent those wetlands
may be defined as "navigable waters." Consequently, the critical questions the Court faced in Rapanos were the permissible definition of
"navigable waters," and the extent wetlands must be related to those
waters to become subject to the Corps' jurisdiction.
Rapanos was the third case in which the Supreme Court addressed
the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA. In the first action, a unanimous Court granted the Corps jurisdiction over wetlands directly adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, or waters that fit the traditional definition of navigability.'" In the second case, a more divided Court (5-4
majority) refused to grant the Corps jurisdiction over "isolated ponds"
far from any navigable water." In Rapanos, the Court faced the question of the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands with a more attenuated
connection to navigable waters than those directly adjacent to navigable waters, but with a less attenuated connection than remote ponds
and swamps. Rapanos offered the Court the perfect opportunity to
5. See Steve Louthan, US. Supreme Court Sharply Split over Wetlands, URBAN LAND,
Jan. 2007, at 126 [hereinafter Louthan, Court Sharply Split].
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).

7.

Id. § 1344(a).

8.

See generally Rapanos II; Less costly and time consuming nationwide or regional

permits are available: "[g] eneral permits are often issued by USACE for categories of
activities that are similar in nature and would have only minimal individual or cumulative adverse environmental effects. General permits can be issued on a nationwide
("nationwide permit") or regional ("regional general permit") basis." UNITED STATES
ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF EPA AUTHORITIES FOR NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGERS
DEVELOPING AQUATIC INVASIvE SPECIES RAPID RESPONSE AND MANAGEMENT PLANS: CWA
SECTION 404-PERMITS TO DISCHARGE DREDGED OR FILL MATERIAL, http://www.epa.gov/

owow/invasive species/invasives management/cwa404.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2007).
9. Louthan, Court Sharply Split, supra note 5, at 126.
10. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside Bayview II), 474 U.S.

121,133 (1985).
11. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 171-72 (2001).
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clarify the exact extent of Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands.'" However,
the Court's dual holdings in Rapanos only obscured the scope of the
Corps' regulatory authority behind two competing tests that are neither completely loyal to the language of the CWA, nor directly track
Court precedent under the CWA.
U. PRE-RAPANOS
The Court's first attempt at interpreting the Corps' jurisdiction
under the CWA took place in 1985, thirteen years after the Act's enactment and over a decade after the Corps promulgated regulations
defining the scope of its jurisdiction." In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the parties sought a judicial determination of whether
an eighty-acre wetland owned by Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. was an
"adjacent wetland" within the meaning of the CWA and therefore subject to the Corps' jurisdiction." The disputed wetland abutted Lake St.
Clair, a traditionally-navigable lake and, although no continuous surface hydrological connection existed between the wetland and lake,
the wetland was susceptible to periodic inundation during times of
high lake levels.'" Faced with drawing a line where no clear line existed, the Court-in a unanimous decision-chose to give deference to
the Corps' regulations. The Court held that, although no continuous
surface hydrological connection actually existed between the wetland
and the traditionally navigable waterway, the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over the Riverside Bayview wetland was nonetheless in harmony
with the language, policies, and history of the CWA. 6
Subsequent to the Riverside Bayview holding, the Court's unanimous endorsement of the regulations promulgated by the Corps lead
to the Corps adopting increasingly broad interpretations of its own
regulations under the CWA.'7 "For example, in 1986, to 'clarify' the
reach of its jurisdiction, the Corps announced the so-called 'Migratory
Bird Rule,' which purported to extend its jurisdiction to any intrastate
waters '[w]hich are or would be used as habitat' by migratory birds."'8
In fact, it was the adoption of the Migratory Bird Rule which would
lead to the Court's second opinion regarding the Corps' jurisdiction

12.

ChanningJ. Martin, Supreme Court Decides Clean Water Act Cases, 38

SEC. OF THE ENV'T, ENERGY,

& RES.

NEWSLETTER 1, 1

TRENDS:

ABA

(2006).

13. Riverside Bayview 11,474 U.S. at 123-24 & n. 1.
14. Id. at 124-25.
15. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside Bayview 1), 729 F.2d
391, 393-94 (6th Cir. 1984).
16. Riverside Bayview 11, 474 U.S. at 465; see also Steve Louthan, FederalJurisdiction
Under the Clean Water Act After Rapanos, 35 COLO. LAw. 47, 48 (Dec. 2006) [hereinafter
Louthan, FederalJurisdiction].
17. Rapanos II, 126 S.Ct. at 2216.
18. Id. at 2216-17.
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under the CWA in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers (" SWANCC') . "
In SWANCC, a consortium of municipalities sought to convert an
abandoned sand and gravel pit into a disposal site for nonhazardous
solid waste."0 Since its abandonment, a number of permanent and seasonal ponds had formed, thereby providing a habitat to migratory
birds." Because of its isolated location, the proposed site did not have
any hydrological connection with, nor was it adjacent to any traditionally navigable waterway and therefore lacked a significant nexus to a
navigable waterway.'
In its ruling, apparently becoming somewhat
disenchanted with the Corps' unbridled exercise of jurisdiction over
non-navigable waterways, the Court, in a 5-4 majority decision, concluded the Corps had overstepped its jurisdictional authority.23 In so
doing, the Court effectively applied the breaks to what had previously
been a carte blanche approach by Corps in interpreting its own jurisdiction under the CWA.

m. THE RAPANOS PLURALITY
In Rapanos, the Court faced a new challenge when confronted with
wetlands that did not match the geographical characteristics found in
either Riverside Bayview or SWANCC. As a result, the distinct geographic nature of the disputed wetlands in Rapanos proved to be even
more problematic for the Court to make a statutory interpretation
than its predecessors in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC. In the plurality
decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court employed a piece-meal
approach to interpret an inherently ambiguous statute. Although Justice Scalia dedicated a considerable amount of his opinion refuting the
reasoning championed by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion
and by Justice Stevens in the dissenting opinion, he established a twoprong test to determine if a wetland similarly situated to the Rapanos
and Carbell sites was in fact a wetland covered by the CWA.24 The test
requires two findings:
First, that the adjacent channel contains a "wate[r] of the United
States," (i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 164 (2001).
Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 174.
RapanosII, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2226 (2006).
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continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to
determine where the "water" ends and the "wetland" begins.25
The first prong of the Scalia Test, requiring that the adjacent
channel contain "waters of the United States," draws its authority, in
part, from the ordinary parlance of the word "waters" as defined by
Webster's New International Dictionary." Because the ordinary usage
of the word "waters" connotes relatively permanent standing or flowing
bodies of water, wetlands that are adjacent to waterways that contain
only ephemeral flows necessarily fail to qualify a wetland as a covered
water under the CWA.27
Justice Scalia also cited the statutory language of the CWA in support of his position. 8 By virtue of the Act distinguishing between
"point sources" and "navigable waters," in its own language, the Act
excludes channels and conduits that typically carry intermittent flows
of water as "waters of the United States."' Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, if a channel adjacent to a wetland qualifies as a "point
source" as defined by the CWA, it will typically not occupy the dual role
of a navigable water.'
The second prong of the Scalia Test, requiring that the wetland has
a continuous surface connection with a relatively permanent standing
or flowing body of water, is rooted in a commingling of the Court's
reasoning found in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC.2 While recognizing
that not all wetlands implicate the boundary-drawing problem found in
Riverside Bayview, Justice Scalia noted that the significant-nexus test
espoused by the Court in SWANCC does not apply in situations where a
wetland is only intermittently connected to a covered water." By making this distinction, Justice Scalia allowed himself the opportunity to
embrace a more easily discernable requirement-namely that there is a
continuous surface connection with the covered water.
TV. JUSTICE ROBERTS' CONCURRENCE
Justice Roberts, in his concurring opinion, took the opportunity to
point out that the Corps' defeat in Rapanos could easily have been
avoided had the Corps provided "guidance meriting deference" by
promulgating rules that fit within the Court's ruling in SWANCC' In25.

Id. at 2227.

26.
27.
28.

Id. at 2220-21.
Id. at 2222.
Id. at 2222-23.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2226.
Id.

33.
34.

Id. at 2226-27.
Id. at 2236 (Roberts,J., concurring).
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stead, the Corps' choice to "adhere to its essentially boundless view of
the scope of its power" caused a divided court to adopt a requirement
that lower courts decide jurisdictional questions arising under the
CWA "on a case-by-case basis.""

V. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy filed a concurrence in the plurality's holding to
vacate and remand the decisions in the consolidated cases for "further
fact-finding," but could not agree with either the plurality's or the dissent's definitions of the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands.' Justice
Kennedy characterized the plurality's requirements for jurisdiction
over wetlands as limitations "without support in the language and purposes of the Act. .

. .""

He claimed the plurality's first requirement

"makes little practical sense in a statute concerned with downstream
water quality ...,"' and described the plurality's second requirement as
lacking in appropriate deference to the Corps ability to distinguish
wetlands from navigable waters. 9 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy
elected not to side with the dissent because the dissent offered to grant
the Corps too much deference.' He feared that the Chevron deference
the dissent offered the Corps would allow the Corps jurisdiction over
waters too far removed from navigable waters."
Many consider Justice Kennedy's categorization of the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands the controlling holding from Rapanos." The "basic rules of legal interpretation long accepted by the federal judiciary"
give precedence to Justice Kennedy's conclusion because it concurs
with the plurality's holding to deny jurisdiction to the Corps on the
narrowest grounds.' Justice Kennedy commended the Sixth Circuit
for "recognizing" the "significant nexus" test formulated in SWANCC as
the appropriate test for determining if wetlands constitute navigable
waters." However, Justice Kennedy concurred with the decision to vacate and remand because the Sixth Circuit failed to "consider all the
factors necessary to determine that the lands in question had, or did
not have, the requisite nexus.""
35.

Id.

36.
37.

Id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Martin, supra note 12, at 14.
RapanosII, 126 S. Ct. at 2242 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

38.
39.
40.

Id. at 2242.
Id. at 2244-45.
Idat 2249.
Id, see generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

41.
837 (1984).
42. Marks v. United States, 430 US 188, 193 (1997); United States v. Gerke, 464
F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006); Louthan, Court Sharply Split, supranote 5, at 127.
43. Louthan, Court Sharply Split, supra note 5, at 127.
44. Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct at 2250 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

45.

Id at 2236.
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Justice Kennedy crafted a two-part test for determination of the
Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands."6 The first part of his test would address wetlands directly adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, while the
second part would deal with wetlands neighboring non-navigable waters, or drains and tributaries like those at issue in the consolidated
cases. 47
In a "straightforward affirmation" of Riverside Bayview, and in deference to the Corps' regulations, Justice Kennedy based the first prong
of his test on "adjacency."48 The first part of Justice Kennedy's test is
satisfied and jurisdiction granted to the Corps over wetlands directly
adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, as one commentator has noted,
"because there is a reasonable inference that there is an ecological
connection between the wetland and the navigable waterway. 49 Justice
Kennedy asserted that, insome instances, a wetland adjacent to a navigable-in-fact water may be so connected or proximally situated to the
navigable water that the "Corps may deem the wetland a 'navigable
water' under the Act."' The Corps, then, "may rely on adjacency to
establish its jurisdiction" over wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact
waters." The first part of Justice Kennedy's test enables ready determinations of the Corps jurisdiction over waters or wetlands directly adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters. However, the wetlands at issue in the
consolidated cases before the Court did not abut waters traditionally
considered navigable. The wetlands at issue in the consolidated cases
bordered drains, streams, or other tributaries to non-navigable waters.
The second part of Justice Kennedy's test addressed the more
complicated task of determining jurisdiction over waters or wetlands
that are adjacent to or neighbor non-navigable tributaries of navigable
waterways." He based the second part of his test on the "significant
nexus" model introduced in SWANCC.53 Also, in accordance with the
text, structure, and purpose of the Act, Justice Kennedy concluded that
jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to non-navigable waters must be
granted to the Corps where "the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters
more readily understood as 'navigable."'54
Justice Kennedy did not provide any specific criteria for what constitutes a "significant nexus," but rejected jurisdiction where "wetlands
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Steve Louthan, FederalJurisdiction,supranote 16, at 49.
Rapanos II, 126 S.Ct. at 2246-48 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See 33 CFR § 328.3 (a) (7); Louthan, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 16, at 49.
Louthan, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 16, at 49.
Rapanos II, 126 S.Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2249.

52.
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54.
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effects on water quality are speculative or insubstantial."" Moreover,
he labeled the Corps' existing regulatory standard for tributaries too
broad to be determinative.' Justice Kennedy did not specify particular
actions that unquestionably affect the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters," but he negated the Corps' ability
to continue to rely on a hydrological connection to establish jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to non-navigable waters. 7 He stated
"[g] iven the role wetlands play in pollutant filtering, flood control, and
runoff storage, it may well be the absence of hydrologic connection...
that shows the wetlands' significance for the aquatic system. ' By refining and relying on the "significant nexus" test, Justice Kennedy also
supplanted the Ordinary High Water Mark ("OHWM") test the Corps
previously relied upon to establish jurisdiction over tributaries to navigable waters. 9
Legal scholars have argued that Justice Kennedy's nexus test suggests that the Corps evaluate the "wetland's overall role in the aquatic
system and provide a significant measure concerning how the action
will affect downstream water quality."'
What is clear to scholars,
though, is that Justice Kennedy's somewhat obscure test forces the
Corps to "establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis when it
seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to nonnavigable tributaries."6 A case-by-case analysis will be necessary at least until Congress
or the Corps provides a more concrete rule that satisfies the nexus requirements."
VI. THE DISSENT
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg
joined, dissented from both the plurality's decision and Justice Kennedy's concurrence.' Justice Breyer filed a separate dissent.' Justice
Stevens claimed the "plurality disregard [ed] the nature of the congressional delegation to the [Corps] and the technical and complex character of the issues at stake" in its decision to vacate and remand the
consolidated cases.' He characterized the plurality's holding as a 'judicial amendment" to the Act, and claimed that no part of the Act "requires the relatively permanent presence of water" to qualify for regu55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 2249.
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Id. at 2251.
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60.
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Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct. at 2237.
Louthan, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 16, at 50.
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RapanosII, 126 S. Ct. at 2242-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

63.

Id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

64.

Id. at 2266 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

65.
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lation.' As for Justice Kennedy's concurrence, Justice Stevens asserted
that it failed to "defer sufficiently to the Corps," while allowing that
Justice Kennedy was "more faithful to [the Court's] precedents and to
principles of statutory interpretation than [was] the plurality[]."67 Justice Stevens pointed out that Justice Kennedy's test would create additional uncertainty, extra work for all parties, and would not provide
developers with any "certain way of knowing whether they need to get §
404 permits or not. " ' According to Justice Stevens, "[i] n the final
analysis,

. .

. concerns about the appropriateness of the Corps'... im-

plementation of the Clean Water Act should be addressed to Congress
'
or the Corps rather than to the Judiciary."69
Justice Stevens based his analysis squarely on the unanimous holding of Riverside Bayview." The dissent concluded that, akin to the deference the Court afforded the Corps in Riverside Bayview, the Court
should have granted Chevron deference to the Corps' definition of its
jurisdiction in the consolidated cases.7' He classified the Corps' exercise of jurisdiction over wetlands as the "quintessential example of the
Executive's reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision."7" Based
on "Congress' deliberate acquiescence in the Corps' regulations in
1977," Justice Stevens argued that Congress intended that the Corps,
not the Court, should determine the nature and extent of wetlands
and their connection to navigable waters. 2 He stated that "[b] ecause
there is ambiguity in the phrase 'waters of the United States' and because interpreting it broadly to cover such ditches and streams advances the purpose of the Act, the Corps' approach should command
our deference."74 Justice Stevens called for the reinstatement of the
judgments in the consolidated cases if the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's tests are met.7 Justice Stevens accepted the application of either

test because the dissent would have upheld the basis for the Corps'
jurisdiction in the consolidated cases anyway, and would grant jurisdiction "in all other cases in which either the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied."7'
Justice Breyer also filed a dissent based on a more robust deference
standard than the plurality was willing to grant. He asserted that because the nation's waters are so "intricately interconnected," Congress
66.
67.

Id. at2260.
Id, at 2252.
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Id. at 2253.
I at 2252.
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intentionally left their definition vague to allocate to the "enforcing
agency... the task of restricting the scope of that definition, either
wholesale through regulation or retail through development permissions."' In his dissent, Justice Breyer noted that the Corps' experts
were better suited than the Court to determine which wetlands fall
under Corps' juisdiction.' He also observed that until the Corps updates its regulations to coincide with the plurality's orJustice Stevens's
jurisdictional tests, "courts will have to make ad hoc determinations that
run the risk of transforming scientific questions into matters of law."'
VII. POST-RAPANOS
Over a dozen United States circuit court of appeals cases and
United States district court cases have addressed the limit of the Corps'
jurisdiction since Rapanos. The First Circuit held that either the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's tests are apposite for establishing Corps' jurisdiction.' The Seventh and Ninth Circuits support the Kennedy concurrence as "the controlling rule in their respective circuits."8 ' For
example, in Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, the
Ninth Circuit exhaustively applied Justice Kennedy's significant nexus
test to find that Healdsburg violated the CWA by discharging wastewater into a man-made pond containing wetlands that border additional
wetlands adjacent to the Russian River, a traditional navigable water. "
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found: a significant chemical nexus established by elevated chloride levels in the stretch of the Russian River
adjacent to the wetlands abutting the pond clearly resulting from chloride leaching into the wetlands and River from the pond, adjacent wetlands, and underlying tributary aquifer; a significant physical nexus
between the pond and the Russian River based on a surface connection between the two when the river overflows its levee and the "two
bodies of water commingle;" and a significant biological nexus based
on the indistinguishable ecological connections between the pond and
the river whereby bird, mammal and fish populations indigenous to
Russian River were impossible to differentiate from those found in the
wetlands adjacent to the river and the pond itself.
In March, 2007, the Corps reissued all existing Nationwide Permits
("NWPs") currently effective in part to provide better protection and
77. Id at 2266 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
78. Id (citing33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)).
79. Id. at 2266.
80. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006).
81. United States v. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006); N. Cal.
River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
Louthan, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 16, at 50.
82. Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 2007 WL 2230186 (9th
Cir. 2006).
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definitions of "intermittent and ephemeral streams and their adjacent
wetlands."83 Then, in June, 2007, the Corps and EPA simultaneously
adjusted their jurisdictional standards to better reflect the Rapanos decision. 4 The new Corps' and EPA regulations now grant jurisdiction to
the agencies over the following waters: traditional navigable waters,
wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters, non-navigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters that are "relatively permanent" or
flow "year-round," non-navigable tributaries that flow seasonally for at
least three months, and wetlands that "directly abut" non-navigable
tributaries." The agencies will determine jurisdiction on a case-by-case
basis utilizing the significant nexus test over the following waters: nonnavigable tributaries with relatively intermittent flow, wetlands adjacent
to intermittent tributaries, and wetlands adjacent to ("but do not
abut") relatively permanent non-navigable tributaries.'6 The agencies
intend to apply the significant nexus test by "assess[ing] the flow characteristics and functions of the tributary itself and the functions performed by all wetlands adjacent to the tributary to determine if they
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the downstream traditional navigable waters.. .include[ing] consideration of hydrologic and ecologic factors.""7 The agencies will not assert
jurisdiction over "swales or erosional features" or ditches "excavated
wholly in or draining only uplands" with only intermittent flow.'
VIII. CONCLUSION

The new agency guidelines should shed some light on the dual
tests promulgated by Rapanos. Indeed, in United States v. Moses, the
Ninth Circuit recently relied on the new guidelines to find Moses violated the CWA by significantly manipulating a non-navigable tributary
that only flowed seasonally during the spring runoff. 9 While Moses was
a bad actor that continuously ignored agency desist orders, the decision clearly expands the definition of waters of the United States over
definitions previously relied upon the EPA and the Corps prior to Rapanos. However, questions persist. The Moses decision seems to
broaden the definition of waters of the United States beyond the limit
the Rapanos plurality was willing to grant to intermittent non-navigable
tributaries. Yet, the Ninth Circuit did not undergo the extensive fact
83.

Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 72 Fed. Reg. 11,092 (Mar. 12, 2007).

84.
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analysis in Moses that it had in Healdesburg,seemingly giving short-thrift
to the chemical, physical, and biological connections necessary to satisfy Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test. In all likelihood, "[i]f
Congress does not act, and courts across the country are unable to
bring clarity and consistency to the question of wetlands jurisdiction,
the issue will once again end up in the U.S. Supreme Court."' The
agencies' persistently expansive interpretation of the CWA jurisdictional definitions make this result inevitable.
Timothy Cronin & Matthew Smith

90.

Louthan, CourtSharply Split, supra note 5, at 127.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Water law in the United States has a long history of competition between federal and state interests. Even though states are primarily responsible for the creation and regulation of water rights within their
borders, federal ownership and control of water still plays an important
role in the management of this public resource. Federal reserved
rights, the navigation servitude, international compacts, and federal
environmental laws all limit the state's control over its water. Federal
"non-reserved" rights provide another example of federal interference
with state water management.
The federal "non-reserved" rights doctrine allows the federal government to acquire unappropriated water rights pursuant to state law.'
This doctrine is often the logical premise for Congressional directives
or executive decisions to acquire water rights for federal programs.
When these federally acquired rights comply with substantive state water law, there is usually no controversy.2 However, the federal govern-

1.
See Memorandum for the Assistant Attorney General, Land & Natural Resources Division, "Federal 'Non-reserved' Water Rights," 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 328
(1982).
2.
Substantive state water law refers to the requirements for perfecting a water
right. For example, in prior appropriation states, substantive water law requires: 1) the
intent to apply water to a beneficial use; 2) the actual diversion of water from a natural
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ment can use its "non-reserved" rights in ways that are inconsistent with
substantive state water law.' As long as there is sufficient Congressional
intent and Congress acted under appropriate Constitutional authority,
any conflicts with state substantive law become irrelevant. Under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, when state law frustrates a federal program or congressional mandate, the federal purpose preempts
state law. In 2004, the National Park Service ("NPS") filed an application for absolute groundwater rights for the Great Sand Dunes National Park based on a theory of federal "non-reserved" rights.!
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE SETTING

An understanding of this water right adjudication requires an understanding of its setting, the San Luis Valley in south central Colorado. The San Luis Valley spans approximately 8,000 miles and is the
world's largest alpine valley. Mountains almost completely surround
the valley, with the San Juan range bordering to the west and the Sangre De Cristo range to the east. Despite the region's geographic isolation, the valley receives much attention because of its water. The Rio
Grande, one of the longest rivers in the United States, flows through
the valley from its headwaters in the San Juans as it makes its way to
Mexico. In addition to the Rio Grande, the valley has two large aquifers, one confined and one unconfined.
As a result of the valley's unique geological and hydrological characteristics, sand dunes formed along the western side of the Sangre de
Cristos. These dunes, reaching almost 750 feet above the valley floor,
are the tallest in North America. The dunes' impressive height is the
direct result of the hydrological systems in the valley, which allow the
dunes to remain stationary and maintain their summits. As Congress
stated, the "unique pulse flow characteristics of Sand Creek and
Medano Creek ... are integral to the existence of the dunes system."5

President Herbert Hoover recognized these dunes as a National
Monument in 1934, and in 2000, Congress authorized the Department
of the Interior to designate the dunes as the Great Sand Dunes National Park.

source; and 3) the application of the water to a beneficial use. City of Thornton v.
Denver Bd. of Water Commissioners, 44 P.3d 1019, 1025 n.4 (Colo. 2002).
3. Memorandum for the Assistant Attorney General, supra note 1.
4. Application for Approval of Absolute Ground Water Rights, No. 2004 CW 35
(Water Ct. Div. 3, Dec. 30, 2004).

5. Memorandum from the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior to the Director of the National Park Service, "Great Sand Dunes National Park" (Jan. 18, 2001).
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B. THE PARTIES
The primary parties involved in this adjudication for an absolute
groundwater right are the NPS, the state of Colorado, three private
parties opposed to the application, and several other intervenors, including public water users associations and The Nature Conservancy.
After the NPS filed the application, they received general support from
the Colorado State Engineer, the Colorado Water Conservation Board,
the public water users associations, and The Nature Conservancy. The
main opponents to the application are John Mattingly, a farmer in the
San Luis Valley, and Gary Boyce, owner of both Cotton Creek Circles,
L.L.C. and the San Luis Valley Water Company, L.L.C.6 Additionally,
two private property owners in the valley with a water right dated after
2000 opposed the NPS's application insofar as it fails to subordinate
the application's priority date to their private property interest.
C. THE FACTS
On November 22, 2000, Congress provided for the establishment
of the Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve in the state of
Colorado This legislation "shows clearly that a concern with water was
a primary motivation for expansion of the protected area and conversion of the National Monument into a National Park."8 In the Act,
Congress specifically stated that the Secretary of the Interior shall acquire any water rights necessary for the purposes of the national park
in accordance with the following provisions:
(a) Such water rights shall be appropriated, adjudicated, changed,
and administered pursuant to the procedural requirements and priority system of the laws of the state of Colorado.
(b) The purposes and other substantive characteristics of such water
rights shall be established pursuant to State law, except that the Secretary is specifically authorized to appropriate water under this Act exclusively for the purpose of maintaining ground water levels, surface
water levels, and stream flows on, across, and under the national park
and national preserve, in order to accomplish the purposes of the na-

6. Boyce owns several companies and a four million dollar ranch in the San Luis
Valley. "The speculation has always been that he plans another water development
project." David Nicholas, Boyce law suit to be heard in January; Status Conference to be held
Nov. 8, THE CREsToNE EAGLE (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.crestoneeagle.com/

archives2005/headlineA2.novO5.html.
7. Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-530
(2000).
8. Memorandum from the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, supra note
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tional park and the national preserve and to protect park resources

and park uses. 9
Congress also explained that except for the previous reservations
for the national forest and the national monument, "no Federal reservation of water may be claimed or established for the national park or
the national preserve."'" On September 24, 2004, the director of the
NPS officially designated the park.
D. THE PROCEDURE

On December 30, 2004, the NPS filed the application for an absolute groundwater right for the Great Sand Dunes National Park in the
district court for Water Division 3, located in Alamosa." The application sought an in-place groundwater right, with no actual diversion
provided or no quantity specified. The application claimed the requisite intent to appropriate occurred on November 22, 2000 and the application to beneficial use occurred on September 24, 2004. The application stated that the right it seeks to acquire can not interfere with
any water rights in existence prior to November 22, 2000 or the Bureau
of Reclamation's Closed Basin Project. While the court has not finalized a trial date, the parties expect the trial to commence in early 2008.
M. QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE DEPT. OF INTERIOR'S
GROUNDWATER RIGHTS APPLICATION
The NPS's application for absolute groundwater rights raised two
principal questions: 1) whether the federal "non-reserved" rights doctrine valid; and 2) whether Congress intended act under appropriate
Constitutional authority and provide sufficient intent in the 2000 Act
to warrant the application of the doctrine. While some legal theorists
argue that a federal "non-reserved" rights doctrine does not exist, the
Assistant Attorney General from the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice explains that the concept of federal
"non-reserved" rights is valid. 2 As the Assistant Attorney General
stated, "as a matter of constitutional law, Congress clearly has the
power to preempt state law governing the use and disposition of unappropriated water by federal agencies on federal lands."'" Based on the
supremacy clause, "Congress [has] ample power, when coupled with
the commerce power, the Property Clause, or other grants of federal

9. Great Sand Dunes National Park and Preserve Act of 2000, supranote 7.
10. Id.
11. The Mc Carran Amendment subjects the U.S. to state court jurisdiction for
general stream adjudication. See43 U.S.C. § 666 (1952).
12. Memorandum for the Assistant Attorney General, supra note 1.
13. Id.
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power, to supersede state law. The exercise of such power must be explicit or clearly implied, however, and federal rights to water will not
be found simply by virtue of the ownership, occupation, or use of federal land, without more.' '
According to the NPS, Congress acted under appropriate Constitutional authority and with the requisite intent. In creating national
parks, Congress acts under the property clause of the Constitution. In
establishing the Great Sand Dunes National Park, Congress explicitly
provided that "the Secretary is specifically authorized to appropriate
water under this Act exclusively for the purpose of maintaining ground
water levels, surface water levels, and stream flows on, across, and under the national park."1 As the Interior's Solicitor stated, "with the
Great Sand Dunes legislation, we have a clear example of Congress
exercising [their] power" to preempt substantive state water law.'6 If
the district court accepts these arguments, it will likely approve the
NPS's application for the federal "non-reserved" water right. Any decision by the district court in this matter, however, will be ultimately reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States because it is a federal question.
IV. THE RIO GRANDE CONSERVATION DISTRICT PERSPECTIVE
The Rio Grande Conservation District ("District"), represented by
David Robbins of Hill and Robbins, P.C., serves the primary purpose of
protecting the waters of the Rio Grande and its tributaries. The District filed a statement of opposition in support of the NPS's application
in February 2005. Mr. Robbins has been the District's legal counsel for
more than twenty-five years and graciously agreed to discuss this
groundwater right application and provide his perspective. As Mr.
Robbins explained, this application is merely fulfilling the 2000 congressional mandate. As Robbins articulates it, the NPS is seeking to
obtain a right for a fluctuating level of water sufficient to maintain the
dunes.
From the District's point of view, this application is a step in the
right direction. As Mr. Robbins mentioned, the leadership in the San
Luis Valley is generally very supportive of NPS's application. Because it
is not a federal reserved right and because it is subordinate to existing
water rights in the valley, there is little objection to the application.
Mr. Robbins also commented that NPS's application will help Colorado fulfill its obligations under the Rio Grande Compact by insuring a
stable groundwater level. Mr. Robbins remarked that, in the end,
14.

Id.
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some answer to the water question at the Great Sand Dunes National
Park is necessary, and this application could be the successful answer.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Satisfying both federal and state interests in water rights can be a
complicated endeavor. In the NPS's application, however, the use of
the federal "non-reserved" rights doctrine seems to strike a balance
between these interests. As the Office of the Solicitor remarked, "this
approach strikes a useful accommodation between state and federal
law, by including elements of both."'7 Federal "non-reserved" rights, as
opposed to federal reserved rights, have two important benefits: 1)
they give the public early notice of the claimed right because the right
is subject to state procedural law and 2) they allow the federal government to still accomplish its objectives, because the federal purpose
preempts state substantive law. 8 Even if the district court adopts the
federal "non-reserved" rights doctrine, the general applicability of the
doctrine is still uncertain. The question remains, however, whether
this theory will become a useful mechanism for balancing federal and
state interests, or whether the Great Sand Dunes National Park application is a unique case limited to its specific factual circumstances.
MariaE. Hohn

17.
18.
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CONFERENCE REPORTS
CHANGING VALUES, CHANGING CONFLICTS
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, AND RESOURCES
25TH ANNUAL WATER LAW CONFERENCE
San Diego, California

February 22-23, 2007

DAY ONE: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2007
FUNDAMENTALS OF WATER LAW

Professor Robert "Bo" Abrams, Florida A&M University, College Of
Law, Orlando Florida, gave the first presentation of the Conference by
moderating a panel on the Fundamentals of water law. The panel included R. Timothy Weston, K & L Gates, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania;
Stephen Bartel, U.S. Department of Justice, Environment and Natural
resources Division, Washington, D.C.; and Jennifer Gimbel, U.S. Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado.
Mr. Abrams opened the discussion by stating the purpose of the
presentation was to provide an overview of water law for inexperienced
practitioners and newcomers to the field of water law. After offering
several legal anecdotes about water law including "whiskey is for drinking, water is for billable hours," Mr. Abrams opened the floor to Mr.
Weston.
Mr. Weston examined the development of water law in the United
States. The starting point of the lecture was water rights. Mr. Weston
explained that a water right does not convey ownership of the water;
water rights are mere rights of use. Thus, there are two ways to look at
a water right: what can I do with the water and what can someone else
do to me? Mr. Weston then discussed the historical basis for riparian
water rights and groundwater rights. Three theories of ground water
rights were presented: absolute dominion, reasonable use, and the correlative rights doctrine. Then, turning his attention to the eastern
states, Mr. Weston discussed regulated riparianism.
Mr. Bartel followed Mr. Weston and spoke about the prior appropriation doctrine in the western states and basin adjudications. After
discussing water law terminology, including c.f.s., storage rights,
groundwater rights, and instream flow water rights, Mr. Bartel listed
three factors necessary for a valid appropriation of a water right. In
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general, one must attempt to validly appropriate, actually divert water
from a source, and put the water to beneficial use.
Mr. Bartel also discussed water permits and the relationship between senior water rights holders and junior water rights holders. He
noted that the limits on a water right define what the right allows. Mr.
Bartel concluded his lecture by discussing three groundwater use doctrines: reasonable use, rule of the big pump, and reserve water rights.
Ms. Gimbel lectured on the topic of federal reserve water rights
which is also known as the Winters Doctrine. She stated in basic terms
that when the federal government withdraws land, the federal government also receives the water rights associated with that land. Ms. Gimbel stated the doctrine started with Indian tribes but now applies to all
federal lands.
The lecture concluded with a discussion of interstate water compacts. The discussion included the different types of compacts, how
states negotiate compacts, and enforcement of compacts. To conclude
the session, Mr. Abrams opened the panel to questions.
PLENARY PRESENTATION #1: THE 25-YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON WATER LAW
Janet Newman, Professor of Law at Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon, moderated this panel presentation. She asked each
panelist to address five topics in turn: conflicts between water law and
environmental law, economic pressures and market forces, Indian water rights, water as a property right, and water and decision-making.
Justice Ronald B. Robie from the California State Court of Appeal,
District 3, was the first to address the conflicts between water law and
environmental law. He discussed the Clean Water Act, public interest
review, and the Mono Lake case. He also mentioned the Endangered
Species Act and its impacts on the San Joaquin Delta. Finally, Justice
Robie discussed the Central California Project Improvement Act and
the fact that environmental protection is included in the authorization
act for that Project. The next panelist to address this topic was David
H. Getches, Dean of the University of Colorado Law School. He began
by pointing out that most water projects on the Colorado River were
completed over 25 years ago and that NEPA has had a large impact on
the operation of those projects. Dean Getches then discussed the
Adaptive Management Workgroup. He pointed out that in the 1980's
salinity was the big issue on the Colorado River, but that the attention
has now turned to the Colorado River Delta. In conclusion, Dean
Getches stated that the potential impacts are just becoming clear and
that the Endangered Species Act has been overly expensive and misses
the point of an ecosystem method of addressing issues. The next panelist was RogerJ. Marzulla, Marzulla & Marzulla, Washington, D.C. Mr.
Marzulla began by stating that environmental law has been the most
important development in water allocation in the last 25 years. He
discussed that the Endangered Species Act was not designed for habitat
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preservation, and using it for that purpose is difficult-"you can drive a
screw with a hammer, but a screwdriver is easier." He pointed to expanded definitions of "taking" and "species" as the largest developments in history of the ESA. Mr. Marzulla then turned to the Clean
Water Act, noting that while it was originally designed for point source
pollution, it has since expanded significantly into the arena of nonpoint sources. However, like the ESA, the CWA is not tailored to nonpoint sources and isn't the best way to address them.
Dean Getches was the first panelist to discuss the next topic: economic pressures and market forces. He began by stating that the
promise of water marketing has not been fully realized in Colorado.
He discussed the marketing efforts in California, including the Imperial Valley to Metro Water Department transfers, water banking, and
California's "Conceptual Approach" which would allow California to
purchase water from the other six Colorado River Basin States. He
added that he did not consider California's internal reallocations to be
marketing. Mr. Marzulla predicted that over the next 25 years water
marketing would become the most powerful force in putting water to
its highest and best use. Finally, Justice Robie addressed the issue, stating that California was the only state that has the plumbing to move
water around in a way that is necessary for an efficient market. He
mentioned that during the 1970's and 1980's many people bought
more water then they needed, and that water is slowly being reallocated through markets. He concluded by agreeing with Mr. Marzulla
that water transfers would become important because new source development is unlikely.
Dean Getches addressed the third topic: Indian water rights. He
suggested that Indian water rights represented enormous claims on
water that has been ignored. He mentioned the potential for offreservation marketing of Indian water rights, but opined that this
would not be possible until the tribes are included in the decision making process on the Colorado River. Mr. Marzulla stated that Indian
water rights represented a challenge because they are outside of state
systems, in essence that they are "springing rights" that have not been
factored into management. He then focused on the Klamath River
Basin, where competing interests include farmers, Endangered Species
Act, and tribal water rights, which, in his opinion have not been sufficiently accounted for by Bureau of Reclamation authority. Justice Robie disagreed with David Getches' statement that Indian tribes were
not being included in decision-making.
Mr. Marzulla was the first to comment on the fourth topic: property rights claims and takings. He said that if water is in fact a commodity, it may not be taken without compensation, citing the Tulare
Lake case, the Stockton East case, and the Casitas case. Dean Getches
pointed out that there are issues with environmental enforcement
when considering water as a property right. Justice Robie said that use
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of the public trust doctrine, as administered in California, has not resulted in excessive litigation, but that if the board becomes more aggressive in using public trust review there will be more litigation in the
future.
Dean Getches opened discussion of the fifth theme: who are the
decision makers: is it still the water buffalos and the iron triangle? He
said that the decision-making shifted as environmentalism came to the
forefront, and that there is now a more inclusive attitude about decision making by environmental enforcement and federal policy. He
closed his remarks by proposing a Basin wide decision-making forum
to bring all interests together, perhaps charged with advising the Secretary of the Interior. Justice Robie stated that presence of a younger,
more diverse, management has opened up decision making in California and made it more adaptive to the public needs. Mr. Marzulla discussed the Bayview NAFTA case, and whether water as property would
constitute an investment under NAFTA. He predicted that there will
be more litigation if it is an investment, pointing out that the water
community has become a concern of the world community. Janet
Newman closed the panel saying that she hoped that basin-wide and
international decision-making is the future.
PLENARY PRESENTATION #2: AGENCY DEFERENCE: WHERE ARE THE
COURTS GOING?

Kim Diana Connolly, Associate Professor of Law at the University of
South Carolina School of Law, Columbia, SC, moderated this presentation. The panelists for this presentation were Matt Kenna, Western
Environmental Law Center, Durango, CO and Roderick E. Walston,
Best Best & Krieger LLP, Walnut Creek, CA. This panel focused
whether the Rapanos decision is an indication that courts will grant
greater deference to a federal agency's interpretation of their statutory
authority.
Ms. Connolly began the presentation by providing a brief summary
of the issues and outcome of the Rapanos decision. Specifically, Ms.
Connolly stated that the underlying issues in Rapanos were 1) what
does "navigable waters" mean and 2) how much deference should be
given to an agency's interpretation of that term under the Clean Water
Act. Ms. Connolly explained that the plurality decision held that the
United States Army Corps of Engineers and the United States Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of the term was not
based on a reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision. The dissent determined that it was based on a reasonable interpretation of a
statutory provision. The bottom line, according to Ms. Connolly, is
that the immediate future regarding agency decision making is muddy.
Mr. Kenna began his part of the presentation by providing an introduction to deference as "Deference 101." First, if a statute is clear
and unambiguous, then agencies should rely on the statute. If, how-
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ever, a statute is not clear and unambiguous, then an agency's interpretation must be reasonable. Mr. Kenna noted that deference is often
misunderstood to mean that when deference applies, the agency
automatically wins. That is not the correct rule. Instead, if deference
applies, then the court must still determine whether the agency interpretation is reasonable. Mr. Kenna concluded by suggesting that the
Rapanos decision does not signal a new direction in the law, and instead practitioners are left with the same muddied definition we've had
since the Chevron case.
Mr. Watson began his presentation by pointing out several arguments against giving government agencies greater deference. Mr. Watson said that deference could be used as a tool to decide cases without
a hearing the merits. He also said that deference is not good when an
agency interprets a statute to determine its own jurisdiction. This, he
said, results in reducing other bodies of governments' jurisdiction over
matters. Mr. Watson suggested that courts, instead of agencies, should
draw the jurisdictional boundaries. Finally, Mr. Watson opined that
after Rapanos, courts should grant deference to agency interpretations
of ambiguous statutes in circumstances involving highly technical, scientific judgments, but should not grant such deference where the
agency interpretation results in an expansion the agency's own jurisdiction.
KEYNOTE SPEAKER: THE HONORABLE GREGORYJ. HOBBSJR.
The Honorable Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Supreme Court,
Denver, CO, delivered the keynote conference address titled "One
Body, One Spirit, and Many Futures." Justice Hobbs touched on many
themes, all centering around the idea that, as our most universal resource, water transcends people, time, and places.
First, Justice Hobbs argued that water law transcends people by
adapting to the changing values of people through the doctrine of
community. He noted that no one has a monopoly on the public interest, as evidenced by the changing demand for instream flows. As
public interest demands for water change, so will the law.
Second, Justice Hobbs stated that water's ubiquitous nature is seen
in the law as well. The creation of new environmental laws over the
years has responded to, and affected, water law. Justice Hobbs discussed how water law transcends time and that beneficial use dates
back beyond traditional conceptions of water engineering. Ancient
peoples had made reservoirs and protected the water. Today we have
codified what has always been done through the doctrine of priorappropriation.
Finally, Justice Hobbs touched on possible water issues in the future. He identified the trend of water use moving from the private
sector for irrigation purposes to the public sector for environmental
and recreation purposes. Moreover, Justice Hobbs called for the need
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to consult and communicate as part of this grand interrelation of all
things through water. He said that the winning combination of public
interest, beneficial use, and conservation will allows us to overcome the
divide and always has let us overcome the divide.
BREAKOUT SESSION #1: INSTREAM USE AND CHANGING VALUES (ESA,
URBAN STREAMS, RECREATION)

Micheal J. Pearce, from Maguire & Pearce PLLC, Phoenix, Arizona
moderated this panel discussion. He began the presentation by asking
each of the panelists to discuss instream flow issues in their respective
states. The first panelist to respond to this was Steve Macaulay, Executive Director, California Urban Water Agencies, Sacramento, California. He discussed California's Environmental Water Account and its
role in preserving the health of the San Francisco Bay/Sacrament-San
Joaquin River Delta. He then discussed market based water transfers
and successes in renting water through intergovernmental cooperation. He concluded his remarks saying that a lot of underlying science
is unclear and that efforts should be made to better understand the
river systems.
Martha Pagel, of Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, Salem, Oregon, was
the next panelist to discuss instream flow issues. She framed the issues
as being between those that have the senior water rights and those that
want the instream flows. She discussed the ways that Oregon law has
been structured to allow "voluntary" transactions to occur that preserve
instream flows. She then mentioned some specific issues in the
Deschutes Basin, and concluded by cautioning that where there is a
market driven need for water, mitigation will be important.
Finally, Norman Semanko, of Idaho Water Users Association, Inc.,
Boise, Idaho, covered instream flow issues in his state. He discussed
the minimum stream flow program, which provides for instream flow
rights held by the Idaho Water Resource Board, that the state enacted
29 years ago. He mentioned that the Endangered Species Act has been
a motivator for the program and that the efforts were in cooperation
with the federal government. He then turned to the State's water
bank, which has been used to supply water when a 2001 instream flow
right was out of priority. In conclusion, he said that minimum stream
flows should be accomplished under state law, because that is where
state water rights administration is best understood.
Mr. Pearce then asked the panel whether the instream programs
would still be in place if it had not been for the Endangered Species
Act, since many of those programs were a reaction to that Act. All of
the panelists responded that they believed that those programs would
be in place. Mr. Macaulay stated that the public trust doctrine would
have been pushed harder, but that the Endangered Species Act was an
effective hammer to spur the movement. The next question that Mr.
Pearce put to the panel was whether private industry has pushed or
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funded instream programs, and what would drive that movement. The
panelists discussed the various ways that their states had gotten funding
for instream flow programs. Finally, Mr. Pearce asked the panel why,
in their opinion, a wide open market for creation of instream flows
would not work. The panel discussed fears of water rights being purchased and changed to instream flows without mitigation efforts. Ms.
Pagel touched on the use of mitigation credits in Oregon, and the
panelists agreed that the determination of how much water is needed
is critical.
BREAKOUT SESSION

#2:

CONFLICTING SOVEREIGNS, CONFLICTING

RIGHTS

Jennifer Gimbel, U.S. Department of the Interior, Denver, Colorado moderated a panel which included Major Jeremy N. Jungreis,
Special Counsel, Environmental Law, U.S. Marine Corps, Western Area
Counsel Office, Camp Pendleton, California; Scott B. McElroy, Greene
Meyer & McElroy PC, Boulder, Colorado; and Tim Vollmann, Attorney
at Law, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
MajorJungreis spoke first and suggested an answer to the question:
Why do federal water rights matter? His answer began by discussing
three threshold considerations: 1) What is a federal water right and is
it an issue for your water project; 2) advantages of federal water rights;
and 3) whether the existence of a federal water right is contingent
upon state law or the method of federal enclave creation. Major Jungreis then focused on determining the scope of a federal water right.
In this portion of the lecture he discussed the differences between Indian water rights under the Winters Doctrine, regulatory water rights,
and hybrid water rights created by interstate compacts.
Using his water rights framework, Major Jungreis posed a second
question: "Can a federal agency or tribe obtain a water right on acquired lands?" Two answers to this question were posed. The first answer discussed was the Western Theory. This theory holds that the
United States only receives what they purchase. Thus, if they do not
purchase a water right when they buy land, they do not have a water
right in that land. The second answer discussed, the Olson Theory,
where federal water rights are possible provided the purpose of the
land would be frustrated without the water right. Overall, Major Jungreis feels the question of federal water rights on acquired lands is wide
open. He advises that, if possible, the best strategy is preserving the
state water rights associated with the acquired land. Major Jungreis
concluded his presentation by analyzing hybrid water rights settlements.

Mr. McElroy spoke after MajorJungreis and lectured on the development of the reserve rights doctrine and the impact of Arizona v.
California on Indian tribes. Mr. McElroy suggests that Indian water
rights are reserved by implication. He reaches this conclusion by ana-
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lyzing three theories: 1) the supremacy of federal law, 2) the United
States obligation to uphold treaties, and 3) when Indians relinquished
rights, they explicitly retained all rights not given up.
After establishing the existence of Indian water rights, Mr. McElroy
discussed the problem of determining how much water should be associated with an Indian water right. Here a brief discussion of the problems of measuring practicable irrigable acreage and determining beneficial uses took place. Mr. McElroy then discussed Indian ground water
rights and the litigation surrounding the quantification of Indian
ground water rights. He suggested a broad template for determining
the quantity of water associated with the right should be based on a
broad template that should include a tribe's population, historical use,
and current use.
The lecture then turned to a discussion of the necessity of water for
economic growth. Mr. McElroy noted that the need for water in a successful economy is "particularly true on Indian reservation."
Mr. McElroy concluded his presentation by looking to the future of
the reserve water rights doctrine and stating that there is a strong legal
framework to do what was promised and make reservations livable.
However, he had reservation about the practicality of this future.
Overall, he felt that there may be a lack of resources to adjudicate water rights and that the adjudications would not take place in a timely
manner.
Mr. Vollmann anchored the panel and spoke about tribal water
marketing and whether the Indian Nonintercourse Act is a bar to water
marketing. To begin, Mr. Vollmann discussed international law principles to provide a foundation for discussion of Indian law. In moving
to the focus of his lecture, Mr. Vollmann discussed water marketing.
He suggested that market forces do not control whether tribes can
market their water. In reaching this conclusion, he discussed the Indian Nonintercourse Act and the fact that Indian land is inalienable
without an act of congress. Yet, Mr. Vollman notes that short term water marketing contracts may be enforceable under the Indian Tribal
Economic Development and Contract Encouragement Act of 2000
without running afoul of the Indian Nonintercourse Act. Mr. Vollmann notes that there is no case law on point and concludes with the
question: Why not create legislation authorizing Indian water marketing? The panel then accepted audience questions.
BREAKOUT SESSION #3: PROMOTING CONSERVATION BY LAW

Mary Ann Dickinson, Executive Director, California Urban Water
Conservation Council, Sacramento, CA, moderated this presentation.
The panelists for this presentation were Stephen Arakawa, Group
Manager, Resource Management, Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California, Los Angeles, CA; Craig Bell, Executive Director,
Western States Water Council, Midvale, UT; and David E. Filippi, Stoel
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Rives, LLP, Portland, OR. This panel focused on whether the demand
for water conservation can be met within the bounds of existing water
laws, or whether existing laws, such as prior appropriation, undermines
the goal of conservation.
Ms. Dickinson gave a brief introduction to the panel, and noted
that conservation is no longer a tool used solely in drought periods.
Conservation is now a widely used water supply planning tool.
Mr. Arakawa began his presentation by using Southern California
as an example of how conservation needs to be used to meet future
demands. He talked about historical droughts, and the various temporary solutions people used during these periods. Mr. Arakawa then
talked about Integrated Resource Planning which utilizes water storage, recycling, and conservation. He then discussed how the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California has implemented an Urban Conservation plan which he described as a core element of their
long-term water management strategy. The Water District is beginning
to focus more on outdoor landscaping and the commercial aspects in
its Urban Conservation plan. Mr. Arakawa concluded by saying that
conservation is a necessary and important part of California's water
supply planning.
Mr. Filippi's presentation focused on the conflict between existing
water law, much of which is embodied in the doctrine of prior appropriation, and conservation efforts to meet emerging demands for water. The "use it or lose it" principle of prior appropriation, whereby a
water user must exercise his water right or risk forfeiture, obviously
creates a great deal of tension with conservation efforts. If a water user
uses less water to accomplish the same beneficial use, then the water
right can be subject to forfeiture and loss. Mr. Filippi made reference
to Oregon laws which have attempted to integrate prior appropriation
and conservation. Mr. Filippi noted that Oregon has a number of statutes designed to encourage water right holders to conserve. For example, Oregon has redefined beneficial use to include instream uses.
As the final panelist, Mr. Bell discussed various strategies that have
been used to integrate the prior appropriation system with conservation. Mr. Bell mentioned various state legislative efforts which have
sought to mitigate the disincentives of conservation which are inherent
to the prior appropriation doctrine. Mr. Bell also suggested that water
policymakers must preemptively prepare for future obstacles such as
climate change. Mr. Bell mentioned a recent Colorado River Basin
Water Management Report which states that water conservation alone
is not sufficient to meet future water demands, but it is a very essential
step. Finally, Mr. Bell posed the question of what happens to water
when it is conserved-should it stay at its point of origin? In other
words, who owns conserved water? This, Mr. Bell suggested, is a question that will have to be answered in the near future.
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BREAKOUT SESSION #4: EMERGING ISSUE - INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
(ALL-AMERICAN CANAL)
James S. Lochhead of Brownstein, Hyatt, Farber & Schreck PC,
Glenwood Springs, Colorado moderated a panel which included Professor John Leshy, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law, San Francisco, California; Robert Snow, U.S. Department of the
Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Washington, DC; and Jay Stein, Stein &
Brockmann, P.A., Santa Fe New Mexico.
Mr. Lochhead briefly introduced the conflict regarding the lining
of the All-American Canal that has resulted in the litigation CDEM v.
United States. He also -introduced the panelists' role in the litigation.
John Leshy was formerly Solicitor General at the Department of the
Interior, Robert Snow is counsel for the defense, and Jay Stein is counsel for the plaintiffs.
Mr. Leshy spoke first and introduced the All-American Canal Lining Project in more detail. The All-American Canal takes 3.12 million
acre-feet of water through the Imperial Valley. The lining of the canal
blocks the seepage water of the canal from entering into Mexico and
recharging the underlying aquifer. This raises legal issues on water law
and environmental law fronts.
Mr. Stein spoke next and discussed some of the water law issues involved in the case and presented the arguments for the plaintiffs. Mr.
Stein identified four water rights counts: 1) Unconstitutional Deprivation of Water Rights, 2) Constitutional Tort, 3) Equitable Apportionment, and 4) Estoppel. In regard to the fourth claim, Mr. Stein argued
that third parties can acquire water rights by seepage and the canal had
been operated for seventy years with seepage into the aquifer, thus
constituting estoppel. Mr. Stein also challenged the district court's
ruling plaintiff lacked standing, stating that this is not a diplomatic
issue and that it is in fact a private claim.
Mr. Snow spoke last and discussed the environmental law claims.
He identified four statutory violation counts: 1) NEPA, 2) Endangered
Species Act, 3) Migratory Bird Act, and 4) San Luis Rey Act Wetland
Mitigation Measures. In regard to NEPA, Mr. Snow argued that the
statute is silent on looking at the impacts across the border. Moreover,
he argued that the Endangered Species Act is also silent on taking action for effects on listed endangered species existing abroad. Mr. Snow
said that this conflict was largely a consequence of parties talking past
each other. He said that a simple difference between the plaintiff and
defense's perspective on the case is that plaintiff believes this is a case
about ground water and the defense believes it is a case about surface
water. Mr. Snow summed up the defendant's argument stating that
"borders matter."
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DAY TWO: FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2007
PLENARY PRESENTATION #3: CLEAN WATER ACT PERMITS FOR WATER
TRANSFERS
Ann R. Klee of Crowell & Moring, former General Counsel, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, moderated a panel which included
Roger R. Martella, Jr., Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC; Karen Smith, Deputy Director, Arizona Department of Water Reources, Phoenix, AZ; and
James M. Tierney, Assistant Attorney General and Watershed Inspector
General, New York State Office of Attorney General, Environmental
Protection Bureau, Albany, NY.
Ms. Klee began by introducing the topic of whether the Clean Water Act requires discharge permits for water deliveries between watersheds. She said the main issue in this dispute is whether movement or
transfer of water constitutes an addition, thus requiring a permit. Ms.
Klee argued that transfers provide a benefit and that it is burdensome
for water suppliers to get CWA permits. Finally, Ms. Klee added that
courts are split on this issue.
Mr. Martella spoke next and addressed four topics: 1) water transfers across the nation, 2) EPA approach to water transfers, 3) comments on EPA position, and 4) recent case law. In regard to transfers,
Mr. Martella defined transfers as when one water of the United States
is added to another water of the United States with nothing in the
middle. He said transfers occur for three main purposes: commercial
drinking water, environmental reasons such as wetlands restoration,
and irrigation. Next, Mr. Martella said the EPA has had a longstanding position that water transfers do not require a § 402 permit.
Based on the Klee/Grumbles Memo, "addition" is intentionally left
undefined in the Clean Water Act and Congress intended water transfers to be subjected to oversight by state water resource management
agencies. Mr. Martella commented that there is a proposed rule to
exclude water transfers from permitting to settle this issue. Next, Mr.
Martella said that in response to the proposed rule the comments EPA
received were split geographically between the East and West. He said
the West supported the rule while the East opposed. Finally, in regard
to recent case law, Mr. Martella said that the issues in the CatskillMountains and Friends of the Everglades cases were distinguishable from the
present issue.
Ms. Smith spoke next and argued that EPA has it right on this issue. She said that this is different than industrial discharges and that
"water quality is not impaired by these types of transfers." She added
that there is no such thing as a benign permit and the best solution is
to leave this type of permitting up to the states.
Finally, Mr. Tierney spoke, arguing for EPA permit requirements
for transfers. He said that if you take polluted water from one distinct
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body and put it into another body of water, this must be an addition.
To support his argument he referenced the Catskill Mountains and
Friends of the Everglades cases and argued that under Chevron if the statute is clear based on the standard statutory construction, the issue is
over. In this case, "any" is used to qualify "addition" and therefore a
permit should be required. Mr. Tierney then gave examples of the
consequences of additions currently not requiring an EPA permit, such
as adding saltwater to freshwater or warm water into cold water, and
that EPA did not consider these real examples. Moreover, this would
allow downstream states to be damaged by upstream states who do
regulate transfers themselves. In conclusion, Mr. Tierney said that a
EPA permit system is completely feasible.
Both Ms. Klee and Mr. Martella responded to Mr. Tierney, each arguing that it is outside the bounds of the Clean Water Act for EPA to
regulate. Finally, Ms. Klee concluded that there are better ways to cure
environmental ills than EPA permitting.
PLENARY PRESENTATION #4: THE CHANGING INTERFACE BETWEEN LAW
AND SCIENCE

Professor Barbara Cosens, University of Idaho, College of Law,
Moscow, Idaho, moderated this panel which included Michael Bogert,
Counselor to the Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C.; Dr. Stephen L. Katz, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Northwest Fisheries Science Center, Seattle, Washington; Chairman Rebecca Miles, Nez Perce Tribe, Lapwai, Idaho; and Dr.
William Woessner, University of Montana, Department of Geosciences,
Missoula, Montana. The panel met to discuss the interface between
law and science during a typical water withdrawal project. Specifically,
the presented hypothetical looked at a state permit for a proposed
groundwater well for a water bottling plant. Mr. Woessner discussed
the potential hydrological impacts of the hypothetical. Mr. Katz discussed the hypothetical project's impact on various fish species in the
effected basin. Chairman Miles discussed potential tribal issues. Mr.
Bogert discussed the possibility of a settlement between all of the stakeholders. Ms. Cosens then open the panel to questions from the audi-

ence.
PLENARY PRESENTATION #5: FORUM FOR CHANGING VALUES: DE WE
STILL NEED ADJUDICATIONS?

Peter W. Sly, Colby College, Brooklin, ME, moderated the final plenary presentation. The panelists for this presentation were Dr. Bonnie
G. Colby, The University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ; Charles "Chuck" T.
DuMars, Law & Resource Planning Associates, PC, Albuquerque, NM;
Ramsey L. Kropf, Patrick, Miller & Kropf, P.C., Aspen, CO. This pres-
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entation focused on whether adjudication is the most fair and efficient
way to resolve water disputes.
To start this presentation, all of the panelists joined Mr. Sly in singing an introductory parody, "Come on Baby, Do the Litigation." Afterwards, each panelist gave a brief introduction of themselves to explain their personal connections and qualifications with water adjudications. As moderator, Mr. Sly compiled a list of questions for the
panelists to consider.
Mr. Dumars addressed the question of why does it take so long to
litigate water cases? Mr. Dumars noted that most people do not benefit from adjudication. More specifically, adjudication does not benefit
those who can't afford to use less water; it does not benefit junior users; and it does not benefit water users that have no desire to change
their use regardless of the monetary value.
When asked what they would advise a state that is contemplating a
new adjudication or major revision to an existing statute, the panelists
had the following comments:
Mr. Dumars suggested that the standing requirement needs to be
more strict. Only parties that are directly affected should be able to
bring suits. Furthermore, Mr. Dumars suggested that a penalty should
be imposed on unnecessary and annoying interveners.
Ms. Kropf noted that it is very important for states to be involved in
water litigation. States have many important interests in almost any
water litigation, and should therefore be considered a necessary party.
Ms. Kropf also pointed out that water litigation issues are cyclical, and
that practitioners today are dealing with many of the same issues that
were being addressed 30 years ago.
Doctor Colby, an economist whose work and research focuses on
complex water transfers, discussed the economical costs of water adjudications. Doctor Colby pointed out that the most obvious costs of
water adjudications are the public costs which are paid by federal,
state, and local taxpayers and by tribal governments. Doctor Colby also
suggested that rules need to be developed to make water transfers
more straight forward.
HOT Topics: CLIMATE CHANGE

Fabian Nunez, Speaker of the California State Assembly, delivered
the Hot Topics Luncheon presentation on climate change. During his
spirited speech, he discussed his background in California, his work as
a legislator, and the efforts that California is making to get global climate change in hand. The goal that California has set is to reduce
emissions levels to 1990 levels by the year 2020, a 25% reduction. He
expressed his concern over future generations, stating that he wants
the economy for our children and our children's children to be a clean
economy, and for the neighborhoods they live in to be clean
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neighborhoods. He concluded his presentation by encouraging other
states to follow suit in a national effort to combat global warming.
Mark Terzaghi Howe, Thomas Jantunen,Andrew Ellis & Jeff McGaughran
COLORADO WATER LAW
CLE INTERNATIONAL
Denver, Colorado

March 8-9, 2007

The Colorado Water Law conference, sponsored by Denver based
CLE International, was a two day conference covering an assortment of
current water related issues facing Colorado including climate change,
conjunctive management, "ag to urban" transfers, water re-use and
conservation, as well as recreational uses of water. The conference had
something of interest to individuals from many water related fields including attorneys, engineers, water managers, and city planners and
was heavily attended by individuals from those fields. James Lockhead
of Brownstein Hyatt & Farber, P.C., Glenwood Springs, and Raymond
Petros of Petros & White, L.L.C, Denver, co-chaired this event. Each
day began with a brief introduction to what the day's presentations had
in store. In addition to the sessions described in more detail below,
the conference featured a presentation entitled "New Challenges (or
Realities) for Water Development in Colorado: Water Managers Discuss New Definitions of Drought, Climate Change, Groundwater Depletion, and Alternatives for Development of New Supplies" presented
by a panel consisting of James Broderick, the Executive Director of the
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, Eric Kuhn, the
General Manager of the Colorado River Water Conservation District,
and Dale Rademacher, P.C, the Director of the Longmont Public
Works and Water Utilities. As part of the section of the conference
covering "Conflicts in Groundwater Administration and Development,"
a panel consisting of Mike Shimmin, Esq., of Vranesh and Raisch,
Boulder, and Kim R. Lawrence, Esq., of Lind, Lawrence & Ottenhoff,
Windsor, discussed the issues on the South Platt. Cynthia F. Covell,
Esq., of Alperstien & Covell, Denver, concluded the first day of the
conference with a presentation on the new ethics rules being considered by the Supreme Court.
CONFLICTS IN GROUND WATER ADMINISTRATION AND
DEVELOPMENT
DESIGNATED GROUND WATER BASINS: UNDESIGNATING AND OTHER
CHALLENGES
Anne Castle, Esq., of Holland & Hart, Denver, and Steven J. Bushing, Esq., of Porzack, Browning & Bushong, Boulder, represented opposing parties in litigation concerning water users in the Republican
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River Basin, including an attempt to have the boundary line of the
Northern High Plains Designated Ground Water Basin changed. This
litigation began over a petition by the Pioneer Irrigation District to
move the boundary based on information in the Republican River
Compact Administration Model. The controversy focused on Colorado Revised Statute §§ 37-90-101 et seq. (Colorado Ground Water
Management Act), and the jurisdiction of the Colorado Ground Water
Commission ("CGWC").
Anne Castle opened this panel presentation with a short discussion
of the 1965 House Bill 0367 "Ground Water Management Act," which
resulted in the designation of groundwater basins encompassing about
15% of Colorado's land mass including about 7,700 large capacity
wells. She described the process of designating ground water basins
and the modified prior appropriation applied to those areas, which was
designed to promote full economic development of the resource. Ms.
Castle then touched on the CGWC rules for well permitting in the
Northern High Plains Basin and the hydrology supporting those rules.
Ms. Castle then turned to a past case, Gallegos v. Colorado Ground
Water Commission, 147 P.3d 20 (Colo. 2006), in which the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the CGWC had jurisdiction to determine if a
groundwater diversion within a designated basin does not meet the test
for designated ground water. According to Ms. Castle's reading of the
Gallegos case, the petitioner seeking un-designation must prove with
new evidence that there is a hydrologic connection between the
groundwater and surface water, that the pumping has a more than de
minimus impact on surface rights, and that the pumping is causing injury to surface rights.
Finally, Ms. Castle briefly discussed the application by the Pioneer
Irrigation District and Laird Ditch owners, both of which own surface
water rights in the High Plains Basin and claim injury to those rights,
to redraw the boundaries of that Basin. The petitioners relied on the
Republican River Compact Administration Model to support their
claim of injury. Ms. Castle advocated an interpretation of the de minimus prong to encourage full development of designated basins in the
context of the Ground Water Management Act.
Steve Bushong then took the floor to discuss the petitioners' point
of view. He began his presentation with a hypothetical discussion of
senior surface water users injured by junior large capacity wells that
ware not subject to the prior appropriation system because of an arbitrarily drawn designated groundwater basin boundary. As part of the
hypothetical, he suggested that the High Plains Basin was designated
by the CGWC after only three hours of meeting.
Mr. Bushong discussed Colorado Revised Statute § 47-90-106,
which allows the CGWC to redraw the boundaries of a designated basin. He then discussed the Gallegos case, suggesting that the holding
only requires the petitioner to prove two prongs: that there is a more
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than de minimus connectivity and that there is injury. Turning to the
most recent dispute involving the Pioneer Irrigation District, Mr.
Bushong stated that the dispute did not implicate any new questions of
law except that the groundwater in question was the subject of litigation before the United States Supreme Court over the Republican
River Compact. He maintained that the model used to evaluate compliance with the settlement agreement was appropriate to show connectivity and injury to surface water rights in the areas Republican
River Basin that are in the High Plains Designated Basin.
In response to questions, both Ms. Castle and Mr. Bushong elaborated on the Republican River Compact Administration Model. Ms.
Castle suggested that the Model was not designed for the purposes that
it was being used for in Pioneer's petition and that the Republican
River settlement agreement stated that the states do not have to enact
more stringent regulations that it had at the time the agreement was
reached. Mr. Bushong responded that the Model could not be disputed as the special master accepted it in the litigation over the Republican River Compact, and that the settlement agreement says that the
state cannot promulgate regulations that are less stringent than those
in place at the time of the agreement.
COALBED METHANE

The next presentation in the ground water conflicts section of the
conference was delivered by Sarah Klahn of White & Jankowski, Denver. The subject of her presentation was the production of large
amounts of water from coal bed methane ("CBM") extraction and the
potential for injury to ground and surface water rights. The issue is
before the Colorado Water Court for Water Division 7, which had not
yet issued a decision. Ms. Klahn began with a discussion of CBM production in Colorado, specifically in the San Luis Basin and the Raton
Basin. She pointed out that all of the water produced in the San Luis
Basin is deep well injected to about 5000 feet below the surface and
will never be recoverable, thus making one hundred percent consumptive use of the produced water.
Ms. Klahn then discussed the current regulation of CBM produced
water beginning with the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, which regulates disposal and evaporation of the water. She mentioned the Colorado Water Quality Control Commission, which issues
"meaningful discharge permits" and regulates storm water, and the
Environmental Protection Agency, which requires permits for deep
well injection of produced water. She then turned to the issue implicated in the case before the water court: whether the state engineer
has jurisdiction to curtail the production of thousands of acre-feet of
water if there is injury to vested water rights. In support of her contention that the state engineer should have that authority, she pointed to
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studies that indicate some connectivity between the produced water
and vested water rights, particularly those rights to springs and seeps
that many of the areas ranches depend on.
Ms. Klahn then turned to the legal basis for the assertion that CBM
producers must obtain permits for their diversions that comes from an
analogy to a line of cases concerning gravel pits. The first case that she
discussed was Three Bells Ranch Assocs. V Cache La Poudre Water Users
Ass'n, 758 P.2d 164 (Colo. 1988). This case arose from a claim by the
Water User's Association that a gravel pit was impacting its surface
rights. The Colorado Supreme Court held that, because the gravel pit
extended below the water table, it was effectively a well. Ms. Klahn
then discussed Zigan Sand and Gravel v. Cache La Poudre Water Users
Ass'n, 758 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1988), in which the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the operator of a gravel pit must have an augmentation
plan to replace all water lost to evaporation, notjust that water which is
put to beneficial use.
Finally, Ms. Klahn discussed the case before the water court. She
said that after they filed the case, the State Engineer's Office moved to
dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction claiming that this was not a water matter
for the water court, and that BP America, Inc. moved to intervene and
to dismiss the case on the grounds that the Southern Utes were indispensable parties but could not be joined because of sovereign immunity. The petitioners then amended the complaint, and the parties
agreed to file cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of
whether a CBM well required a permit thus implicating the authority
of the state engineer to administer those wells within the priority system. Ms. Klahn concluded by asking who should have bear the burden
of CBM production, local water users or the CBM producers, and suggesting that there will likely be an appeal of the water court decision
regardless of the turnout.
AG TO URBAN TRANSFERS OF WATER
LAND FALLOWING

The presentation on rotational land fallowing was given by Peter
Nichols, Esq., of Trout, Raley, Montano, Witwer & Freeman, Denver,
and Jerry Kenny, Ph.D, P.C., of HDR Engineering, Denver. Mr. Nichols began this presentation by suggesting that the "buy and dry"
method of transferring water from agricultural use to municipal use
often has substantial adverse impacts on the basin of origin. As an alternative, Mr. Nichols discussed rotational fallowing using leases of
water to municipalities instead of permanent transfer of water out of
the basin of origin. Specifically, he discussed efforts in the Arkansas
River Basin to create a "Super Ditch Company" to facilitate leasing and
fallowing. He made sure to clarify that this was not the official name of
the proposed entity, but that no one had come up with anything better
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to date. In fact, as discussed later in his presentation, after a choice an
entity analysis one of the organization structures that definitely will not
work for the Super Ditch Company is that of a ditch company.
According to Mr. Nichols, the proposal would create a new crop in
the Arkansas River Basin-water. The program would allow for payments to participants for the fallowing of land on a rotating basis while
maintaining the long-term health of the basin. Mr. Nichols pointed to
the Palo Alto interruptible supply contracts of the 1990's as a past use
of a similar arrangement. The idea of the program is that it will prevent municipalities from taking the senior rights from the basin by
employing collective bargaining, thus maximizing the benefits of the
water resources. The program would act as a clearinghouse for the
water rights, and would operate separately from the Lower Arkansas
Valley Water Conservation District.
Mr. Nichols then turned to the specifics of the Super Ditch Company operation. The program would involve participants between the
Pueblo Reservoir and the John Martin Reservoir. The participants
could opt to put all or some portion of their land and water into the
program. Although the details of ownership and control are still in the
planning phase, participating irrigators would receive shares of stock
and would control the board. Several municipalities would be able to
lease water, including Pueblo and Colorado Springs. The leases, likely
30-50 years in duration, would be sold by auction in hopes of equalizing the value per acre-foot across the service area. Although there are
many more details that must be worked out, Mr. Nichols and may others have put in substantial effort on the project and Mr. Nichols stated
that it represents a way to maximize the benefit to the water user by
creating a new crop for the basin, water, while facilitating agriculture
to urban transfers.
Jerry Kenny, PhD, PE, has been heavily involved in studying the potential of the Super Ditch Company. He presented the work that he
had done on the project, indicating that although there is still a lot
more work to be done and that this remains a concept, he is confident
that the concept will be workable in the future. He began his presentation by discussing the benefits and problems with permanent "buy and
dry" transfers, short term leasing, and non-permanent, long term leasing.
Mr. Kenny then turned to the engineering aspects of land fallowing
and water leasing. The firm studied the ditches and associated water
rights in the service area and predicted an annual system yield available
for lease of up to 311,000 acre-feet per year (AFY) in a wet year, and
between 9,000 AFY in a dry year with 40% participation and 69,400 AFY
in an average year with 100% participation. They are currently refining those estimates and considering options to move the water and to
protect the source ditches. Mr. Kenny pointed out that the project
cannot injure the nonparticipating water users, so the program will
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require substantial attention to hydrologic conditions and demand
levels to address delivery issues for those nonparticipating users. He
concluded by saying that Kansas is watching the program and its affect
on interstate entitlements closely.
1041 REGULATION-MOUNTAIN AND PLAIN WATERSHED PROTECTION:
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Gerald Dahl, Esq., of Murray, Dahl, Kuechenmeister & Renaud,
Denver, gave a presentation on regulations pursuant to the 1974
House Bill 1041, which are still referred to as 1041 regulations, codified at Colorado Revised Statutes §§ 24-65.1-101 et seq. He began by
suggesting that the legislature enacted 1041 because of concerns that
traditional zoning and subdivision tools might not be adequate to address the impacts caused by specific development activities, or adequate to protect and plan for development in certain physical areas.
The bill gave local governments the ability to designate "areas" or "activities" as "matters of state interest" and regulate those matters.
The designation process is by publication of notice, a public hearing, and a designation order. Once an area or activity is designated,
the county or municipality can require a permit granted by a quasijudicial hearing.
Mr. Dahl then turned to use of 1041 by Colorado Western Slope
headwater counties in response to the impacts caused by the construction and operation of trans-mountain diversions. He pointed out that
because a trans-mountain diversion removes the water from the basin
permanently, with no return flows, those diversions have substantial
impacts on the basin of origin. In 1978, Grand County designated "efficient utilization of municipal and industrial water projects" and "major new domestic water and sewage treatment systems and extensions
thereof." Eagle County designated the same activities in 1980. The
permit applications under those regulations required detailed environmental impact statements, mitigation plans, engineering plans,
financial impact analysis, and a showing of need for the project. Front
Range trans-mountain diverters challenged those regulations.
Mr. Dahl discussed the line of cases that resulted from the challenges to Grand and Eagle County's regulations. The courts rejected
several arguments against the regulations including that the regulation
is preempted because the diverters were home rule municipalities, that
it was a denial of the constitutional right to appropriate water, that the
projects had been approved by the electorate, and that 1041 itself was
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The line of
cases also makes it clear that one must sue in the county where the
regulating local government is resident. Finally, Mr. Dahl complemented an opinion written by Colorado Supreme Court Justice Gregory Hobbs in City of Colorado Springs v. BOCC of the County of Pueblo, 147
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P.3d 1 (Colo. 2006) in which Colorado Springs challenged Pueblo's
1041 regulation, calling the opinion "a cliff note version" of the preceding line of cases.
Mr. Dahl then discussed other aspects of 1041 regulation. Recently, several Eastern Plains counties have enacted 1041 regulations in
response to agricultural land dry-ups, including regulation of development in "areas containing or having a significant impact upon natural resources of statewide importance." In context of irrigation water
transfer and land dry-up, the regulations require re-vegetation plans.
Water court approved re-vegetation plans may be accepted as partial or
full satisfaction of the requirement. Additionally, some local governments, such as Douglas County and the City of Idaho Springs, have
sought to regulate the activities of state agencies, specifically Colorado
Department of Transportation ("CDOT"), by designating highways and
interchanges. CDOT challenged the actions but the district courts
rejected its arguments, upholding the regulations.
Mr. Dahl concluded his presentation with a brief discussion of watershed protection ordinances enacted by about two dozen Colorado
municipalities under the authority of Colorado Revised Statute § 31-15707(1) (b). That section provides that those municipalities have control over an area within a five mile radius of their water works. Mr.
Dahl pointed out that for mountain towns the water system intake is
often outside of the town, thus creating a sort of "mini zoning district"
around the diversion structure. According to Mr. Dahl, Steamboat
Springs has recently considered a watershed protection ordinance.
The local ranching community has opposed the plan because of potential permit requirements for construction of irrigation works. Mr. Dahl
said the discussions over this issue are ongoing.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS-MY TENURE AS STATE ENGINEER
Hal Simpson, PE, Director, Colorado Division of Water Resources,
Denver
Hal Simpson, the Colorado State Engineer who recently announced his retirement, gave the keynote address reflecting on his
experiences and discussing issues that his successor will face. The address began with a joke, and then turned to a history of his appointment following the retirement of State Engineer Danielson. He was
appointed acting state engineer as part of what he referred to as the
"Valentine's Day Massacre," and appointed state engineer on August 7,
1992.
Mr. Simpson then discussed the changes within the Division of Water Resources he had witnessed during his tenure. He illustrated the
first major change by example, saying that the first meeting of water
commissioners was in a room filled with smoke where commissioners
gave verbatim readings of written reports. The last of such meetings he
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attended was in a smoke free room and most of the presentations included attractive Power Point presentations. The second major change
that he mentioned was the growing role of women in the workplace as
engineers and water commissioners. He also discussed the growth of
technology, saying that when he became state engineer, there was one
computer with a water right databank located at Colorado State University. Now, water data is readily available through the powerful Colorado Decision Support System, and through use of electronic information exchange. He mentioned the growth in the staff from about 200
employees to 265, and commended the Colorado legislature for responding appropriately to the increasing complexity of water administration by giving the Office of the State Engineer the resources to do
the job. Mr. Simpson pointed to improvements in the Dam Safety Program and the Hydrographic Programs, and the creation of a Well Inspection Program. Finally, he discussed improvements in communication within the Department staff, including the departure from a topdown management structure and use of electronic inter-office communications.
Mr. Simpson then turned to a discussion of the major issues that he
had faced during his tenure. The first area he discussed was leadership
development within the department including the creation of a training program, shared leadership, a leadership team that he established
when he took office, and leadership by example creating an atmosphere of trust within the Department. The second challenge that Mr.
Simpson covered was conjunctive management of ground and surface
water. He discussed the difficulty of bringing thousands of unregulated wells into the priority system. He summarized the Colorado Supreme Court decision in the Empire Lodge case, overturning the authority of the state engineer to approve augmentation plans, and a legislative amendment allowing the state engineer to approve substitute water
supply plans. Addressing the South Platte, Mr. Simpson recounted his
experiences trying to integrate the thousands of wells in that basin into
the priority system and expressed regret that there had been no mutually acceptable solution. He then turned to his experiences with the
Arkansas River Valley, discussing the agreements reached for conjunctive management and the approval of those agreements by the special
master. He also noted that he and the Kansas State Engineer had
started meeting as the ten year compliance period draws to a close.
The final issue that Mr. Simpson touched on was the extreme variability of runoff during his tenure from the plentiful water of the 1990's to
the droughts of the early 21st century that emptied reservoirs and extended calls on the South Platte. He then concluded this section of his
address by discussing the relationship building that has occurred
through activity in interstate water organizations such as the Western
States Water Council, which advises the Western Governors Council.
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The final portion of Mr. Simpson's address covered the issues that
his replacement will face in the future. The first issue that he discussed
was San Luis Aquifer management, suggesting that his replacement
should encourage the Rio Grand Water Conservancy District to continue its efforts to create sub-districts and a groundwater management
plan. He then turned to the Republican River Water Conservation
District, highlighting the recent attempts by Pioneer Irrigation District
to un-designate portions of the Northern High Plains Designated
Ground Water Basin. He then moved on to the Arkansas River Basin,
suggesting that his successor will have to implement the decision of the
special master in that basin, and that conservation efforts in that basin
may reduce return flows to the river, an issue that Kansas is watching
closely. Finally, Mr. Simpson addressed the Colorado River Basin, expressing his opinion that lower basin demand is going to increase in
the coming years, and that Colorado needs rules for curtailment of
upper basin uses before it becomes necessary.
Mr. Simpson concluded his address with best wishes for his successor, noting that there is an excellent team in place in the Division of
Water Resources to receive his replacement. He said that he plans to
spend time doing some part-time consulting, spending time with his
grandchildren, fly fishing, and golfing, but that most importantly he
wants to continue assisting that State of Colorado. Upon his closing
line-"I have been fortunate and blessed to serve as the State Engineer"-Mr. Simpson received a standing ovation.
NEW TECHNOLOGIES
REUSE TECHNOLOGIES; GROUND WATER RECHARGE AND REUSE

The presentation on reuse technologies was given by David Stewart,
PhD, PE, President and CEO of Stewart Environmental Consultants,
Fort Collins, Steven 0. Sims, Esq., of Brownstein, Hyatt & Farber, Denver, and Bill Carter, of CH2M Hill, Englewood,Dr. David Stewart began
this panel presentation with a general discussion of available reuse
technology. He gave a short background on water reuse efforts covering efforts in South Africa, Colorado, California, Arizona, and Florida.
Noting that reuse technology is a way to use imported water to exhaustion, Dr. Stewart discussed the difference between direct potable water
reuse, which is not very practical but can be achieved, and non-potable
water reuse for a variety of purposes, including reuse of CBM produced
water. His presentation then turned to the water quality criteria, including regulation 84 adopted in 2000 and amended in 2004, which
creates 3 categories of water reuse-restricted use with no contact and
limited use areas, unrestricted use but no direct contact, and the most
stringently regulated category, unrestricted use with direct contact. He
touched briefly on the reuse water regulations in California and Florida before turning to a discussion of the technologies available. The
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principle technologies that Dr. Stewart discussed were membrane bioreactors, which offer efficient treatment in a smaller facility with less
operator attention and work well as scalping plants, and activated
sludge treatment, which is a more intensive treatment well suited to
large facilities such as the Denver Water Districts reuse facility. In conclusion, Dr. Stewart reiterated the importance of the growing field of
water reuse to the future of water management in times of shortage.
The next presenter in this panel was Bill Carter from CH2M Hill,
who discussed the Prairie Waters Project in Aurora, Colorado. He began with a background discussion of the how the Prairie Waters Project
fits into Aurora's integrated resource plan. He said that Aurora looked
at about 32 different projects varying in yield from 2000-4800 acre-feet
per year, and using the Colorado, Arkansas, and South Platt rivers as a
source. According to Mr. Carter, Aurora settled on the Prairie Waters
Project because it allowed recapture of already developed waters delaying need for additional trans-mountain diversions, and it is a quickly
implementable and reliable solution. The aesthetic issues with water
from the South Platt including taste, discoloration, and smell, were
issues that had to be taken into account in designing a system that
would acceptably augment the direct treatment mountain water currently used in Aurora's system. After considering high-pressure membrane filtration methods, the engineers settled on a blend of natural
and conventional purification methods. According to Mr. Carter, this
option eliminates water loss to brine streams and is lower cost, but does
not address taste, discoloration and smell issues. To address those issues, the reuse water will be blended with the direct treatment water.
As described by Mr. Carter, the system will consist of a riverbank filtration system resulting in 10 days of underground movement of river
water before reaching the intake wells, and an aquifer recharge and
recovery system with an additional 30 days of travel time. He concluded by noting that underground travel time is critical and that all of
the undesirable impurities were non-detects after the aquifer recharge
and recover process.
The final panelist was Steven Sims, who discussed the legal aspects
of water reuse. He opened his presentation with an anecdote about
Hal Simpson, referring to him as "the Teflon man" because nothing
would stick to him on cross-examination in the Arkansas River trials.
He briefly discussed the history of aquifer recharge and underground
storage. He then turned to a discussion of the 1979 House Bill 0481,
which provides for underground storage, and the Board of County Commissioners v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch decision. He referred to the
case as the definitive case on underground storage and praised the
opinion written by Colorado Supreme Court Justice Gregory Hobbs.
Mr. Sims then outlined the elements of proof to acquire an underground storage right, and noted that you can store water under another persons land without permission, but must have permission to
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construct injection or recovery facilities. Turning to the Prairie Waters
Project, he said that Aurora had chosen to obtain an underground
storage right for that operation because of the amount of time that the
water would remain underground, and that Aurora will have to comply
with liner requirements for the operation and will need EPA permits
for the injection wells.
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RECREATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
RECREATIONAL IN-CHANNEL DIVERSIONS: THE "INSIDE" STORY
Glenn Porzack, Esq., of Porzack, Browning, and Bushong, Boulder,
who was heavily involved in the legislative and judicial process that lead
to the recognition of recreational in-channel diversions ("RICDs"),
began his presentation with what he viewed as the four defining highlights that lead to the success of RICDs. The first thing that he discussed was the size of the claimed flows, noting that Golden claimed
1000 cubic feet per second ("cfs"), which is what the kayak park in
question was designed for, and that the opposition claimed that 35 fps
was sufficient to float a boat. He drew an analogy between the 1000 cfs
needed for a "world class" kayak park and the states other attractions,
pointing out that people do not come to Colorado to climb the minimum size mountains, or ski in the minimum sized ski areas. Mr. Porzack then turned to the issue of economics, claiming that recreation is
economically important to Colorado and that RICDs help fill the gap
between the summer and winter tourism seasons by taking advantage
of snowmelt flows. He pointed out that there would not have been
such adamant opposition to the Golden RICD application if it had
been a for hydroelectric power generation, which differs from a RICD
only in that it dries up the stream for a stretch and the RICD generates
more economic benefit. Mr. Porzack then turned to the use of photographs in litigation, and distributed the poster size photos used in
showing that kayak parks are major engineered diversion structures,
rather than just slight rearrangement of boulders as some had suggested. Finally, Mr. Porzack discussed the disqualification of Colorado
Supreme Court Justice Gregory Hobbs from the Golden case because
of his involvement in the Ft. Collins case and the similarities in the arguments that were being made in the Golden case. The presenter
stated that the decision to make a motion for disqualification was not
taken lightly, but that an attorney has an obligation to act in the best
interest of his client regardless of coincident implications to the attorney.
Mr. Porzack then discussed some "lessons learned" from the process. His first observation was that you must be prepared for a fight. He
suggested that the state made the process as expensive and cumbersome as possible, and that the media was critical in garnering public
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support for RICDs, which "bucked up" the city councils that were approving the expenses and ultimately leading to successful procurement
if water rights for kayak parks. The next observation that Mr. Porzack
made was that if you go to the legislature for a fix, be careful because
you might not get what you asked for. He pointed to attempts to prevent RICDs legislatively, which ultimately ended up creating legislation
confirming RICDs. He stated that the process of getting RICDs integrated into Colorado law was proof that the Colorado's water system
works, and is flexible enough to accommodate new types of water
rights. Finally, Mr. Porzack mentioned that there have been instances
of post-decree validations where the existence of a RICD has prevented
destructive municipal and trans-mountain diversions.
Mr. Porazk concluded his presentation by suggesting that the Colorado Water ConservationDistrict v. City of Centralcase, protecting a CWCB
instream flow from injury resulting from an exchange of senior water
rights, will apply to RICDs. He cited Carville, saying "it's the economy
stupid" and finished by stating that "the greater the flow, the greater
the dough for the State as a whole."
SMART DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Bart Miller, Water Program Director, Western Resource Advocates,
Boulder
The final presenter at this conference was Bart Miller, Water Program Director, of Western Resource Advocates, Boulder, who discussed
Colorado's future water needs and how the State can meet those
needs. First, Mr. Miller discussed the SWSI study, which concluded
that that by 2030 we will need an additional 1.18 million acre feet of
water per year. He then turned to potential solutions.
The first solution Mr. Miller discussed was the traditional large water project, noting that these projects have major consequences, often
hurt recreational opportunities by interrupting flows impacting fishing
and boating. He then turned to a "new balanced plan" conceived by
the Sustainable Water Caucus consisting of the Colorado Environmental Coalition, Western Resource Advocates, and Trout Unlimited.
The priorities of that plan are to conserve healthy rivers, protect
threatened rivers, and restore damaged rivers. He discussed 1041
regulations, Clean Water Act, and NEPA, and suggested that state instream flow programs and bypass flow agreements will aid in the effort
to protect rivers. He said that the current climate changes would accelerate this need.
Mr. Miller then addressed the potential solutions, suggesting that
indoor and outdoor conservation measures alone could yield 100,000
acre-feet per year each, and that the State should also look at reuse,
sharing arrangements like rotational fallowing, and conjunctive use to
maximize benefit. On the demand side of the equation, he suggested
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that smaller lot sizes, turf limits like Aurora has in place, and prevention of the over-watering that is currently standard will reduce the use
of water to irrigate lawns. Mr. Miller also discussed the use of rate
structures to incentivise conservation. On the supply side of the equation, Mr. Miller mentioned that water system loss through leakage is
approximately 120,000 acre-feet per year and should be addressed. He
also discussed water reuse, underground storage, "ag to urban" transfers, and land fallowing as potential sources of water to meet the growing needs.
Finally, Mr. Miller discussed "smart projects," specifically mentioning the Chatfield Reservoir reallocation, which allows a portion of the
storage pool historically reserved for flood control for municipal water
storage, and the Prairie Waters Project in Aurora. He concluded by
making the assertion that many options such as water conservation,
reuse, and agriculture to urban transfers will go a long way towards
meeting future demand, but acknowledged the possibility that reservoir expansions and trans-mountain diversions may be necessary to
some extent.
Mark Terzaghi Howe

LAW OF THE RIO GRANDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES IN
CHANGING TIMES
CLE INTERNATIONAL
Santa Fe, New Mexico

February 1-2, 2007

When the "Law of the Rio Grande" conference started on a cold
and snowy Thursday morning at the Eldorado Hotel in historic Santa
Fe, water was on the minds of not only the lawyers, hydrologists, and
engineers in the conference room, but on the whole state of New Mexico. Governor Bill Richardson recently named 2007 "The Year of Water" in the state and his pronouncement generated a heightened sense
of importance and urgency in managing water resources across the
state, but especially along the Rio Grande, the 1886-mile river that bisects the state from north to south.
The first morning of the conference provided the attendees with a
foundational understanding of the historical management of Rio
Grande water resources and how New Mexico, in particular, aims to
manage them in the future. John D'Antonio Jr., New Mexico's State
Engineer and Secretary to the Interstate Stream Commission, gave a
quick overview of the history and management of the Rio Grande
Compact from the perspectives of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas.
D'Antonio focused on how demand on the river resources drove the
solutions of the individual states, and individual portions of the river
inside New Mexico. A good rule of thumb began to emerge; the far-
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ther the river stretches, the more people and land it touches, the more
complicated and nuanced the management issues become.
Following the overview of the Compact, Rolf Schmidt-Petersen,
chief of the Rio Grande Basin Bureau, gave a more detailed perspective of New Mexico's attempts to address the complicated management
issues along the Rio Grande. From his perspective, the Governor's
declaration fell short, in that every year in the West is the year of water.
His overview of this year's efforts mirrored much of the content for the
rest of the conference: the recent water right settlements with New
Mexico's Indian tribes and Pueblos, the formation of a preadjudication bureau for the Middle Rio Grande district, the State-wide
water management plan update, endangered species management,
and new demands arising from increased population along the Rio
Grande.
The featured presenter, Christopher Rich, indulged the audience
in a personal account of his relationship with water resources, including his legendary light-hearted lyrical limericks on legally leaden litigation. He offered many insights into interstate adjudication and water
resource disputes, from his experiences as a Senior Attorney with the
Department of the Interior, including cases that he personally led into
the highest levels of the federal judiciary. After many years of extremely tense and ill-willed litigations and disputes, Mr. Rich concluded that the states and federal government have significantly improved their relationships. The current level of cooperation between
various government entities points to a less litigious and contentious
method of resolving water resource disputes.
Presentations by two prominent New Mexico policy makers bookended the morning's overview of current issues. State Senator Carlos
Cisneros, former interim chair of the Senate Conservation Committee,
and Bill Hume, Policy and Issues Director for New Mexico Governor
Bill Richardson, presented their perspectives on what "The Year of Water" would mean for the state of New Mexico, agreeing that the Governor's decision to intentionally use recent surpluses in state revenue on
water management would mean that projects placed on the backburner in the past few years would return to the forefront. Priorities
for both branches of government included various capital improvements for water delivery and conservation systems, payments into the
Indian water right settlements, developing a dependable water market
for rights in the middle section of the Rio Grande, and concentrating
on finding solutions to environmental concerns along the river, especially regarding various Endangered Species Act demands on water
resources. In his closing remarks, Mr. Hume told the audience that
2007 would be a "seminal waypoint in the history of the river" by concentrating on supply-side demands, balanced by the state's approach to
regulating new demands within the system currently in place.
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The afternoon sessions resumed with a discussion on conversion of
Rio Grande water to support growth and yet maintain the agrarian
economy. A panel of three experts explained different conversion projects all aimed to address these demands on the river, which are evolving from agrarian to urban needs.
Jay Stein, a partner at Stein & Brockmann in Santa Fe, began the
panel discussion with a detailed look at the San Juan-Chama Project.
Starting with a brief overview, Stein explained that the project serves to
provide New Mexico with its apportionment of Colorado River water as
stipulated by the 1949 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact. Almost
thirteen miles of tunnels under the San Juan Mountains and the Continental Divide deliver the project water to serve municipal, domestic,
industrial, and agricultural purposes in the Middle Rio Grande Valley,
especially the city of Albuquerque. Stein then explained a few of the
recent project issues; including the successful use of permanent repayment contracts by six municipalities to offset diversion impacts, and
the State Engineer process to regulate municipal contracts that allow
for direct diversions for consumptive use within a municipality.
Steven Hernandez, a partner at Hubert & Hernandez in Las Cruces, followed Stein with a discussion of special water user associations.
Hernandez began by pronouncing that 2007 is the year of water litigation. Hernandez then delved into the history of the development of
special water users associations in New Mexico. In 2000, New Mexico
established the special water users' association statute to address, in
large part, municipalities' problems acquiring water rights. According
to Hernandez, the statute expands the "water bank" ability for irrigation districts by expanding their authority.
Timothy Brown, an attorney on the Texas Water Rights Commission from Austin, ended the panel focusing on conversion contracts
for El Paso to convert project water originally designated for agricultural purposes to municipal purposes from the Texas point of view.
Brown mostly focused on the increasing demand in El Paso, which is
"growing like a weed." In order to meet these increasing demands, El
Paso is using conversion contracts with private landowners to acquire
the water that would ordinarily go to the landowner.
Upon returning from the afternoon break, DL Sanders, Chief
Counsel for the New Mexico Office of the State Engineer, took the
stage. His presentation, entitled Active Water Resource Management and
Adjudication and Administration of Water Rights gave an overview of the
history, current state, and plans for the future of New Mexico's water
rights administration.
Sanders explained how, in the eyes of the New Mexico State Engineer's Office, the need for adjudicating water rights among users in
New Mexico only came about within the last ten to fifteen years. Upon
this realization, New Mexico looked to the Colorado water court process for some guidance. As a result, the New Mexico Supreme Court
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created water divisions within each judicial district and there are currently a number of ongoing adjudications. In 2002, the need for priority administration became evident and New Mexico embraced the idea
that water rights should be adjudicated before being administered. It
also determined that the State Engineer, not the court should administer the rights. Accordingly, the State Engineer realized the authority to
appoint water masters to administer water rights, paid for with tax dollars.
Today, the New Mexico State Engineer's Office is making efforts to
improve its adjudication process. It is trying to educate people, make
the process less scary, and get people to work together. The ultimate
goal for the New Mexico State Engineer's Office is to improve on the
Colorado adjudicatory process.
Following Sanders, Carlos Rubinstein, Texas Water Master, spoke
on the value of water masters. He gave an overview of the advantages
and disadvantages of an administered system versus an honor system,
including the increased efficiency under a water master. Rubinstein
also explained how water masters work, who pays for them, how complaints are handled, and the monitoring activities. Rubinstein was an
obvious proponent for the water master system, but gave an interesting
and relatively balanced presentation.
Following these speakers in the last session of the day was John M.
Stomp, Water Resources Manager for the Albuquerque Bernalillo
County Water Utility Authority. His presentation, entitled How Municipalities Are Meeting Water Demands for Their Customers in the Rio Grande
Stream System discussed the effects ground water pumping has had in
the last ten years and the conservation measures now in place to help
prevent further effects. He also discussed the current state of water
treatment. In particular, he detailed a number of structures including
a newly constructed adjustable height dam designed to move sediment,
pipelines, and a water pump station built to resemble a replica of a
Spanish church. Stressing the importance of education and public
acceptance of surface water consumption, Stomp described some of
Albuquerque's plans, including bringing all school kids through the
water treatment plant and learning from the mistakes Tucson made in
attempting to introduce surface water consumption to its customers.
John Bruciak, General Manager & CEO of the Public Utilities
Board in Brownsville Texas also spoke. Brownsville Texas is the end of
the line for the Rio Grande before it enters Mexico. Bruciak explained
how Brownsville is utilizing a combination of reservoirs and desalination of brackish water to meet its water demands. Because of their
proximity to salt water, desalination is an ideal supply of water for
Brownsville. In 2001, Brownsville considered building a reverse osmosis membrane treatment plant and by 2004, it was constructed and
running. It was interesting and inspiring to hear the advances made in
Brownsville, and how quickly it got things in place.
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Day two of the conference started with a session on Indian water
rights settlements along Rio Grande tributaries. A panel of three attorneys each gave their interpretations on the settlements for Aamodt
and Abeyta, which are two Pueblo groups along Rio Grande tributaries
who have spent the last four decades trying to secure their water rights.
John Stroud, a partner at Abramowitz, Franks & Stroud in Albuquerque, argued that the defining characteristic of these settlements is, not
surprisingly, the length of the litigation. Stroud advised that there are
a few principles to learn from this lengthy process. First, he suggested
that these settlements established that courts should look to both federal law and Spanish influence to adjudicate Indian water rights.
These settlements determined that the premise of Indian water rights
is aboriginal occupancy and use of the resource. Second, Stroud focused on a few of the key aspects of the settlements, which he argued
were responsible for making the settlements possible. .The Pueblo's
concepts of historically irrigated acreage and forbearance make it possible for the state to meet the Rio Grande Compact requirements and
to take the settlements seriously.
Jessica Aberly, of the Aberly Law Firm in Albuquerque, suggested
that the audience should view the Aamodt and Abeyta settlements as "a
study in variations on common themes," because despite variations in
the two settlements' factual backgrounds, there are many common
themes. The Aamodt settlement included four Pueblos and involved
extensive litigation. The Aamodt Pueblos faced the hydrological problem of chronic surface water shortages and maintained strong, but not
uniform, acequias. The Abeyta settlement, on the other hand, involved only one Pueblo, and the adjudication process never produced
court orders. The Abeyta Pueblo also had well-organized and traditional acequias.
Despite these factual differences, Aberly argued that both settlements had four common themes, which contributed to their success.
First, both settlements focused on the protection of the aquifer
through mechanisms to lessen in-basin impacts on groundwater development. Second, both settlements incorporated a respect for traditional surface water irrigation by the acequias. Third, they both recognized the aboriginal water rights of the Pueblos, but compromised regarding the manner of development of currently unused portions of
those water rights in order not to disrupt existing non-Indian water
uses. Lastly, both agreements were dependent upon imported water
supply. Throughout Aberly's presentation, she stressed the important
influence of place and location in these settlements and suggested that
these settlements represent the intersection of the ancient and the
modern.
John Utton, an attorney at Sheehan, Sheehan & Stelzner in Albuquerque, began by sharing that these two settlements reminded him of
Mark Twain's comment that "whiskey is for drinking, and water is for
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fighting!" Utton focused his presentation on the logistics of implementing the regional water project that the Aamodt settlement established. Utton suggested that even though the various parties signed
the settlement agreement in May 2006, four "large" steps remain before the settlement is actually complete. First, the parties must determine the project specifications and costs, which could include a federal
contribution of around $200 million. Second, the parties need to establish where the water will come from for the project. Third, the settlement requires approval from the U.S. in the form of legislation.
Fourth, a final approval of the executive settlement is necessary from
the court. After examining these remaining obstacles for the settlement, Utton remarked that "water runs uphill to money!"
Just before lunch, John Shomaker, of John Shomaker & Associates,
spoke on Hydrology and Water Markets, outlining the inherent problems
in an appropriation system. He explained how the uncertainty of water flow and the fluctuation in use make an appropriation system a
wasteful one. Using a compilation of charts and graphs, Shomaker
outlined the inefficiency of reservoirs and the delay of return flows
require a much greater amount of water than any appropriation ever
calls for. While he did not offer an alternative solution, he clearly outlined the disadvantages and waste of the appropriation system.
Following Shomaker was Dave Simon, Director of New Mexico
State Parks

discussing Recreational Uses and Recreational Economy.

Simon's presentation introduced Bosque State Park, New Mexico's
newest state park, located just outside of Las Cruces, New Mexico. He
detailed the history of the area and the land acquisition process, including key players, development plans, funding, and special considerations. Among the special considerations were a number of endangered species present on the property. Simon discussed the details and
process of entering into a Safe Harbor Agreement to protect the species and working with water users to maintain wetlands in the area.
Steve Harris also spoke on the topic, covering the importance of instream flows and recreational use on the river. While slamming Colorado's diversion requirement, Harris stressed the importance of recognizing the intangible value of in-stream flows as well as the tangible.
He was a vibrant and passionate speaker who brought a lot of interesting and valid points to light.
Alletta Belin, partner at Belin & Sugarman in Santa Fe, along with
Dean Robbins, Assistant General Manager for the Texas Water Conservation Association, presented on environmental issues facing the Rio
Grande. Belin provided a litigation update on the Rio Grande Silvery
Minnow, an endangered species inhabiting the Middle Rio Grande.
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys involves, to date, over six years of liti-

gation and legislation seeking to determine whether the Bureau of
Reclamation ("BOR") should release project water to maintain sufficient river flow to avoid jeopardy to the minnow. After several district
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court opinions, two Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, and several appropriations riders, referred to by Belin as the "Minnow Riders,"
the case is on appeal again to the Tenth Circuit after Judge Parker's
November 2005 judgment. Judge Parker held that the claims regarding San Juan-Chama Project water were moot due to the minnow riders
and the claims regarding Middle Rio Grande Project water were not
moot. He affirmed the settlement between the environmental groups
and Albuquerque regarding San Juan-Chama Project water and he decided not to vacate his prior orders compelling BOR to maintain sufficient river flow for the minnow.
In addition to the drawn-out litigation process, the minnow still
faces several remaining obstacles. Belin ended her talk by discussing
these remaining problems for the minnow, including growth in the
valley, drought cycles exacerbated by climate change, budget constraints. Furthermore, the reestablishment of a silvery minnow population in other parts of its historic range is crucial to the species success.
Dean Robbins discussed some of the current environmental projects and objectives at the Texas Water Conservation Association. Robbins stated that the agenda for the association is to seek a balance between the needs of the environment and the needs of development.
While the association would be against retroactively placing environmental restrictions on older, pre-existing water rights, they are seeking
other alternatives to address environmental concerns. Currently, the
association is working on environmental flows legislation in Texas.
After a brief break for drinks and cookies, the afternoon session resumed with an ethics session presented by Felicia Orth, the hearing
officer for the New Mexico Environment Department. Orth discussed
the interesting intersection of her role as an Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ") with the implementation of notions of environmental justice,
and the underlying ethical considerations that affect her daily work.
Orth began by explaining her procedure for hearings, which emphasizes transparency and public involvement to insure fairness. Orth
then explained the ethical implications of being the arbiter between
your employer and their adversaries, including the importance of impartiality, transparency, and avoiding ex parte contacts and fraternization.
Orth ended her presentation with a discussion of environmental
justice and how it affects her hearings. Environmental justice focuses
on preventing the disproportionate burden of environmental harms
on vulnerable communities. In her hearings, Orth permits pollution,
and there is no apparent legal basis on which to deny an application
for environmental justice considerations. Nonetheless, Orth suggests
that the Rules of Professional Conduct implicitly allow individual attorneys and ALJs to incorporate environmental justice concerns. Furthermore, Orth urges that local communities must take charge and
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confront environmental justice head-on by encouraging more thoughtful planning and zoning.
The conference concluded with a discussion about the nature of
water markets by the program's co-chair, Glenn Jarvis, and William
Turner, a trustee of the firm Waterbank. Mr. Turner started his presentation by giving an overview of Waterbank generally and then moved
into what his vision for the future of water resources. He set the stage
for his perspective on water by stating that water was not a human
right, but a human need. As such, humans should determine its ownership and use through a market system. He stated that the New Mexico Water Market was one of the most advanced water markets in the
world, perhaps only second to the markets of Chile and Australia.
What defines an advanced market for Mr. Turner? Straightforward,
known process that is not susceptible to unnecessary government interference. As his supplementary reading stated, "markets that work the
best operate without or only with a modicum of regulations."
Mr. Turner explained how his firm, Waterbank, operates water
right auctions on a near weekly basis, often with little interference
from the State of New Mexico. His company was responsible for verifying the worthiness of the rights and facilitated the transfer. His belief
in the maturity of the New Mexico market appeared grounded in his
business experience. It would seem that his opinion about the New
Mexico water market, however, stood in direct contradiction to nearly
every other presenter at the conference.
Each state on the Rio Grande has a water market as different as
their respective water laws. Mr. Turner suggested that a small step
across the Colorado-New Mexico border was a great leap in terms of
water market maturity. Mr. Glenn Jarvis, the co-chair of the entire
program, picked up the conversation at the New Mexico-Texas border.
Mr. Jarvis laid a foundation for transferring water interests on the
Lower Rio Grande in Texas. The ten factors regarding transfers
seemed to come from Mr. Jarvis' personal experience facilitating transactions along the river. Indeed, he explained the general factors by
describing their relation to a transfer he had worked on. These factors
included the location of the original right on the river, the purpose of
the new use, how the water would be taken from the river, the parties
involved, and whether or not the transfer and new use was consistent
with regional and state plans.
MariaHohn, Kelly Snodgrass & PaulD. Tigan

BOOK NOTES
Colorado Foundation for Water Education, Citizen's Guides, Colorado
Foundation for Water Education, Denver, Colorado (2005); 3 3 pp;
free; ISBN 0-9754075-0-3, paperback or online.
Created in 2002, the Colorado Foundation for Water Education is
Colorado's only statewide non-profit, non-advocacy organization
formed to promote better understanding of Colorado's water resources and issues by providing balanced and accurate information
and education. The Colorado Foundation for Water Education publishes a series of short, educational booklets, the Citizen's Guides, designed to provide Colorado citizens and practitioners with balanced
and accurate foundational information on a variety of subjects related
to water resources. The Citizen's Guides provide succinct, current
summaries of relevant areas of water law in Colorado and are quite
useful for law students, practitioners, and those interested in the area
of water law. The Colorado Foundation for Water Education provides
the booklets in PDF format on their website free of charge. Hardcopies are also available for purchase through their website's online store
at http://cfwe.org or by calling (877) 426-4434 or (303) 377-4433.
Discounts are available as a membership benefit.
The Citizen's Guide to Colorado Water Law, authored by Colorado Supreme Court Justice Gregory Hobbs Jr., serves as a useful desk reference discussing the basics of Colorado water law. This Citizen's Guide
traces water law through its historical development to its application
today. This Citizen's Guide provides the groundwork for Colorado
water law articulating the fundamentals of the prior appropriation system, tributary and non-tributary groundwater, beneficial use, domestic
preference, water waste and return flows, efficiency of water diversions,
conjunctive use, abandonment of water rights, and over-appropriation.
This Citizen's Guide offers quick summaries on the Colorado and federal agencies that handle water rights and water quality along with the
judicial process for water rights and decrees. This Citizen's Guide discusses surface and ground water allocation and regulation, helping
readers to understand concepts such as interstate compacts and federal
laws. Also, this Citizen's Guide addresses environmental protection
and its relationship with water law. Near the end of the booklet, this
Citizen's Guide provides a useful chronology of water law, glossary, and
reference list.
The Citizen's Guide to Water Quality Protection, authored by Paul D.
Frohardt of the Colorado Water Quality Control Commission, tackles
the complex system of water quality laws and regulations. Intended as
467
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a useful desk reference, this Citizen's Guide addresses Colorado's history of water quality development and how the state decides to set the
levels of expectation for "clean" water and what rivers are healthy for
fish and what lakes are safe for swimming and other outdoor recreation. The discussion of water quality issues specific to Colorado and
the Rocky Mountain Region from mining, to road maintenance, to
pesticides and fertilizers from farming is especially instructive. This
Citizen's Guide provides quick summaries on the methods used to
monitor and assess water quality, how polluted waters are cleaned up,
and how pollution is controlled. This Citizen's Guide addresses the
risks and investigates the solutions to Colorado's water quality problems in a succinct, informative way. The glossary, reference, and contact list are also helpful at the end of the booklet.
The Citizen's Guide to Colorado Water Conservation, authored by Nancy
Zeilig, looks at the core dilemma of all water use in Coloradomultiple water users with diverse needs and goals that must share limited, fluctuating supplies. This Citizen's Guide discusses current water
conservation technologies, incentive programs, regulations, and policies that promote efficient water use in Colorado. This Citizen's Guide
addresses both the short-term strategies that promote water conservation to reduce use and stretch existing supplies and long-term responses for a demand that is ever increasing. This Citizen's Guide illuminates efficient water use techniques for homes and cities, commerce and industry, and agriculture. This Citizen's Guide serves as a
useful reference for Colorado residents or practitioners who need a
balanced overview of the opportunities and challenges of water conservation in Colorado today. The end of this Citizen's Guide provides a
useful reference list of books and Internet publications and sites.
The Citizen's Guide to Colorado Water Heritage draws together the expertise of six prominent historians and scholars from throughout
Colorado and the West: Gregory Hicks, Jared Orsi, Devon Pena, Steven
Schulte, Dick Stenzel, Michael Welsh, and Ken and Ruth Wright. This
Citizen's Guide focuses on the theme of how water has shaped Colorado's culture, history, identity, and community. Focusing on Colorado's first 100 years, this Citizen's Guide highlights the heritage of
each of the major river basins throughout the state. Revealing Native
American, Hispano, and Anglo contributions, this Citizen's Guide explores Colorado's water legacy today. This Citizen's Guide provides a
useful historical context for Colorado citizens or practitioners interested in water resource issues, as well as serving as a valuable teaching
aid. The foldout timeline of Colorado's water heritage provided at the
end of the booklet is especially helpful.
As a follow-up to Citizen's Guide to Colorado's Water Heritage, the Citizen's Guide to Colorado Environmental Era extends the exploration to recent years-labeled the "environmental era." Uniting six prominent
historians, authors, and environmentalists, this Citizen's Guide dis-
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cusses how the environmental movement has shaped Colorado's culture, communities, and landscape. From the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts to the Endangered Species Act, this Citizen's Guide demonstrates how the era of environmental regulation has changed the way
that Colorado residents do business and manage water. This Citizen's
Guide highlights the stories of several specific efforts to return Colorado waters to natural rivers and streams and ensure their future protection.
Authored by Neil Grigg of Colorado State University, the Citizen's
Guide to Where Your Water Comes From, explains how weather patterns

and aquifers supply water for use in Colorado. This Citizen's Guide
summarizes the complex distribution systems developed by Colorado
over the last 150 years to deliver water to agriculture, parks, and
household taps. This Citizen's Guide discusses the two natural sources
of water, rivers for surface water and underground aquifers for
groundwater, and how they are recharged with an annual supply of
water. Emphasizing the role of human intervention for more efficient
use, this Citizen's Guide depicts the infrastructure constructed to divert, collect, convey, treat, and distribute water. This Citizen's Guide
also articulates the community approach of utilities, water districts, and
other organizations that handle the variety of tasks necessary to deliver
water for agricultural, municipal, industrial, or environmental use.
Caitlin Quander

E.C. Pielou, Fresh Water, University Of Chicago Press; New Ed edition
(2000); 275 pp; $15.00; ISBN 0-226-66816-9 soft cover.
Fresh Water tells the story of water from a scientific perspective. Part
hydrology, part biology, and part geology, Fresh Water focuses on the
natural processes that make up the water cycle. Groundwater is explored first, followed by flowing water, then lakes, dams, wetlands, and
finally, water in the atmosphere. Each phase of the water cycle is explored in depth from the way water moves in a particular system, to the
chemical processes it undergoes, to its transfer to the next phase in the
cycle.
Pielou, a research scientist, biologist, and naturalist, believes water
is more than just a "natural resource." Pielou believes water is the lifeblood of all living things and an integral part of our planet. Fresh Water
attempts to explain how the water system works in a technical yet very
readable manner. The book describes how water works, how it flows,
how it freezes, how it moves, what it is made of, and what organisms
call it home. It describes the processes we see all around us in the
natural world in depth, explaining each as it goes and building upon
the last as it moves though the water cycle. Along the way Pielou describes the scientific tools researchers use to study water in all its forms
and what science has taught us thus far about fresh water.
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Chapter one, The Water Cycle, describes the hydrologic cycle, how
water circulates in the natural environment. This brief introduction
describes how water vapor, though transpiration, rises into the atmosphere. Later the vapor falls as rain or snow, traveling across and under
the ground before it eventually returns to the sky. The water cycle is
described as a life cycle; from sea to ice to air, the journey of water is
introduced.
Chapter two, Water below the Ground: Groundwater, introduces underground water. The differences between water table and the saturated zone are explored. The three different types of ground watermeteoric, fossil, and juvenile - are discussed. Ground water in solid
rock, as well as moving ground water is described. The processes that
form aquifers and their different incarnations are then examined.
Aquifer recharge and discharge are scientifically described. Finally,
the chapter ends with a discussion of how groundwater flows, the way
that flow is measured, and how that flow affects the underground
world.
Chapter three, Groundwater in Use, continues the book's exploration of the subject. Aquifers and their usefulness to humans is the focus of the first part of the chapter. The science behind groundwater
extraction is then discussed. This short chapter finishes with a section
on groundwater pollution, how it enters the water cycle, and how it
moves underground and can be tested for.
Water below the Ground: Vadose Water, the fourth chapter, analyzes
how water behaves in the unsaturated, or vadose, zone. This area
forms a temporary holding area for water as it moves towards some
other destination. The process of rain to soil is examined. The biological organisms that call this region home and help cause water
movement are also described. The chapter then turns to a detailed
explanation of how water in the vadose zone moves and is measured.
Gravitational water, capillary water, and hydroscopic water are then
described with a discussion of evapotranspiration rounding out the
chapter.
Chapter five, Flowing Water: Rivers and Steams, changes the focus
from ground water to surface water. It begins with a survey of how
streams originate and grow. The chapter describes streams that start as
groundwater seeps, that flow from lakes, and that begin their lives as
glacial melt water. Then watersheds and measuring a river's flow are
described. Next the chapter describes how rivers rise and fall, recharge, and discharge. The different currents found at differing parts
of the river bed are detailed with a discussion of hydraulic jumps, with
uncritical and supercritical water flows rounding out the section. The
chapter then turns to laminar and turbulent flows and how these affect
moving water.
Chapter six, Rivers at Work, also discusses surface waters. It starts
out by describing how rivers transport sediment, erosion, and deposi-
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tion. The processes that pick up sediment move it along the river and
the myriad of geologic formations rivers create are examined. Next
the topics of how rivers move above and below the ground are presented. The science of river meanders, hyporheic flows, and how
plants and animals affect river systems rounds out this chapter.
Lakes, the seventh chapter in Fresh Water, examines how these
common water features form. It begins with a discussion of the ways
water and nature interact to create lakes. Seeps, river inflow, glacial
carving, and melt water are all studied. Then the chapter turns to an
in-depth inspection of the differing layers that form in lakes and
ponds, and how these mix and separate as well as how scientists measure these effects. Movement above and below the water is examined
next, with a focus on how waves form in each. The chapter ends with a
description of the chemical properties of lake water, including pollution.
Chapter eight changes the direction of the book again. This chapter, When Water Freezes, analyzes the freezing process from its beginnings in fall to the annual spring breakup. Ice below the ground, from
permafrost to ice wedges, is also examined. An explanation of chemical processes and the changes to rivers and lakes as they freeze ends
the chapter.
Chapter nine, Dams, Diversions, and Reservoirs, describes how humans have changed the way water flows and is stored. The types of
manmade structures are examined. The chapter ends with a discussion of how dams, diversions, and reservoirs affect a river's flow, a
lake's layers, the natural chemical process, and the plants and animals
that inhabit them.
Wetlands is the tenth chapter of the book. It starts by describing the
difference between bogs, fens, marshes, and swamps. Each is examined in turn with specific attention paid to the types of plants that distinguish them. How water moves in wetlands is next explored, with the
chapter ending with a focus on how the different wetlands were geologically created.
Chapter eleven, Microscapic Life, changes the focus of the book to
the organisms that call water home. Lake plankton is analyzed. The
different organisms that live in this environment are also examined.
How they behave and their chemical processes are evaluated next.
How they interact with the plants and animals surrounding them is
described. The chapter ends with a discussion of plankton that produce methane and their role in the aquatic environment.
Water in the Atmosphere: Vapor, Clouds, Rain and Snow, is the twelfth
and final chapter of the book. This brings the reader full circle, back
to the water cycle described in the first chapter. Evaporation is examined first, including how it is measured. The chapter then focuses on
water vapor specifically examining clouds and fog, how they are produced, their chemical makeup, and how they react in the atmosphere.
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Finally, the book closes with a brief discussion of how water returns to
the ground, either by rain or snow.
Fresh Water attempts, and ultimately succeeds, at taking the very
complex and scientific subject of water and creating a very understandable book about it. To understand water we must also understand the sciences of hydrology, biology, and geology. Fresh Water takes
these complex subjects and explains them in a way that anyone can
understand. Fresh Water gives the reader a technical explanation of the
intricacies of the water around us in a readable format. For that reason alone, this book should be read. Fresh Water forms a good foundation for readers looking to understand the science behind the policy,
without getting too bogged down in the science itself.
Matthew Willson
Dik Roth, Rutgerd Boelens, & Margreet Zwarteveen, Liquid Relations:
Contested Water Rights and Legal Complexity, Rutgers University
Press (2005); 313 pp; $29.95; ISBN 978-0-8135-3675-0, paperback.
Liquid Relations is a collection of essays from presentations at the
thirteenth international congress on folk law and legal pluralism, held
in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in April 2002. The approach of viewing water rights, primarily irrigation control, in terms of "legal complexity" or
"legal pluralism" provides the common thread in this collection.
In Chapter 1, Legal Complexity in the Analysis of Water Rights and Water Resources Management, the editors map out the cultural anthropology
methodology of this approach. Legal complexity looks beyond state
law and the standard codification of regulations to include non-state
sources of law, such as norms and social relationships. These non-state
laws form influential sources of law in developing nations. The legal
complexity approach holds that standard solutions to water management problems are inadequate because they do not address solutions
that are context-specific, and because they ignore the daily realities of
how ethnicity, gender, and class affect water rights.
In Chapter 2, Prescribing Gender Equality, the authors examine the
governmental attempt to achieve greater representation by women in
Nepalese water user's associations (WUAs). State regulations mandate
that at least two women members must be present on each WUA executive committee. Using a "broad conceptualization of law" that encompasses both state law and "normative ordering in society," the authors analyze the WiUA in the Tukucha irrigation system. The policy,
driven by high-level government bureaucrats and donor organizations,
had a success rate of approximately twenty-five percent; policy implementers and local water users would be better suited to driving the
policy and improving the success rate.
Chapter 3, Defending Indigenous Water Rights, examines the water
rights allocated to Native Americans as a theoretically positive example
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of a dominant culture that acknowledges the importance of respecting
the water rights of indigenous people. The most direct result of the
reserved rights doctrine, won though treaty and statute in the 19th and
20th centuries, is that Native Americans have access to a legitimized
legal mechanism through which they can attempt to protect their
rights; many peoples in developing nations lack a similarly legitimate
and formalized standing. However, rights on paper do not necessarily
translate into actualized and enjoyed rights. Native Americans often
must litigate to secure their paper rights, and the cost of pursuing
these rights often is high in terms of litigation or negotiation costs. In
addition, many tribes lack the economic resources to act upon adjudicated rights after the trial stage.
In Chapter 4, In the Shadow of Uniformity, examines the irrigation
system built and operated by the state agency in Luwu, South Sulawesi,
Indonesia. Indonesian technical irrigation systems based on civil engineering technology began construction from the 1960s. These systems
imposed a technological and legal notion of irrigation that did not
attempt to accommodate the daily experience and norms of the Balinese farmer population they serve. The WUA itself is not an influential
organization; instead, much influence still stems from the traditional
local subak (a secular and ritualistic organization that traditionally
governed water distribution decisions with and eye toward social equity
and beneficial use). Local users will not necessarily fit their behavior
to a social engineering blueprint, but rather balance the regulatory
system as best they can to comply with traditional and everyday notions
of use.
Chapter 5, Anomalous Approaches to Water Rights and the Politics of
Normalization, explores the trend for water rights privatization in the
Andes as a process that reflects the marginalization of local notions of
identity and political power. The essay begins by tracing the notion
that private property is superior to communal property back to
enlightenment ideas, which privilege Western modes of thought. The
authors then analyze how, in countries like Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and
Bolivia, the forced privatization of water rights implements an academic notion of identity that in practice restructures local cultures and
power relationships. Struggles to control water reveal an underlying
struggle to control cultural values and identity.
Chapter 6, Complexities of Water Governance, illustrates how groundwater extraction technology in Kathmandu, Nepal affects existing rules
and water rights. Because of the scarcity of water in the Kathmandu
region, users have increasingly turned to groundwater use; the state's
attempts at regulating access to this water have been only partly successful. Access to groundwater extraction technology in itself shapes
local users' perceptions of water rights. When state agencies provide
water for specific uses, local users perceive that use as being endorsed
as a right by the state. The author proposes an allocation of water in
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several categories: fundamental rights (free access to drinking water),
discretionary rights (bathing, washing, and domestic uses), provisional
rights (industrial and commercial rights), and hydraulic rights (regulation of the technology used to extract water from aquifer and ground
sources).
In Chapter 7, Special Law, the authors demonstrate how local custom and norms play a central role in daily water management practices
in the Andean region. Legislative attempts to enact "special laws" to
recognize local custom around indigenous and peasant water systems
in fact achieve the opposite effect. Such legislation essentializes local
users' dynamic relationship to water rights and renders the context
static. Special law legislation effectively isolates rapidly shifting relationships and makes it easier for influential water users to disempower
local water users. As a result, local users follow rules deemed illegal by
the state system but which comply with the daily use needs of local
populations. The struggles between local and legal definition consequently take place both in and out of a formal legal context.
In Chapter 8, A Win-Some Lose-All Game, the authors examine the
politics of groundwater extraction for purposes of irrigation in India.
The authors focus on Gujarat, where groundwater supports over seventy-seven percent of irrigation; with water tables declining due to
overuse, a significant water market has emerged. Leading academics
and policy makers have advocated competitive markets based on efficient use. However, rich farmers with deep wells are profiting disproportionately; efficiency analysis does not adequately account for the
social position of water users. In addition, influential landowners have
successfully lobbied to prevent implementation of any restrictive regulations. Focusing on the relationship between legal regulation and
social relations, the authors show that caste, rather than equitable resource allocation governed by legal regulation, determines water access.
In Chapter 9, RedressingRacial Inequities through Water Law in South
Africa, the authors examine the attempt by South Africa's National Water Act of 1998 to address inequities of water management rooted in
apartheid-era laws. The Act employs water access as a tool for promoting social and environmental justice and for redressing the former
government's marginalization of the apartheid-era Homeland governments. Looking at three sources of law still influential in South Africa - Apartheid-era laws, former Homeland laws, and post-apartheid laws of
the new national government - the author shows that the new democratically elected government remains in conflict with the local chiefs
who exert influence in the former Homeland areas of the country. A
tension emerges between the way the Act defines and implements "basic human needs" and the way the government establishes catchment
management agencies. The success of the Act's social goals depends
on establishing a dialogue between the government and local popula-
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tions to build upon notions of water tenure established in the older
legal systems.
Chapter 10, Routes to Water Rights, argues that imposition of water
rights by third parties (potentially consultants and bureaucrats) results
in inefficient and often ineffective water use agreements. Transaction
costs impact negotiation efforts for implementing water management
policy. Lower transaction costs directly result in more successful policies. Using local rights and context, or legal complexity, rather than
economic drivers, can result in a more efficient and feasible framework
for water rights.
Chapter 11, Analyzing Water Rights, Multiple Uses, and Intersectional
Water Transfers, relies on examples from India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka to
argue that studies of intersectoral water transfers from agricultural to
non-agricultural use in Western industrialized nations do not necessarily provide a useful model applicable for developing countries. The
United States and Europe have well established regulatory and market
processes for transfers that are not present in developing nations. To
understand the viability of transfers in developing nations, the authors
espouse using a perspective of legal pluralism, which considers the interplay of legal and social frameworks. The authors review the basic
concepts of legal pluralism and discuss the ways rights and laws change
in the context of intersectoral transfers.
In Chapter 12, Water Rights and Legal Pluralism, the editors draw
upon the essays collected in this volume to show that an analytical
method should consider the full context in which water control is situated, and that this context varies substantially based on local circumstances. An understanding of the dynamic activities of people's daily
lives in specific contexts provides the broadest view of water rights. As
a result, water policy imposed by academic and bureaucratic sources
can achieve only modest results, especially in developing countries
where control of water is an important source of power.
Although the essays in Liquid Assets do not employ a standard legal
analysis structure, the collection presents a well-researched alternative
understanding of the way laws affect the daily lives of water users. The
legal complexity approach, while often deeply immersed in cultural
theory, seems best suited for demonstrating the complicated relationship between state regulation and deeply embedded cultural notions of
water use, especially applicable in developing nations. The book thus
offers the most insight for those pursuing an interdisciplinary approach to law.
PaulRodney
Franklin M. Fisher, et al., Liquid Assets: An Economic Approach for
Water Management and Conflict Resolution in the Middle East
and Beyond, Resources for the Future Press, Washington, D.C.
(2005); 242 pp; $ 39.95; ISBN 1-933115-08-4, hardcover.
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In Liquid Assets: An Economic Approachfor Water Management and Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and Beyond, Franklin M. Fisher, Annetter Huber-Lee, Ilan Amir, Shaul Arlosoroff, Zvi Eckstein, Munther J.
Haddadin, Salem G. Hamati, Ammar M. Jarrar, Anan F. Jayyousi, Uri
Shamir, and Hans Wesseling provide a history of the Middle East Water
Project and address the ways that an economic approach to water consumption can resolve disputes and lead to better water management.
The authors begin with two key starting points: first, water scarcity is a
matter of cost and value, not merely of quantity; second, the value of
water and its scarcity will be different in different locations.
Part I of the book-Chapters 1 through 4-focuses on methodology. Chapter 1 describes the economic principles that can usefully be
applied to water disputes, allocation, and management. This first
chapter begins with the premise that competitive markets lead to an
efficient and, in some sense, optimal allocation of resources, and economic analyses provide useful guidance on water management. The
authors use shadow values, scarcity rents, basic theorems, and costbenefit analyses to further make their point. Chapter 2 describes the
Water Allocation System ("WAS") Model, which is a tool users can employ to analyze the consequences of various decisions and alternate
circumstances, including private water demand, naturally occurring
supply, treated wastewater, infrastructure and capital costs, and public
policies toward water. The authors provide mathematics for this model
in the chapter's appendix. Because of the significant differences between water consumption for households and agriculture, Chapter 3
explores the need for and usefulness of an agricultural submodel. In
addition, Chapter 3 provides a mathematical representation of an agricultural submodel, applies the agricultural submodel to Israeli data,
and discusses benefits and problems of agricultural sub-models. Chapter 4 addresses international conflicts and suggests ways that modeling
efforts and accompanying analysis can be used to resolve water disputes. Notably, the authors suggest that if property rights in water are
seen to be reducible to monetary values, negotiations over water can
cease being limited to water itself and can be conducted in a larger
context where water's value is measure against other things. Further,
the authors posit that the availability of seawater desalination means
that the monetary value of disputed property rights will generally not
be very large. Moreover, the authors point out that water agreements
that simply divide water quantities are fixed-quantity agreements that
amount to a zero-sum game, whereas if permits were used and traded,
especially when cooperation involves the construction of mutually
beneficial infrastructure, the gains to all parties can increase and be
greater than the value of the value of water property rights themselves.
The authors' ultimate hope is for cooperation and trust in place of
conflicts over water.
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Part I-Chapters 5 through 8-addresses the detailed results of
WAS models for Israel, Palestine, and Jordan, though not before
thoughtfully discussing sensitive issues one would expect to arise regarding terminology, settlements, and ongoing political conflicts. The
authors make their best efforts to remain fair and neutral to the extent
this is possible.
Chapter 5 applies the WAS model to Israel and discusses the various assumptions and costs and benefits of infrastructure projects. The
WAS model employs data from 1995 and covers water consumption
and water demand curves, as well as supply data and the existing conveyance system. Chapter 5 also provides a section on administrative
pricing versus competitive allocation and data projections for 2010 and
2020. Chapter 6 addresses the results for Palestine, beginning with a
brief discussion of natural features and data on water consumption,
population, and available water supply, including existing infrastructure. Following this, the authors provide an analysis of the current
situation, as well as projections for future conditions, with analyses of
several possible scenarios for Palestine's future. Again, the model results are based on data from 1995, and there are projections for 2010
and 2020. Chapter 7 presents important background and the results of
the application of the WAS model to Jordan, which the authors note is
one of the most arid countries in the world. The results of this application, based on 1995 data, confirm Jordan's need for a new infrastructure to control for leakage and to bring additional supplies to Jordan's
urban areas. The authors also evaluate the projects that are most costeffective and provide projections for 2010 and 2020.
Chapter 8, the final chapter, addresses the value of cooperation
and ways WAS models can be used to resolve water disputes. The authors conclude that if water and water disputes are monetized and analyzed in terms of economics, taking full account of water's social and
national value, which may exceed its private value, and each party can
use its own version of WAS models to evaluate the consequences of
different water agreements, there will be more cooperative agreements
that are most beneficial to all.
Kathleen Potter
William Ashworth, Ogallala Blue: Water and Life on the High Plains,
W.W. Norton, New York, NY (2006); 416 pp; $26.95; ISBN 0393058-42-5, hardcover.
A body of water that stretches under 174,000 square miles and
eight states garners many creative metaphors. Jim Goeke, a hydrogeologist and professor at the University of Nebraska offers one of the
more instructive comparisons in William Ashworth's OgallalaBlue. To
Goeke, the Ogallala Aquifer is like an elephant in a dark room: "the
man who feels the elephant's trunk thinks the animal is like a hose, the
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one who feels its side thinks it's like a wall, and the one who feels the
tusk thinks it's like a rock." In Ogallala Blue, Ashworth examines this
metaphorical elephant and its social, political, and legal impact on
those who depend upon it for their livelihood. His account of the aquifer spans every state that draws water from the source in an attempt,
perhaps, to turn a light on and offer everyone in the room a glimpse of
what they are really holding.
The book is broken up into three broad sections: "The Underground Ocean," "The Ghosts of Ancient Rivers," and "Minimum Water." Rather than examining each state or class of user separately,
Ashworth examines the greater social, political, and legal issues of the
aquifer, folding the concerns of the states and users into these discussions.
"The Underground Ocean" lays a foundational understanding of
the Ogallala aquifer, including many statistics about the area, volume,
and economic impact of the aquifer on the economies of the states
over it, and on the economy of the United States as a whole. Ashworth
begins drawing corollary lines between the water below the ground and
the culture of the water users above ground. Specifically, the section
considers the condition of the aquifer in each state; including relative
thickness, predominant uses, and other issues unique to the particular
states. Ashworth also introduces a consistent theme in the book: how
unique water law systems influence the culture of water usage in individual states.
With this foundation set, Ashworth begins his travels across the
Ogallala Aquifer in earnest in the second section, "The Ghosts of Ancient Rivers." Using a visit to a well-drilling operation in the Sand Hills
of Nebraska as a foil for the history of drawing water out of the aquifer,
Ashworth begins connecting the disparate areas of the High Plains that
draw from the aquifer. Ashworth begins connecting the disparate areas of the High Plains that draw from the aquifer. As a team of well
drillers extracts layer after layer of dirt and silt in Nebraska, Ashworth
describes how each layer arrived from the mountains of Wyoming to
the west, connecting two disparate locations through the passage of
time, wind and earth. Though the nature of the aquifer below the
ground is as unique as the landforms above, there are universal characteristics that the Ogallala shares across its entirety. This section addressees these common and connected aspects, including the geological formations that formed the aquifer and the movement of the water
between seemingly distinct parts of the aquifer. His interviews with
individuals across the aquifer shows that the basic human concerns
regarding the water are as universal as the geology that formed the
aquifer.
The conflicts over Ogallala water, be they between neighboring
ranchers or neighboring states, become apparent in the third section,
"Minimum Water." Previous conflicts in the book generally addressed
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the difficulties of individual users getting water out of the ground; this
section explores the ramifications of legal ownership of water, "beneficial use," and the elusive calculus of determining the value of water. By
comparing and contrasting those who would use the water for traditional purposes (farming, ranching, municipal use) with those who see
water rights as the basis for a traditional market, Ashworth sets the
stage for what are likely to be the future controversies between Ogallala water users well into in the future.
Ogallala Blue addresses the quantitative data and historical records
of the aquifer (which are exhaustive), but also personal perspectives
offered through extensive interviews with people whose life depends
on the aquifer. Ashworth is most successful in OgallalaBlue when tying
these two incompatible notions of the water together. The stories of
the farmers, municipalities, geologists, and lawyers are simultaneously
personal and instructive. Ashworth creates the impression that the
best way to know what the water means is not to look at data tables on
saturation and relative thickness, but to talk to the people whose lives
are determined by the fate of the water.
Paul Tigan
Phoebe Koundouri, Katia Karousakis, Dionysis Assimacopoulos, Paul
Jeffery & Manfred A. Lange Eds., Water Management in Arid and
Semi-Arid Regions, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, UK (2006); 288 pp; $130.00; ISBN 1-84542-423-0, hardcover.
Water Management in Arid and Semi-Arid Regions: InterdisciplinaryPerspectives explains the conclusions of the ARID Cluster projects. The
ARID Cluster projects are three distinct research projects, which use
case studies to explore water scarcity and demand, adaptive approaches, and management strategies. Specifically, the ARID Cluster
projects focus on strategies for regulating and managing water resources in water deficient regions; conflicting demands and hydrological conditions for sustainable use of water on Mediterranean islands;
and a co-evolutionary approach to integrated management of changing utilization.
The first chapter, written by Katia Karousakis and Phoebe
Koundouri, introduces the ARID Cluster projects and gives n overview
of each part of the book. The first part of the chapter reviews the history, implementation, and objectives of the ARID Cluster projects. The
Second part of the chapter contains na overview of the book broken
down by chapter.
The second chapter, written by Ezio Todini, Andreas Schumann
and Dionysis Assimacopoulos, explains the WaterStrategyMan project,
one of the ARID Cluster projects. The authors first explain the support systems, framework, and architecture of the WaterStrategyMan
project software. Next, the authors discuss certain variables including
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water availability and demand, allocation, quality and economic analysis and the ability of the module to change simulations based on different scenarios. The authors conclude with a review of the model and
evaluation options available in the WaterStrategyMan software.
In the third chapter, Rodrigo Maia, provides a case study of the alternative water management scenarios in Ribeiras do Algarve, Portugal.
Maia describ3es the case study, the Ribeiras do Algarve River Basin,
and the analysis approach applied in the case study. Next, Maia discusses demand and availability scenarios, including urban demand,
irrigation, availability, hydrological demand, financial and environmental costs, and revenues. Maia discusses the options available for
management, socio-economic measures, and dam construction and
other structural options. Maia includes a results analysis for domestic
use, irrigation use, economics, and the feasibility of management options. Maia concludes the third chapter with strategies for domestic
use, irrigation use, economics and cost recovery.
The fourth chapter, written by Manfred A. Lange, Antonio Alkistis
Donta, and the MEDIS consortium, describes the MEDIS project. The
MEDIS project examined the increased vulnerabilities and exacerbated
characteristics of the islands of the Mediterranean. The authors begin
with an introduction of the MEDIS Projects background, underlying
concepts, and the methods of assessment the project used. The authors explain the vulnerability and adaptation of physical and environmental dimensions, economic and regulatory dimensions, and social, institutional, and political dimensions. The authors conclude the
fourth chapter with recommendations for addressing current and future Mediterranean island water availability problems.
The fifth chapter, written by Kostas Chartzoulakis and Maria Bertaki, discusses irrigation, crops, and agriculture relating to water resources and sustainable development on Mediterranean islands. The
first part of the chapter discusses climate and irrigation. The second
part of the chapter covers irrigation systems, crop water requirements,
and scheduling. After a brief discussion of the price of irrigation water, the authors conclude with recommendations for irrigation practices, soil and crop management practices, water pricing, reuse of marginal waters, strengthening capacity, and an increase in participation of
farmers in water management.
The sixth chapter, written by Katia Karousakis and Phoebe
Koundouri, provides the economic perspective for implementing an
integrated approach to water resources management and discusses the
instruments and valuation techniques available to price water efficiently and effectively. The authors describe a framework and threestep approach for a comprehensive economic characterization of water, called the Water Framework Directive. The authors discuss market
and government failures as well as optimal allocation of scarce water
resources when failures occur. The authors also explain the economic
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instruments available for effectively managing water resources. The
authors conclude the sixth chapter with an outline of the proposed
methodology for application to the Water Framework Directive.
In the seventh chapter, Marita Laukkanen and Phoebe Koundouri
develop the stochastic recharge model of groundwater extraction. The
authors discuss groundwater extraction under non-cooperation and
social planner problems. The second half of the chapter describes an
application of the model in the Kiti agricultural region of Cyprus.
The eighth chapter, written by Antonio Aledo Tur, Gudalupe Ortiz
Noguera, Paul Jeffrey, Mary Gearey, Jean Daniel Rinaudo, Sebastien
Loubier, Tatjana Veljanovski, and Natasa Ravbar, examines the
Aquadapt project. The Aquadapt project studied variations of the determinants of water use at different levels across France, Spain, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom. The authors describe the four regions
and the survey methodology, including the socio-demographic variables. The second part of the chapter reports the results of the survey
including national difference in attitudes to water use, and water-saving
behaviors. The third section explores the emerging European water
culture and the dual roles the population demonstrates.
The ninth chapter, written by Andreu Bonet, Juan Bellot, Denise
Eisenhuth, Juan Pena, Juan Rafael Sanchz, and Julio Cesar Tejada, analyzes structural change in the natural and social systems. The authors
begin with a discussion of the changing landscape, land cover, and
land use. Next, the authors describe a conceptual framework for the
landscape transition patterns, and conclude with an analysis of the
changes in the patterns of water consumption.
The tenth chapter, written by Katia Karousakis, Phoebe Koundouri,
Dionysis Assimacopoulos, Paul Jeffrey, and Manfred A. Lange, concludes with policy recommendations using common themes of the
three ARID Cluster projects and ideas for future research. The authors
express the need for a holistic approach for sustainable water resources
management is apparent.
Tomi L. Hanson

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
U.S. v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that under the Clean Water Act, wetlands have a requisite nexus
with navigable waters and can be regulated by the Army Corps of Engineers if, alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the
region, they significantly affect the chemical, physical, or biological
makeup of traditional navigable waters).
The United States charged Gerke Excavating, Inc. ("Gerke") with
violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by discharging pollutants into
navigable waters from point sources without a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). Under the CWA, parties must obtain a
permit from the Corps to dredge or fill wetlands.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment for the government. Gerke appealed, claiming that the wetlands at issue were not navigable waters
under the CWA §§301 (a) and 502(12). The Seventh District Court of
Appeals upheld the District Court's decision. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case to the Seventh
District Court of Appeals to determine if the wetlands Gerke dredged
and filled had the requisite nexus with navigable waters in light of its
decision in Rapanos v. United States.
Because the decision in Rapanos consisted of a four Justice plurality
opinion and a concurrence, the court must apply the narrower test in
the concurrence. Therefore, the court does not apply the plurality's
test, that in order for wetlands to fall under the CWA, there must be
(1) an adjacent channel of relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters; and (2) that there
continuous surface connection makes it difficult to know where the
'wetlands' begin and the 'navigable waters' end. Instead, the court
applies the concurrence's test, that a wetland has the requisite nexus if,
alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, the
wetland has a significant chemical, physical, or biological effect on the
integrity of traditional, navigable waters. Because the trial court did
not conduct the factfinding necessary to apply this test, the court re-

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

manded the case to the district court with instructions to apply this
new test.
Elizabeth Meyer
NINTH CIRCUIT
Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2006)
(affirming the district court's decision that states may set minimum
flow standards, but are not required to do so; reversing the district
court's decision finding Great Basin Mine Watch's argument sufficiently exhausted and concluding that the Agency's cumulative impact
analysis was insufficient).
In March of 1997, Appellee Newmont Mining Corporation ("Newmont") proposed an expansion of its open-pit gold mining facility
("South Project") to the Bureau of Land Management, the Department of the Interior, and Helen Hankins, manager of the BLM's local
field office (collectively "BLM"). The proposed South Project was on
the southern edge of Newmont's existing mine, which the BLM approved in 1993. The South Project would have disturbed an additional
1,392 acres of land, of which, 839 are public. The South Project proposed a deepening of the existing mine, along with continued dewatering and discharging excess groundwater into nearby Maggie Creek.
In April of 1997, Newmont also filed a proposal with the BLM for
the Leeville Project ("Leeville"), which proposed a new open-pit gold
mine 20 miles north. This project proposed disturbance of 486 acres
of land, of which, 453 are public. Under the proposal, the South Project site received gold ore trucked in from Leeville for processing.
The BLM, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), found that there was a potential for significant environmental impacts, and required an Environment Impact Statement
("EIS") be prepared for both proposals. The BLM issued a final EIS
for the South Project and Leeville in April of 2002 and July of 2002
respectively. The BLM then issued Records of Decision ("RODs") for
the South Project and Leeville in July of 2002 and September of 2002
respectively.
In both RODs, the BLM permitted agency preferred alternatives to
Newmont's plan, finding that the agency's alternatives would not cause
unnecessary or undue degradation of the public lands." The alternatives provided for further mitigation of impacts related to dewatering.
The BLM also required Newmont to post bonds for post-mine closure
mitigation, and for groundwater and surface water monitoring.
In November of 2002, Great Basin Mine Watch ("Great Basin")
filed suit in United States District Court in Nevada against the BLM.
The complaint, citing violations under NEPA, the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), sought review of the final EISs, the RODs, and the bonding requirements. Great
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Basin argued that the BLM violated the CWA by failing to maintain "all
beneficial uses" of the water as required under the act. Great Basin
also argued that the discharged groundwater would violate state and
federal water quality standards.
Great Basin attempted to introduce a document from the Nevada
Division of Environmental Protection, arguing that the document was
relevant as to whether the South Project and Leeville were connected
actions and the BLM should have evaluated these proposals in a single
EIS. The District Court refused admission of the document, and refused taking judicial notice of the facts contained in the document.
The district court granted summary judgment for the BLM on all
claims. The district court granted summary judgment on the CWA
claim because it found those issues of water flow are questions of fact
that lies within the technical knowledge of the BLM. Great Basin appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
In affirming the district court's CWA determination, the court
found Great Basin's claim failed as a matter of law. The Court found
that the South Project and Leeville sites were not connected actions,
and a single EIS was not required. Then, the court, in referring to the
case law Great Basin relied upon, found that the case merely held that
states may set minimum flow standards; it did not hold that states must
do so. Because Nevada does not have an explicit provision requiring
such enforcement, the provisions of the CWA are binding. Therefore,
the court held the CWA's anti-degradation provision was inapplicable
and consequently Great Basin's arguments regarding a potential drying effect fail as a matter of law.
The court next reviewed the district court's decision that Great Basin had not properly exhausted the issue of groundwater discharge
before the BLM prior to filing suit. The court held that Great Basin's
expressed concern during the comment period regarding the current
and future levels of toxins in the discharged water was sufficient to preserve the claim for judicial review.
The court went on to state that general comments about groundwater, springs, and seeps did not suggest an argument that the BLM
had failed to protect federally-reserved water rights under an eighty
year old order; and therefore those claims were not exhausted. The
court then concluded that the cumulative impacts analyses in the two
projects final environmental impact statements were insufficient.
The court reversed the district court's determination that Great Basin failed to exhaust the argument and the court concluded that the
BLM's cumulative impacts analysis was insufficient and reversed the
district court. In all other aspects, it affirmed the judgment.
The dissent agreed in the majority determination that the cumulate effects analysis was insufficient, but found that the South Project
and Leeville Project were connected actions, and required only a single, comprehensive EIS.
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The dissent employed the "independent utility" test from a 2000
Ninth Circuit case. This benchmark test, the dissent argued, decides
whether each of the two projects would take place with or without the
other, and thus has independent utility. Here, because the South Project is an expansion of the existing Leeville mine, and split mine operations occurred between the two facilities, the two projects are interconnected and the appropriate evaluation of the two is a single EIS.
Therefore, the dissent would have reversed the district court's granting
of summary judgment as to the sufficiency of the EIS, but affirms in all
other respects.
Brandon Saxon
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(holding that the revocation of Colvin's grazing lease by the government did not affect a taking of its water or other property rights because Colvin did not own a vested grazing right in the federal land).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed a ruling by the United States Court of Federal Claims which
dismissed the claims on all counts presented by the Colvin Cattle
Company ("Colvin") against the United States. Colvin held 520 acres
of land adjacent to a 625,000 acre federal parcel called the Montezuma
Allotment. The United States received the allotment by treaty in 1848
and owned it continuously from that time. In 1934, Congress enacted
the Taylor Grazing Act ("TGA") which governs administration of the
land by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). Under the TGA,
Colvin applied for and received a grazing license which was subject to
an annual fee of $966.00. For over twenty years, Colvin paid the fee;
but in February 1995, Colvin failed to do so. Ultimately, the BLM cancelled the grazing lease, assessed trespass damages, and issued a notice
of intent to remove Colvin's cattle. The actions culminated in November 2003 when the BLM issued a final decision to deny Colvin's range
improvement permits and to remove all constructed range improvements-except those necessary for Colvin to exercise its water rights
vested under Nevada law. Colvin's stockwatering rights in the federal
land were not in dispute.
On August 18, 2003, Colvin filed suit in the United States Court of
Federal Claims asserting takings claims on numerous theories, a
breach of contract claim for cancellation of the grazing lease, and a
compensation claim for improvements made by Colvin on the federal
land. The trial court dismissed all claims in favor of the government
and Colvin appealed.
The Court of Federal Claims first considered Colvin's takings
claims under each of its various theories. As an initial matter, the court
noted that a taking cannot occur unless the aggrieved party held a
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vested property interest in the first instance. Colvin's first theory asserted that the government's revocation of Colvin's grazing lease affected a taking of its vested water rights. Colvin argued that the grazing right was "inherent," or appurtenant, to its water right. Initially,
then, the court considered whether any such "grazing right" had vested
in Colvin. The court noted that as the TGA explicitly denied conveying rights in federal land, any property interest must have vested prior
to 1934. However, prior to that time the Property Clause of the United
States Constitution governed the Allotment and, according to case law,
allowed grazing at the sufferance of the government. Further, the government could retract the grazing right at any time. Therefore, any
"implied license" in grazing prior to 1934 did not convey any vested
rights in the land appurtenant to the water rights obtained by Colvin
or its predecessors. Alternately, Colvin argued that the Nevada Stockwatering Act of 1925 conveyed grazing rights inherent to its vested water rights. The court found no indication in the language of that Act,
or in prior case law, which indicated the Act intended anything other
than to assert police powers over the water rights vested under Nevada
law. It followed that because Colvin had no vested rights in grazing
inherent to its water rights, no takings of the water right occurred
when the government revoked Colvin's grazing license. This finding
also defeated Colvin's claims that the government affected a taking by
rendering its water rights, or the ranch itself, valueless as a result of the
grazing revocation.
The court quickly rejected Colvin's final takings argument which
alleged that the government's failure to prevent its successor to the
grazing license and wild horse from infringing Colvin's water rights
affected a taking. The court noted that the government could not be
held responsible for the infringing acts of private parties or of animals
outside of its control. Finally, Colvin's breach of contract claim was
barred by a six-year statute of limitations and the claim for compensation was not ripe for review because Colvin had not exhausted administrative remedies on that issue.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the ruling of
the Court of Federal Claims, holding that Colvin did not have a vested
property interest in grazing and, as a result, revocation of its grazing
lease did not affect a taking of either its water rights or of its property
interests in adjacent land.
Kathleen Ott
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
United States v. Donovan, 466 F. Supp. 2d 590 (D. Del. 2006)
(holding that the United States Army Corps of Engineers had jurisdiction to regulate all navigable waterways of the United States under the
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Clean Water Act, and that government regulation of filled wetlands
pursuant to the Act did not constitute a government taking).
In 1982, David H. Donovan ("Donovan") purchased land adjacent
to a tributary of Sawmill Branch, which flowed into the Smyrna River.
The tributary, Sawmill Branch, and the Smyrna River were all navigable
waterways. Donovan's parcel was a designated wetlands area subject to
the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
In 1987, the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") discovered that Donovan filled a .74 acre piece of his wetland. The Corps
warned him that pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and Nationwide Permit 26, he could only fill up to one acre of wetland without prior Corps approval. In 1993, the Corps discovered that Donovan
had filled 1.771 acres of wetland.
Donovan refused to comply with the Corps' orders to remove the
fill material, and maintained the Corps lacked authority to regulate his
activities. He declared himself a foreign nation and threatened that if
the Corps continued to interfere, there would be "no choice but for
the [D]elaware militia (the peoples['] militia) to defend by whatever
means necessary." In 1996, the United States filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware, seeking injunctive
relief and civil penalties for violations of the CWA.
Donovan filed a motion for summary judgment and a petition requesting damages for the taking of his private property without just
compensation. He claimed that his land was outside the scope of the
CWA, and therefore the government's attempt to regulate his land
constituted a regulatory taking. The court upheld a previous holding
that the Corps has jurisdiction over all navigable waters of the United
States - including Donovan's parcel. The court denied Donovan's motion for summary judgment because he did not introduce any new evidence to justify a change in the court's previous holding.
Donovan also contended that the government's action amounted
to an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. The court
held that a physical taking occurs where the government authorizes a
physical occupation of the property or takes the property. Furthermore, the government is only required to compensate the landowner
under a regulatory taking if the purpose of the regulation, or the extent to which it deprives the landowner of the economic use of his
property, suggests that the regulation unfairly singled out the landowner to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole.
Because the parties agreed that the government did not physically
occupy the land, the court held that a physical taking did not occur.
The court also held a regulatory taking did not occur because the CWA
and the Corps did not target Donovan's land in particular. Therefore,
the court held that Donovan failed to establish a taking under the Fifth
Amendment.
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The court denied Donovan's motion for summary judgment, his
petition for injunctive relief, and his claim for damages for the taking
of his private property withoutjust compensation.
Jacobj Schlesinger

Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1171
(M.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that the United States Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of a general permit for a development project encompassing 48,150 acres of wetlands in the Florida panhandle, though extraordinary, did not go beyond the scope of Corps' authority and correctly followed all necessary Clean Water Act, National Environmental
Policy Act, and United States Environmental Protection Agency standards).
During the Spring of 2005, the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense Council filed suit against the United States Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida on six grounds: (1) that the extensive amount of
land covered in the general permit was beyond the scope of the Clean
Water Act's ("CWA") general permitting scheme; (2) that the authorized activities were not "similar in nature"; (3) that the permit would
cause more than minimal adverse impacts and that the Corps had not
calculated those impacts properly; (4) that the Corps had not followed
the United States Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") standards for applying the CWA; (5) that the Corps had not taken a "hard
look" at the project under the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"); and (6) that the Corps erroneously issued a Finding of No
Significant Impact ("FONSI") after completion of its Environmental
Assessment ("EA"). In August 2005, the Sierra Club filed a motion for
preliminary injunction which the court granted on restricted grounds,
halting one of five projects already approved under the general permit,
and placed a moratorium on further authorizations until it resolved
the instant case.
In 2000, the Corps noticed a rising number of permit applications
from St. Joe Company, Inc. ("St. Joe") to dredge and fill wetlands in
the Florida Panhandle. St. Joe traditionally raised pine trees in its wetlands, but the company expressed its desire to commercially and residentially develop its land. In response, the Corps sought to develop a
large-scale plan for the region and entered negotiations with the company. In June 2004, the Corps granted a general permit that controlled development of 48,150 acres, or seventy-five square miles.
Unlike individual project permits, the Corp may issue a general permit
on a regional level, which allows dredging and filling for an "entire
category of activities, provided that the activities are similar in nature
and will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects, both separately and cumulatively." After the Corps issues a general permit,
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landowners need only "authorization" from the Corps to dredge and
fill, making the process "far less onerous." The Corps may place additional terms on any project.
The Corps' permit limited impacts to high-quality wetlands on 125
acres, and limited impacts on low-quality wetlands to twenty percent in
any one of nineteen sub-basins identified by the Corps. St. Joe owns
more than seventy-five percent of the acreage included in the permit.
St. Joe promised 13,200 acres of conservation easements to the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), as well as entered
into a thirty-page Ecosystem Management Agreement ("EMA") with
DEP that the Corps included in the NWP general permit.
In their first argument, the Sierra Club stated that the scope of the
permit "obliterated" the distinction between individual and general
permits, and thereby ignored the policy reasons for having the two
categories. The Corps usually issued general permits for projects like
building utility lines. However, this permit granted a range, from construction of hospitals to golf courses. The Sierra Club further argued
that landowners escaped the important and detailed review of individual permits for these widely varied projects, and "bought" the Corps'
deference with the promise to conserve so much acreage.
The Corps countered that without a "holistic" view of this vast
amount of uniform acreage, a piecemeal approach to permitting could
result in greater harm, and validated its discretion under agency privilege. The court held it could not rule on whether the permit was "unprecedented" in size, but only if the Corps followed the proper procedures. The court held that Congressional intent for the general permit
was, in fact, to reduce paperwork and free the Corps from reviewing
every dredge project in a region. Additionally, "the novelty or scope of
a general permit's proposed usage does not alone create grounds for
the Court to find it to be outside the law."
Second, the Sierra Club argued that the authorized activities for
development were not similar in nature and that the Corps acted "arbitrarily or capriciously." As explained above, the Sierra Club envisioned
varied projects under the Corps category of "suburban development."
The Sierra Club argued that the language of the general permit under
the CWA was not ambiguous, and that the CWA does not allow this
broad range of projects under "similar in nature." However, even if
the language is ambiguous, it argued that the Corps should not be allowed the deference under the Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources
Defense Council, Inc., standard, but instead must prove a "power to persuade" under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., depending on "thoroughness,
logic, and expertness," as determined in United States v. Mead Corp.
The court held the language ambiguous. The Corps argued that
because it had limited the width of roads in the area, the developer
could only develop the area for suburban use as opposed to other sorts
of development. The court performed a statutory interpretation test
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because the "similar in nature" language created either narrow or
broad categories. Without clear legislative intent, the court followed
the Chevron test and read the Corps own regulations. The court held
the Corps' regulations "impermissibly" overstepped its bounds, and so
finally the court followed the "power to persuade" test. The court held
the Corps had correctly interpreted the "similar in nature" language by
holding a four-year discussion with landowners, government agencies
and the public in the area, by restricting road widths, and because
Congress let the Secretary interpret the language by not including a
definition, the court was convinced, "although this is admittedly an
extremely close call."
Third, the Sierra Club claimed that the Corps violated the CWA
because the permit allowed more than "minimal adverse environmental impacts." The Sierra Club brought three arguments: (1) the
impacts would not be "minimal" per se, (2) the Corps would not rely on
future projects of mitigation to net impacts; and (3) the Corps lacked
scientific support.
While neither the CWA nor the Corps' regulations defined what
"minimal" meant, a decision in the Fourth Circuit convinced the court
to allow the earlier preliminary injunction because "the actual projects
to be authorized . . . were unknown . . . the Corps could not assess

what impacts of any projects would be in advance of the permit's issuance." The Fourth Circuit vacated that ruling before the instant case
began, and so the court looked anew at the issue.
The Sierra Club argued that because development would destroy at
least 1500 acres of wetlands, and the Corps has a stated goal of"no net
loss" of wetlands, the impacts can not be "minimal" per se. The court
used the "power to persuade" test to determine the meaning of "minimal," allowing the Corps to make its argument for interpretation. The
court held that the statute did not require the Corps to make a "preproject" acreage determination. It also held that, as the majority landowner, St. Joe was bound to the DEP by the permit; that the general
permit served as a backdrop to guide development in the region; and
conservation easements would be in place. However, after calculations,
the court held that the Corps had relied on future mitigation projects
and condition to arrive at its "minimal" impact assessment. Therefore,
the court turned to the Sierra Club's second argument regarding
,'minimal:" that the Corps improperly relied on those post-permit
measures.
The Corps' interpretation of "minimal adverse environmental effects" was "net effects." The agency argued that the special conditions
within the permit supplied their basis for calculating "net effects."
Those conditions included stormwater treatment requirements, specific guidelines for fill material, buffers between pristine areas and development, the caps on high and low-quality wetland impacts, and that
the Corps could add additional terms needed to "minimize adverse
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effects." With future mitigation measures included, the Corps found
an actual net increase in wetlands because of future restoration to St.
Joe's pine tree farms, which had degraded some wetlands area.
The court held in the Corps' favor, finding the Corps relied on
mitigation in the past to calculate impacts. Secondly, EPA guidelines
used mitigation to assess environmental benefits. And finally, while the
individual impacts would not be known for each project, the Corps had
already determined "overall limits of the impacts."
The final aspect of the Sierra Club's argument against the Corps'
determination of "minimal adverse environmental impacts" was that
the Corps' science was flawed on four levels: (1) the mitigation plans
were too vague; (2) the calculations lacked "scientific rigor"; (3) the
mitigation plans were not adequate; and (4) the Corps had not addressed water quality purposes under the CWA. The court rejected
each claim in turn.
The Sierra Club claimed that the mitigation plans only contained
preferences and not details regarding the mitigation plans. The court
held that the pre-authorization meetings before the Corps would authorize a project provided the appropriate venue to work out the details of mitigation measures. Next, the court held the Corps had completed significant scientific work and linked impacts with the proposed
mitigation. The court gave deference to the Corps on technical and
scientific matters. Additionally, the court held the Corps calculations
accounted for risk of failure and "temporal loss of functioning," and
therefore the plans were adequate. Finally, the Sierra Club argued that
the Corps had not explored the differing possibilities of water quality
issues stemming from differences in run-off from a golf-course to runoff from a parking lot. The court held the argument unconvincing, as
the permit's requirements for water quality were higher than Florida's
water quality requirements, and therefore necessarily met the EPA's
requirements unless the EPA added "other water quality aspects." Instead, the EPA endorsed the permit.
The Sierra Club's fourth major argument was that the Corps did
not follow the EPA's 404(b) (1) guidelines in granting the permit.
Those guidelines "set forth regulations regarding compliance, testing,
evaluation, and minimization of adverse effects" in order to perform a
benefit/detriment test. Failure would require a remand to the Corps.
The Sierra Club pointed to language that activities under a general
permit must be similar in their water quality impacts. It, once again,
highlighted the diverse variety of activities potentially permitted. The
court held the Corps' determination of the uniformity of the wetlands
sufficient. Additionally, the Sierra Club argued that the Corps had not
set forth in writing a "precise description of activities to be permitted."
Though the court held the Corps had not done so, the court held a
remand unnecessary because the error was harmless; the Corps could
easily fix the oversight.
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The Sierra Club's final argument questioned the Corps compliance
with NEPA. Federal agencies are required to perform an EA to determine if a broader, more detailed Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") is required. After the Corps' completed the EA, it issued a
FONSI and therefore was not required to perform an EIS. For an
agency to reach a FONSI, NEPA requires that agency to take a "hard
look" at the evidence to satisfy the process. However, United States
Supreme Court precedent indicates a court must be "highly deferential" regarding technical or scientific evidence. The Sierra Club questioned the agency's "hard look," their FONSI determination, and
whether the Corps had completed the appropriate alternatives analysis.
The court held the Corps had satisfied each claim.
The court looked at the 4500 pages of record and held that the
Corps did not need NEPA to "remind it to take a hard look at the impacts of its actions." It already had. Regarding the FONSI determination, the Corps admitted to relying on mitigation measures. The court
held mitigation measures must be "more than a possibility." They must
"constitute an adequate buffer so as to render such impacts so minor as
to not warrant an EIS." The court held that the science supported
both the mitigation and the special conditions attached to the permit.
Finally, regarding the Corps' search for alternatives, the court held the
Corps had detailed a no action alternative and individual permitting
alternative in its EA. The court held the Sierra Club's argument inadequate because it lacked a genuine discussion, only "summarily dismisses" the Corps' work, and had no suggestions of its own. Further,
an EA requires a lower standard of alternatives discussion than an EIS.
In addition to holding in favor of the Corps on all of the Sierra
Club's claims, the court also vacated the preliminary injunction. The
court ended by holding the Corps' issuance of the permit, "is at, but
not beyond, the outer limits of that authority."
Zackary Smith
Ky. Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 426 F. Supp. 2d 612 (W.D. Ky.
2006) (holding that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously
when it approved the procedures providing administrative and judicial
review under Kentucky's permitting process and that Kentucky's
antidegradation procedures meet the requirements of the CWA).
Kentucky Waterways Alliance ("Waterways") sought summary judgment against United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA");
Waterways asserted that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously
when it approved Kentucky's Tier II Antidegradation Rules and did not
ensure the protection of existing "high quality" water as required by
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). States establish their own methods for
identifying which waters in its boundaries require Tier II protection
and the EPA may give final approval to the chosen method. When a
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state permits new pollutants or discharges into Tier II waters, the state
must determine that reducing the water quality is required to accommodate economic or social development. The entity discharging pollutants must receive a permit from a state agency to discharge into Tier
II waters unless the release of the pollutant is de minimis. The issues
before the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky were: (1) whether the EPA's approval of Kentucky's antidegradation procedure was consistent with the requirements of the CWA; and
(2) whether the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it approved Kentucky's procedures.
The court addressed eleven matters concerning Kentucky Tier II
antidegradation procedures to determine whether the EPA's decisions
were arbitrary and capricious. First, the court addressed the EPA's determination that discharges with increased pollutant loadings of less
than twenty percent would not significantly degrade water quality.
Kentucky regulations did not require an antidegradation review for
Kentucky Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("KPDES") permit
renewals and modifications that caused less than a twenty percent increase in pollutant loading from the formerly allowable pollutant loading. The court held that a comprehensive review of the Kentucky
permit program's history and its possible impact on receiving waters
performed by the EPA demonstrated that the provision would have
resulted in no more than a de minimis discharge and consequently
would not require a Tier II review.
Waterways requested the court assess the EPA's determination that
the default limits for domestic sewage discharges did not considerably
degrade the water quality. Kentucky's antidegradation implementation procedures provided that permits for new or expanded domestic
sewage discharges that had restrictions as strict as the limitations provided in the CWA Tier II regulations were not required to undergo a
Tier II antidegradation review. The court held that, when the EPA
looked at past statistics and measured water levels, it was justified in
determining that the procedures set by the KPDES permitting system
would achieve the CWA's objective without requiring a Tier II antidegradation review.
The court then examined the EPA's determination that discharges
at a default level of one-half of otherwise permissible quality-based restrictions were not likely to cause significant water quality degradation.
Kentucky regulations permitted new or expanding non-domestic dischargers to high quality water to accept KPDES permit restrictions that
were no more than one-half of the water quality-based limitations that
standard design conditions allowed for. The court held that the EPA's
analysis of the historical KPDES permits, flow records, and conditions
justified the conclusion that the fifty-percent provision would not have
resulted in any reduction of the water quality or in a significant degradation of high quality waters. Additionally, discharges which met the
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restrictions would likely not had greater than a de minimis impact on
water quality because the fifty-percent provision would have imposed
more stringent limits than currently in place.
The court assessed the EPA's determination that a publicly owned
treatment works subject to a regional plan did not require Tier II
antidegradation analysis. Kentucky's antidegradation policy stated that
an approval of a publicly owned treatment works regional facility plan
met the requirements for an antidegradation review. The court held
the proposed plant approvals met the CWA's standards because they
were equivalent to antidegradation review.
The court analyzed the EPA's determination that the process for
the issuance of storm water general permits sufficiently dealt with
antidegradation concerns. Kentucky's implementation procedures
stated that discharges subject to KPDES storm water general permits
were not subject to Tier II antidegradation review. The court agreed
with the EPA that the public participation process was satisfied through
a general permit issuance and the EPA's recognition of Kentucky's
right to exercise discretion addressed the socioeconomic accommodations. Additionally, under the general permit any potential storm water discharges would have been a de minimis reduction of water quality
and would not have required a Tier II review.
Waterways asked the court to examine the EPA's determination
that, under Kentucky regulations, discharges associated with coal mining received a Tier II antidegradation review consistent with the requirements of the CWA. Under Kentucky antidegradation regulations,
coal-mining discharges were subject to regulation under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, and were not subject to Tier II
regulation. The court agreed with the EPA that the findings indicated
that the existing programs under Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act had a decision-making process with Tier II review and with
the CWA.
The court considered the EPA's determination that Kentucky's
recognized process for permitting domestic sewage from single-family
residences was consistent with the CWA. Kentucky regulations stated
that Tier II review was not compulsory for domestic sewage discharges
from single-family dwellings. The EPA argued, and the court agreed,
that the Kentucky permit process was consistent with the CWA because
the established process fulfilled the requirements by allowing public
involvement in addition to a socioeconomic accommodation study,
and was consistent with the general purpose of the CWA to retain high
quality water levels.
The court then assessed the EPA's determination that concentrated animal feeding operations ("CAFO") do not need antidegradation review. Kentucky regulations stated that CAFO discharges were
not subject to Tier II review because permits regulated the CAFO facilities and allowed absolutely no discharges apart from those that may
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have arose from considerable rainfall. The court held that non-point
discharges were not subject to antidegradation review as they were not
subject to federal regulation but were a matter for the states. In addition, the infrequency of precipitation in connection with the fact that
the regulation prohibited all other discharges demonstrated that
CAFO sources would have no more than a de minimis effect on water
quality.
The court examined the EPA's approval of Kentucky's choice not
to include impaired waters in its Tier II classification. The court held
that case law recognized the use of a water body-specific approach, as
over ninety percent of Kentucky waters received Tier II or III protection using this approach. The court also held that the EPA correctly
examined the impact of a water body-specific approach and found it to
be consistent with EPA requirements supporting water levels necessary
to sustain fish, shellfish, and wildlife.
Waterways asked the court to assess the EPA's determination that
the Kentucky regulations contained adequate implementation procedures. The court held that the EPA was correct in arguing that antidegradation regulations applied to discharges involving KPDES permit
review and they provided permit applicant guidelines for the state to
follow.
The court then considered the EPA's approval of Kentucky's
KPDES permit implementation procedures, even though the procedures did not address CWA Section 401 water quality certifications.
The EPA answered, and the court agreed, that this claim had no merit
because a procedure to issue 401 certifications already existed in Kentucky.
The court held that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously
when it approved the procedures providing administrative and judicial
review under Kentucky's permitting process.
Kathleen Brady
UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT
Stockton East Water Dist. v. United States, No. 04541L, 2007 WL
548819 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 20, 2007) (holding that (1) individual water users were not third-party beneficiaries of water allocation contracts between the Bureau of Reclamation and the irrigation districts; (2) the
shortage provision in the contracts excused non-performance of water
allocations; (3) conservative operation of the New Melones Dam was
not unreasonable and did not breach the contract; (4) the alteration of
the contractual obligations due to recent legislation was not a taking).
This case arose from a water allocation and distribution dispute in
the Central Valley Basin ("Basin") of California regarding water from
the New Melones Dam. The dam is part of a federal water conserva-
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tion project serving the Basin called the Central Valley Project
("CVP"). The United States Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") is
the designated federal administrative agency that manages the CVP.
Reclamation answers to the governing State Water Control Board
("Water Board"), which posses the power to issue appropriative water
permits in California.
The history of the CVP is especially significant to this case. Territorial expansion into the western desert lands resulted in an unprecedented need for reclamation and irrigation. As a result, the Flood
Control Acts of 1944 and 1962 granted the federal government the
authority to form the CVP in order to improve management of water
resources in the Basin. In 1962, Reclamation applied for permits from
the California state government to construct the New Melones Dam,
and later sought to expand the project in 1978. At that time, California imposed a number of requirements on Reclamation for the expansion, including: allocation of water for fish, wildlife, and habitat uses;
the use of "firm commitments" regarding its domestic and agricultural
water allocations; and priority of both seniority water rights and inBasin usage. The "firm commitment" requirement lead Reclamation
to sign separate water allocation contracts in 1983 ("1983 Contracts")
with the Stockton East Water District ("Stockton East") and the Central
San Joaquin Water Conservation District ("Central"). Both Stockton
East and Central function as irrigation districts to serve municipal, industrial and agricultural water needs in their respective areas, and are
responsible for managing water facility operations.
Even before the 1983 Contracts, the Basin experienced increasing
conflicts between the growing domestic and agricultural water needs of
surrounding communities and the stability of river habitat. In addition, following the 1983 Contracts a number of federal and state legislative decisions substantially increased the over-commitment of the
CVP. In 1993, the congressional Central Valley Project Improvement
Act ("CVPIA") went into effect. The CVPIA increased the amount of
water releases for environmental purposes, and furthermore altered
allocation priorities to give more weight to fishery, wildlife, and habitat
needs. Then in 1987, the California Department of Fish and Game
signed an agreement with Reclamation, which the Water Board approved, to implement in-stream flow schedules in order to protect the
chinook salmon; the agreement in effect doubled the original commitment goals of the CVPIA. Finally, the 1998 Vernalis Adaptive Management Plan developed salinity standards for the section of the Vernalis River below the New Melones Dam. The Water Board subsequently approved the San Joaquin River Agreement, which required
the CVP managing authorities to implement the salinity standards outlined in the Vernalis Adaptive Management Plan; this Agreement further increased the water commitments of the New Melones Reservoir.
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Ultimately, Reclamation reduced the water allocations delineated
in the 1983 Contracts to meet other increasing demands on the system
and a lawsuit ensued. Multiple parties joined in the suit against Reclamation, including signatories Stockton East and Central. While the
City of Stockton, the County of San Joaquin and California Water Services ("United Contractors") were originally parties in the claim, the
court later limited the suit to only the Stockton East and Central irrigation districts. Since the United Contractors merely benefited from the
1983 Contracts incidentally or indirectly, they did not have sufficient
third-party beneficiary status to support a claim. The court found that
the contractual benefits outlined in the 1983 Contracts could only extend to parties organized under state law, such as the irrigation districts, and not individual water users.
Stockton East and Central ("Contracting Parties") originally filed
the lawsuit in United States District Court in the Eastern District of
California alleging a breach of contract and regulatory taking for failure to provide water in accordance with the 1983 Contracts. The district court transferred the case to the United States Court of Federal
Claims, which denied Reclamation's motion to dismiss but granted
partial summary judgment in favor of the Reclamation. At trial, the
court conducted a review of 16 different lawsuits and regulations related to the suit filed by the Contracting Parties. The net findings established that the CVP contracts were not immune from subsequently
enacted statutes, and furthermore, that Reclamation had broad discretion to determine allocation of water rights in the valley. Ultimately,
three main issues developed. Since the court found that the United
Contractors were not third-party beneficiaries under the 1983 Contracts, the remaining relevant issues were limited to whether Reclamation breached the contracts and whether the re-allocation of water
constituted a taking.
The court first addressed the controlling law for the 1983 Contracts
and found that state law controlled the claim. The Reclamation Act of
1902 explicitly states that the Act shall not interfere with state laws relating the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water. In addition, the 1983 Contracts expressly acknowledged the authority of state
law regarding water use. Since no Congressional mandate had displaced the state's power to make decisions, the court determined that
Reclamation must comply with all state-imposed requirements as determined by the Water Board.
A number of questions emerged with regards to the breach of contract claim, including whether Reclamation: 1) could make reductions
from the water schedule; 2) could distribute less water than the minimum requirements outlined in the Build-Up Schedule; 3) made unreasonable operational decisions regarding allocation. First, the court
ruled that Reclamation was not liable for reductions to the water
schedule as long as its finding of a water shortage was reasonable. The
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Contracting Parties claimed that between 1993 and 2004 they did not
receive all of the water that they needed and had scheduled. The 1983
Contracts provided that the Contracting Parties must submit a schedule of water needs for the upcoming year, and that Reclamation had a
contractual duty to fulfill the scheduled amount of water. In addition,
even in years when the Contracting Parties failed to submit a timely
schedule, they were still entitled to receive their water allocations because they substantially complied with the contract by paying for the
water and by constructing multi-million dollar water facilities. On review of the record, the court found that the 1983 Contracts obligated
Reclamation to make deliveries to Stockton East from 1994-96 and in
1998, and to Central in 1995, and therefore it violated the contract on
its face for non-performance.
However, the 1983 Contracts also included a clause that protected
Reclamation from liability in the case of reductions, such as the event
of a drought or other shortage beyond Reclamation's control. The
court determined that Reclamation had reduced allocations in 1994
due to drought and in the years following due to a continued dry forecast and diminished supply in the New Melones Reservoir. Furthermore, the reduction of water designated for irrigation was necessary in
order to balance the environmental use needs dictated by the CVPIA.
Had Reclamation been unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious in reducing water to the Contracting Parties, the contract would not have excused it from liability. Because the court did not find any evidence
that Reclamation was unreasonable in reducing these water allocations,
the court excused its non-performance under Article 12(d).
Second, the court decided that Reclamation was not liable for failing to allocate the minimum amount of water in the Build-Up Schedule. The Build-Up Schedule created an annual minimum purchase
and supply schedule that Reclamation was to use in the event it could
not provide the scheduled amount of water requested by the irrigation
districts. Reclamation violated Article 3 of the 1983 Contracts when it
failed to meet even these minimum standards during drought years.
However, since the court found that Article 12(d) also applied to the
Build-Up Schedule, this likewise excused Reclamation from nonperformance.
Third, the court held that Reclamation was reasonable in its operational decision-making regarding the allocations, and therefore did not
violate the contract. While Article 9(a) required Reclamation to "use
all reasonable means to guard against a condition of shortage in the
quantity of water available," Congress also granted the CVP considerable discretion in determining how to meet its obligations because it
recognized the difficulty of meeting water demands in an overcommitted region. The Contracting Parties made a number of arguments to show that Reclamation's operations were unreasonable, but
the court rejected all of these arguments. Even though computer mod-
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eling maintained the argument that Reclamation could have delivered
the full allocations and still avoided shortfalls, the model did not take
into account other real-time considerations such as seasonal water
needs. Furthermore, Reclamation had developed a carry-over storage
policy for the New Melones Reservoir so that the CVP would have sufficient water in the event of a catastrophe or severe drought, and this
carry-over was also not included in the model. While Reclamation's
conservative approach to operating the Reservoir may have resulted in
reduced allocations to the Contracting Parties, the court did not find
that its decisions were unreasonable.
The court also rejected the Contracting Parties' argument that Reclamation unreasonably failed to develop water release alternatives under Article 9(a) in light of the CVP's over-commitment. The CVPIA
and various mandates following the 1983 Contracts required Reclamation to release water into the Vernalis River in order to meet salinity
goals and to protect fishery habitat. Reclamation allocated this water
exclusively from the New Melones Reservoir instead of other CVP water resources, even though it knew these releases would result in regular shortages for Stockton East and Central. Nonetheless, Reclamation
successfully argued that the proximity of the Reservoir to the Vernalis
River made it the most logical and cost-effective choice for water releases into the Vernalis. The Contracting Parties also argued that Reclamation should have implemented a water recirculation process in
order to reduce salinity, instead of relying solely on water releases.
Conversely, Reclamation presented evidence that a recirculation process would have resulted in higher operating costs to all users, and may
have resulted in adverse environmental impacts on the system such as
effects on salmon spawning and the release of additional contaminants
into the waterway. Consequently, the court found that Reclamation's
decisions to use water from the New Melones Reservoir for environmental water releases and to not implement a water recirculation
process did not violate Article 9(a).
Finally, as none of Reclamation's activities effectively breached the
1983 Contract, the court considered whether the reduction of water
constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment. The Contracting
Parties asserted that the CVPIA's impact on water allocation constituted a regulatory taking because of its impact on the 1983 Contracts,
but the court rejected this argument. First, claims based on contractual rights or obligations usually give rise to a breach claim, which the
Contracting Parties had already asserted, and not a takings claim. In
addition, the court found that Reclamation was merely acting in a
commercial capacity by implementing the 1983 Contracts, rather than
in the sovereign capacity necessary to give rise to a taking.
In conclusion, the court found that Reclamation did not breach
1983 Contracts according to their terms, and that the water reductions
did not constitute a taking. For the reasons above, the court granted
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summary judgment in favor of Reclamation because the Contracting
Parties failed to meet their burden of proof.
Sarah A. Quinn
STATE COURTS
CALIFORNIA
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 150 P.3d 709 (Cal. 2007) (holding that an environmental
impact report for a large development project need not show that the
project has definite long term water supplies, but that while the report
adequately analyzed the near-term groundwater supply, it failed to do
so in regard to the long-term surface water supply and the potential
impact on salmon migration).
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. ("Group")
filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the County of Sacramento's ("County") approval of a community development plan.
Group claimed that the approval violated the California Environmental
Quality Act ("CEQA"). The Superior Court, Sacramento County, denied the petition after a bench trial. On appeal, the California Court
of Appeal affirmed, finding that the discussion of water supply in the
environmental impact report ("EIR") met the requirements of CEQA,
because its conclusions did not rely on "speculative or illusory sources"
and substantial evidence illustrated that the effect of the proposed
groundwater extraction would be insignificant. The Supreme Court of
California granted Group's petition for review, reversed and remanded. The court reviewed the administrative record for legal error
and the County's factual findings using the substantial evidence standard. On review the court addressed two issues. First, the court addressed the adequacy of the final EIR in regard to its identification and
evaluation of future water sources for the development project. Second, the court determined whether the County's findings regarding
the potential impacts on migratory salmon, which the County first disclosed in the final EIR, should have been open to public comment.
Group contended that the final EIR was deficient because it failed
to assure that the actual water sources would meet the project's demand. Therefore, the final EIR failed to disclose all the possible environmental impacts that would result from the project. Further, when
such a failure occurs, it is impossible to evaluate all available mitigation
measures. The question presented to the court concerned how much
uncertainty is allowable in an EIR under CEQA in regard to water supplies for a land use plan. The court first acknowledged that neither
CEQA nor its guidelines address this issue specifically. On a general
level, the court notes that CEQA guidelines assert that an agency must
use its best efforts to find all available information and "disclose all that
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it reasonably can." The court then discussed the precedent on the
"sufficiency of an EIR's analysis of future water supplies" from the California Courts of Appeal and concluded that the cases do not clearly
define a standard. However, the court did decipher four over-arching
principles from the precedent.
First, CEQA requires that an EIR must contain factual information
that allows the decision makers to properly weigh the advantages and
costs of supplying the water allotted under a proposal. The court advised that an EIR, which "simply ignores or assumes a solution to the
problem of supplying water to a proposed land use project," does not
meet CEQA. Second, if the proposed land use project is for multiple
years, an EIR is inadequate if it only addresses the water supply for the
first stage or first few years of the project. The court held that an EIR
does not meet this requirement by simply stating that the drafters will
provide the information in the future. Further, the court explained
that while tiering is proper in some instances, the future water supply
for a land use project is not an issue that decision makers can defer
using such a technique. The court reasoned that the drafters of an EIR
for a land use project must assume that the project will be built and
will need water, and therefore, the EIR "must analyze, to the extent
reasonably possible, the impacts of providing water to the entire proposed project." Third, an EIR must identify and address the impacts of
"likely" future water sources. To qualify as likely, the sources must not
be speculative to the extent that they are unrealistic and "must bear a
likelihood of actually proving available." Included in the EIR's analysis
should be a discussion of the circumstances surrounding the availability of identified future water sources. Fourth, an EIR must discuss either possible replacement sources or alternatives to the proposed future water sources. Further, decision makers must include the environmental impact of those actions in that discussion.
Moreover, the court held that CEQA does not require "assurances
of certainty" in regard to long-term future water supplies in a final EIR.
However, the burden to attain such assurances and certainty increases
as the project moves from more general to more specific phases of
planning. To determine the adequacy of an EIR in regard to the future water supply for a land use project, courts should determine the
likelihood of development of the identified source of water and
whether or not the EIR adequately addresses the "reasonably foreseeable impacts" of the proposed water allocation. In applying these
principles to the EIR at issue, the court broke its analysis of the EIR
into two parts. It first looked at the analysis of the near-term water
supply and then the analysis of the long-term water supply.
In regard to the near-term water supply outlined in the EIR, the
Group contended that other competing uses for the identified source
make the source inadequate for the project. Therefore, the Group
argued that the project would use other unidentified sources, of which
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the County has not analyzed the environmental impact. The court
found that the County's factual conclusions regarding the adequacy of
the water supply to meet the near-term water needs of the project met
the substantial evidence standard. The facts indicated that the project
needed 5,000 afa of the total 10,000 afa available from the source. Further, the competing project projected that it would require 3,000 afa.
Therefore, the court concluded that the remaining 7,000 afa was sufficient to meet the project's near-term needs. The court reasoned that
the supply was available "at least in substantial part" to meet the project's near-term needs. Further, in respect to the analysis of the nearterm water supply, the court found that the County did not rely on an
illusory supply of water or use tiering.
The Group asserted the same claim of competing demands in regard to inadequacy of the EIR's analysis of the long-term water supply.
The EIR identified a water source with 15,000 afa available. However,
the allocation of that source was uncertain. The court found that the
EIR presented substantial evidence that some part of this water supply
would be developed and made available for use by the project. Yet, the
court further held that the uncertainty in regard to how the County
planned to meet the entire demand of the long-term water supply was
insufficient to meet CEQA. In holding such, the court pointed to the
EIR's failure to outline the total future water demand that would result
from the long-term growth of the project. The long-term demand
numbers varied without explanation among different proposal documents. Further, the EIR produced gaps between the amount of future
growth demands and source supplies. The EIR addressed these discrepancies by referring to "new" water supplies that were unidentified
and not quantified. The court held that this explanation was too vague
to meet CEQA. While CEQA does not require a land use project EIR
to identify long-term future water supplies with certainty, here the
court found that "a discussion of total supply and demand is necessary."
The court then compared how the EIR for near-term water supply
analysis differed from the long-term. The court found that while the
near-term analysis included substantial evidence that competing users
would not interfere with the planned allotment of water for the project, that the EIR did not lay out any evidence other than inconsistent
demand numbers that illustrated that the long-term water supply
would be both attainable and allocated for use by the project. The
court concluded that the EIR in regard to the long-term water supply
was defective both factually and procedurally. The court found that
the County's attempt to tier the long-term supply to constitute a procedural defect and that the inconsistent evidence on future demand
and lack of evidence of future water supplies to be factually inadequate
under CEQA.
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In regard to the future water supply issue, the court found that
while the County's EIR adequately addressed the near-term supply, it
did not do so in regard to the long-term supply. The County's assessment of the long-term supply did not "clearly and coherently" state
what the long-term demand would be or the sources that would meet
it, what the environmental impacts of meeting such a demand would
be, and any possible mitigation measures that could be taken. The
court also found that the County must make the potential impacts on
migratory salmon available for public comment by first issuing such
findings in a draft EIR. The court remanded and directed the County
to prepare a revised EIS that adequately addressed the long-term water
supply and to allow for public comment on the project's impact on
migratory salmon.
One judge entered a dissenting opinion. The dissent interpreted
the majority opinion to impose the requirement that all proposed land
use projects cannot gain approval under CEQA or California's Water
Code until the "entire region's projected long-term water supply and
demand are in balance." The dissent argued that CEQA did not require this regional threshold. Moreover, the dissent found that this
threshold was not in the spirit of California's Water Code, since the
legislature essentially rejected a similar rule in its 1995 amendments.
The dissent further asserted that a regional standard imposed costs,
such as discouraging development, increasing project costs, and encouraging litigation.
Mary Byrne
Divers' Envtl. Conservation Org. v. State Water Res. Control Bd.,
51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the Regional
Water Quality Control Board issued a valid industrial storm water discharge permit which allowed the Navy to formulate a pollution prevention plan utilizing best management practices rather than specific numeric effluent limitations).
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of California reviewed
the decision of the Superior Court of San Diego County denying a petition for writ of administrative mandate filed by Divers' Environmental
Conservation Organization ("Divers"'). Divers' petition challenged the
validity of a storm water discharge permit issued by the California Water Quality Control Board ("Board") to the United States Department
of the Navy ("Navy").
The court began by reiterating that the goal of the Clean Water Act
("CWA") is to "restore and maintain ...

the integrity of the Nation's

waters" and to generally prohibit "the discharge of any pollutant." One
statutory exception to this prohibition involves obtaining a valid National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit from
either the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") or an EPA-
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approved state permit program such as the Board. Initially, NPDES
permits required recipients to adopt technology-based effluent limitations ("TBELs") which mandated the installation of particular technologies to reduce water pollution. Subsequently, recipients were also
required to employ more stringent "water quality-based effluent limitations" ("WQBELs") which identified and limited the level of pollutant
discharged.
The court noted that the EPA originally utilized these permitting
requirements to regulate "discharges of process wastewater" and that it
was not until the Costle decision and subsequent amendments to the
CWA that the regulations became applicable to "storm water discharges" as well. The EPA, however, differentiated between the two
types of discharges in employing its preferred permitting methods.
Although process wastewater discharges were subject to the stringent
TBEL and WQBEL requirements, the EPA expressed a preference for
regulating storm water discharges by requiring permittees to develop
particular pollution prevention plans utilizing "best management practices" ("BMPs"). Specifically, the Navy's permit required it to develop a
"Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan" utilizing non-structural
BMPs-such as "good house-keeping, preventative maintenance, spill
response procedures, material handling and storage procedures, employee training programs, recycling procedures, and erosion controls."
If the Board determined that these practices were ineffective, it would
then require the Navy to consider structural BMPs-such as structures
covering chemicals, retention ponds, berms channeling runoff, and
treatment facilities. Further, the Board required the Navy to monitor
and comply with specified benchmark concentrations of copper and
zinc.
Divers' argued that the Navy's permit was invalid for several reasons. First, Divers' argued that the CWA required that the Board identify the numeric level of particular pollutants in the Navy's storm water
discharges, which the Board failed to do. The court disagreed, finding
that although title 40, section 122.44(d) (1) (ii) of the Code of Federal
Regulations ("CFR") required the Board to perform a general "reasonable potential analysis," it did not follow that the Board needed to analyze particular pollutants. As the Board conducted a water quality
analysis and made extensive findings on the toxicity of copper and
zinc, it met the CWA general analysis requirement.
Second, Divers' argued that the Navy's permit should have been
subject to numeric WQBELs rather than BMPs. The court held that
title 40, section 122.44(k) (2) of the CFR authorized the use of BMPs as
appropriate WQBELs in storm water discharge permits. Further, the
court held that it was within the Board's discretion to determine that
BMPs were the most cost effective method for regulating the Navy's
storm water discharge.
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Finally, Divers' argued that industrialstorm water discharges were
different than ordinary storm water discharges and permitting should
require numeric WQBELs. The court again disagreed and held that
the statute gave no indication that the use of BMPs was limited to municipalities and other non-industrial storm water discharge permittees.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of Divers' petition for
administrative mandate challenging the storm water discharge permit
issued by the Board to the Navy.
Kathleen Ott
N. Kern Water Storage Dist. v. Kern Delta Water Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr.
3d 578 (Cal Ct. App. 2007) (holding that California properly measured
the forfeiture of appropriated water rights using the five-year period
preceding a clash of water rights; that the court properly measured an
appropriator's nonuse of water in monthly, rather than seasonal, increments; that the court is to consider all water, including released
water, in determining an appropriator's nonuse of appropriative water
rights; and that forfeiture of water does not necessarily create allocable
excess to be used - rather when a river is oversubscribed, junior rights
holders may use in full the forfeited water under their existing entitlements).
North Kern Water Storage District ("North Kern"), the owner of
junior appropriative water rights, and Kern Delta Water District
("Delta"), the owner of senior appropriative rights, both appealed to
the California Court of Appeals a decision of the Superior Court of
Tulare County, California, which declared a forfeiture of certain previously appropriated water rights to a river. North Kern contended
that the trial court erred in selecting an appropriate forfeiture period
as well as a time frame against which to measure nonuse of water by
junior water right holders; that the court should have considered all
water available to each junior appropriator as its actual entitlement,
not just appropriated water; and that the court should have awarded
Delta's forfeited water to North Kern rather than making it available
through the permit process. Delta contended that the court erred in
measuring the forfeiture against its full appropriation even when there
was insufficient water to meet the full appropriation.
First, North Kern contended that the trial court erred in selecting
an appropriate forfeiture period. To determine a forfeiture period,
California measures water use in the five consecutive years prior to the
occurrence of a clash of rights. North Kern contended that the trial
court should have used a five-year period beginning in 1971 and continuing through 1975 rather than beginning in 1972 and continuing
through 1976. The Court of Appeals held that, while there was a clash
between the parties in 1975, this clash was not a clash of rights because
Delta had no rights at that time. Therefore, the court held the trial
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court correctly included 1976 in the measurement, and correctly established the five-year period as 1972 through 1976.
Second, North Kern contended that the trial court erred in selecting the timeframe against which to measure nonuse of the water.
North Kern contended that seasonal timeframe was the correct choice
because the initial need for water, pattern of use of the water, and historical beneficial use of the water was for seasonal irrigation. The trial
court, however, held that the relevant measurement was monthly, as
measurement across an entire season would result in greater forfeiture
than measurement across a shorter period of time. The court affirmed
the trial court, and held that the law generally disfavors forfeiture, and
the law should err in the direction of preserving the senior appropriator's water entitlement. The court further affirmed the trial court's
holding that daily measurements would be the most accurate; however,
accurate daily records did not exist for the foreifiture period.
Next, the court addressed the issue of junior appropriator's rights.
North Kern contended that the trial court should have considered all
water available to each junior appropriator as its actual entitlement,
including released water actually available to it. The court agreed with
North Kern's position, and held that the trial court erred in its position. The court gave four reasons for its holding. First, junior rights
do not depend upon predictability of availability of water, but instead
the beneficial use was as supplemental water that was useful despite its
unpredictability. Second, the uncertainty of the availability did not
prevent junior appropriators from using all the water they beneficially
could since they did not have to fill customer orders on the same day,
thus the maximum amount of actual use during a measurement period
establishes a base against which forfeiture is determined. Third, the
court held that during the entire forfeiture period, significant quantities of release water were available, and Delta filled all orders from its
junior rights customers whenever it had them. Finally, the court held
that if released water was not the basis for measurement of actual entitlement, Delta could divert its junior appropriation rights to the extent
released water was available, increasing use of junior rights over historical levels. The court held that this decision permitted a windfall for
Delta's junior rights, and it failed to maximize quantity beneficially
used during the forfeiture period.
North Kern's final contention was that the trial court erred in holding that the water forfeited by Delta reverted to the public and was
available for appropriation through the permit process. This court
agreed with North Kern and held that forfeiture of an appropriative
right may or may not result in unappropriated water that the State Water Resource Control Board ("Board") could award to an applicant
through the permit process. The Board had the right to determine
whether forfeiture created allocable excess that would be available for
permitting. In this situation, the river was so oversubscribed - existing
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junior right holders would use all water forfeited by senior-rights holders in full under existing junior entitlements.
Delta's appeal contended that the trial court erred in measuring
the forfeiture against its full appropriation even when there was insufficient water to meet the full appropriation. The court addressed this
issue in Kern's appeal, but held that what was forfeited was the right to
appropriate in excess of Delta's greatest use as determined by the forfeiture period and the measurement period. Thus, Delta's claim that it
forfeited water it never had an opportunity to use was meritless.
The court affirmed the judgment as modified to declare the extent
of forfeiture of senior and junior appropriative rights.
CarrieStanley
COLORADO
Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 147 P.3d 20 (Colo. 2006)
(holding if an owner of surface water rights within the boundaries of a
designated ground water basin can show hydrologic connection between the surface water rights and water within the designated ground
water basin, and show injury from that connection, the Colorado
Ground Water Commission will have jurisdiction over the surface water
rights only for the purpose of altering the basin's boundaries. Jurisdiction over the surface water rights will then vest in the water courts and
the State Engineer).
In 1987, the Colorado Ground Water Commission ("Commission")
established the Upper Crow Creek Designated Ground Water Basin
("Basin") in Weld County, Colorado. Reinaldo, Marianne, Harold,
Ellen, and Gene Gallegos ("Gallegos Family") possessed surface water
rights that predated the Basin's designation but were located within
the Basin's boundaries.
In 2002 and 2003, the Gallegos Family sent letters to the State Engineer, claiming diversions and pumping within the Basin interfered
with the family's surface water rights, and asked that either the State
Engineer or Commission curtail junior well pumping. The State Engineer denied the Gallegos Family's request. The Gallegos Family appealed the decision to the Commission. The Commission held that
through the designation process, the Commission determined that all
water within the basin is designated groundwater and only has a de
minimus effect on surface water when it is withdrawn. In addition, the
Commission held it only has jurisdiction over designated ground water
and not surface water. The Gallegos Family appealed to the District
Court for Weld County. The district court held the Commission has
jurisdiction over surface water rights when withdrawals of designated
ground water impact surface water rights. The district court also held
that when the Commission has jurisdiction, it must apply modified
prior appropriation and administer junior designated ground water
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wells for the benefit of the senior surface water rights. The Gallegos
Family appealed and the Commission cross-appealed.
The Gallegos Family argued to the Colorado Supreme Court that
the Commission has jurisdiction over the family's surface water rights
but prior appropriation, not modified prior appropriation, applies.
The Commission argued that designated ground water only had a de
minimis impact on surface water and jurisdiction does not apply. The
Commission also argued that if jurisdiction does apply, the Commission must use the modified prior appropriation doctrine.
The court first considered the Commission's jurisdiction in light of
the Colorado Constitution, the Colorado Ground Water Management
Act ("Management Act"), and the Water Rights Determination and
Administration Act ("1969 Act"). The court explained the Colorado
Constitution applies prior appropriation to the unappropriated waters
of any natural stream, which include surface water and ground water
that is tributary to surface water. In 1965, the Management Act created
the Commission, an administrative body that designates and manages
ground water basins. The Management Act specifically requires modified prior appropriation and gives the Commission discretionary power
to curtail the pumping of junior wells for the benefit of senior appropriators. In addition, the Management act defined designated ground
water as ground water that has no more than a de minimis impact on
any surface stream. The court then examined the 1969 Act, which
gives State and Division Engineers the non-discretionary duty to administer water rights under the prior appropriations system. The court
explained that the 1969 Act applies to all surface water and underground water tributary to a natural stream, but clearly does not apply
to designated ground water.
The court next considered whether a designated ground water basin may contain more than just designated ground water and who has
jurisdiction over a designated basin containing more than just designated ground water. The court pointed to previous Colorado Supreme
Court decisions that held designated basins may contain designated
ground water as well as water that is tributary to surface water and subject to the 1969 Act. The decisions also established that the Commission has jurisdiction over a designated ground water basin unless the
proponent can prove certain water within the basin is not designated
ground water. If the water is not designated ground water, but instead
water subject to the 1969 Act, jurisdiction switches to the water court.
The court also referred to the Management Act's text that states the
Commission shall alter a basin's boundaries in response to future conditions and factual data. The court interpreted this to mean that the
General Assembly contemplated that a basin could contain more than
just designated ground water and, in response, the Commission must
redraw a basin's boundaries.
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The court concluded the Commission has jurisdiction over surface
water rights only for the purpose of redrawing basin boundaries. A
surface water rights holder seeking relief must prove that ground water
being pumped in the basin has more than a de minimis effect on surface water rights. Pumping must be hydrologically connected and
causing injury to surface water rights. If a surface water rights holder
can prove injury, the Commission must redraw the basin's boundaries,
and jurisdiction will switch to the water court and State Engineer, who
administers water rights under the 1969 Act. If a surface water rights
holder cannot prove injury, the Commission must dispose of the case.
The court found the Gallegos Family had not proven ground water
in the Basin was hydrologically connected and causing injury to its surface water rights. The court reversed in part and remanded so the
Gallegos Family could make a factual showing of hydrologic connection and injury.
Kurt Kropp
Colorado Springs v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Pueblo County, 147 P.3d 1
(Colo. 2006) (holding that venue for declaratory relief action challenging validity of land use regulations impacting regional water delivery
project was properly in neighboring county, where passage of challenged regulations occurred).
The City of Colorado Springs ("Colorado Springs") filed a complaint in the El Paso County District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that new land use regulations adopted by the Board of Commissioners of the County of Pueblo ("Board") were invalid with respect to
the Southern Delivery System ("SDS"). The Colorado Springs District
Court granted a transfer of venue to the Pueblo County District Court.
Colorado Springs filed a petition for an original proceeding in the
Colorado Supreme Court requesting transfer of action back to El Paso
County District Court. The court reviewed, under original jurisdiction,
whether the Pueblo County District Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction or without jurisdiction.
In 1990, Colorado Springs began working on SDS, a regional water
delivery project designed to increase its water supply and storage. The
SDS plans required facilities crossing through a small portion of unincorporated Pueblo County. In 2005, the Board adopted a resolution
that changed its existing land use regulations. The adopted resolution
prohibited the development of municipal and industrial water projects
wholly or partially within unincorporated Pueblo County without the
developer first obtaining a permit. Colorado Springs argued that the
resolution was invalid, asserting that its purpose was to stall the SDS
project.
Colorado Springs challenged the venue decision on two grounds,
C.R.C.P. 98(b) (2) and C.R.C.P. 98(a). In pertinent part, C.R.C.P.
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98(b) (2) states that when an action involves a public official's action,
venue is proper in the county where the officers performed the action.
The court found the substance of Colorado Springs' complaint directed at the official actions of the Board and that venue was proper
where the official actions occurred, Pueblo County.
C.R.C.P. 98(a) states that venue is proper in the county in which
the subject of the action, or a substantial part thereof, is situated if the
subject of the claim affects real property, franchises, or utilities. The
court found that the term "affects" means the subject of the claim must
relate to title, lien, injury, or possession of the property, franchises, or
utilities. Colorado Springs' requested relief was directed at the validity
of county land use regulations. Thus, the claim was not directed to the
title, lien, injury, or possession of the property, franchises, or utilities
and C.R.C.P. 98(a) did not apply.
The court held venue for the action challenging validity of land use
regulations was properly in Pueblo County District Court.
Michael S. Samelson
Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Simpson, 148 P.3d 142 (Colo. 2006)
(holding that a stipulated provision of a conditional water rights diligence decree precludes the district's use of wells designated for "emergency" and "backup" purposes as a primary source when its commitments outside the designated basin increased after entering into the
stipulation).
Cherokee Metropolitan District ("Cherokee"), a metropolitan water district that supplied water to homes and businesses east of Colorado Springs, used two sets of wells in the Upper Black Squirrel Creek
Designated Ground Water Basin ("Designated Basin") known as
Cherokee Wells 1-8 ("Wells 1-8") in the north and Sweetwater wells in
the south. Cherokee provided water to lands both within and without
the Designated Basin. In March, 1999, the Colorado District Court,
Water Division 2 granted a due diligence decree for ten Sweetwater
conditional water rights that Cherokee obtained from predecessors-ininterest. At the same time, the district court incorporated an agreement between Cherokee and the Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground
Water Management District ("Management District") that included a
stipulated provision which allowed Cherokee to use Wells 1-8 for inbasin beneficial use that discharged unused water back into the Designated Basin. The parties included in the stipulation two exceptions for
"emergency use" and "backup" purposes, which the provision further
explained would include the inability to get sufficient supply from the
Sweetwater wells.
At the time the parties entered into the agreement, Cherokee predicted the Sweetwater wells would produce over 6000 acre-feet annually. The district court held that the wells had a capacity of 3407 acre-
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feet. At the time of the parties' agreement, Cherokee's commitments
for water supply were 2683 acre-feet annually. The current demand
has increased up to 4,944.02 acre-feet annually because of escalated
growth outside the Designated Basin. The stipulated decree also allowed Cherokee to obtain additional rights to divert an extra 10,000
acre-feet from the Designated Basin, but this option was more expensive than utilizing Wells 1-8.
Cherokee instituted this action against the Management District,
the State Engineer, and the Colorado Ground Water Commission,
claiming that the "emergency" and "backup" exceptions allowed
Cherokee to use Wells 1-8 as a primary supply for its commitments outside the Designated Basin. The district court held the stipulated provision to allow Cherokee to use Wells 1-8 only for emergency and backup
purposes when the Sweetwater wells proved insufficient for commitments that existed at the time the parties entered into the agreement.
Cherokee appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Facing the increased demand and insufficient Sweetwater supply,
Cherokee argued that the exceptions for emergency and backup allowed the use of Wells 1-8 as a primary source for its commitments outside the Designated Basin. In examining the plain language of the
provision, the court upheld the district court's interpretation that
Cherokee could use Wells 1-8 only on a temporary basis when its
Sweetwater wells could not provide sufficient supply for the commitments outside the Designated Basin. The court held that Cherokee's
interpretation of the provision frustrated the stipulated decree provision's purpose to keep water from Wells 1-8 in the Designated Basin.
The court held that, although the parties could have designated Wells
1-8 as available primary sources for Cherokee in the event the Sweetwater wells did not perform as predicted, nothing in the plain language suggested that was the parties' intent.
Further, the court upheld the district court's reading of the stipulation that the agreement referred to Cherokee's commitments outside
the Designated Basin that existed at the time of the agreement. The
court held that neither the intent of the parties nor the plain language
of the stipulation provided that Cherokee could employ Wells 1-8 for
out-of-basin use when its commitments increased due to further development. Rather, the court noted the parties were both concerned with
limiting the exportation of water outside the Designated Basin at the
time of agreement.
The court affirmed the district court's judgment that the stipulated
decree provision provided that Wells 1-8 may be used to supply water
outside the Designated Basin only for emergency and backup purposes
when its Sweetwater wells were unable to produce a sufficient supply to
meet Cherokee's commitments that existed at the time the parties entered into the stipulation.
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Coats disagreed with the court's interpretation of the stipulation in favor of the Management District. He
argued that the record did not support the characterization of the
emergency and backup exceptions as temporary. Additionally, Justice
Coats suggested that when both the district court and the majority determined the parties' intent in agreeing to the stipulation, they ignored evidence of Cherokee's interest in maintaining an adequate
secondary supply through Wells 1-8.
Ryan Malarky

HAWAII
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 147 P.3d 839 (Haw. 2006)
(holding that the intermediate court of appeals has jurisdiction over
appeals filed after July 1, 2006 regarding the Water Commission decisions).
Hakipu'u 'Ohana, Ka Lahui Hawai'i and Hawai'i's Thousand
Friends appealed the Water Commission's decision regarding the use
of water from the Wai hole ditch system. Appellants filed the appeal on
August 11, 2006 with the Supreme Court of Hawai'i pursuant to Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 174C-60 (1993) which grants the supreme court jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Water Commission. The supreme court
ordered the appeal to be rescheduled with the intermediate appellate
court pursuant to the newly enacted Haw. Rev. Stat. § 602-57(1), which
provides the intermediate appellate court jurisdiction over appeals
from any agency absent a law to the contrary. The new statute became
effective onJuly 1, 2006.
The court determined that the legislature's failure to include Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 174C-60 in the list of fifty-three statutes amended by the
recent Haw. Rev. Stat..§ 602-5(a)(1) was merely an oversight. The
court reasoned that it could resolve the oversight by applying a provision in the new statute which grants jurisdiction over all agency appeals
to the intermediate appellate court. The court further used the rules
of statutory construction to find that, where the laws are inconsistent
with one another, the legislature will be deemed to have changed the
preceding law to be in conformity with the new statute. Therefore,
despite the legislature's failure to expressly amend the older statute,
which grants jurisdiction of Water Commission appeals only to the supreme court, the court held that the intermediate appellate court has
jurisdiction over such appeals effective July 1, 2006.
Accordingly, the court ordered that the appeal be docketed with
the intermediate court of appeals nunc pro tunc to October 10, 2006.
Diane O'Neil
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IDAHO
Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States (In re SRBA Case No. 39576),
Subcase Nos. 55-10135, 55-11061, 55-11385 and 55-12452, 2007 WL
428947 (Idaho Feb. 9, 2007) (holding: (1) that a rancher's predecessors obtained water rights on federal land for stock watering by simply
applying the water to a beneficial use; (2) that water rights obtained by
ranchers are appurtenant to their patented lands; (3) that deeds to
land that do not specifically exclude water rights convey those rights;
(4) that grazing permit applications did not constitute an attempt to
abandon any water rights or preclude findings that the priority date of
a water right predated the application; and (5) that the United States
did not acquire water rights through appropriations made by individuals using the water on federal land with federal permission).
Joyce Livestock Company ('Joyce") filed a claim for instream stock
water rights in Jordan Creek, asserting a priority date of 1898. The
United States subsequently filed overlapping claims for instream stock
water rights, based on Joyce's use of the water, with a priority date of
1934. A special master heard the issue and ruled thatJoyce's claim was
inadequate, because its predecessors did not show intent to acquire a
water right by excluding others from using their water source. The
special master determined that the United States should be granted
the water right with a priority date of 1934, based on the date of the
enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act. The special master stated that
the Taylor Grazing Act demonstrated an intent to appropriate water,
through management of the rangeland and regulation of stock watering.
The District Court for the Fifth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho reviewed the special master's determinations, and held that
Joyce should be granted a water right. The district court found, however, that the earliest possible priority date that Joyce could claim was
April 26, 1935, the date thatJoyce's predecessor applied for a grazing
permit under the Taylor Grazing Act. The district court further ruled
that the United States had no claim to the water rights, because it had
not actually appropriated any water. The district court stated that the
United States could only claim water rights through Joyce's appropriation of the water ifJoyce or its predecessors were acting as agents of the
United States. Both the United States andJoyce appealed the decision.
The Supreme Court of Idaho first upheld the district court's decision thatJoyce had acquired a water right on federal land. The United
States argued that Joyce's predecessors could not obtain a water right
prior to the Taylor Grazing Act, because they did not have the right to
exclude others from the water sources located on federal lands. The
court rejected the United States' argument, reasoning that exclusive
access is not a requirement of a water right. The court cited precedent
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establishing that under the Idaho constitution, prior to the creation of
the mandatory permit process in 1971, individuals properly appropriated water for stock watering by actually diverting the water and putting it to a beneficial use. The court further ruled that the water rights
obtained by ranchers by watering their livestock on federal lands were
appurtenant to their patented properties. It stated that water rights
appurtenant to real property are conveyed with the real property,
unless the seller specifically reserves them. Since Joyce's predecessors
did not reserve the water rights in the deeds they executed to Joyce,
the court held thatJoyce was the owner of those water rights.
The court next considered if the district court properly determined
that the earliest possible priority date for the claim was 1935. The district court established this priority date because Joyce's predecessor did
not claim that he had water rights on federal lands when he applied
for a grazing permit. The court ruled that the application did not ask
if the applicant claimed any water rights, and thus Joyce's predecessor
did not abandon any water rights he may have had by failing to list
them. The question on the application asked if the applicant owned or
controlled any source of water. The court stated that since a water
right holder does not own or control the source of water, the question
was insufficient to demonstrate the existence of water rights. The
court vacated the district court's priority date, and remanded the case,
instructing the district court to consider when Joyce's predecessors
actually first made a beneficial use of the water for stock watering.
Finally, the court upheld the district court's decision that the
United States did not have a claim to water rights for stock watering.
The United States argued that when it allowed others to use the waters
on federal lands for stock watering, through the Bureau of Land Management's management plan under the Taylor Grazing Act, the United
States put the water to a beneficial use. The court rejected the United
States' argument, ruling that the United States could not claim water
rights through the beneficial use of others. Had the United States
used water on federal lands to water its livestock, it would have established a right to the water. However, under Idaho law, a landowner
does not own a water right permissively obtained on its land by another
appropriator, unless that appropriator is an agent of the landowner.
Here, Joyce's predecessors were not agents of the United States, so the
United States did not obtain a water right through their appropriations.
The United States further argued that, under the supremacy
clause, Idaho law should not be applied in interpretation of the Taylor
Grazing Act. Even though the act did not come into conflict with any
provision of Idaho water law, the United States claimed that the supremacy clause should still apply because Idaho water laws are contrary
to the purpose of the act, and would allow certain ranchers to monopolize the use of water on federal lands. The court rejected this ar-
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gument, finding thatJoyce only has a right to the water, that the right
does not give Joyce a possessory interest in the federal land, and thus
thatJoyce's right does not threaten the ability of others to use the federal lands.
The court upheld the district court's ruling that Joyce had a right
to water, and that the United States did not have a water right. It vacated the district court's priority date, and remanded for consideration
of when Joyce's predecessors actually appropriated water for stock watering.
Benjamin Skeen
In re Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d 75 (Idaho 2006) (holding a lake's
vegetation line may be used to determine its ordinary high water mark
only under specific conditions, and owners of lakeshore property do
not have littoral rights to exclude public from exposed lake bed between the ordinary high water mark and ordinary low water mark).
Lake Coeur d'Alene ("Lake") is a navigable lake located within the
City of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. On October 19, 2004, the city of Coeur
d'Alene and Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney initiated an action
in the First Judicial District of Idaho to determine the ordinary high
water mark ("OHWM") of Sanders Beach, which is part of the Lake's
shoreline. On June 14, 2005, Sanders Beach property owners filed a
motion for summary judgment, seeking a ruling that the owners' littoral rights permitted them to exclude the public from any exposed lake
bed between the OHWM and the ordinary low water mark ("OLWM").
The district court determined, based on the vegetation line, that the
OHWM was 2130 feet above mean sea level. In addition, the district
court rejected the property owners' right to exclude the public from
exposed lake bed between the OHWM and the OLWM. On appeal,
the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the OHWM was 2130
feet, and whether lakeshore property owners' littoral rights permitted
them to exclude the public from exposed land between the OHWM
and OLWM.
The court first addressed whether 2130 feet was the accurate
OHWM of the Lake. The court explained the vegetation line is the
line along a lake's shore resulting from water remaining at a level long
enough to deprive the underwater soil of vegetation. The court was
careful to point out that the vegetation line may be used to determine
the OHWM only in certain circumstances. The line must be at a consistent elevation along the whole lake and cannot vary from place to
place, cannot be determined by just one particular spot, and must be
the line that existed at the time the state joined the Union. The court
held that the district court erroneously used the vegetation test because it recognized varying vegetation lines along the lake, and because the court did not know the vegetation line's elevation in 1890,
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the year that Idaho joined the Union. The court held that the district
court should have determined the OHWM through historical facts.
The court explained that in 1907 the Washington Water Power
Company completed dams on the Lake's outlet river. Every year since
their completion, the dams kept the OHWM at 2128 feet, the same
OHWM level as 1890. The court rejected the district court's finding of
2130 feet because, based on historical facts, the OHIWM could not have
been higher than 2128 feet.
The court next addressed whether the lakeshore property owners
had any right to exclude the pubic from the exposed lake bed between
the OHWM and OLWM. Like the district court, the state supreme
court rejected the property owners' contention that English common
law applied to the case. English common law cannot apply to Idaho
state court decisions when it is inconsistent with state law. The English
case at issue recognized a private land owner's title to land down to the
lake's OLWM. Conversely, Idaho common law recognized a littoral
owner's rights only down to the OHWM. The title to the lake's bed
below the OHWM belonged to Idaho and was held in a trust for the
public. Even more damaging to the lakeshore owners' claim was an
Idaho statute that specifically stated that lakeshore between the Lake's
OHWM and OLWM is devoted to public use. Due to inconsistencies
between English and Idaho law, the court held that lakeshore property
owners could not exclude the public from exposed lake bed between
the OHWM and OLWM.
The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for
further proceedings.
Kurt Kropp

MARYLAND
Neifert v. Dep't of the Env't, 910 A.2d 1100 (Md. 2006) (holding
that denial of application for sewer service and wetland fill permits did
not violate equal protection or amount to an unconstitutional taking).
On April 3, 2003 Euginia Neifert, Melvin Krolczyk, and Teresa
Krolczyk ("Neifert & Krolczyk") filed suit against the Maryland Department of the Environment ("Department") seeking damages and
attorneys fees resulting from the Department's denial of sewer service
and wetland fill permits. Neifert & Krolczyk claimed that the Department's denial of the permits deprived Neifert & Krolczyk of equal protection and constituted a taking under both the United States Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Circuit Court of
Worcester County granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. Neifert & Krolczyk appealed to the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals. The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari on its own
initiative to hear the case, and affirmed the circuit court's decision.
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Neifert & Krolczyk owned four parcels of land in the Cape Isle of
Wight subdivision in Worcester County. The deed to each lot contained a restriction requiring that any septic tanks or sewage disposal
systems conform to all requirements established by the Maryland Department of Health and the Worcester County Maryland Health Authorities. Worcester County, as a result of sewage disposal problems in
the mid 1970s, required that lots pass a seasonal percolation test when
the water table was at its highest. This requirement virtually eliminated
the possibility of any property in the Cape Isle of Wight subdivision
obtaining a septic tank permit as such lots were unable to pass the seasonal percolation testing. Neifert & Krolczyk applied for a septic tank
permit in 1979, but Worcester County denied the application. Neifert
& Krolczyk did not appeal this decision.
In 1983, Worcester County proposed a central sewage collection
system in order to allow for the development of new homes and businesses in the area. Worcester County sought additional funding from
the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The EPA
agreed to fund 75% of the total sewer system cost, but, pursuant to an
Environmental Impact Statement ("1983 EIS"), required that the sewer
system not provide service to any parcel of land within wetlands, as defined by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.
The EPA also required Worcester County to submit maps that
clearly delineated all non-service areas. Worcester County submitted
maps in 1984 ("1984 Maps") and later expanded the map in 1986
("1986 Maps"); however, Worcester County increasingly used the maps
only as guidance, and denied service to any property not only mapped
as a wetland but also any property defined as a wetland under the applicable Fish and Wildlife Service delineation.
In 1991, the Department realized that the EPA's interpretation of
the restrictions imposed by the 1983 EIS was frustrating many lot owners who had relied upon the wetland guidance maps in purchasing
their lots. In addition, the Department realized that as more lots became ineligible for sewer service, Worcester County would face increasing difficulties in retiring the debt it had assumed in order to finance
its share of the project. The Department requested that the EPA review and revise the EPA's interpretation of the restrictions imposed by
the 1983 EIS. In 1992, the EPA agreed to reinterpret the restrictions to
the 1983 EIS to apply only to those wetland areas originally identified
in the 1983 EIS. Under this 1992 Policy, the County could approve
sewer service for parcels outside the 1986 Maps if the owners obtained
all necessary wetland fill permits. Conversely, lots with mapped wetlands were ineligible for sewer service.
Neifert & Krolczyk's parcels contained mapped wetlands under the
delineation methodology in place as of 1983, and Neifert & Krolczyk
had been unable to obtain fill permits or sewer system permits. How-
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ever, at least 26 other lots with unmapped wetlands obtained the necessary fill permits and sewer service permits under the 1992 Policy.
In affirming the circuit court's dismissal of Neifert & Krolczyk's
equal protection claims, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that
because Neifert & Krolczyk were not members of a suspect class and no
fundamental right was at issue, that the standard of review applied to
the circuit court's decision was the traditional and deferential rational
basis analysis. Neifert & Krolczyk would only be able to recover if (1)
the government treated Neifert & Krolczyk differently than it treated
others similarly situated, and (2) the disparate treatment did not bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate interest. The court held that as
Neifert & Krolczyk could not meet either of the prongs of this test, the
Department had not violated Neifert & Krolczyk's equal protection
rights.
First, the court found that Neifert & Krolczyk's mapped lots were
not similarly situated to the non-mapped wetland lots. Although the
court held that Neifert & Krolczyk were not collaterally estopped from
re-litigating that their lots were similarly situated (based on the court's
finding that the issue was not necessary to the agency's prior decision),
the court found that as Worcester County had applied the distinction
between mapped and non-mapped wetlands consistently to determine
sewer service eligibility under the 1992 Policy, the mapped lots were
not similarly situated to the non-mapped wetland lots and the Department did not treat Neifert & Krolczyk differently than it treated others
similarly situated.
Second, the court found that the disparate treatment afforded by
the Department's implementation of the 1992 Policy was rationally
related to the legitimate state interest of ensuring fairness, fiscal integrity, and the ecological protection of the sewage system service. The
court found that the EPA and the Department rationally decided upon
the 1992 Policy out of fairness to property owners that detrimentally
relied on the 1983 Maps, fiscal concern to ensure that Worcester
County could repay its portion of the debt, and concern for adherence
to the environmental restrictions the EPA imposed on its grant conditions for the sewer system.
In holding that the denial of sewer service and fill permits did not
constitute a taking, the court found that Neifert & Krolczyk were unable to prove that the denial of the permits under the 1992 policy was
the proximate cause of rendering Neifert & Krolczyk's property undevelopable. In addition, the court found that there was no constitutional right of access to a sewer system.
First, the court found that the required seasonal septic testing
caused Neifert & Krolczyk's inability to develop their property. As
Neifert & Krolczyk had conceded that Worcester County's denial of an
on-site septic system in 1979 rendered their lots undevelopable until
the possibility of attaching to a sewage system arose, and Neifert &
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Krolczyk had not appealed this decision, the court found that Neifert
& Krolczyk were unable to demonstrate that the denial of their permits
under the 1992 Policy was the proximate cause of their lots being undevelopable.
Second, although the denial of the septic permits rendered Neifert
& Krolczyk's lots undevelopable, the denials did not constitute a taking
as there was a "nuisance exception," recognized by the Supreme Court
in Lucas, to taking when the government restricted development of a
property to prevent public harm. The court found that the operation
of an on-site septic system on Neifert & Krolczyk's lots most likely
would have contributed to the contamination problem and constituted
a nuisance; thus, there was no taking when the State denied Neifert &
Krolczyk's permits for on-site septic systems in 1979.
Finally, the court found that Neifert & Krolczyk's takings claim also
failed because Neifert & Krolczyk did not sufficiently allege that access
to sewer service was an interest that qualified as a constitutionally protected property interest. Instead, the court found that there was no
right to sewer service under either constitution, and that Neifert did
not demonstrate a property interest established by other existing rules
or state law.
The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Worcester County.
Patrick Greenleaf
MONTANA
Mustang Holdings v. Zaveta, 143 P.3d 456 (Mont. 2006) (holding
that the district court erred in granting a preliminary injunction to
prevent an injury where the injury in question was already complete).
Mustang Holdings ("Mustang") and Marge Zaveta ("Zaveta")
owned neighboring land in Montana. For more than a century, a
creek on Mustang's property provided water via an irrigation ditch to
Zaveta's property. Although Zaveta had valid claims for water rights
associated with the ditch, the Water Court terminated those claims in
1999 for nonpayment of the claim processing fee. After Zaveta continued to divert water through the ditch, Mustang filed a complaint in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, in July 2003 seeking a
declaratory judgment that Zaveta had no right to use the ditch because
the Water Court's 1999 decision had permanently terminated Zaveta's
water rights. Zaveta offered an affirmative defense and claimed an
easement for the ditch. She subsequently paid her claim fees and the
Water Court reinstated her claims in November 2003. However, before
the district court could rule on the declaratory judgment, Mustang
bulldozed the ditch. Mustang's actions prompted Zaveta to move for a
preliminary injunction in 2005, alleging that Mustang violated a statute
prohibiting interference with a party's ditch easements. The district
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court ruled in Zaveta's favor and required Mustang to restore the
ditch.
On appeal, Mustang argued that the district court abused its discretion because none of the five statutory situations in which a court may
grant a preliminary injunction applied here. Specifically, none of the
situations addressed granting an injunction to remedy past injuries.
Because Mustang completely destroyed the ditch before Zaveta requested a preliminary injunction there was no action to enjoin. In reversing the trial court, the Montana Supreme Court also relied on
Bouma v. Bynum IrrigationDistrict. In Bouma, the court upheld the trial
court's denial of a preliminary injunction under similar circumstances
and states that "an injunction ... is to afford preventive relief only."
The court noted that the trial court had not yet made findings regarding whether Zaveta held a valid easement over Mustang's property
or if the easement was extinguished when the water rights were terminated for nonpayment of claim fees. Should Zaveta prevail in those
proceedings, she would then have a possible remedy in the form of
damages or enjoining Mustang. However, because Mustang had completed the destruction of the ditch, the preliminary injunction issued
by the district court was erroneous and constituted an abuse of its discretion. The court therefore reversed the district court's order granting Zaveta a preliminary injunction and held in favor of Mustang.
In a lengthy opinion, the dissent raised multiple arguments, including the validity of the underlying water rights, the existence of a prescriptive easement, and legislative intent on the importance of irrigation ditches. Moreover, the court distinguished the facts of this case
from those of Bouma. In Bouma, the plaintiff constructed dams in a
canal to prevent the contaminated water at issue from entering his
property prior to the court ruling on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The dissent distinguished Bouma because the contested action stopped the harm. Mustang's action of destroying the
ditch, on the other hand, caused Zaveta's harm by ceasing her access
to water. Therefore, the dissent argued, the majority erred by holding
that the remedy by injunction was not an option as enjoining Mustang
to restore the ditch would resolve the problem.
Emily Bright
NEVADA
Bacher v. Office of State Eng'r of the State of Nevada, 146 P.3d
793 (Nev. 2006) (holding that applicants can demonstrate a need to
import water through third parties, that the anti-speculation doctrine
applies in Nevada, and that the State Engineer's decisions regarding
water applications must be supported by substantial evidence).
In 1999, Primm South Real Estate Company sought, through its
agent, Vidler Water Company, an interbasin groundwater transfer
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from the Sandy Valley Basin, Nevada, to the Ivanpah Basin, Nevada.
Residents of the Sandy Valley Basin opposed the transfer. The State
Engineer approved the transfer, and the residents of Sandy Valley subsequently filed a petition for judicial review of the decision in the
Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County. The district court denied
the petition, and the residents appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada.
The residents first argued that Nevada Revised Statute
533.370(6) (a), which requires a showing of need to import water, can
only be satisfied when an applicant shows personal need for water.
The court disagreed. The court found that the statute was ambiguous
as to whose need must be shown, and interpreted it according to reason and public policy. The court considered a 1914 Nevada case, Prosole v. Steamboat Canal Co., in which it determined that it was reasonable
to allow the water user's agent to file an application for a water diversion. Even though that decision was issued before the statute in question was enacted, the court found that the ruling proved that it was
reasonable for third parties to apply for water permits on the behalf of
others. The court also cited cases from New Mexico and Wyoming,
which demonstrated that third parties can reasonably satisfy certain
water permit requirements. The court concluded that the legislature
intended to allow applicants for water to rely on a third-party's need.
The court limited the reach of its holding by adopting in its ruling the
anti-speculation doctrine. Under this doctrine, which is intended to
prevent water speculation, only applicants with agency or contractual
relationships with third parties may use those third parties to demonstrate need. The court found that this holding was consistent with Nevada Revised Statute 533.370(1)(c)(2), which also serves to prevent
speculation, by requiring applicants to show financial ability and a reasonable expectation to apply appropriated water to a beneficial use.
Next, the residents asked the court to consider if the State Engineer abused his discretion in granting the transfer. The court stated
that it would not substitute its own judgment for the State Engineer's
judgment, but rather that it would consider whether the record contained substantial evidence to support the State Engineer's decision. It
defined "substantial evidence" as "evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." While the court
found that the State Engineer had substantial evidence to show that
the residents of Sandy Valley would not be detrimentally impacted by
the transfer, it did not find substantial evidence to show Primm South's
need for water. The court reversed the district court's order denying
the resident's petition forjudicial review.
Benjamin Skeen
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NEW MEXICO
Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 140 P.3d 1117 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2006) (holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction because
the lower court's decision regarding a peremptory writ of mandamus
was not a "final and appealable order").
The San Lorenzo Community Ditch Association ("San Lorenzo")
appealed the District Court of Luna County's ("district court") decision to quash a writ of mandamus to compel the Water Master to enforce a 1993 decree on the Mimbres River.
The 1993 final decree determined San Lorenzo had water diversion rights on the river senior to the rights of upstream individuals and
entities and appointed a Water Master to enforce it. In 2003, San
Lorenzo filed a petition for a preliminary and permanent injunction
against the upstream junior water users. San Lorenzo sought to prevent those users from diverting water when the flow level was less than
6.7 cubic feet per second. According to the petition, San Lorenzo's
senior right could not be fulfilled if the flow level fell below this
threshold. The district court ordered the Water Master to meet with
San Lorenzo and the upstream junior water users to establish a rotation schedule for water distribution. The parties did not reach an
agreement, so the Water Master created a rotation schedule on April 8,
2004. San Lorenzo did not abide by the schedule, and the Water Master moved for the San Lorenzo to be held in contempt.
On June 28, 2004, one day prior to the contempt hearing, San
Lorenzo filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus. The petition alleged the Water Master failed to perform his duties under the
decree and that upstream junior users were violating San Lorenzo's
senior right on the Mimbres. The district court issued the writ and
ordered the Water Master to respond. In his answer, the Water Master
countered that the writ should be denied because San Lorenzo's injunction petition constituted an adequate remedy at law and factual
issues remained unresolved. Accordingly, the district court quashed
the writ. San Lorenzo appealed the order to the Court of Appeals of
New Mexico ("appellate court").
The appellate court only has jurisdiction when a lower court has issued a "final and appealable" order. Therefore, the court considered
whether the district court's decision on the writ of mandamus met this
standard.
When the facts present a clear legal duty for a public official, a writ
of mandamus requires the public official to perform that duty. Courts
require undisputed facts to determine if a writ is proper. Further proceedings, such as a trial, are necessary to clarify the official's duty if the
facts are in dispute. When an official's duty is clear and a lower court
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renders a decision on the propriety of the writ, the order is "final and
appealable."
The appellate court cited several facts in dispute in the writ and answer including: the accuracy of the diversion rate of 6.7 cubic feet per
second, the amount of water adjudicated to San Lorenzo with priorities
of December 1869 and 1875, and the sufficiency of the measuring devices for the Water Master to perform his duty. The district court cited
these factual differences in its decision not to issue the writ. Accordingly, the appellate court reasoned that the district court's decision did
not concern whether the writ of mandamus was proper; rather, the
district court deemed the writ insufficient to adjudicate the parties'
rights, making further proceedings necessary. Citing precedent, the
appellate court held that the district court's order was not "final and
appealable" because of the disputed facts and necessity of further proceedings. Therefore, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the
matter. Additionally, also because of the facts in dispute, the appellate
court did not consider the issue of whether San Lorenzo's petition for
a preliminary injunction was an adequate remedy of law.
The Court of Appeals of New Mexcio remanded the case to the district court for resolution of the facts and a clarification of the Water
Master's duty under the decree
Matthew Larson
OKLAHOMA
Jacobs Ranch L.L.C. v. Smith, 148 P.3d 842 (Okla. 2006) (holding
that a temporary moratorium on the issuance of water permits for a
"sole source" aquifer does not qualify as an unconstitutional state special law, nor is it a taking, nor a violation of the equal protection
clause).
In 2003, the Oklahoma legislature passed Senate Bill No. 288 temporarily halting the state from issuing water-use permits for any
groundwater basin that the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") had determined to be a "Sole Source Aquifer." The
EPA defined this label as basins that are "the principle source of drinking water for the area and which, if contaminated, would create a significant hazard to public health." At the time the bill passed, the EPA
had identified only one aquifer in Oklahoma as a sole source aquifer,
the Arbuckle-Simpson Groundwater Basin. The aquifer lies entirely
underneath the state and has unpredictable recharge and discharge
rates due to its geology. The Oklahoma Water Resources Board
("OWRB") would reconsider the moratorium on issuing permits once
the OWRB determined the maximum annual yield to ensure that the
aquifer was not over-pumped.
The state had issued temporary permits toJacobs Ranch ('Jacobs")
since 1986, but in 2003 the state denied them. In 2003 they intended
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to sell 20 billion gallons of water annually to an out-of-basin municipality. Jacobs sued the state and lost in Oklahoma County District Court.
They appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which affirmed the
lower court's decision. On appeal, Jacobs argued that the law was unconstitutional, amounted to a taking, and that the state had denied
them equal protection under state and federal constitutions.
The court prefaced its holding by reminding the parties that the
Legislature may exercise its police powers, which covers the state's water supply "irrespective of the rights of private owners of the land most
immediately concerned," to secure public welfare. It then moved to
the first issue: Jacobs' argument that distinguished "general laws" from
"special laws." Special laws are unconstitutional under Oklahoma's
constitution because they target particular persons or things, but not
the whole class of either, and if the groundwater law was special, the
court must strike it down. Jacobs argued that because the moratorium
only affected one basin, it was a special law. The court defined a general law as: one that is a rightful subject for legislative regulation; one
in which the class identified in the law (i.e. the type of basin) must
have "a substantial and reasonable distinction," and be rationally related to that classification; and finally one that operates uniformly
across the state.
Here, the law met the first element because the statute "relates to
the state's water resources that supply safe drinking water to the basin
area," and thus subject to the legislature's prerogative. The court
found because of the EPA's own distinction of the basin as a sole
source aquifer, the basin differs substantially and reasonably from
other basins in Oklahoma. The court also found the law rationally
related to the classification of the basin. Because as the aquifer acts as
the backbone of the water system in the area, the law endeavored to
ensure the preservation of that water for the in-basin communities until the OWRB could make an educated decision.
The court also found uniformity in the legislation's application, despite Jacobs' argument. Jacobs argued because the Arbuckle-Simpson
aquifer was the only so-designated aquifer in the state, the state had
singled it out. The court determined that "[t]he fact that there was
only one groundwater basin designated by the EPA .... does not destroy its uniform operation throughout the state." If the EPA later designated another basin this way in Oklahoma, the moratorium would
apply to that basin as well. Therefore, the water statute was a general
law and constitutional.
Jacobs then argued that this law constituted a taking under the
state and federal constitutions because Jacobs had not received just
compensation. The court disagreed, again referencing the Legislature's police power. It further cited the U.S. Supreme Court ruling
under Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, in which the Court says that just compensation is not necessar-

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 10

ily required when government regulations "prohibit a property owner
from making certain uses of her private property." The court determined that if the "means adopted ....

tend toward the preservation of

public welfare, health, safety, or morals," the legislation was a proper
act of the legislature's police power and fell under the Supreme
Court's ruling.
Jacobs' final argument concerned whether the law caused "disparate treatment of landowners," violating their rights under the equal
protection clauses of both state and federal constitutions. Because the
complaint was not based on race or any other fundamental constitutional right, the court used a relaxed standard of review. The court
held the legislature may draw lines that create distinctions as long as
they relate to the task and do not infringe upon a constitutionally protected right.
Justice Opala dissented on two bases: standing and judicial expansion of the legislation. Specifically, Justice Opala argued the legislation
did not apply statewide as the court found, but only to the ArbuckleSimpson Groundwater Basin.
The court affirmed the district court's decision in favor of the state.
Zackary Smith
Heldernon v. Wright, 2006 OK 86 (Okla. 2006) (holding that the
trial court cannot determine the rights of parties without proof that
the Oklahoma Water Resources Board received notice of the suit).
Danny Wright, an upstream riparian property owner, began construction of a dam on an unnamed stream that ran through the property. Teddy Neal Heldermon, a downstream riparian landowner,
brought an action against Wright in Caddo County District Court seeking a determination of competing rights to the stream's water. Neither
party had permits from the Oklahoma Water Resources Board
("OWRB") to appropriate waters of the stream, so both parties asserted
riparian rights to the waters. Heldermon did not notify the OWRB
about the pending lawsuit.
The trial court granted Heldermon a temporary injunction until
Wright obtained an OWRB permit. During Wright's effort to obtain
an OWRB permit, the trial court held that Wright must release enough
water so that downstream users had enough water for domestic use.
Oklahoma law requires a riparian without an OWRB appropriation to
store a maximum of a two-year domestic supply of water and requires
the riparian collecting the water for domestic use to provide for the
continued natural flow of the stream. Both parties appealed to the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, where the central issue was whether the
OWRB needed notification of pending water right lawsuits.
The Oklahoma legislature intended that a party seeking to adjudicate its rights to stream water give the OWRB notice of the suit. The
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OWRB is then responsible for determining if the Attorney General's
intervention in the suit would best serve the public interest; the Attorney General must intervene on behalf of the state when the OWRB
decides that it would be in the public interest. The court held that the
trial court erred when it proceeded to determine the rights of the parties without proof that the OWRB received notice of the pending suit
and, thus, depriving the public from the Attorney General's representation.
On remand, both notification of the lawsuit to the OWRB and the
Attorney General's opportunity to intervene must occur.
Michael S. Samelson
TEXAS
Hix v. Robertson, No. 10-05-00214-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS
10292 (Tex. App. Nov. 29, 2006) (holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment and declared a creek to be statutory
navigable water where the plaintiffs had standing to sue, the creek and
lake at issue met the relevant statutory definitions, and the engineers
measured the creek correctly).
William Hix and William and Lester Robertson own neighboring
land in Texas, through which Hog Creek runs. After the government
dammed the creek, a 100 acre lake formed, 90 acres of which lie on
Hix's land and the remainder on the Robertsons' land. Hix blocked
the Robertsons' use of the lake by constructing a fence across the lake.
The Robertsons sued Hix for access, seeking a declaratory judgment
that Hog Creek was a statutory navigable stream and, as such, the lake
is owned by the State for the benefit of the public for fishing, boating,
and recreational purposes. The 5 2nd District Court Coryell County,
Texas granted the Robertsons' motion for summary judgment and enjoined Hix from interfering with the Robertsons' access, use, and enjoyment of the water on Hix's land. Hix appealed on five issues.
First, Hix argued that the Robertsons did not have standing to litigate whether Hog Creek is a statutory navigable stream. Hix traced his
title to an 1837 Republic of Texas land patent and relied on Bradford v.
State to argue that only the State has standing to litigate ownership of a
streambed conveyed by patent. The Court of Appeals of Texas, Tenth
Circuit, Waco disagreed and held that the Robertsons, regardless of
tile, had a right to use and enjoy the waters of a navigable stream. The
court pointed to the "Small Bill" statute that granted title to beds of
navigable streams to the riparian owner, but reserved the public's
rights to the waters of navigable streams. As such, the Robertsons had
standing to bring suit and have the part of Hog Creek at issue declared
a statutory navigable stream.
Hix also appealed the trial court's ruling that the section of Hog
Creek in question was a statutory navigable stream. The court struck
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down Hix's assertion that the existence of survey lines in the original
patent barred the stream from being navigable. The court held that
the trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment for the
Robertsons based on evidence that Hog Creek, at an average width of
more than 30 feet from the mouth up, fell within the definition of a
statutory navigable stream. The trial court properly held that the
Robertsons and the public have a right to use and enjoy the waters of
the lake formed by the damming of Hog Creek.
The three other issues upon which Hix appealed related to deficiencies in the affidavits that identified the width measurements of
Hog Creek. Hix argued that the affidavits failed to show that the engineers used the appropriate methodology to measure the stream. The
court, however, found that there was no specific method for measuring
a stream's width for the purposes of determining its navigability. The
court further looked at the nature of the affidavit testimony and found
that it was appropriate lay witness opinion evidence. The court only
addressed one of the affidavits in question because it alone supported
the trial court's ruling of summary judgment.
Finally, the court modified the portion of the trial court's judgment that stated that both Hog Creek and the lake in question were
navigable waters by finding that the governing statute applied only to
streams. The court affirmed the modified judgment, upholding the
summary judgment and overruling the five issues Hix raised.
Emily Bright
UTAH
Wayment v. Howard, 144 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2006) (holding that a
pumping and refilling cycle of a slough can be a protected method of
appropriation for a water right and that a dike which obstructs or hinders that flow constitutes interference).
Glynn F. Wayment and Edward C. England (collectively "Wayment") were successors in a water right that allowed withdrawal of 0.5
cubic feet per second for irrigation from a slough which spanned both
Wayment's and Lee R. Howard's ("Howard") adjacent property. The
nature of the slough did not allow a consistent flow, so Wayment made
used the water by damming the northern end of the slough and pumping water out when it filled. This method was consistent with the
original 1914 Application to Appropriate Water.
Howard did not own a water right but rather owned shares in an irrigation company that built a dike on Howard's property across the
southern end of the slough. The dike impeded the flow of water onto
Wayment's property and delayed the slough refilling process. Howard
installed two pipes in the dike at the request of the United States Army
Corps of Engineers, but the dike still impeded the flow. Witnesses at
trial testified that Howard intended to collect water on his property.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Wayment dredged the slough on his own property in order to improve
the flow, but Howard did not allow any dredging on his property.
Wayment filed suit claiming interference with his water right and Howard counterclaimed for trespass, nuisance, and negligence. The Second District Court, Ogden Department, found in favor of Wayment.
Howard appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, claiming the district
court did not have sufficient evidence for a finding of interference.
The court noted that a finding of interference requires the district
court to find facts concerning the alleged interference and then apply
those facts to the specific water right at issue. Because the issue was
highly fact dependent, the court gave extra deference to the district
court's finding, and put the burden of proving the facts inconclusive
on Howard. First, Howard challenged the district court's finding that
the pumping and refilling cycle was a protected part of Wayment's water right. Howard argued that the dike did not disrupt the amount of
Wayment's water right, but only impacted the flow. He further argued
that unless the pumping and refilling cycle was a protected part of the
water right, there was no evidence of interference. The court agreed
with the district court's finding that the pumping and refilling cycle
was the basis for the water right as described in the original application. Thus, the pumping and refilling cycle was a protected method of
appropriation. Second, Howard disputed the district court's finding of
interference and argued that Wayment received the amount of water
stated in the water right. The court upheld the district court's finding
that the dike was an obstruction and hindrance to Wayment's existing
water right, and therefore constituted interference.
Finally, Howard counterclaimed for trespass, nuisance, and negligence stemming from Wayment's damming of the water before pumping for irrigation, which caused water to pool on Howard's property
where it usually did not. The court accepted the finding that Howard's
building of the dike and his refusal to dredge his property caused the
pooling, and agreed with the district court's dismissal of these claims.
In addition, the court noted that Wayment's damming the slough was a
protected part of the method of appropriation. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the district court's finding of interference by Howard and its
dismissal of Howard's counterclaims for trespass, nuisance, and negligence.
Ryan Malarky
WASHINGTON
Thompson v. Dep't of Ecology, 150 P.3d 1144 (Wash. Ct. App.
2007) (holding that the ordinary-high-water mark under the Shoreline
Management Act is the line where a river causes aquatic vegetation to
grow).
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The Washington Shoreline Management Act ("Act") requires all
buildings within conservancy environments remain at least fifty feet
away from the ordinary-high-water mark unless the Department of
Jack Thompson
Ecology ("Department") granted a variance.
("Thompson") applied to the Department for a variance and the Department rejected his application. The Department defined the ordinary-high-water mark as the point where aquatic vegetation transitioned to terrestrial vegetation. Both the Shoreline Hearing Board and
the Grays Harbor County Superior Court affirmed the Department's
definition of the ordinary high water mark.
On appeal to the Washington Court of Appeals, Thompson had
the burden of demonstrating that the Department erroneously interpreted or applied the law. Thompson argued that, under the Act, the
ordinary-high-water mark is the point where soil submerges under water so frequently that no vegetation grows. However, Thompson did
not provide case law supporting this interpretation of the Act. The
court held that the Act defined the ordinary-high-water mark as the
area where water created a mark upon the soil giving it "a character
distinct from that of the abutting upland, in respect to vegetation."
The plain language of the Act used vegetation in defining the ordinaryhigh-water mark. The court held that Department acted reasonably
when it interpreted "ordinary-high-water mark" by implying a distinction between aquatic and terrestrial vegetation. Therefore, the court
affirmed the Department's definition of the ordinary-high-water mark
and upheld the Department's denial of a variance.
JonathanP. Long
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